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Summary 
This thesis addresses the relationship between Greek Cypriot nationalism, militarism 
and masculinity following the opening of the borders in Cyprus between North and 
South in 2003. Drawing upon empirical research conducted in Cyprus in 2011, the 
thesis argues that there is an integral relation between nationalism, militarism and 
masculinity and that since the opening of the borders, there has been a re-
constitution of this relationship. In the re-constitution of this relationship what 
appears as the weakening of each component is illustrated to be an adapted 
reiteration of its co-constitution under new social and political parameters. This 
adapted reiteration is a continuation of the Greek Cypriot perceived nationalist 
militarist masculinist stance of power in the conflict situation against ‘occupation’ and 
explains, amongst other post – 2003 nationalist, militarist and masculinist reiterations, 
as to why the opening of the borders has not helped in the bringing together of the 
two communities. On the contrary, in fact, in some cases the adapted reiterations 
have helped new divisions to emerge.  
The research reveals that the inextricability of masculinity in this three-fold co-
constitutive relationship is significant in the adapted reiteration of an identity, which 
exists beneath the politically symbolic or institutional level – and is hindering the 
process of reconciliation.  It is argued that despite there being a shifting away of the 
hegemonic masculinity of men from the national struggle, and thus also the 
conscription service, towards a transnational entrepreneurial masculinity, there 
remains a broader masculinist discourse in this co-constitutive relationship, which I 
name in this thesis as nationalist  militarised masculinity. This is significant because 
it is a discourse that is integral to this Greek Cypriot nationalist militarist masculinist 
stance, with its adapted reiterations, that creates obstacles for reconciliation. The 
results of this thesis highlight the necessity of addressing the co-constitution of 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity in Cyprus and likewise in other post-armed 
conflict societies.  
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
DHSY Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός (Democratic Rally of Cyprus) 
EDEK Κίνημα Σοσιαλδημοκρατών (The Movement for Social Democracy)  
EDHK Εθνικιστικό Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα (Nationalist Democratic Party) 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
ELAM Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο (National Popular Front) 
EOKA Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών (National Organization of Cypriot 
Fighters) 
EU European Union 
FRONT Μέτωπο (Front) 
G.C. Greek Cypriot 
ROE Representative of ELAM 
SADD Ενιαίο Αμυντικό Δόγμα Ελλάδας-Κύπρου (Single Area defence Doctrine with 
Greece) 
T.C. Turkish Cypriot
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1.Chapter one:  Introduction  
This thesis examines the relationship of Greek Cypriot (G.C) nationalism, militarism and 
masculinity in Cyprus following the opening of the border1 (2003) and argues that there 
is a co-constitutive relationship between them. The historical context of the so-called 
‘Cyprus Problem’ has changed significantly since the opening of the borders between 
North and South Cyprus, the accession of the Republic of Cyprus (South Cyprus) to the 
European Union (EU), the Annan Plan referendum for reconciliation (2004) as well as 
wider societal developments. Yet, the Republic of Cyprus remains globally one of the 
countries that have not abolished its conscription service.  
The historical frame of the research coincides with the time of my own personal 
experience of serving in the Cyprus National Guard (NG) as a soldier (2003-4), shortly 
after the opening of the borders in 2003, while the Annan Plan referendum was in 
process and when Cyprus was on the threshold of European Union (EU) accession 
(admitted in 2004). 
Coming from a family with strong pro-reunification views and having Turkish Cypriot 
(T.C.) friends since early childhood, the institutionalised expectation of the country and 
society where I grew up to serve two years of military service was incomprehensible to 
me. Having being compulsorily enlisted in the NG eleven days after I graduated from 
                                                          
1
 The ‘border’ as mentioned here also known as the ‘Green Line’ in Cyprus is a line that splits the island in 
two, separating the North and the South, and is about 112 miles long. This line has had many names 
dependent on one’s political positioning. Here, I will use the term ‘border’. By referring to the ‘border’ I am 
not taking a political position. Rather, this is understood to resemble more the militarist aspect of it, which 
is a major focus in this work. In some instances the term ‘Green Line’ is used interchangeably with 
‘border’. These cases mostly relate to a broader context or understanding of the conflict.  
In more detail, the choice of the term ‘border’ or ‘barricade’ to refer to the commonly known ‘Green Line’ 
or ‘Buffer Zone’ in Cyprus is an issue treated with paramount importance. This is an issue that is 
repeatedly addressed in this thesis. Traditionally, the right-wing scene in Cyprus has referred to them as 
‘barricades’; a term that is used in illustrating the temporality of them. It also highlights the official 
pronouncement of the Cyprus conflict as a problem of invasion and occupation,whilst the word ‘border’ 
most often reveals a liberal positioning towards the conflict.  
This line was first referred to as the ‘Green Line’ in 1963 after the first interethnic violence. Other names 
since then have included the ‘Dead Zone’, and the ‘Partitioning Line’. After the 1974 events, it has also 
been referred to as the ‘Attila Line’ and the ‘No-man’s Land’, see Cockburn (2004). 
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high school, I began my journey into the micro-cosmos of the army where I was called 
to protect my country from the ‘threatening Turk’ by, first of all, being a ‘proper G.C. 
man’. A personal anecdote that took place during this experience aroused my curiosity 
about possible links between nationalism, militarism and masculinity. One day, I 
suggested the following to my Captain: “Is it not realistically useless that a Greek 
Cypriot army even exists? In the case of war we will be fighting Turkey; one of the 
strongest military powers in the world! Also, it is even worse if we try to resist and not 
surrender as people will die and we are going to lose regardless.” His answer was 
revealing: “Stratis, if you are walking with your girlfriend in the street and another man 
bigger than you comes and disturbs your girlfriend, are you not going to do anything 
because he is bigger than you? Or are you going to stand on your feet as a man and 
protect your girlfriend?” 
In this anecdote that my Captain used to justify the existence of the military in the 
Republic of Cyprus (ROC), the aggressor, the physically strong man who is bigger than 
the boyfriend, represents Turkey, and the weaker man, who is the protector, represents 
the G.C. army. The latter will, even if much weaker than the Turkish army, protect the 
powerless girlfriend, who is here used as a voiceless symbol of post-war Cyprus2, which 
is itself conceived as feminine and in need of protection.  
My service was an important period through which there were new political and social 
developments for Cyprus, which brought hopes for the reconciliation between the two 
Cypriot communities, namely Greek and Turkish Cypriot. For me, these developments 
sparked my curiosity for reflection and research. During this time, I observed that the 
aforementioned political events began to challenge some of my fellow soldiers’ and my 
own commitment to military service. It was this observation that encouraged me to 
explore the extent to which our response was perhaps reflective of broader social and 
political changes, processes and events like the opening of the borders and, the (then) 
imminent accession of Cyprus to the EU.  Furthermore, after I was discharged from the 
                                                          
2
 Post-war Cyprus in this thesis refers to post-1974 Cyprus. Even though the bio-communal clashes of 
1963-64 had significantly contributed to the polarisation of the communities as well as to the creation of 
the NG in 1964 and the introduction of conscription under the National Guard Law of 1964 (Article C, 
subsection 1), see National Guard law 2011. This thesis is concerned with examining the post-opening of 
the borders Cypriot society. In placing analytical significance on the opening of the border, the partition of 
the island (1974), which led to the immediate creation of the border, also gains analytical significance.  
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army I observed that the centrality of the defence sector in the G.C. political discourse 
of the national struggle 3  was becoming undermined and the phenomenon of draft 
dodging was becoming exponential, which was of great concern for the wider society 
and political leadership. This observation made me curious to understand how it was 
possible to simultaneously have the masculinist discourse of my Captain with a 
declining political discourse on militarism. These observations further fuelled my 
curiosity as to why, in this context, the desire to protect ‘powerless Cyprus’ from the 
perceived Turkish threat was decreasing amongst political leadership and ‘proper’ G.C. 
men. 
 
1.1. Overview of the literature related to the scope of the thesis 
Beyond my initial curiosity there are several other factors that contributed to the 
rationale for this thesis. Firstly, there appeared to be increasing academic recognition of 
the significance of gender to the investigation, construction and mobilisation of 
nationalism, militarism or both. Secondly, it was recognised from the outset that there 
was a gap in the literature addressing the relationship between nationalism, militarism 
and masculinity in post-armed conflict societies4.  Thirdly, I wanted to illustrate the 
significance of studying masculinity in nationalism and militarism through empirical 
research on Cyprus; an issue for research enquiry that has been largely ignored in 
writings about militarism and nationalism in Cyprus.  
Nationalism (for example Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983) and militarism (for example 
Huntington, 1957; Moskos, 1976) have been approached by mainstream scholarship 
independently and, most often, when they are brought together the issue of gender has 
been neglected. However, in recent years, scholars who have studied nationalism, 
militarism or both in post-armed conflict societies have begun, in some cases, to adopt 
                                                          
3
 This thesis is concerned with the significance the G.C. understanding of the national struggle as shaped 
following the opening of the borders has for the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. 
For this reason hereinafter when referring to the national struggle I will be referring to the post-opening of 
the borders national struggle. When referring to the post-war national struggle I will be referring to the 
national struggle that has taken place in the period of 1974 to 2003, which is when the borders opened.  
4
 In this thesis I use the term post-armed conflict societies to refer to societies that are coming out of 
armed conflict. In the literature, the term post-conflict societies has been previously used to refer to 
societies such as South Africa, (see Cock, 2004), and to refer to Cypriot society, (see Yakinthou, 2008). 
However, here I use the term post-armed conflict societies to highlight the culture of conflict that exists 
specifically following the end of armed conflict.   
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a gender lens when looking at these societies. This work tends to focus primarily on the 
role of and impact on women and femininity (for example Evangelista, 2010; Banerjee, 
2003).  
This focus is not surprising, as the predominance of these studies were conducted in 
the developing scope of feminism, first introducing gender as a key analytic category 
and transforming women’s lives on many levels during the past two centuries (Tinker, 
1990; Freedman, 2002). Yet, this focus on women’s experiences of nationalism and 
militarism has not only made women visible, it also made it possible for researchers to 
see men (Enloe, 2004). Therefore, extending feminism to men, the investigation of 
masculinity needs to be embraced as an issue of research enquiry in itself and as an 
issue for investigation in research on nationalism and militarism.  
What is increasingly recognised is that, in the context of post-armed conflict societies, 
research on masculinity has a vital role to play in understanding these societies, and 
that masculinity needs to be included in the gender lens adopted in researching such 
contexts (Kwon, 2000; McKeown and Sharoni, 2002). As McKeown and Sharoni (2002: 
2) aptly comment:   
“It is impossible to understand, let alone transform, the relationship between 
gender, conflict, and peace building without a serious examination of men and 
various conceptions of masculinity in different socio-political contexts.”  
The link between nationalism, militarism and masculinity clearly cannot be ignored.  As 
Cynthia Enloe finds (1990: 45) in her reminiscent book, Bananas, Beaches and Bases:  
“Nationalism has typically sprung from masculinised memory, masculinised humiliation 
and masculinised hope … [as in nationalism] … the real actors are men, men who are 
defending their freedom, their honor, their homeland and their women”.  
Meanwhile, elaborating on this perspective that ties nationalism and its militaristic side 
to masculinity, Nagel contends that “the ‘micro-culture’ of masculinity in everyday life 
articulates very well with the demands of nationalism particularly its militaristic side”, 
(1998: 252).  
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Increasingly, researchers have directed their attention to how masculinity has a stake in 
nationalism and militarism in post-armed conflict societies. Yet, the masculinist 
discourses of nationalism and militarism continue, in most cases, to be analysed 
exclusively in terms of the ‘role-proper’ of, and impact on, women and femininity in such 
processes (examples include Enloe, 2010, 2007, 2004; Sjoberg and Sandra Via, 2010; 
Sjoberg, 2007). One way in which masculinity has informed discussion on the adoption 
of a gender lens when looking at post-armed conflict societies is through the 
‘essentialisation’ of masculinity (McKeown and Sharoni, 2002). With masculinity being 
typically treated as a monolithic entity in explorations of such contexts, such research is 
often focused on an explanation of masculinity as inextricable from the persistence of a 
patriarchal culture in nationalism and militarism that is continuing the oppression of 
women (Kwon, 2000).  
There are also significant concerns about masculinity’s invisibility in the context of post-
armed conflict societies, as it often appears irrelevant to processes of conflict 
transformation (Ashe, 2012). McKeown and Sharoni (2002: 1), amongst others (e.g.  
Kwon, 2000), argue that:  
“[W]hile it is understandable that men had to be pushed aside to create space for 
women, it would be impossible to understand the interplay between gender and 
conflict if the diverse experiences of men remain unexamined. Moreover, the lack 
of attention to masculinity is likely to backfire as the conflation of ‘gender’ with 
‘women’, leaves masculinity, unproblematised and thus treated as the norm.” 
At the same time, and pulling in another direction, there is a line of research on post-
armed conflict societies that takes a similar approach to this thesis. This body of 
literature suggests the significance of the study of masculinity in such contexts as an 
issue of inquiry itself and the impact that political and ideological changes can have on 
masculinities. Examples that have taken this approach include Kwon’s (2000) and Kim’s 
(1993) analysis of South Korea and Ashe’s (2012) analysis of Northern Ireland. Yet, this 
body of literature focuses exclusively on the masculinity of men; omitting the broader 
masculinity discourse that operates at a societal level, the analytical significance of 
which my own thesis develops.  
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The approach that I take in looking at nationalism and militarism in post-armed conflict 
societies could help in further exploring, deconstructing and maybe even challenging 
mainstream gender approaches of these societies in relation to masculinity. Just as 
nationalism and militarism have been linked to the shaping of femininity (Peterson, 1999; 
Sylvester, 1989; Cock, 1989), masculinity is likewise linked; shaping and being shaped 
by nationalism and militarism (Ashe, 2011).  
A key contribution to the literature on masculinity in post-armed conflict societies is 
Fidelma Ashe’s (2012) work that, whilst focusing on Northern Ireland, notes some 
similar themes to this thesis. In looking at the transformation of ethno-nationalist conflict 
and militarisation in Northern Ireland, she approached masculinity through ‘a framework 
of engaging with masculinities during times of political transition’ and explored how 
traditional forms of masculinities were undergoing processes of change after the signing 
of the ‘Good Friday Agreement’. Similarly, this work focuses on the changing G.C. 
traditional hegemonic militarised masculinity in the scope of repeated negotiations for 
the reunification of Cyprus and other political events that are directly related to 
developments in the politics of the conflict.  
In the scope of the political and social developments this work embraces the global 
perspectives that highlight the impact of globalisation on local definitions of masculinity 
(for example Connell, 1998, 2005; Altman, 2001), which cannot be neglected when 
examining these issues in post-armed conflict societies. What is most significant about 
this literature is that it has pointed out the more egocentric masculinity of the capitalist 
entrepreneur who is gaining hegemony at the global level, (Connell, 1998: 17), whilst 
the rigid ventures of the military masculinity are now globally a fading threat (ibid) to this 
change.  
The academic research on nationalism and gender in Cyprus has followed similar 
thematic lines to international mainstream scholarship. Whereas, research on Cyprus 
has been prolific in studying and analysing G.C. nationalism extensively (for example 
Papadakis et al, 2006; Kizilyurek, 1993; Mavratsas, 1996; Bryant, 2004), both militarism 
and masculinity remain, to the present day, seriously understudied. The scholars who 
have addressed the relationship of gender and nationalism in Cyprus, and even very 
briefly of gender and nationalism in relation to militarism, have commented only on the 
13 
 
 
stakes of the conflict being constituted in masculine terms. They have placed their focus 
on the constructed role for women and on the co-constitution of femininity to masculinity 
in such processes (for example Hadjipavlou, 2010, 2006; Cockburn, 2004). Most 
importantly, this literature has neglected the co-contingency of nationalism, militarism 
and masculinity.  
1.1. Research questions and objectives 
In adopting a gendered perspective I aim to propose that, when looking at nationalism, 
militarism or masculinity in a post-armed conflict society, we need to address the way in 
which there is a three-fold co-constitutive relationship, by illustrating this through the 
case of post-armed conflict Cypriot society following the opening of the borders.  
As I suggested above, there is already a body of literature examining post-armed 
conflict societies, and Cyprus in particular, but there is still a significant gap. As it 
became clear to me that solely looking at G.C. nationalism  could not capture the 
posture of the larger social fabric in the conflict situation, I propose the concept of a co-
constitutive relationship between nationalism, militarism and masculinity to explain the 
situation in the post-opening of the borders Cyprus. Further, I aim to address social 
questions, which have not been discussed in relation to the post-war composition in 
Cyprus, that assist us in understanding the post-opening of the borders situation and 
thus could then carry the potential for assisting reconciliation.  
The opening of the borders in 2003, which was perceived by many as the beginning of 
the solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’, turned out not to carry reconciliatory potential. 
Most G.C. to present day refuse to cross the borders (see for example Hadjipavlou, 
2007b) or to form relationships to the perceived ‘other’.  
There was a failure of three events which held the potential of reunification, namely the 
G.C. defeat of the Annan reunification plan, the pressure brought by the accession of 
Cyprus to the EU to bring an end to the conflict, and more than ten years of open 
borders and crossings. In this setting of G.C. nationalist imagination (Anderson, 1983) 
the division with the ‘other’ remains deeply entrenched. This symbolic division is clearly 
illustrated by the creation of the ideological border, which is refused to be crossed.  
14 
 
 
In contrast, or indeed in addition, from the military perspective that I observed whilst 
conscripted, the successive governments that followed the opening of the borders were 
undermining the military framework of the post-war national struggle, pointing to a 
relative demilitarisation of the ‘Cyprus Problem’. Moreover, draft-dodging was a new 
and exponential phenomenon that expressed the lack of motivation of men to serve the 
army and, thus, a declining military masculinity. Yet, even though the borders were 
open and these military and masculinity developments were taking place, there was an 
unrelenting resistance from the general public to cross the border and to accept the 
weakened National Guard with a decline in motivation to serve. I witnessed the 
apparent contradiction between the declining militarised masculinity and militarism, and 
nationalism, as the former continued to be feeding into the nationalist assertion against 
‘occupation’ (In Greek: Κατοχή)5.  
The findings that emerged out of the 57 fieldwork interviews, (conducted in summer 
2011) with Cypriots from a range of social and political backgrounds (including soldiers, 
officers, politicians and policy makers), provided an insight into the workings of the co-
constitutive relationship between nationalism, militarism and masculinity. I began my 
fieldwork with the aim of providing an analysis of the social and political, ideological and 
discursive mechanisms for the reproduction of the post-war co-constitution of 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity and their patterns of practice in society, following 
these political events. This preconception was formed whilst writing up my PhD 
research proposal and then research outline, when witnessing that, even though the 
borders were opened and the new phenomenon of draft dodging was increasingly 
growing, there was an unrelenting resistance from the general public to cross the border 
and to accept the decline in motivation to serve.  Early on in my time in the field, certain 
accounts of my interviewees illustrated that the events after 2003 challenge certain 
traditional military views of masculinity (equated to ‘everyday men with guns’), militarism 
                                                          
5
 The broader yet also official G.C. understanding of the conflict situation is that this is a problem of 
invasion and occupation, which opposes its alternative (and internationally prominent) that it is a ‘bi-
communal conflict amongst two ethnic communities; G.C.s and T.C.s’. What is understood by ‘G.C.s’ as 
an ‘invasion’, for the ‘T.C.’ community is largely understood as ‘intervention’.   
In this analysis while ‘invasion’ or ‘intervention’ is understood as a contested historical event, ‘occupation’ 
is seen as a G.C. discourse, which becomes central in the analysis that follows. Hereinafter, I will be 
referring to the understanding of the conflict situation as an ‘occupation’ by bearing in mind that this is 
part of the broader conceptualisation of ‘invasion and occupation’.  
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(equated to a mass army) and nationalism (contained within the closed borders 
between North and South Cyprus) and thus all three are shaped and constituted in 
terms of the new socio-political conditions that Cyprus was entering. Following these 
early findings, I became eager to understand the factors that underpin the weakening of 
the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity and the adapted 
reiteration of this co-constitutive relationship in the new social and political milieu 
following the opening of the borders. In this context, it needs to be clarified that when I 
talk about this adapted reiteration, I am referring to the discourse and, thus, I am not 
necessarily saying that individuals are themselves becoming adapted or reiterated.  
This project was guided by three objectives: (1) to illustrate the co-constitution of 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity in Cyprus through the empirical data featured in 
this thesis. (2) to explore whether they are co-constituted in such a way that social and 
political developments and events can contribute to the re-imagination and, thus, re-
adaptation of this relationship under the new social and political parameters. (3) to 
contribute to broader contemporary debates on Cyprus, by providing a masculinity lens 
of analysis for a better understanding of G.C. nationalism and militarism following the 
opening of the borders.  
Given these objectives, the general research question became: How does G.C. 
nationalism operate through the broader national level of military ideology and particular 
understandings of masculinity following the opening of the borders? In considering this 
primary question, a number of sub-questions arise:  
 What changes have the opening of the border, the accession of Cyprus to the 
EU, and the process of the Annan Plan brought about in attitudes towards G.C. 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity?  
 What is the role of masculinity under the changed nationalism and militarism  
following the opening of the borders?  
 Do these shifting forms of nationalism and militarism inform, to a significant 
extent, the hegemonic masculinity shaped thereafter?  
 Are G.C. national awareness, national definition and national protectionism 
following the opening of the borders expressed through masculinised notions and 
ideals?  
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 Finally, how does an analysis of the co-constitution of G.C. nationalism, 
militarism and masculinity contribute to a better understanding of post-2003 
Cyprus? 
In exploring these questions, I illustrate that there is a co-constitutive relationship 
between nationalism, militarism and masculinity in the post-armed conflict, modern, 
European Cyprus with opened borders. This co-constitution can, under certain social 
and political conditions, contribute to the weakening of each one of its components. Yet, 
the weakening of this co-constitutive relationship can, specifically, generate its adapted 
reiteration under new social and political parameters. The adapted reiterations of this 
relationship are integral to the sustenance of a G.C. position of power in the conflict 
situation, even in the increasingly globalised and Europeanised modern Cyprus.   
I will argue that in these adapted reiterations we need to not only focus on the changing 
hegemonic masculinity of men, but we should also address the concept I have named in 
this thesis as nationalist militarised masculinity. This is a broader masculinist discourse 
that has been a linchpin in specific nationalist, militarist re-adaptations and reiterations. 
Yet, returning, to the hegemonic masculinity of men, it will be illustrated that, in the 
scope of the intense cultural westernisation and Europeanisation of the G.C. society, 
the opening of the borders and accession of Cyprus to the EU have affected the roles of 
men in the national struggle, whilst further instigating the shift of G.C. hegemonic 
masculinity towards a transnational, entrepreneurial masculinity. 
The time period in which the fieldwork was conducted (11th of May to 11th of September 
2011) and the focus of this research project on nationalism, militarism and masculinity 
have naturally limited the light shone on other important issues of research that could 
have been included as key analytic categories in the scope of these thematic research 
areas. The fieldwork was conducted when the financial crisis in Cyprus was only 
beginning and had not yet become the issue that it is now, and before the finding of gas 
in Cyprus territorial waters was verified. Furthermore, for the purposes of this study the 
empirical data was drawn from G.C. opinion of armed militarism, given that my focus 
was on the masculinised militarism, which spoke of the national struggle and armed 
defence (In Greek: Άμυνα). Therefore, the civil defence in Cyprus, which predominantly 
conscripts women, is not considered in this study. Similarly, the issue of social class is 
not addressed specifically. There is a clear importance at examining the intersection of 
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social class to nationalism. Different social classes imagine the ‘national community’ in 
different ways. This research focused on nationalism, militarism and masculinity as it 
considered these thematic categories to be most significant in the changing socio-
political context that followed the opening of the borders. Moreover, in examining the co-
constitution of the three, this theoretical framework opens up the space for social class 
to be included as a key analytical category when examining such inter-sections in the 
context of Cyprus. Moreover, in this context, I wish to note that for the purposes of this 
thesis I am not defining interviewees by their profession. However, in attempting to 
provide the reader with a broad background of the interviewees, I have included some 
details about their professions. Furthermore, the cultural impact that the accession of 
Cyprus to the EU has had on G.C. society has been addressed throughout the thesis 
informing the discussion on the re-adaptation of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. 
Moreover, this opens up the space for further examination of the contextual impact of 
these cultural developments on notions of nationalism, militarism and masculinity to be 
addressed in future research.  
Also the research was conducted during the period in which AKEL the Communist Party 
of Cyprus, was in power. Within this context AKEL’s, agenda should be acknowledged. 
For AKEL, which is a Cypriot major party, rapprochement has been a key policy since 
1974 onwards. The party struggles for peaceful coexistence with Turkish Cypriots in a 
common homeland. Several interviewees did support AKEL or the party’s positions 
(whose accounts become mostly prominent in the discussion on crossings and their 
view on ideals of heroism). However, while members were approached, attempts to 
interview AKEL’s political leadership were unsuccessful.  
Finally, the aim of this study was to draw links between nationalism, militarism and 
masculinity and not to provide an account of reconciliation. Although it is clear that 
reconciliation cannot be side-lined completely (see chapter on nationalism) the findings 
will have implications for the future development of such approaches (see conclusions).   
1.3. Chapter outline 
In terms of how the thesis is structured, the first three chapters that follow the 
introduction provide a short account of the history of the Cyprus conflict and an account 
of the contextual history of the opening of the borders, the Annan Plan referendum and 
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the accession of Cyprus to the EU; a literature review and a discussion of methods and 
research design.  
In Chapter 2 (A Short History of the Cyprus Conflict) I present an account of the history 
of the strife between the G.C. and T.C. communities starting from the beginning of the 
second millennium to the present day. In this chapter I provide a historical account of 
the perpetuation of the divide between the two communities.  
In Chapter 3 (Literature Review) I provide a review of the academic literature on 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity, illustrate the gaps in the literature this project 
aims to address and explain the way in which I adopt certain theorisations in studying 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-2003 Cyprus. After explaining some of 
the main approaches to nationalism and studies focusing on G.C. nationalism as 
negotiated and constructed at the everyday level in particular, I explain the way in which 
I employ Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ to understand G.C. nationalism, 
but also in specific ways the ‘other’ and the masculinist and militarist discourses co-
constituting G.C. nationalism. I then engage with different theorisations of militarism and, 
whilst pointing to the lack of literature on militarism in Cyprus, I discuss my choice of 
approaching the relationship between the military and society as reciprocal and 
bidirectional in looking at the case of post-armed conflict Cyprus. I later draw on 
contributions from feminist scholarship to highlight the gender construction of 
nationalism and militarism, illustrating that there is an emerging body of literature that 
has begun to specifically examine masculinity in nationalism or militarism in post-conflict 
societies. Whilst this review reveals that there has been no literature that has provided 
an analysis of how these three are co-constituted, including in regards to the case of 
Cyprus, it further points to the lack of literature on Cyprus that has addressed 
masculinity as an issue of research enquiry in itself. ‘Nationalist militarised masculinity’ 
is the last issue discussed in this chapter. This is a concept I have put forward in 
proposing that there is a broader discourse of masculinity that does not exclusively 
relate to the masculinity of men, and which needs to be addressed when looking at 
nationalism, militarism or the co-constitution of the three. 
Chapter 4 (Methods) first presents the rational for qualitative methodology in these 
environments of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. Secondly, my choice of semi-
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structured interviews as the research tool to gain empirical understanding of the issues 
of enquiry is discussed. Then, after laying out some issues of consideration in the 
interviewer – interviewee relationship, which are inherent in conducting empirical 
research with human subjects, I describe my sample in relation to each group of 
interviewees (namely: public, politicians and policy makers, representatives of youth 
sections of political parties and independent political youth groups, soldiers and military 
officers). A discussion on how I devised my ‘general interview guide’ follows for each 
one of these groups, as well as my strategies for finding interviewees from each group. I 
then move on to describe data analysis and finally I provide my reflection on issues that 
emerged with each distinct group of interviewees.   
Chapter 5 (Nationalism in the post-opening of the Cypriot borders) is the first of three 
discussion chapters based on research data gathered during fieldwork. In this chapter I 
focus on how participants in post-2003 Cyprus understand formative discourses of post-
war nationalism, such as the idea of the national struggle. I focus first on the impact that 
the opening of the borders and the accession of Cyprus to the EU have had on the G.C. 
idea of the national struggle for liberation from ‘occupation’ and the preservation of a 
potent ‘fighting spirit’ in the struggle; an issue which I then discuss in the following 
chapter in relation to the weakening of the militarist frame of the struggle. Then I discuss 
how the fact that the ‘mothers, wives and sisters of the missing persons’ (In Greek: Οι 
μάνες των αγνοουμένων)6 continue to symbolise a specific construction of post-war 
Cyprus as a feminised victim of ‘occupation’ following the opening of the borders 
precisely illustrates the persistence of this self-understanding of the G.C. community in 
this new situation as a ‘victim’ of ‘occupation’. I move on to put forward the argument 
that the failure of the opportunity created by the opening of the borders to bring together 
the two communities and the broad G.C. resistance in crossing the border, are 
conditioned by the discourse of ‘occupation’. The final section of this chapter discusses 
the appearance of ultra-nationalist political formations following the opening of the 
borders. This the first part of a three-fold discussion presented in each of the empirical 
chapters that investigates what has made these parties and groups possible from within 
                                                          
6
 Hereinafter I will be using the term ‘mothers of the missing persons’ to refer to the mothers, wives and 
sisters of the missing persons. In popular G.C. discourse the term ‘mothers of the missing persons’ (In 
Greek: οι μανες των αγνοουμενων) is used to refer to the category of mothers, sisters and wives of the 
missing persons.  
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the post-opening of the borders co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and 
masculinity. In this context, I wish to note that I do not draw any differentiations between 
the ultra-nationalist political formations discussed. The differences between them are 
not understood to be significant in the scope of this thesis, where it is their common 
positions on the issues of enquiry that are used in the analysis that follows.   
In Chapter 6 (Militarism in the post-opening of the borders Cyprus) I address G.C. 
militarism following the opening of the borders and argue that the ideology of defence 
(In Greek: Άμυνα), the version of militarism (Huntington, 1957; Enloe, 2004) that 
appeared in post-war Cyprus, has been undermined since this event. In the first section, 
I discuss the creation of the ideology of defence in post-war Cyprus illustrating that it 
has been a central expression of the ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle against the 
‘occupation’ forces.  
In the next section, building on the findings from the previous chapter, I focus on how 
the opening of the previously un-crossable internal border has counter-posed and 
undermined the ideology of defence and its underside: the commitment of the 
community as a ‘nation-in-arms’7. In the next section I discuss how the accession of 
Cyprus to the EU has marked a turning point in the ‘struggle’ for Greek Cypriots and 
illustrate how successive governments have undermined the militarist framing of the 
national struggle, thus the ideology of defence.  
In the subsequent section, I discuss how the governmental and public disinvestment in 
the army has found itself in opposition to the post-war societal structures and that, in 
this context, a number of public reactions have been expressed. In the section that 
follows I discuss the changing civil-military relations. I illustrate that individualism 
transverses civil-military relations, undermining in this way the ‘nation-in-arms’. And in 
the final section, I argue that the ultra-nationalist parties are also a response to the 
undermining of ‘defence’; rendering ‘defence’ now an extreme discourse placed in their 
hands.  
Chapter 7, the final chapter based on empirical data and entitled ‘Masculinity in Cyprus 
following the opening of the borders’, investigates the relationship of G.C. hegemonic 
                                                          
7
 Nation-in-arms is portrayed as a model of relations in which the boundaries between the civil and 
military sectors are fragmented, (see Rapoport, 1962).  
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masculinity (Connell, 1995; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) and nationalist militarised 
masculinity with the changing understanding of the national struggle and the 
undermining of the ideology of defence following the opening of the borders. The first 
section of this chapter provides an account of G.C. masculinity in Cyprus in relation to 
the island’s turbulent modern history.  Later on in the chapter, I address the emerging 
G.C. transnational entrepreneurial hegemonic masculinity. In the sections that follow, I 
discuss the relationship between G.C. hegemonic masculinity and the conscription 
service, illustrating that the opening of the borders has further instigated the changing 
G.C. hegemonic masculinity, in which military service is not viewed to the same extent 
as a rite-of-passage in becoming a G.C. man.  
In the penultimate section, I address a certain paradox that emerges from the data 
through the theorisation of nationalist militarised masculinity. I present this as a case 
through two examples: the resistance to cross the borders and the continuous support 
for the existence of a potent army and its call for change into a semi or fully professional 
force in the context of the weakened ideology of defence.  
In the last section, I discuss that the hyper-militarist masculinised character in which the 
newly formed ultra-nationalist political parties have risen in the last few years contains 
elements of the state post-war masculinisation and militarisation of the national struggle. 
And there is a certain reiteration of these elements in the face of their undermining, but 
with these now being fused with neo-Nazi and junta-phile ideological elements.  
Finally, in Chapter eight, I conclude that there is an adapted reiteration of the co-
constitutive relationship of nationalism, militarism and masculinity against ‘occupation’ 
that has been formed following the opening of the borders and that, through the adapted 
reiteration of this co-constitution, the broader G.C. stance in the post-opening of the 
borders conflict situation can be explained. This re-constitution is illustrated to construct 
new ideological borders that have now replaced the previously closed un-crossable 
ones and scaffolds the resistance to cross and the continuous support for the existence 
of a potent army and its change into a semi or fully professional force.   
I also conclude that although the three elements characterising the readapted post-war 
Cypriot society are co-constitutive, they are very much weakened independently. I 
argue that the newly created ultra-nationalist political formations should be understood 
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as a discursive response to the process of the weakening post-war co-constitution of 
this three-fold relationship.  
The concluding remarks highlight the importance of addressing the co-constitution of 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity in coming closer to the obstacles retaining the 
conduction of meaningful negotiations for reconciliation and to overcome the conflict 
culture by building bridges to understand the traumas and fears of both communities.   
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2. Chapter two: A short account of the Cyprus conflict 
This chapter presents a short account of the Cyprus conflict and three important political 
events, the opening of the borders in 2003 between North and South Cyprus, the Annan 
Plan referendum and the accession of Cyprus to the EU, all of which occurred before 
the fieldwork took place. These events have been approached in this thesis as 
formative in the relationship of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity.  
Short account of the history of Cyprus 
Cyprus is located in the eastern Mediterranean, in a geo-strategic position between 
Europe, Asia and Africa. Its position is often presented in popular narratives as the main 
reason that it has been conquered and colonised many times during its history 
(Hitchens, 1997).  
More recently difficulties between two populations, the Greek Cypriots on the one hand, 
the Turkish Cypriots on the other, have led to excessive conflict. The politics of 
nationhood and identity played a central role in the rise of inter-communal tension and 
the creation of the so-called ‘Cyprus problem’, (Kızılyürek, 2002). Making claims to a 
Hellenic past and lineage, G.C.s, especially the nationalists, often emphasise the arrival 
and settlement of the Mycenaean/Achaeans from mainland Greece in the second 
millennium BC as the first colonisers of the island. They had formed city-kingdoms on 
the Minoan model and introduced the Greek language, religion and culture to the island. 
Thus, it is often asserted by the G.C.s that this period determined the predominant 
character of the island, (Hadjipavlou, 2006: 331). Many T.C.s on the other hand, see 
1571 as an historical starting point, since this was the year that the island was 
conquered by the Ottoman Turks, after being occupied by Venetians between 1489 and 
1571 and the French Lusignan dynasty of Jerusalem between 1191 and 1489 
(Calotychos, 1998: 5). During the almost four centuries before independence, Muslim 
Turks lived dispersed throughout the island, both in separate villages and mixed villages 
with the Christian Greeks. With the exception of some occasional violent events, social 
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relationships between the two groups were relatively harmonious (Loizos, 1981:40).  
The rendering of Cyprus by the Ottomans to the British in 1878 became formative to the 
development of the inter-communal conflict. In 1914, the island was officially annexed to 
the British Empire as a colony. At that time the island consisted of 73.9% Orthodox 
Greeks and 24.4% Muslim Turks (Calotychos, 1998: 5).  
The situation created between the two communities during the British rule had set the 
basis for a consolidation of their differences.  Greek and Turkish nationalisms 
developed during the colonial period in Cyprus (1878-1960) (Attalides, 1979) and 
became a tool for forming an ethnicised sense of person-hood in the masses through 
separate educational systems (Bryant, 2004). During that period, as Bryant (2004: 2) 
argues, identity became singular and ethnic, the outcome of which she describes as the 
process by which people one knows may nevertheless ‘appear to be or to become 
strangers’.  
 
2.2 The bi-communal clashes of 1955-59 
The British politicised intra-communal differences as a tool to serve their colonial 
interests in the Middle East (Pollis, 1998). They reinforced the two emerging 
antagonistic nationalisms and competing visions based on each group’s ‘primordial 
attachments’ to their respective ‘motherlands’. During the British rule, the idea of union 
(in Greek: ένωσης) with Greece started to become popular amongst G.C.s; however, 
any moves to create alignment with Greece during that period were quashed (Fisher, 
2001: 309).  
The 1950s was a period of growing inter-ethnic mistrust, fear and violence. 1955 was 
the year that marked the start of serious bi- communal clashes, (Kızılyürek, 2012). 
Divides between Greeks and Turks crystallised during the anti-colonial struggle from 
1955–59 in the context of which the G.C.s fought the British for ‘union’ with ‘motherland’ 
Greece and the T.C.s fought the British for Taksim, that is for union of part of the island 
with ‘motherland’ Turkey (ibid).  
In 1955, the quest for union with Greece was intensified and the National Organisation 
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of Cypriot Struggle (EOKA) was formed as a self-proclaimed liberating movement 
against British colonialism and its close at the time ally, the overwhelmingly T.C. police 
force. The group engaged in guerrilla warfare and operated under the leadership of 
General Georgios Grivas (Markides, 1997). The reaction to the guerrilla movement 
resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives, and alienated the T.C population who 
responded to enosis with a call for the partition of the island into two separate 
communities (Loizos, 1981). This situation led to interethnic killings and in consequence, 
in 1958, riots and armed interethnic confrontations broke out (Pollis, 1979).  
According to T.C. writers (Salih, 1968; Nedjatigil, 1997; Kizilyurek, 2002), the T.C. 
leadership expected that eventually the EOKA would terrorise the T.C. community. By 
1957, the T.C.s aligned themselves with the British and established the TMT (Turkish 
Resistance Organization), (Papadakis, 1998:149), with the goal of counteracting the 
Greek-based EOKA. TMT engaged in limited inter-communal fighting with the G.C.s, 
until a ceasefire was implemented in 1958 (Fisher, 2001:310). 
Yet, it was not only the T.C.s, who were excluded from the liberation and nationalism of 
EOKA, but also leftists and communists, as separation existed also between right and 
left G.C. factions. EOKA ’s leadership saw the communists as outside the national 
community and as a threat to their struggle, whilst it formed allies with the Church of 
Cyprus and other conservative agents (Loizides, 2007: 176). 
In 1960, G.C.s and T.C.s accepted a compromise settlement that led to the creation of 
the Republic of Cyprus (Xydis, 1973). The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus 
(RoC) marks an important development in the history of Cyprus, as the island became 
an independent republic for the first time since antiquity, albeit in a limited way (Attalides, 
1979; Faustmann, 1999). This settlement was agreed by outside stakeholders, Greece, 
Turkey and Britain, who were to act as guarantors to protect the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the new state (Papadakis, 1998: 152).  
The 1960 constitution was a “complex power-sharing arrangement with both a national 
legislature and two communal chambers, and a cabinet, public service, police force and 
army” (Fisher, 2001: 310). In the newly formed state, Archbishop Makarios became the 
first President of the RoC and Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, was appointed as the Turkish Cypriot 
Vice-President. 
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However, soon after independence, power-sharing arrangements broke down and 
violence erupted again between the two communities. In the years 1963-1964 and 1967, 
the T.C.s suffered the greater losses and many of them moved to areas that gradually 
became their armed enclaves (Loizos, 1981; Papadakis, 1998; Fisher, 2001). As the 
interethnic fighting of 1963-67 subsided, G.C.s became deeply divided between those 
arguing for enosis now, and others favouring enosis if possible in the future (Loizos, 
1974: 125). 
In this context, the National Guard (NG) has been an integral part and a clear 
manifestation of the developing deep-routed dichotomy created between the two 
communities during the bi-communal clashes of 1963-4. Following the end of British 
rule, as part of the formation of Cyprus as an independent state, the Cyprus army was 
created, composing both G.C. and T.C.s. However, the purpose of the army in Cyprus 
changed and became re-imagined following the bi-communal clashes of 1963-4. As a 
result of these clashes that marked the beginning of the separation of the two 
communities, the Cyprus army was dissolved and the NG was created in its place 
consisting only of G.C.s, whilst in 1964 conscription was introduced, (see: National 
Guard law (2011). The NG was involved in two minor military clashes with Turkey and 
T.C.s in 1964 and 1967 and fought in the war with Turkey in 1974.  
The continuing violent inter-communal strife led to concerns in NATO and eventually to 
the involvement of the United Nations (UN). The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in March 1964 and remains on the island to this 
day. Shortly after, a UN monitored buffer zone, usually referred to as the ‘Green Line’ 
was established in Nicosia.  
Hostility and inter-communal violence continued for the remainder of the 1960s, and the 
early 1970s were “punctuated by intermittent crises sparking Turkish involvement and 
repeated calls for ‘enosis’ by nationalist elements in the G.C. community” (Fisher, 
2001:310). The differences between the two communities were never resolved. On the 
contrary, the T.C.s lived in enclaves intermittently until 1974.  
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2.3 The war of 1974 
In 1967 the rise of a military junta in Greece had significant repercussions in Cyprus. 
With the support of the junta, EOKA B, a paramilitary pro-enosis organisation, was 
formed, again under the leadership of General Georgios Grivas, and started a series of 
attacks, killings and violent episodes against the government and members of the left-
wing party (Hitchens, 1997:71).  
In July 1974, the military junta in Greece encouraged a coup d’état that deposed the 
president, Archbishop Makarios.  In response to this, Turkey, as a guarantor power of 
the constitution, legally intervened by launching a military offensive to protect T.C.s and 
to supposedly restore constitutional order, which had been suspended since 1964, 
(Papadakis, 1998:152). However, Turkish forces moved to illegally occupy 37% of the 
island. 
During the short (20th July- 16th August 1974) and bloody conflict created by the Turkish 
invasion around 3, 500 people were killed and 2, 000 were reported as missing. In the 
empirical chapters, the issue of G.C. missing persons is shown to take an indispensable 
part in the gendering of G.C. nationalism. This is through the use of the mothers, wives 
and sisters of the missing persons to project the image of post-war Cyprus as a victim 
awaiting liberation. Out of the total G.C. community of 574,000 some 180,000 became 
refugees (Kyle, 1997) fleeing to the south of the island and creating a complicated 
refugee problem (see Zetter, 1998). Later, the voluntary regrouping of populations 
resulted in approximately 40,000 T.C.s moving to the North. Thus, the events of 1974 
had the effect of creating two separate ethnic zones on the island (Calotychos, 1998: 8).  
In 1975, the T.C. community declared itself the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, with 
Rauf Denkta  as its first leader. In 19 3, it declared independence as the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The state of northern Cyprus is only recognised 
by Turkey and it is treated internationally as an illegal non-state (Calotychos, 1998: 9). 
The south part of the island that has since then essentially been the G.C. administration, 
gained international recognition and legitimacy as the official Republic of Cyprus.  
Following the events outlined above, constitutional power was never restored. Instead 
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the island was divided and remains divided to the present day. Therefore, in this thesis 
when I will refer to the state, the state refers to the Republic of Cyprus  which is a post-
colonial state. But which, since 1963, no longer represents the T.C.s and, since 1974, 
represents only the southern part of Cyprus.  
The dividing line, known as the ‘Green line’ that had been drawn in Nicosia by the UN 
forces to deal with inter-communal violence, was rearranged into the ‘Attila Line’8 (112 
miles long) in August 1974 now extended to separate the island into two parts. In the 
empirical chapters the border separating the two communities is illustrated to have 
become a G.C. symbol of the polarisation of the two communities and opposition to the 
‘occupation’ of North Cyprus yet also of the need to ‘I struggle’. It will also be discussed 
how the national struggle for the G.C. community following the opening of these borders 
becomes conflicting and contradictory to the reality of opened borders and their 
crossing-taking place from both sides of the divide.  
2. 4 The opening of the North-South border in 2003, EU accession and Annan 
Plan  
The opening of crossing points on the borders (2003) took place in the context of 
Cyprus being on the threshold of its accession to the EU and increased negotiations for 
reunification (UN Annan Plan). Since 1975, a long series of inter-communal high-level 
negotiations had been conducted every so often under UN auspices, but to this day no 
mutually acceptable agreement has been reached.  
The concept of the EU and the perceived benefits of membership were primary 
motivators for positive political change towards peace in both North and South Cyprus, 
(Yakinthou, 2009). Both populations were called to vote in the most recent resolution 
initiative: the Annan Plan referendum put together by the UN Secretary General in 2004 
after the two sides had negotiated (Trimikliontis & Demetriou, 2011: 17; Palley 2006).  
The decision in 1997 by the EU to open up accession negotiations with the RoC, 
following the Republic’s initiation of a unilateral application to join the EU in 1990, 
created a new catalyst for settlement.  In December 1999, talks also began between 
                                                          
8
 The term 'Attila’ is used in Cyprus to refer to the Turkish conqueror of North Cyprus. This name seems 
to have been adopted from ‘Operation Attila’, which was the Turkish Armed Forces’ code name of the 
invasion of Cyprus. 
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Turkey and the EU in regards to Turkey becoming a candidate for EU membership. 
However, the talks quickly broke down with the confrontation between Turkey and the 
EU becoming visible over Cyprus’ accession.  Turkey’s candidacy was clearly tied to 
Cyprus’ EU membership.  
Cyprus’ EU accession and Turkey’s candidacy became a catalyst for solution. Perhaps 
in realising the gravity of the situation, Rauf Denktas, at the time T.C.  President, in 
November 2001, initiated a new peace process with Glafcos Clerides, at the time G.C. 
President. However, the talks soon reached a deadlock. In an attempt to help this 
situation a new round of negotiations was opened between the G.C.s and T.C.s under 
UN auspices, (Sözen & Özersay, 2007).  The Security Council agreed that the 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, should present the two sides with a blueprint settlement, 
which would have formed the basis for further negotiations.  
At the time it was hoped that the urgency of resolving the Cyprus conflict prior to Cyprus’ 
accession to the EU may have brought the two sides finally to the bargaining table and 
that they would have agreed to the Annan plan. At each stage of the negotiations 
“official EU statements underlined again and again the Union’s aspirations for a final 
solution to the problem to be found and for the whole island to eventually become a 
member” (Demetriou, 2005: 9).  
The RoC signed the Accession Treaty on 16th
 
of April 2003. A week later, in an 
unprecedented move, the T.C.  leadership decided to open up the crossing points on 
the Green Line. Up to that point, from 1974 to 2003, communication between the two 
sides of the border was virtually impossible and the two communities lived completely 
separate from the other. “No direct phone line connection existed, postal services were 
not available and physical crossing of the line was prohibited.” (Demetriou, 2005: 11).  
 
Opening of the borders  
The decision of the at the time T.C. President, Rauf Denktas, to partially lift the ban on 
freedom of movement in April 2003 and to open up a number of checkpoints around the 
island came as a surprise to G.Cs. After the long term division and isolation of the two 
communities, the possibility to cross opened new debates about the meanings of the 
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opening and its possible significance for the future of Cyprus (Cockburn, 2004: 7). To 
the present day, it is not completely clear what the reasons were for the opening of the 
borders. Nonetheless, the G.C. side did not have a role to play in this decision. For 
them the legality of the existence of the border was, from the outset, not accepted.  
In this manner, the crossings, which were opened on the border, where treated with 
suspicion and uncertainty from the G.C. public and political powers (Dikomitis, 2005, 
2004; Demetriou, 2007). The G.C. leadership discouraged the public from crossing the 
border (Demetriou, 2007). A significant number of G.C.s have provided clear resistance 
in crossing (Webster & Timothy 2006; Boedeltje & Houtum, 2007), while the crossings 
that have taken place have not resulted in significant interaction between the two 
communities (Hadjipavlou, 2007b; Webster & Timothy, 2006). This resistance to cross 
will be shown in the empirical chapters to be an expression of the adapted reiteration of 
the relationship of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity following this event.  
It is difficult to present an accurate number of the crossings that have taken place since 
then, as it appears that often these numbers are filtered through political agendas.  Yet, 
the following statistics provide some indications. On the 23rd April 2013 the left-wing 
newspaper ‘Alitheia’ (in Greek: αλήθεια) commented that since 2003, thus within about 
10 years, there have been 22 million crossings, (see Alitheia – Aλήθεια, 2013). 
Out of the total number, it commented that 8 million G.C.s and 14 million T.C.s (ibid) 
have crossed. Specifically, the UN office in Cyprus estimates that a total of 9 million 
people have crossed in the three years between 2003 and 2006 (see Hadjipavlou, 
2007b).  
These numbers illustrate that some people have been crossing the border repeatedly.  
If we were to base our analysis merely on statistics, then one could conclude that 
reconciliation has taken place. However, as this qualitative driven thesis reveals this is 
certainly not the case.  
 
Annan Plan failure and accession to the EU 
The ‘Annan plan’ (officially Annan III), which was the initiative that followed the 
submission and presentation of a version and modified version of two UN plans for 
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settlement (named Annan I and II), was defeated in a referendum on 24th April 2004 by 
the G.C.s. The majority of G.C.s - 76% - voted ‘no’ to the plan, while the majority of 
T.C.s - 65% - voted ‘yes’, supporting reunification and the entry to the EU of the whole 
Island, (for a more detailed discussion of the plan see Palley, 2006 and Russell & Cohn, 
2012). Shortly after, on 1st May 2004, the RoC became a member of the EU.   
The defeat of the referendum created an atypical type of EU membership;  Cyprus now 
exists as an EU member state, but it remains divided. Whereas officially the whole 
island acceded to the EU, EU legislation only applies in the recognised RoC. The acquis 
communautaire is suspended in the north part until a solution of the ‘Cyprus problem’ is 
achieved, in accordance with protocol 10 of Cyprus’ EU accession treaty (Yakinthou, 
2009; 309).  
However, whilst only the South of Cyprus directly receives the benefits (and meets the 
obligations) of EU membership (Yakinthou, 2009: 307), after the rejection of the re-
unification plan in the south, special measures were adopted by the EU, which has been 
regulating its relations with the north, starting with the policing of the Green Line and 
extending to trade, funding, and official representation (Demetriou, 2005: 9). Noteworthy 
is that the EU has provided €259,000,000 in funds to help the T.C.s upgrade their 
infrastructure  (Yakinthou, 2009: 317).  
The defeat of the Annan Plan in the above-described context marked a new turning 
point in the recent history of the conflict, demonstrating that the accession of the island 
to the EU was not powerful enough to facilitate both sides to overcome past divisions 
and reservations to imagine a shared future.  Political intercessions, such as the 
opening of the borders, the Annan Plan referendum process, and the accession to the 
EU could have contributed to a collective paradigm shift of peace aspiration and 
reconciliation, but have not. Yet, as this thesis illustrates, these three events have 
become formative in the politics of the conflict.  
This project questions the persistence of a particular G.C. nationalist identity in Cyprus 
despite the opening of the borders in 2003 and the accession to the EU. It explores, in 
particular, the relationship between G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity, 
claiming that there continues to exist a ‘post-opening of the borders conflict culture’, in 
which militarism (in a defensive posture) and masculinity serve an important function. 
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This thesis argues that such an analysis can contribute towards a better explanation as 
to why the opening of the borders, the interaction between the two communities and the 
EU accession have not resulted in furthering substantial attempts towards a resolution.  
In the context of the recent discovery of gas in the Cyprus exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ), there has been a further UN initiative to begin talks for new rounds of 
negotiations. The RoC was delaying the start of talks by setting a precondition that 
before starting the talks both parties need to agree on a joint communiqué that will 
clearly define the framework within which a solution to the Cyprus Problem will be 
sought (see Psylides, 2014). Yet, both parties have since early 2014 entered an intense 
process of negotiations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Chapter three: Literature review  
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the literature relating to the key 
issues of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, both as separate areas of research in 
their own right as well as relating to their inter-connection.  
This review illustrates that there is a lack of literature that has addressed the co-
constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity and discusses the literature used 
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in this thesis to demonstrate that these three are co-constituted in Cyprus. The 
conclusion raises the contention of this thesis, that it is the interrelationship of ideas 
associated with nationalism, militarism and masculinity that is we need to address when 
looking at post-armed conflict societies. Therefore, while these three theoretical areas 
for the purposes of this chapter will be treated in most cases as distinct. I will bring them 
together at the end of the chapter in highlighting that they are co-contingent, while also 
pointing to the ability of this three-fold relationship to be reiterated or re-adapted under 
new social and political parameters. In this relationship masculinity is not only seen to 
be an issue relating to the identity of men rather to the broader masculinist discourse 
co-constituting nationalism and militarism in such societies. For the purpose of 
illustrating this, I employ the term ‘nationalist militarised masculinity’. The ‘nationalist 
militarised masculinity’ underpinning G.C. nationalism and militarism, as it will be 
introduced in this chapter and illustrated in the empirical ones, is a linchpin to the 
obstacles created for reconciliation.  
3. 2 Nationalism 
Although there are many definitions of ‘nation’, it is not my intention to review them 
here. Rather, I want to shortly point to some central areas of debate and then put 
forward the argument that a modernist-constructivist  approach to nationalism will be the  
analytic tool I will be using to understand  G.C.  nationalism and the origins of the 
“Greek” nation. Benedict Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ will be applied 
to this discussion.  
Nationalism is still an ambiguous concept. There is no general consensus amongst 
scholars on the nature and definition of the concept (Ozkirimli, 2005.; Brown, 2004; 
Harris, 2009 ). That is because there is fundamental disagreement about the nature of 
nationalism and nation among scholars (Brown, 2004; Harris, 2009). Different 
understandings of the development of nations and nationalism rest on and form the 
different definitions of how and when they arose and what they are. For example, 
Gellner, (1983), Anderson, (1983) and Smith, (1998) provide very different answers to 
these questions. Yet, the fact remains as Ozkirimli (2005: 7) informs us that, “definitions 
abound, and the most fundamental conceptual divide in the literature concerns the 
relative weight to be attached to objective and subjective elements in the definition of 
nations.” 
34 
 
 
A lecture given by Ernest Renan at the Sorbonne, Paris, in 1882, was one of the early 
investigations into the meaning of nationalism. In this lecture entitled “Qu’est-ce qu’une 
nation?” (What is a nation?) he proposed that a nation is a matter of the will of people to 
be a nation; it is based on their common ancestry and their desire to live together. 
Therefore, under this framework “‘nationalism’ is what ‘nations’ do”, (Hearn, 2006).  
Central to the debate on nationalism and nations is the relationship between ethnicity 
and nation. For example, primordialists tend to place ethnicity at the centre of their 
understanding of nationalism, and so in this vein nationalism is understood rather as a 
late development of much older processes of ethnicity (see: Hearn, 2006). An example 
of this is G.C.  nationalist ideology that, through a primordial attachment, “views Cyprus 
as an extension of Greece”, see Mavratsas (1996: 89). However, this theory is sharply 
criticised by modernist theorists of nations and nationalism (such as Breuilly, 1985; 
Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Kedourie, 1985 and Anderson,1983) for giving nations 
biological and/or racial attributes.  
Modernist scholars (for example Breuilly, 1985; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 
1983 and Anderson, 1983) view nations as being born out of the conditions of modernity 
and have the idea that the nation is constructed through internal processes within the 
nation. According to modernists, nations are the result of social, political and economic 
changes, which occurred since the 19th century and are related to the rise of industrial 
capitalism, the expansion of imperialism, the French and American Revolutions, and the 
modern bureaucratic state, urbanisation and secularism (Puri, 2004). Max Weber 
defines a nation as a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in 
a state and which holds notions of common descent, though not necessarily common 
blood (Gerth and Mills, 1948). Kedourie is one of the most-cited modernist scholars on 
nationalism. In his book ‘Nationalism’, published in 1960, he developed the approach 
that nationalism is an ideology developed in Europe as a response to the predicament 
of Modernity.  
Modernist approaches emphasise the ‘creation’ of nations. A central argument in 
modernist accounts is that the presence or absence of an ethnic link does not in itself 
bestow any particular characteristics (Gellner, 1996).  Nations are not unchangeable 
35 
 
 
entities. In short, ‘nationalism comes before nations. ‘Nations do not make states and 
nationalism, but the other way round’ (Hobsbawm, 1990: 10).  
Hobsbawm (1990) finds mutual ground with modernist thought on seeing state control 
as a central point of nationalism, and he places emphasis on the importance of the 
nation state as the political outcome of nationalism. Hobsbawm, unlike the primordialists, 
emphasises the discontinuities of modern nationalisms with the past. By the use of the 
term ‘invented traditions’ Hobsbawm and Ranger (19 3) argue that nations, nationalism, 
the nation-state, and national symbols are types of recently invented traditions and that 
any seeming continuity with the past is mostly fictitious.  As Hobsbawm and Ranger 
(1983, 1992: 2) put it: 
 
“I would stress the element of artefact, invention and social engineering which enters 
into the making of nations.” 
It is important to point out that Hobsbawm, as Puri (1994:) clarifies, does not suggest 
that “invented traditions such as nationalism are fictions and therefore meaningless; 
rather, he shows how ‘traditions’ such as nationalism, which seem or claim to be old, 
are recent in origin and actively created.”  
Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) have shown us how memory in nationalism can serve as 
a function of resistance, since the creation of the nation-state rests on the construction 
of a single historical narrative, which recalls the glorious periods of the nation and its 
struggles.  ‘The invention of tradition’, as conceived by them, refers to rethinking, and 
redefining certain practices, symbols, and spaces of a community. This can involve the 
attribution of novel symbolism and significance to historical monuments or the 
manipulation of historical figures, by reinventing them as great heroic ancestors. By 
instilling this façade of the nation’s immortality and its extension to immemorial periods 
of its history this constructs a unitary national past and present. This aspect is 
discussed in the analysis of my empirical research in the chapters in relation to the G.C.  
national slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ (In Greek: Δεν Ξεχνω και Αγωνίζομαι).  
In this thesis, I approach G.C.  nationalism through Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined 
communities’ and Ozkirimli’s understanding of nationalism as ‘a discourse’.  Anderson 
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characterises nations as ‘imagined communities’ and argues that these communities 
are to be distinguished from one another ‘not by their authenticity but by the way in 
which they are imagined’ (19 3: 15).  The concept of ‘imagined community’ does not 
imply that nations are not real; thus that the ‘imagined’ nation is an ‘imaginary’ nation. 
Rather it guides us in understanding that nations are imagined: 
“Because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their 
fellow- members, meet them, or even hear of them; yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion” (ibid)  
The emphasis on the nation as a construct rests on the nationalist assumption that 
authentic or true communities do exist. However, in fact, apart from the face-to-face 
everyday interactions in primordial villages, all modern communities are imagined in one 
way or another.  
Furthermore, Ozkirimli (2005:29) takes a discursive approach to nationalism, arguing 
that we should understand nationalism as a particular form of discourse. Following 
Stuart Hall’s definition, he understands discourse as; “sets of ready-made and 
reconstituted ‘experiencings’ displayed and arranged through language” (Hall, 1977: 
322). It should be noted that this is the definition of discourse adopted in this thesis. 
This suggests that people live and experience through discourse in the sense that 
discourses impose frameworks that limit what can be experienced or the meaning that 
experience can assume, thereby influencing what can be said or done, Ozkirimli argues 
(2005:29-30). Hence nationalism in this vein “is a particular way of seeing and 
interpreting the world, a frame of reference that helps us make sense of and structure 
the reality that surrounds us.” (Ozkirimli, 2005: 30). 
Both the emphasis on the nation as an ‘imagined community’ and as a ‘discursive 
formation’ point us to the constructiveness of the nation as well as to nationalism as a 
way of interpreting and understanding the world that is continuously reproduced by the 
‘members’ of a nation. Thus, the national imaginary allows the ideological reproduction 
of ‘imagined communities’ that are experienced as both limited and sovereign 
(Anderson, 1983). Then, given that “the nationalist way of thinking and speaking helps 
to make nation,” (Calhoun, 1997: 99),“nationalism is not just a political doctrine, but a 
more basic way of talking, thinking and acting” (Ozkirimli, 2005:31).  
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Furthermore, the national ‘other’ is inextricable to the ‘imagination’ and ‘discursive 
construction’ but also to the continuous reproduction of the idea of the national 
community as authentic and sovereign.  The role of the ‘other’ in the construction and 
maintenance, but also ‘imagination’, of identity has prevailed in the theory of identity 
across social sciences in recent years, stretching, for example, from Said (1978) to 
Billing (1995) and Smith (1991). While the role of the ‘other’ in the general theorisation 
of identity appears primarily in the formation of any type of identity which is said to act 
as a catalyst in the differentiation and realisation of that identity in relevance to the 
‘other’, here I wish to stress the significance of processes of ‘othering’ in nationalism.  
In the same way that nationalism imagines nations (Anderson, 1983) it also imagines its 
‘others’ or namely ‘enemies’, through which interiorised feelings of group belonging and 
cohesion are established and secured. As Hall writes, “identity is partly the relationship 
between you and the other. Only when there is another can you know who you are” 
(Hall, 1992: 344). This consistency of identities and national coherence is made through 
a reverse orientation. Thus, by sketching out what the ‘other’ is for ‘us’, the ‘us’ 
becomes clear and strongly defined in the face of the ‘other’.  As Kennedy and Danks 
(2001:3) point out, all identity construction requires the summoning of difference; thus 
the relativisation of the self against the ‘other’. Then, through the projection of a shared 
‘other’ collective, solidarity is established amongst the ‘we’ and through the 
consolidation of an ‘other’ the collectively understood self becomes consolidated as well. 
The collective acceptance of shared national ‘others’ provides interiorised feelings of 
group belonging, which facilitates and guides collective action.  
The above discussion has reviewed some of the main definitions of nationalism. 
Moreover, as it will be later explored in detail, traditional frameworks employed by 
mainstream analyses of deeply divided ethno-nationalist societies have tended to ignore 
the gendered dimensions of ethno-nationalisms. The next section will review the 
literature on G.C.  nationalism, where again the limited gendered analysis and, more 
specifically, the lack of analysis of masculinity in the relevant literature will be pointed 
out . The contention of this thesis is that masculinity underpins and provides a rationale 
for understanding nationalism and militarism, particularly in post-armed conflict 
situations such as in Cyprus by having a constituent role in the ‘imagination’ (Anderson, 
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1983) of the ‘other’ and the nationalist militarist ‘self’ necessitated in opposition to this 
‘other’. 
 
Literature on Greek Cypriot nationalism 
Nationalism has been often treated by scholars as a process mainly articulated from 
above (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1983). Earlier research on nationalism in Cyprus had 
mostly adopted a macro-analytical approach and focused on the dividing aspects of the 
conflict, in order to unveil the processes and operations of nationalism, and the 
obstacles to reconciliation (Attalides, 1979; Bryant, 2004; Papadakis et al, 2006; 
Hadjipavlou, 2007b; Anastasiou, 2008; Papadakis & Bryant, 2012; Mavratsas, 1996; 
Brown and Theodossopoulos, 2004). For the social scientist of the conflict, 
understanding and deconstructing nationalism especially after the events of 1974 
became a major quest in explaining how violence and division comes about, and also 
how it becomes consolidated and reproduced through both popular discourses and 
state institutions. For instance, Bryant (2004) has examined the historical production 
and lineages of what she calls ‘two conflicting styles of nationalist imagination’ that were 
(re)produced by respective elites in both communities and then gained particular appeal 
amongst the masses. 
Yet, in recent years there has been a growing body of qualitative interviewing and 
ethnographic research on G.C.  nationalism as constructed and negotiated at the local 
or everyday level leading to an increasing focus at the individual level (for example 
Hadjipavlou, 2007; Dikomitis, 2005; Christou, 2006; Spyrou, 2006; Hadjipavlou, 2006; 
Dikomitis, 2004; Webster & Timothy, 2006). By stressing the need to specify, rather 
than assume, how individuals position themselves in relation to nationalism, these 
studies have made a significant contribution to the knowledge on G.C.  nationalism, by 
shifting the level of analysis from the macro to the micro. The findings of my empirical 
study further illustrate the significance of understanding how nationalism is constructed 
and negotiated at the micro level, but also the need to understand the inter-relationship 
of nationalism to militarism and masculinity.  
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There have been many studies on the creation of social memory and the reproduction 
and perpetuation of nationalist ideology in Cyprus. These studies have focused on 
education (Bryant, 1998, 1998b; Spyrou, 2000, 2002), political rituals and 
commemorative events (Papadakis, 2003) and ethnic stereotypes (Brown and 
Theodossopoulos, 2004; Papadakis, 2004) in the construction of ‘otherness’ and 
creation of an ‘imagined community’ in the G.C. educational system (Philippou, 2004; 
Spyrou, 2000) and specifically as generated by the slogan “I don’t forget and I struggle” 
in the G.C. educational system (Christou, 2006). What is key is that these studies move 
beyond the identification and description of the totalising effect of G.C. nationalism by 
examining the meaning that individuals make of national ideologies in their everyday 
lives.  Papadakis (1998), for example, became concerned about the link between ‘the 
national’ and ‘the personal’. The personal biographies he examines would often turn into 
political commentaries on local or national history interwoven with personal experiences 
(ibid:160).  
It is then possible to examine how individuals have the potential to strategically deal 
with nationalist ideology, engage in self-reflection and articulate counter-nationalist 
discourses, whilst also reiterating and re-modelling nationalist discourses under new 
political and social parameters.  
 
Research on political developments in Cyprus; conflict transformation and nationalism 
In recent years mainstream scholarship has encompassed the actual processes of 
conflict transformation. The opening of the Green Line in 2003 and the Annan 
reunification plan with the possibility of a solution raised in 2004, has led to a general 
academic turn of focus: from studying the conflict identities and the separation of the 
two communities, to investigating the new opportunities created by these political events 
for contact between the two communities. A qualitative body of work has been produced 
to investigate border crossings as a ‘new opportunity for contact’ and the potential for 
reconciliation (Dikomitis, 2005, 2009; Hadjipavlou, 2007b, 2009; Bryant, 2010). This 
body of research has unveiled the new opportunities for contact between the two 
communities, and also revealed the new, ideological borders and the utilization of the 
opening of the borders in reiterating divisions (Hadjipavlou, 2006, 2007a; Dikomitis, 
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2005, 2004; Demetriou, 2007).  In her recent book ‘The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the 
New Cyprus’, Bryant (2010) demonstrates that the opening of the borders, while it has 
significantly challenged long-standing imaginings and myths on both sides of the divide, 
it has also in some respects widened the distance between the two communities. The 
analysis of nationalism following the opening of the border, in terms of ‘new 
opportunities for contact’ and ‘ideological borders’ replacing the ‘un-crossable borders’, 
is employed in the thesis, in investigating the adapted reiteration of the relationship 
between nationalism, militarism and masculinity following the opening of the borders.  
The accession of Cyprus to the European Union has also been a political development 
that has led to the production of a body of literature examining the impact of the EU 
accession on the politics of the conflict (for example see: Diez et al., 2008; Demetriou, 
2005, 2008). This has mostly shown how the accession has marked a new turning point 
in the ‘struggle’ for the G.C.s by the accession becoming an instrument of the struggle 
to use against Turkey. This new body of work has also pointed to the feeling of security 
of G.C.s that the possibility of a second invasion by Turkey is simply non-existent 
(Demetriou, 2005; Lordos and Kaymak, 2007). Some research has also drawn links 
between the modern national identity of Cyprus and sexuality, pointing to the 
persistence of ‘hetero-normativity’ and ‘hetero-centricity’ in Cypriot society following the 
accession to the EU (Kamenou, 2011). The analysis of this political development in 
Cyprus in terms of the ‘changing understanding of struggle’ and ‘security vis-à-vis 
Turkey’ in this thesis is employed in investigating the process undermining the ideology 
of ‘defence’ (in Greek: άμυνα) resulting from the Europeanisation of the politics of the 
conflict and the appeal to a ‘Euro-Cypriot’ identity. Moreover, the thesis examines how a  
‘Euro-Cypriot’ identity relates to the changing G.C. hegemonic masculinity. 
 
Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ in the examination of Nationalism, Militarism and 
Masculinity in post-2003 Cyprus 
 
In this thesis I employ Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ to understand 
G.C. nationalism. I also take Andersons theorisation a step further to understand the 
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‘other’ and the masculinist and militarist discourses co-constituting G.C. nationalism. 
Anderson has been repeatedly used to understand G.C. nationalism (Bryant, 2002; 
Mavratsas, 1996) and also more specifically in empirical studies on G.C. nationalism 
(Christou, 2006, 2007; Spyrou, 2006). 
Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ is helpful in understanding the 
construction and the ‘imagination’ of G.C. nationalism and the idea of the G.C. 
community. As Mavratsas argues in his article: ‘Approaches to Nationalism: Basic 
Theoretical Considerations in the Study of the G.C. Case and a Historical Overview’, 
that there is “enough evidence to support the claim that the modern concept of the 
Greek nation only began to appear gradually and to be ‘imagined’, around the turn of 
the nineteenth century.” (1996: 83). The ideological origins of Greek nationalism in 
Cyprus can be traced to when the Greeks began to develop a specific identity in the 
period of the Neohellenic Enlightenment, which differentiated them from the other 
Christians of the Ottoman Empire (Kitromilides, 1983, 1989, 1994). An awareness of 
ethnic distinction had begun to arise in the early years of the 19th century, yet only within 
a small segment of the G.C. population, due to influences from both Greece and centres 
of Hellenism in Asia Minor (Attalides, 1979; Kitromilides, 1979; Loizos, 1974). The main 
mechanisms of ‘nation-building’ were the educational system, which at the time was in 
the hand of the Orthodox Church, and the Greek consulate (Attalides, 1979; Kitromilides, 
1979).  
G.C. national identity has had to reconcile two separate nation states: “Greece and 
Cyprus, a sometime uneasy relationship inextricably bound up with debates over 
Cypriot independence and union with Greece, and ultimately brought into sharp focus 
by the Turkish invasion” (Burrell, 2006: 91). Thus the main internal opposition against 
G.C. nationalism as Mavratsas (1996;   ) informs us “has come from what may be 
broadly called ‘Cypriotism’, a political ideology and cultural discourse which, by placing 
the centre of attention on Cyprus, rather than the Greek nation, functions as a territorial 
nationalism with strong civic elements.” (see also Attalides, 1979).   
The diverse perspectives and the complexity on what constitutes G.C. national identity 
have been convoluted and long drawn out, and as Papadakis (199 : 162) has noted “if 
anything unites Greek Cypriots in a community, it is their participation in a debate about 
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what constitutes the nation, not some shared conception of the nation.” Broadly 
speaking, “it may be argued that the contrast between Greek nationalism and 
Cypriotism corresponds to the political opposition between right and left.”  (Mavratsas, 
1996: 93).  
What has also been particularly useful in employing Anderson’s theory was thinking 
beyond his application of the concept to understand how the ‘other’ is framed in the G.C. 
community. Part of the ‘imagined community’ is imagining the ‘other’. Therefore, the 
concept ‘imagined communities’ works well in the case of Cyprus, as imagination, and 
as it will be argued, also memory, were so to speak ‘sterilised’ and ‘decontextualised’ in 
time from 1974 to 2003, due to the partition of the island. Any contact between the two 
communities during this period was impossible due to the existence of closed, heavily 
militarised borders that physically separated them.  
G.C. post-war nationalism has rested on the imagination of the threatening national 
generalised and undifferentiated ‘other’; the ‘Turks’, who existed across the border,  
(see Spyrou, 2006: 97-99). This has been an indispensable part of the imagination of 
the G.C. community and to the preservation of both national sentiment and unity, yet 
also to a feeling of superiority. The primary ‘other’ (the Turks for G.C.s) provides a 
“convenient point of reference for any kind of comparison, whether in relation to war, or 
civilisation, or any aspect of daily life where ‘being a Greek’ always implies a sense of 
superiority.” (Spyrou, 2006: 9 ). This process is a familiar one to nationalist 
constructions of identity, where the Self is understood as superior to the ‘other’. In the 
broader G.C.  nationalist imagination of the ‘enemy’, T.C.s do not seem to be 
differentiated from ‘Turks’, and the generalised term ‘Turk’ swallows up any diversity in 
the Other and, by  eliminating its diversity, national identity is fully essentialised, (see 
Spyrou, 2006: 99). Thus the ‘imagination’ of the undifferentiated and unifying enemy 
becomes the unifying force for the collective solidarity and Self.  
While, for the G.C.s the ‘other’ living across the border was imagined, the ‘other side’ 
was part of the ‘imagination’ of what Cyprus became for the G.C. community following 
the partition. What was perceived to have been lost, existing across the border was 
either imagined or remembered. Therefore, memory, which in this instance takes the 
form of the official pronouncement of ‘I do not forget’ (Christou, 2006), has been a 
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function of resistance (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) in maintaining in the G.C. 
nationalist imagination the territory of Cyprus that G.C.s  no longer controlled, and were 
also unable to visit. The resistance to forgetting maintained an ‘imagination’ that was 
ideologically turned into the need to ‘I struggle’ to ‘return’; ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ 
for the G.C. community.  
The concept of ‘imagined communities’ can also be extended in assisting us to 
understand the masculinist and militarist discourses co-constituting G.C. nationalism. 
Anderson (1983) has argued that nations also inspire profound love that can lead to 
self-sacrifice for this “imagined community”. “Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it 
possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, 
as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.” Anderson (19 3, 2006: 7).  However, he 
does not further extend his analysis in providing an understanding of the significance of 
gender and militarism to nationalism. As Mavratsas (1996: 84-5) argues;  “it is of crucial 
significance for the researcher to understand that, notwithstanding its often irrational, or 
even catastrophic, implications, Greek Cypriots nationalism has historically produced 
martyrdom, as well as other incidents of genuine national heroism.”  
As will be discussed in the empirical chapters on G.C. nationalism these specific 
constructions of ‘heroism’ and ‘defence’ have been constituent parts of the way in which 
the post-war G.C. community has been ‘imagined’. ‘Defence’, with its specific 
discourses of heroism, was a ‘sacred’ element integrative of the ‘imagination’ of the 
community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ that will protect the victimised Cyprus. Thus, ‘defence’ 
has been an internal indispensable component of the collective consciousness and 
‘imagination’ of the community that has rested on the dynamic of being ‘threatened’ and 
needing to be ‘protected’, while fighting for the legal rights and freedom for the 
community. Moreover, the National Guard occupies a central axis and has been the 
institutional facet in the ‘imagination’ of ‘defence’. As Whitworth (2004:  27) argues 
Anderson’s insight can be applied not only to nations but also to any large 
contemporary institutions, including national militaries and multilateral institutions. ‘They 
are constituted in part through shared ideas that give them meaning.’  The next section 
explores the broader literature on militarism, illustrating the lack of literature on 
militarism in Cyprus. 
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3. 3. Militarism 
Militarism itself is a difficult field of study because of its wide diversity in forms and 
processes as well as socio-cultural contexts. Militarism has been a contested concept 
(Cock, 1989, 2004).Theorisations of militarisation, as Cock (1989: 51) argues, most 
often hinge on distinction being drawn between three social phenomena: 1) the military 
as a social institution: a set of social relationships organised around war, taking the 
shape of an armed force; 2) militarism as an ideology which values war and legitimates 
state violence as the solution to conflict; 3) militarism as a social process that involves 
mobilisation for war through the penetration of the military, its power and influence, into 
more and more social arenas, until the military have a primacy in state and society. 
However, in the literature on militarism, often there is a good deal of slippage between 
these three phenomena. In this thesis the term ‘militarism’ is used to refer: 
 
1. To the military as a formal state institution  
2. To the militarisation of the state  
3. To the militarisation of the society  
4. To the reciprocal process of militarisation between military barracks, state and 
society 
 
Therefore, I employ ‘miltiarisation’ to refer to the militarisation of the military state 
institution, the state and society through a reciprocal relationship between them. This 
relationship, through culture and ideology, is constructing, reproducing and re-adapting 
G.C. post-armed conflict militarized, nationalist, and masculinist discourses.   
The systematic examination of the military in social sciences was launched by scholars 
(for example Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Moskos, 1976; Burk, 1993) who 
focused on the military as a social institution and the military leadership as a 
professional yet social elite. In sociology, the military has been understood classically as 
one of the many, and basic, institutions of the state. For Max Weber (1978)  the analysis 
of the military is central to the definition of the modern bureaucratic state. He defines the 
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modern state as the community, which successfully believes it holds the monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force of a certain territory. Since the state monopolisation of 
violence in the 16th century, armed forces have always been central to the state, (Weber, 
1978; Tilly, 1975; Anderson, 1993; Scott, 2000).  
The military is frequently conceptualised as a discrete institutional entity. While Enloe 
refers to 'the military institution', others have expanded the notion to depict a 'military-
industrial complex' or even 'the military-industrial-technological-bureaucratic complex' 
(Eide and Thee, 1980). This is sometimes identified with the state (see for example 
Williams, 1985:224).  
It is often observed that the military has an ‘institutional’ character because of its 
connection with the means of legitimate violence and the unlimited liability of their 
contract of employment (Moskos and Wood, 1988).  In this understanding the emphasis 
is often placed on the sub-culture of the military as a state-institution. This being “alien 
to civilian life in terms of dealing with fear of physical danger and acceptance of 
hardship, the importance of leadership, and so on.” (Kuhlmann and Callaghan, 2011: 
36). The main features of the military are seen as a distinct set of behaviours, rules, 
norms, and values coordinated around a defensive or offensive goal (ibid). However, 
this understanding has been sharply criticised for attempting to demarcate the problem.  
For example Thompson (1982:21) argues that:  
“We speak of "the military-industrial complex" or of "the military sector" or "interest" of 
the arms lobby. This suggests that the evil is confined in a known and limited place: it 
may threaten to push forward, but it can be restrained.” 
In the same vein Sjoberg and Sandra Via (2010: 7) argue “though war is an essential 
condition of militarism- the apex, the climax, the peak experience, the point of all the 
investment, training, and preparation – militarism -  is much, much broader than war, 
comprising an underlying system of institutions, practices, values, and cultures.”  This 
later conceptualisation of militarism, by providing an understanding of it as a synergy 
between multiple institutions and culture, points us to the reciprocal relationship 
between the military, state and society. Whereas, by pointing to the culture and ideology 
of militarism we can shed light onto understanding the way militarism is co-constituted 
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with nationalism and masculinity, not only during armed conflicts, but also in post-armed 
conflict societies.  
Clearly different societies have experienced different levels of militarisation. The way 
militarisation is to be conceptualised and measured, however, remains an on-going 
question. The RoC, as a result of the Turkish occupation on the island controls only its 
southern part, but is typically ranked by quantitative militarisation indexes in the top ten 
per capita militarised countries globally, for example see the Global Militarisation Index. 
Yet, whether one measures the level of militarisation through qualitative or quantitative 
indicators, taking into account military expenditure, the number and sophistication of the 
weapons systems, the number of heavy weapons in relation to the population, the 
political influence of the military, the power and influence of the military over the society, 
the involvement of the larger society into the ‘military project’, Cyprus is a highly 
militarised society. The high levels of militarisation of Cyprus, as the next section 
illustrates, rely on the strong reciprocal relationship between military and society.  
The military and society as reciprocal and bidirectional 
In this thesis I have approached the relationship between the military and society as 
reciprocal and bidirectional. It is often observed that militaries are dependent upon “the 
host societies from which they recruit, which they serve and from which they derive 
financial and moral support.” (Kuhlmann and Callaghan, 2011: 35). Chamallas (1998: 
307) has argued that the military is a microcosm of society. Conceptualising the military 
in this way helps us to understand how the military reflects and represents a larger 
society at a given historical, political and cultural juncture. Moreover, Lômsqî-Feder & 
Ben-Ari (1999: 1) argue that “both warfare and armed service represent intensive 
meeting points between the individual and the collective.” In investigating militarism, 
therefore, we need to direct our attention both to the military as a micro-society 
conditioned by the broader national society and also to the modalities and perceptions 
shaped within the military that then penetrate the larger society. We could then say that, 
"some variables pertain to the society, in the sense that society is the place where their 
modalities are shaped, and some others pertain to the military, in the sense that the 
military is the place where their modalities are shaped." Nuciari (2006: 83).  Under this 
framework of thinking, ‘militarisation is a social process’ that involves the 
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mobilisation of resources for war at political, economic and ideological levels, (see Cock 
and Nathan, 1989: 2).  
Andreski (1968) importantly argues, that militarism can also mean subservience of the 
whole society to the needs of the army, which may involve a recasting of social life in 
accordance with the pattern of military organisation, while also referring to an ideology 
which promotes military ideas. Enloe takes the ideological dimension of militarisation 
one step further and argues that it implies the extent to which military encroachments 
are acceptable to the population and become seen as 'common sense' solutions to civil 
problems. (Enloe, 1983: 9). The strong relationship between the NG and society is 
discussed in detail in the chapter on militarism, where the argument is put forward that 
‘defence’ is an ideology of militarism developed in post-war Cyprus, which involved and 
appealed to the whole of society. However, certain political developments in Cyprus and 
certain global military trends and cultural developments, which are introduced in the 
section that follows, have begun to undermine the ideology of ‘defence’ in Cyprus.  
The shift from mass-conscript  to professional, all volunteer armies and the abolition of 
conscription 
Military establishments in industrial democracies face serious challenges in the 21st 
century, see for example Kuhlmann and Callaghan (2011). These challenges have 
become a central theme in the recent studies of militarism that have discussed the 
replacement of the mass conscription army by a smaller professional one, as a result of 
technological and economic developments (Burk, 1992; Haltiner, 1998; Cohen, 1995; 
Shaw, 1991; Van Doom, 1975; Janowitz, 1960; Moon, 2005a). Whilst the EU accession 
has also been repeatedly identified as an impactful factor on the professionalisation and 
modernisation of member state armies, (see Lutterbeck 2005; King, 2011, 2005). 
Literature has also discussed how mass conscription armies had to be reconsidered 
due to the decline in the motivation to serve (see Haltiner, 1998). Moskos et al. (2000) 
in the scope of these developments draw a distinction between the modern, late modern 
and postmodern armies and claims that war and armed forces in the West have 
become post-modern.  
From the 1990s, professional, smaller and more cost-effective forces have gradually 
replaced mass conscript armies. Many European countries as well as most members of 
NATO have abolished obligatory military service. Today, out of the 28 NATO countries 
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only 5 have some form of military service. Out of the 28 European Union member-states 
only 6 do9, and this includes Cyprus, which today has the longest conscription service in 
the EU. 
The abandonment of military conscription in European militaries has been discussed 
repeatedly (Joenniemi, 2006; Belfer, 2013), while also pointing to European armed 
forces becoming concentrated and ‘transnational’, see King (2005). Elaborating on his 
theory in light of empirical cases in Western Europe, Haltiner (1998) contended that 
“geostrategic factors” are more important than economic and technological factors in 
determining the decline of the mass conscription army. Military conscription is today in 
Europe mostly an anachronism antithetical to the appeal of a European identity. In the 
scope of the exchange of conscript armies for professional ones in Europe, the 
European cultural dimension of this shift has also been raised (see for example 
example Belfer, 2013: 27).  
Changes in the military reflect broader social changes and vice-versa (Janowitz, 1960, 
1957, 1984). Social scientists became interested in how this change affected society 
and the representativeness of the military in society. The wider cultural background in 
western societies moving away from traditional values poses a serious challenge to 
state-militaries in terms of the micro-culture of the institution. In this scope of cultural 
developments in the West, debates on gender and sexuality and military service, have 
become crucial (Dandeker and Segal 1996; Segal 1995; Winslow,2010).  
 
 
 
Militarism in Cyprus 
Despite its political and cultural saliences, militarism in Cyprus as an issue of inquiry 
itself has attracted surprisingly little social research. Military vehicles, outposts and 
soldiers colour the natural sceneries of the island, while Nicosia, the capital, remains 
divided in two with the heavy military presence, namely G.C. and Turkish armies, on 
both sides of the buffer zone and the UN peace keeping forces located in the middle. In 
                                                          
9
 In 2013 the EU country members sustaining conscription are Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland and Greece.  
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academic literature the NG only appears in historical discussions regarding the appeal 
for union with Greece and the coup d’état of 1974 (for example see Bruce, 1985; Byrne, 
2000), in discussions about defence spending (Kollias, Naxakis & Zarangas, 2004; 
Kollias, 2001), and defence acquisition (Demetriou,1998; Tank, 2002). Militarism, as it 
will be discussed in the section on masculinity, has been very briefly touched on in 
discussions on gender.  
This absence is surprising given the high levels of militarisation that Cyprus has 
experienced following the war of 1974. Moreover, the absence of studies of the NG in 
the literature is surprising given the extensive literature on G.C.  nationalism. The NG 
was created out of and had a significant role in the spark of the bi-communal clashes of 
1963-4 and was involved in the war of 1974 against the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. 
Thereafter it has been ascribed with political and security importance. It has become a 
huge economic investment and has maintained up to the present day a long 
conscription service (since the enactment of the 1964 National Guard law), which is 
currently the longest period of conscription service in the EU. RoC presents a particular 
case of European integration that has become entangled with the on-going national 
conflict. Understanding the relationship between the army and society as bi-directional, 
helps us to investigate both the high levels of militarisation which Cyprus has been 
experiencing as well as this particular dynamic between the state, armed forces and 
society in the scope of the Europeanisation of Cyprus.  
Bi-directional relationship of National Guard to society 
In this thesis I have approached the NG of Cyprus as an institution of the state that has 
direct contingent and conditional links to society. As such the NG is being shaped and 
constructed by the larger society and the larger society is shaped and constructed by 
the ideological mobilisation of the NG. I therefore avoided approaching it as a discrete 
state institutional entity and thus as a micro-society distinct from G.C. society. 
Cyprus presents a case of what we can call ‘nation-in-arms’ (Rapoport, 1962; 
BenEliezer, 1995). In Cyprus the fully conscript NG entirely depends on recruiting 
soldiers from society, for a military service that in the form of conscription, reserve and 
militia today includes males from the ages of 18 – 55, (see: National Guard law (2011).  
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Militarism in Cyprus, operating through a ‘nation-in-arms’ model, further consolidates 
and strengthens the links between the army and society. In Cyprus the military touches 
every G.C. family, with almost every family having a son as a soldier or reserve and a 
husband as a reserve or militia, almost every family has a ‘militarised wing’.  
This thesis draws on specific political, cultural and social discourses that are part of 
relationships binding Cyprus society to the NG. These are argued to be:  
- The perceived threat by Turkey, mostly in relation to a second military offensive 
that has largely characterised post-war politics, has acquired existential 
significance for the G.C. community following the war in 1974.  
 
- The perceived threat by Turkey being responded to by the development of 
the ideology of ‘defence’ (in Greek: άμυνα) and the attendant ‘nation-in-
arms’ that includes an extensive conscription service and diversion of 
financial resources to military uses such as upgrading Cyprus’ military 
capabilities as counter-posed to the small population and size of Cyprus in 
relation to Turkey.  
 
- The political orientation of public opinion towards the significance of the NG 
through political discourse and media. 
 
- The production and reproduction of collective representations of the notions of 
‘citizen-soldier’ and ‘everyday ordinary heroes’ through political, popular and 
state discourse. 
Furthermore, in this thesis, in theorising and understanding militarism in Cyprus through 
the bi-directional relationship between NG and society, I have drawn extensively from 
literature on Northern Ireland, Israel and South Korea. As militarism in all of these 
contexts is argued to have similarities with the case of Cyprus in the way it has been 
constructed and mobilised as bi-directional and manifested outside the confines of the 
army barracks.  The relation of army and society has been mobilised in all of these 
three countries through certain notions of nation-in-arms in response to the perceived 
necessity for defence of the community from the threat of being swept away by the 
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‘enemy’ (Ben-Eliezer, 1995; 199 ; Mamān et al, 2001; Lômsqî-Feder & Ben-Ari, 1999; 
Moon, 2005b; Kwon, 2000; Sheffer & Barak, 2010; Banerjee, 2012; Ashe, 2012). Also, 
specific militarised understandings of masculinity, and co-constitutive femininity, had a 
pivotal role to play both in the construction and reproduction of militarism and defence of 
the community from 'existential-threat' (Kimmerling, 1983; Banerjee, 2012; Robbins& 
Ben-Eliezer, 2000; Sheffer & Barak, 2010; Sasson-Levy, 2003; Kwon, 2000; Moon, 
2005a; Ashe, 2012). Given these strong supportive links between the NG and society in 
Cyprus, as it is discussed in the empirical chapters, the weakening and declining 
legitimacy of the NG in wider society can prove to be particularly detrimental for 
militarism and these developments in militarism are key in investigating its 
interrelationship to nationalism and masculinity.  
In the empirical chapters I am concerned with explaining the tensions created between 
this conflicting trajectory: the broader European shift in professional armies and 
European Cyprus falling back from this shift, with open borders and in the context of 
certain cultural developments (facing a particular political and military situation). This 
particular situation is analysed in exposing the impact it has on militarism, and also on 
the bi-directional relationship of the NG with society. In doing so the empirical chapters 
investigate:   
- The commitment of the community to the idea of a ‘nation-in-arms’. 
- The personal importance social actors ascribe to the armed struggle for defence. 
- Their understanding of security and the place of the military within it. 
- The personal importance they ascribe to military service. 
- Their view of the diversion and management of resources towards military uses. 
- The relationship of gender to military roles.  
The role of gender in nationalism and militarism is the focus of the next section that will 
reveal a significant gap in the literature in relation to masculinity, which this thesis aims 
to redress.   
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3.4. Gender, Nationalism and Militarism 
In this section I start by discussing the initiation of the study of gender by feminism and 
then move into the emergence of the study of men and masculinity and conclude by 
illustrating the significance of addressing masculinity in post-armed conflict societies.  
 
Feminism 
During the past two centuries, feminism as an ideology and as a social movement has 
transformed women’s lives, especially in the West, on many levels (Tinker, 1990; 
Freedman 2002). Unlike other revolutions like “national revolutions, this social upheaval 
crosses continents, decades, and ideologies” (Freedman, 2002: 31). Feminists “believe 
that women have been subordinated through men’s power, variously expressed in 
different arenas. They value women’s concerns, and work to improve women’s status.” 
DeVault (1996: 31) 
As part of the feminist movement, varied theories developed to explain the causes of 
male domination (DeVault, 1996). These theories, “charged that cultural ideologies 
favoured men, that social institutions reflected these ideologies, and that men as a 
group benefited from the subordination of women as a group”, Gardiner (2005: 35). 
Feminism invites us to deal with different perspectives and theorisations about women’s 
oppressions and subordinate roles (Littlewood, 2004). At different times in the 
development of feminism, a strand, an approach, or issue become more dominant such 
as civil rights for women, race and identity. These changes that occurred in the 
development of the feminist movement are called waves, (see: Aikau et al., 2007).  
Feminist approaches to sociological inquiry have developed in the past four decades 
alongside feminist political movements, (see: Stanley, 2013 for overview). This 
challenging of sociology by feminists relates to the inadequacy of sociology in 
documenting and explaining the social world and the structures that might oppress and 
discriminate against women. The feminist critique was therefore a reaction against 
existing sexist bias, with the emphasis on exposing male dominated disciplines and 
research behaviours (Spender, 1981; Stanley and Wise, 2013). This has significantly 
contributed also to both epistemological and methodological academic discussions, 
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(see for example Littlewood, 2004 and DeVault, 1996 which offer a comprehensive 
discussion of these).  
Gender in studies of nationalism and militarism 
Feminists have repeatedly and continually highlighted that nationalisms are highly 
gendered ideologies and need to be examined in relation to gender (see for example 
Peterson, 1999; Sylvester, 1989; Enloe, 1989, 2000; Cockburn, 1998, 2004; Maynard 
&Winn, 1997; Golan, 1997; Sharoni, 1995; Abu-Laban, 2009; Rodenas, 1998; 
Hadjipavlou, 2010; Evangelista, 2011; Ueno & Yamamoto, 2004; Sjoberg & Via, 2010; 
Banerjee, 2003). Despite the nationalists’ investment in the idea of unity, ‘nations have 
historically amounted to the sanctioned institutionalisation of gender difference’ 
(McClintock, 1996: 260).  
Many feminist studies of gender in nationalism and militarism, have pointed out that “the 
militarisation of any nationalist movement occurs through the gendered workings of 
power”, as the militarism that pervades global politics is not gender neutral, “natural or 
automatic” (Enloe, 1993). Yet, such studies have most often tended to focus on the 
implications of the gendered dimension of nationalism and militarism for women. By 
extension, the masculinist discourses of nationalism and militarism have been often 
analysed in the relevant literature in terms of the ‘role-proper’ of and impact for women 
in such process (examples include Enloe, 2010, 2000, 2004, 2007; Sjoberg and Sandra 
Via, 2010; Sjoberg, 2007). Thus, such literature has tended to ignore the significance of 
addressing the role of men and masculinity as an issue of inquiry itself and has often 
taken for granted the role men and masculinity play in nationalism and militarism. For 
example, Sjoberg and Sandra Via (2010) offer a comprehensive edited volume on 
Gender, War and Militarism that predominantly focuses on investigating and assessing 
the impacts of war and militarism on women. They argue in their introduction to this 
volume: 
“Always masculinist endeavours, war and militarism have significant, distinctive, and 
heart-wrenching effects on women.” (ibid: 10).  
More specifically, the impact of militarisation and its attendant masculinity on women’s 
lives has been repeatedly discussed and demonstrated in specific contexts. Examples 
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include Evangelista’s (2010) analysis of gender, nationalism, and war in Algeria, 
Yugoslavia, Chechnya and Quebec (Canada), Banerjee’s (2003) analysis of gender and 
nationalism in contemporary India and Albanese’s (2001) analysis of nationalism, war, 
and gender relations in the Balkans. Also, an emerging body of literature has explored 
the admission and increasing number of women in Western armies, focusing mostly on 
the discrimination and occupational restriction of women, (Carreiras, 2013; Miller, 1998; 
Rogan, 1981). 
 
Gender in studies of nationalism and militarism in post-conflict societies 
In the scope of the analysis of nationalism and militarism in post-conflict societies 
through the lens of gender, unfortunately ‘gender’ has again mostly been understood as 
synonymous to women (McKeown and Sharoni, 2002; Kwon, 2000; Ashe, 2012). By 
prioritising a set of issues relating to women in such examinations of post-conflict 
societies the role of women has largely outweighed the one of men.  Examples, include 
Aretxaga’s (1997) and Dowler’s (1998) analyses of the effects of ethnic conflict on 
women in Northern Ireland, and Cock’s (1989) examination of women’s roles in 
nationalism and militarism in South Africa. For example Jacklyn Cock (1989) in her 
article titled: ‘Keeping the Fires Burning: Militarisation and the Politics of Gender in 
South Africa’ examines how war is a male affair and the military a patriarchal institution 
from which women are excluded and by whom they are often victimised. 
The focus on women in examinations of gender in nationalism and militarism in post-
conflict societies has tended to ignore masculinity as an issue of inquiry itself, the 
experiences and voices of men, the impact that political and ideological changes can 
have on masculinities and the role of masculinity in processes of conflict transformation 
(see McKeown and Sharoni, 2002 who make these points about N. Ireland and 
Palestine, Kwon, 2000 about South Korea and Ashe, 2012 about N. Ireland). It is the 
case that gender analyses of post-armed conflict societies have often understood 
masculinities in conflict as somehow unchangeable, thus essentialised. By extension, 
when men are addressed in the scope of post-conflict societies they are treated as a 
monolithic entity (McKeown and Sharoni, 2002: 1). Moreover, in studies of gender in 
post-conflict societies the inspection of masculinity has often been limited to the 
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explanation that the persistence of patriarchal culture in nationalism and militarism is 
continuing the oppression of women. As Insook Kwon comments:  
“For both South Korean feminists and many of the country’s women in general, the 
persistence of a Confucian patriarchal culture into Korea’s present industrialized era is 
assumed to be a sufficient explanation for the continuation of gendered oppression in 
South Korea: blocking attempts for other explanations.” (Kwon, 2000: 27).  
Scholars have tended to conduct limited investigations of masculinity in the 
examinations of the masculinist dimensions of nationalism and militarism in post-conflict 
societies. As, by doing so, they have unwittingly preserved the naturalised dimensions 
of masculinity (McKeown and Sharoni, 2002: 2). It is the contention of this thesis that, to 
put masculinity aside in our examination of nationalism and militarism in a post-armed 
conflict society, like Cyprus, is to underestimate the array of masculinist stakes that 
construct a nationalist militarist society. Moreover, this thesis takes the perspective that 
ignoring masculinity underestimates the workings of masculinity in the ability of this 
three-fold relationship to continuously reproduce the co-constitution of these three 
discourses and to readapt and reiterate its interdependency in post-armed conflict 
societies: a) in the picking up of the pieces of armed ethnic nationalist militarist conflict 
in such a way that leaves the nationalist masculinist, militaristic culture undisturbed b) in 
the aftermath of political events that demolish central constructions on which this 
relationship has been co-constituted against.  
Nationalism and gender in Cyprus 
The dominance of specific matters pertaining to analysing and solving the ‘Cyprus 
Problem’ in academic literature on Cyprus has not been conducive to explorations of 
other forms of identity (Chatzipanagiotidou, 2012: 5), pushing gender research even 
further than it is usually on to the margins of mainstream social science. Concurrently, 
this academic focus has not been conducive to explorations of how nationalism is co-
constituted with other identities, discourses and ideologies.  
Gender has been previously raised in the context of the Cyprus conflict pointing to the 
different experience and impact of it on men and women (Hadjipavlou, 2010). Such 
scholarship, however, mainly addressed the role of women and femininity and has been 
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concerned with the condition of womanhood in the conflict situation (see Hadjipavlou, 
2009 and 1996; Anthias, 1992 and 1989; Cockburn, 2004 and 2006). Also, the opening 
and crossing of the borders has been previously addressed through qualitative research, 
in relation to gender, although again focusing mainly on women (Hadjipavlou, 2006). 
This justifiable concern for women in research on gender, has masked not only the role 
of men but also the significance of masculinity in the post-armed conflict situation, 
attributing little attention to men and masculinity that remains to the present day 
seriously understudied (exceptions include Kamenou, 2011; Koureas, 2012; Philaretou 
et al., 2006; Philaretou et al., 2005; Scott, 2003).  
The broader body of work on gender in Cyprus has mostly focused on the lack of 
feminist analysis of gender power relations and the lack of analysis of the different 
experiences of women’s lives from those of men (Anthias, 19 9, 1992; Cockburn, 2004; 
Hadjipavlou, 2009). The instrumentalisation of women’s pain and suffering is part of the 
exploitation by the State to promote the nationalist project and its own form of 
masculinity and femininity (Cockburn, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2006; Yakinthou, 2008; Sant 
Cassia, 2005). So is the reluctance of the State in appointing women in important public 
positions (Iacovou-Kapsali et al., 2008). The shared view of T.C.  and G.C.  women is 
that women’s issues have been undermined in the political agenda because of the 
predominance of the ‘national political problem’ (Cockburn, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2010). 
The exploration of women’s exceptional gender status is through their own narratives 
(Hadjipavlou, 2009). Women’s gender consciousness is rising due to their level of 
education and increasing awareness of male dominance in society (Hadjipavlou, 2004, 
2010; Cockburn, 2004; Mertan, 2000). Therefore, the body of work on gender in Cyprus 
is limited, mainly addressing the role of men and masculinity in the post-armed conflict 
situation only in so far as it co-constitutes femininity and the role of women. This has 
had clear implications to the study of men and masculinity with the role of men and 
masculinity remaining unproblematised and obscured through the understanding of 
patriarchy that reproduces gender inequality and oppression for women, most often 
framing masculinities as naturalised and as somehow unchangeable, thus essentialised.  
The absence of studies on masculinity and the role of men in the post-armed conflict 
situation in Cyprus as an issue of inquiry by itself, is surprising, since the centrality of 
masculinity, even if very briefly touched on, has been previously raised in co-
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constituting femininity in patriarchal society (Hadjipavlou, 2010: 93), military masculinity 
and the NG as the primary institutional site of hegemonic masculinity (Philaretou, 
Phellas and Karayianni, 2006: 76), the military service for males as the primary form of 
gender discrimination (Joannidis, 2012) as well as homosexuality and gender 
subjectivities (Kamenou, 2011; Onoufriou, 2010). Also, research that has addressed 
gender and nationalism in Cyprus has, in some cases, commented on the stakes of the 
conflict being constituted in masculine terms such as honour, revenge and heroism (for 
example Cockburn, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2010). This has opened up the discussion on 
the centrality of the G.C. masculine discourse in the formation of nationalism and 
militarism, yet does not proceed further in analysing this.  
Therefore, research on gender in Cyprus has been important in opening up the 
discussion on the significance and implication for and of gender in Cypriot nationalist, 
masculinist, militarist culture.  
Maria Hadjipavlou is the main scholar that became concerned about the link between 
nationalism and gender in Cyprus and has extensively illustrated through her work the 
relevance and significance of studying gender in understanding the conflict, and 
creating prospects for reconciliation. Yet, with her focus been to provide an analysis of 
the role of and implications for women in nationalist and militarist ideological and 
discursive processes in Cyprus, she has only touched on the role of men and 
masculinity in G.C. nationalism and militarism by illustrating the co-constitutive role of 
women and femininity in such conflict processes. However, this focus on gender has 
provided us with important insights about the role of gender in the conflict, whilst 
opening up the discussion to now explore the role of men and masculinity in G.C. 
nationalism and militarism. For example she argues that:  
“In the Greek Cypriot community many posters used in public spaces after the 1974 
Turkish invasion depicted Greek Cypriot women weeping and holding terrified babies or 
photographs of missing loved ones, all embodiments of the collective pain and suffering 
of Greek Cypriot. refugees.” (2010: 37).  
Furthermore, she comments that “as war is deemed part of the ‘male domain’, female 
interpretations, reactions, desires and opinions are excluded as extraneous, secondary 
and ultimately immaterial.” (2010: 43).  
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Hadjipavlou offers a key point here, that war and conflict are seen as masculine as they 
are tightly linked to the ‘male domain’. A masculinist discourse represents this domain in 
the conflict, which as Hadjipavlou observes above, places the female interpretations as 
secondary. In this thesis I am examining how this masculinist discourse on war is 
played out by being co-constituted to nationalism and militarism.  
Furthermore, as Hadjipavlou argues, “not only men but women too reproduce the 
narrative and norms; they participate in the militarisation of the state and Greek Cypriot  
mothers are proud that their sons do their military service for 26 months.”10 (2010: 42). 
The point she makes here is key, as both women and men take part in the militarisation 
of the state and their society’s sense of pride is a product of the masculinist co-
constitution of nationalism and militarism that relates to the broader masculinist 
nationalist militarist G.C. posture in the conflict situation. This thesis therefore puts 
forward the argument that there is a broader masculinist discourse that engages both 
men and women to take part in and reproduce not only the nationalist militarisation of 
the state but also of society. It is this nationalist militarised masculinity  that today 
provides the rationale for the continuous public support of a potent army following the 
opening of the borders in 2003 and the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004.  
Studies of gender in Cyprus have ignored in their analysis, on the one hand, that 
masculinity is a broader discourse in its inter-relationship to nationalism and militarism, 
on the other hand, such studies have not allowed the space for male experiences and 
the voices of men to be enunciated. By not engaging with the broader masculinist 
discourse and the experience of men through the intersection and antagonism of 
masculine ideals in competing political and social discourses, these studies have also 
failed to embrace the role of masculinity at times of political development and social 
transition.  
To challenge this naturalised set of assumptions of masculinity and, thus, to encourage 
research and attention towards masculinity in the European post-armed conflict Cyprus 
with open borders requires a scholar to demonstrate that masculinity concerns a wider 
and deeper range of societal, political and national issues than simply the discourse of 
patriarchy and young men’s experience of compulsory military service. 
                                                          
10
 The military service today is 24 months but the duration of it has been reduced several times over the 
years (see: Ministry of Defence -Υπουργείο Άμυνας - Στρατολογία 2013). 
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The following section will start by discussing the emergence of the study of men and 
masculinity and will then move forward in illustrating the importance of addressing 
masculinity in post-armed conflict societies.  
 
3.4. Nationalism, Militarism and Masculinity 
The emergence of the study of men and masculinity 
The study of men and masculinity emerged following the initiation of the broader 
discussion on gender by feminism, see Kimmel et al. (2005: 1), Gardiner (2005: 35) and 
Hearn and Kimmel (2006: 53). Early feminist research on gender concentrated on the 
relationship of women to particular formations of society, in which women’s oppression 
was manifested. Once those studies became more accepted, the space was generated 
to also explore the relationship of men to particular formations of society, see Kimmel et 
al. (2005: 1) and Gardiner (2005: 35). Feminist thinking has therefore been fundamental 
to the development of men and masculinity studies.  By revealing the dynamics of 
gender, masculinity also becomes visible and then leads to the problematisation of 
men’s position in society, (Gardiner, 2005: 35; Kimmel et al.  2005: 1).  
The study of men and masculinity shifted the exclusive focus in researching gender 
away from women. For example Hearn and Kimmel (2006), in ‘Changing Studies on 
Men and Masculinities’, comment that: 
“Men’s outlooks and culturally defined characteristics were formally generally the 
unexamined norm for religion, science, citizenship, law and authority, the new 
scholarship recognizes their genealogies, structures, and dynamics.”(ibid: 53).  
Thus, this emerging body of research on gender focuses on an analysis that argues that 
masculinity, as well as femininity, are socially constructed and can be oppressive for 
men. As Kaufman (1999: 59) in his article entitled ‘Men, Feminism, and Men’s 
Contradictory Experiences of Power’ argues: 
“In a world dominated by men, the world of men is, by definition, a world of power… But 
men’s lives speak of a different reality. Though men hold power and reap the privileges 
that come with our sex, that power is tainted. There is, in the lives of men, a strange 
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combination of power and privilege, pain and powerlessness… This combination of 
power and pain is the hidden story in the lives of men. It is men’s contradictory 
experiences of power.” 
Kaufman (1999: 60) importantly goes on to clarify that the existence of men’s pain is not 
an excuse for acts of violence or oppression at the hands of men. But rather this pain 
“allows us to better grasp what we might think of as the gender work of a society” (ibid). 
In the case of Cyprus ‘men’s pain’ particularly relates to the institutionalised burden of 
men by state and society to be the ‘saviours’ by becoming ‘conscript soldiers, reserves 
and militia’ and to be willing if need-be, through the organised ‘nation-in-arms’, to 
‘sacrifice’ themselves for the community.  
To the present day there is some debate about what to call this field of research. Hearn 
and Kimmel (2006: 56) comment that to describe the field some scholars have used the 
terms ‘masculinity studies’ or ‘male dominance studies’ or ‘critical studies on men’, while 
others called this area of inquiry ‘men’s studies’. 
The inquiry into the study of men and masculinity has generated considerable 
controversy in the social sciences. The concept of a male sex role has been largely 
critiqued (see for example Brittan, 1989; Kimmel, 1987) and in its place, social 
construction perspectives have emerged highlighting issues of social power (Carrigan, 
Connell, and Lee, 1985; Kaufman, 1987), along with critiques of the dominance of 
heterosexuality and heterosexism (Frank, 1987; Herek, 1986). As Hearn and Kimmel 
(2006: 56) succinctly summarise the above, two major sets of power relations have 
been addressed: the power of men over women, and the power of some men over other 
men. “These twin themes inform contemporary enquiries into the construction of 
masculinities.” (ibid).  
The concept ‘masculinities’ has, over time, replaced that of the ‘male sex role’ (Connell 
and Messerschmidt, 2005: 830-1; Demetriou, 2001: 337-41). The concept 
‘masculinities’ in the plural rather than ‘masculinity’ in the singular, has broadened the 
analysis of men within the gender order (for example Carrigan et al, 1985; Brod, 1987; 
Connell, 1995). These prevailing theorisations of masculinity emphasised social 
structure as the context for the formation of particular masculinities (for example 
Connell, 1987; Hearn, 1987).  
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Within the scope of the critique of the ‘male sex role’, the concept of ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’ has been developed, (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 830). The 
concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ proposes a model of multiple masculinities and 
power relations and refers to the gender practice (i.e. things done, not just a set of role 
expectations or an identity) that allows the dominant social position of men, and the 
subordinate social position of women (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832). The 
theorisation of masculinity adopted in this thesis, in the last two decades has influenced 
extensively the thinking about men and masculinity (Connell 2005). While, it has also 
been debated and critiqued, (for example see Donaldson, 1993; Hearn, 1996; 
Whitehead, 2002; Demetriou, 2001; Wetherell and Edley, 1999).  
Furthermore, global perspectives on local masculinities have become increasingly 
significant in recent years (Cleaver, 2002; Pease and Pringle, 2002; Connell, 1998; 
2005; Hearn and Kimmel, 2006: 56). An emerging issue in the literature on masculinity 
is the impact of globalisation on local gender patterns such as definitions of masculinity 
and men’s sexuality (Altman, 2001). As it will be later discussed in relation to the case 
of Cyprus, Connell’s (199 , 2005) analysis of the ways in which certain versions of 
hegemonic masculinity are reshaped at the global level, as part of globalisation is a 
valuable interpretive tool in understanding a shifting hegemonic masculinity towards the 
entrepreneurial male ideal. The next section reviews literature that has brought together 
masculinity and nationalism or militarism.  
 
Masculinity in nationalism and militarism 
Men and women are constructed and imagined differently through the nationalist 
discourse and consequently they are incorporated differently into nationalist projects. 
While there is no universal gendered division of labour in conflict and post-conflict 
situations, they are highly gendered. Men and masculinity have been traditionally 
associated with public arenas, politics, conflict and military organisations (Enloe, 2000; 
Kaplan, 2006; Mosse, 1996,1990). The theatre of military combat is not viewed as an 
arena for the achievement of normative femininity (see Higate, 2003a) as opposed to 
masculinity (see Kovitz, 2003). 
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Some writers such as Nagel (1998: 252) have argued that militarised models of 
masculinities draw from a more general stock of ideas about what constitutes ‘‘manly’’ 
traits, aspirations, and behaviours and connects them to nationalism and struggles for 
national liberation, (see also Mosse 1996). Cynthia Enloe in her seminal book, ‘Bananas, 
Beaches and Bases’ notes that “nationalism has typically sprung from masculinised 
memory, masculinised humiliation and masculinised hope”, (1990: 45). Moreover, some 
theorists have argued that ‘militarised masculinities’ become dominant or hegemonic 
models of masculinity in nationalist cultures and act as arenas for ‘‘achieving’’ 
masculinities (see Higate, 2003a for overview). Theorists have employed the term 
‘militarised masculinities’ to refer to the types of identities that militarised societies and 
organisations constitute for men (see Higate, 2000a, 2000b).  
In this thesis I employ the term ‘nationalist militarised masculinity’  to refer to the 
broader discourse of masculinity co-constituting nationalism and militarism in such 
societies. Likewise, nationalist militarised masculinity informs the hegemonic masculinity 
of men in nationalist militarist cultures and is an integral part of the reproduction and 
perpetuation of divides in post-armed conflict societies.  
The army and conscription have been classically linked to the formation of masculinities 
(for example Arkin and Dobrofsky, 1978; Cameron 1994), and the nationalisation of 
masculinity in a given context (for example Kaplan, 2006: 135). Studies on male 
conscription have focused on the specific masculinities conscription produces (for 
example Rosen, Knudson, and Fancher, 2003; Karner, 1998; Arkin and Dobrofsky, 
1978), the individual and collective experiences of actual military life and combat 
(Rosen, Knudson, and Fancher, 2003; Ben-Ari, 1998; Cameron, 1994) and the way 
such militarised masculinities are represented in the broader society, such as through 
cultural texts like films, novels, memoirs, and public rituals (for example Dawson, 1991, 
1994; Donald, 1992; Mosse, 1990). However, such studies have failed to address that 
there is a broader masculinist discourse made up of nationalism and militarism in post-
conflict societies, of which the male military service is merely a part. By extension, these 
studies have failed to address how the militarisation of masculinist discourses is the 
militarisation of the masculinist discourses co-constituting nationalism and militarism.  
In order to challenge this rather obscured role of masculinity in nationalism and 
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militarism it is necessary for a scholar to demonstrate that masculinity in nationalist 
militarist societies is a broader discourse that does not only relate to the actual role of 
men in such settings. 
Chamallas (1998; 307) has argued that the military is a microcosm of society. 
Conceptualising the military in this way provides a point of departure in understanding 
that military masculinities do not only relate to the “the types of identities that militarised 
societies and organizations constitute for men” (see Higate 2000a, 2000b), but to the 
militarised masculinisation of the society as a national body.  
The reciprocal relationship between militarism and masculinity functions at the level of 
identity as well as the state (Higate, 2003b). “The state has a vested interest in 
maintaining strong ideological links between militarism and masculinity.” (Higate and 
Hopton 2005: 435). The political representatives of the state have historically mobilised 
ideologies of idealised masculinity that give value to a nation of strong active males, 
collectively willing to risk their personal safety for the good of the country  (Barnett, 1982; 
Segal, 1990). Yet, militarism also feeds into ideologies of masculinity through the 
eroticisation of risk-taking and even lethal violence (Goldstein, 2001). However, the link 
between militarism and masculinity extends beyond the eroticisation of certain notions 
of masculinity, through the glamorisation of a collective military culture and the 
participation of a unified social body for the military goal. Military organisations, military 
successes, military pageantry, and rituals represent the public endorsement of such 
values and their institutionalisation in national culture (Dawson,1994; Hockey, 2003). 
Military masculinities are embedded into discourses of nationalism (Bickford, 2003; 
Caplan, 2003; Dawson, 1994). Nationalism is refracted through military masculinity.  
The links between hegemonic masculinity and the military are surprisingly tenacious 
(Higate, 2003a, 2000a, 2000b). Yet, in tracing many practices to the level of the state 
and culture, it becomes clear that nationalist militarist values have an inextricable 
influence on the ways in which hegemonic masculinity is created, and how it feeds into 
the reproduction of a nationalist militarist masculinist society. In the antagonistic ethno-
nationalist, post-armed conflict culture of Cyprus duty, commitment, violence and 
national struggle have become fused and constitute the elements of nationalist 
militarised forms of masculinity. Yet, the significance of nationalist militarised forms of 
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masculinity extends beyond the hegemonic model of masculinity for G.C. men and the 
military to the nationalist militarised masculinist appeal of the broader social body that is 
committed in an assemblage of ways to the defence and struggle for justice of its own 
community.  
 
Masculinity in nationalism and militarism at times of political and social change 
It has been repeatedly argued that it is important to engage in the study of masculinities 
during times of political transition (Hearn and Morgan, 1990; Hearn, 1997), as current 
and on-going political changes at global, inter-state and “national levels are likely to 
have significant impacts on the gendered characteristics of military cultures” (Dandeker, 
1999: 64). Indeed, gendered transitions in countries such as Russia have emerged 
through a set of political forces. Men’s identities in that context moved from the 
bureaucratic masculinities of the Communist regime towards new entrepreneurial 
masculinities and it is suggested that this shift preserved men’s dominance in private 
and public spheres (Meshcherkina, 2000).  
I wish to take this a step further and argue that it is central in post-armed conflict 
societies to engage with the role of nationalist militarised masculinity at times of global, 
inter-state and national political changes and social transitions. This is because 
masculinity can play a pivotal role in perpetuating the interrelationship of nationalism, 
militarism and masculinity even when the perceived threat has been undermined, by 
becoming readapted under new political and social parameters. This adapted co-
constitution can greatly assist in the reiteration and revision of older nationalist and 
militarist discourses. Specific studies have illustrated how transitions in masculinities 
during times of social change have operated to re-anchor men’s power in shifting and 
changing social contexts (see: Kimmel, 1996), while other studies have indicated how 
masculinity changes under such processes. In the context of post-armed conflict 
Northern Ireland, Ashe (2012: 5) argues that the dynamics of the peace process briefly 
opened a space for exploring men’s traditional identities and power. Yet the actual 
implementation of the Agreement eventually narrowed the space for exploring gender 
issues, including the issue of how traditional forms of masculinities were undergoing 
processes of change (ibid). The next section discusses my employment of ‘hegemonic 
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masculinity’ in this thesis and its significance in studying masculinity at a time of political 
and cultural developments.   
Hegemonic masculinity in the examination of Nationalism, Militarism and Masculinity in 
post-2003 Cyprus 
In this thesis I have used the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ (Connell 1995; Connell 
& Messerschmidt 2005) to illustrate the mutually constitutive G.C. masculinist discourse 
to nationalism and militarism and the hegemonic model of masculinity this co-
constitution has been creating for men. I will now proceed to discuss my decision in 
adopting this concept in this investigation.  
The concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ works particularly well in this investigation that 
has been concerned with the prevailing ideal of masculinity mobilised at the ideological, 
national collective and state level. Thus, the ideals of masculinity that are supported by 
the state and its institutions, especially the military and schools, and wider society have 
taken part in the construction of the post-war culture that supported the national struggle 
for liberation and return. In approaching masculinity through the concept of ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’, the latter (hegemonic masculinity) demands to be distinguished from other 
co-existing masculinities that are seen as being ‘subordinated’ from hegemonic 
masculinity, (Connell, 19 7: 1 6). Therefore, ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is not assumed to 
be ‘normal’ in the statistical sense as “only a minority of men might enact it… [but also] 
hegemonic masculinities can be constructed that do not correspond closely to the lives 
of any actual men”,  (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832). In this way, “there is a 
distance, and a tension, between collective ideals and actual lives… yet very large 
numbers of men are complicit in sustaining the hegemonic model.” (Carrigan, Connell, 
and Lee, 1985: 112-3). Connell and Messerschmidt offer a key point here, that what 
most men support is not necessarily what they are. In extension, what has been central 
to the examination of G.C. ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is not what most men are, rather the 
masculinity men and wider society “position themselves in relation to” (Connell and 
Messerschmidt, 2005:  32). Furthermore, in Connell’s argument there is some 
correspondence between the cultural ideal and institutional power, in the form of state, 
business and corporate power. In this way hegemony “mean[s] ascendancy achieved 
through culture, institutions, and persuasion” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005:  32). 
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Then, this guides us in studying the complex and intersecting ways in which G.C. 
hegemonic masculinity is constructed into the specific understanding of the national 
struggle for liberation and return that is supported and reproduced by state and society.  
Another central aspect of hegemonic masculinity, of important assistance in this 
examination, is that it well captures the struggle of men in attaining or failing to attain 
that hegemonic model. In approaching masculinity through the concept of ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’, the latter demands to be distinguished from ‘subordinated’ forms of 
masculinity, (Connell,1987). The way in which nationalism, militarism and masculinity 
are inter-related in Cyprus illustrates that there is a social cost out there for G.C.s who 
interact with the ‘other’, cross the border and generally for individuals that appeal to a 
more bi-communal approach to the solution of the conflict as they risk failing the 
hegemonic model. Thus, it is the identifiable ‘normative’ or ‘hegemonic’ masculinity that 
sets the standards for male thinking and action, (Connell, 1995). 
Furthermore, the concept of hegemonic masculinity works particularly well in 
understanding the role and/or transformation of masculinity in post-armed conflict 
Cyprus at a time of central developments in the politics of the conflict and cultural 
transitions. The importance of masculinity in this thesis, as discussed above, extends 
beyond the identity of men to the masculinist discourse of nationalism and militarism. 
Rather, masculinity and its possible transformation or reiteration inhabits a crucial role 
at particular periods of political, social or ideological change in the construction and 
negotiation of nationalist and militarist ideas and processes. 
‘Hegemonic masculinity’ is particularly helpful in understanding the shift away of G.C. 
masculinity from military and heroic masculinity to financial, professional and modern 
image oriented ideals of masculinity, as it points us to certain versions of masculinity 
that are being reshaped at the global level, (Connell,1998, 2005). Therefore, these 
changes of masculinity are not understood as a crisis of masculinity, as described by 
the relevant literature (Segal, 2007; Beynon, 2002; MacInnes, 1998), but as the 
hegemony of masculinity, which is changing. As Connell (1998) and Donaldson (1993) 
suggest, hegemonic masculinity is ‘elastic’ and able to change. Thus, I adopt Connell’s 
(1998, 2005) argument that certain versions of hegemonic masculinity are reshaped at 
the global level, with the more egocentric masculinity of the capitalist entrepreneur 
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holding sway the world stage today, (Connell, 1998: 17), whilst the rigid masculinity of 
the military is now globally a fading threat (ibid) to this change. This is extensively 
discussed in the empirical chapters in relation to certain political events further 
instigating the move towards an entrepreneurial model of masculinity.  
 
3.5. Nationalism, militarism and masculinity in Cyprus  
I have presented the literature that is significant to this thesis because it relates to the 
issues that have emerged through the empirical data. In contrast, I am going to show in 
the empirical chapters how these discourses work together to produce a particular type 
of masculinist, militarist. nationalist discourse, which inhibits the understandings that 
might encourage processes of reconciliation between the two Cypriot communities, 
namely Greek and Turkish Cypriot.  
Nationalism has been an extensively researched area, and a lot of the academic 
attention on nationalism has concentrated on the ambiguity of what nationalism is and 
how it should be approached. This focus has undermined the significance of addressing 
the co-constitution of nationalism with other social identities and issues. Likewise, 
academic research on militarism has offered polyphony of rather distinct definitions. 
This has focused extensively on whether militarism should refer to the institution of the 
military exclusively, or also to the host society and the multiple dynamics created 
between them. Yet, it has been less concerned with understanding the inter-relation of 
militarism with other social identities, inequalities and issues. The study of masculinity 
emerged following the developing investigation of gender by feminism. Yet, to the 
present day studies of gender, and its co-constitution to other forms of social identities, 
inequalities and issues tend to focus mostly on the impact of these for women and thus 
aimed to surface their role in these processes. Likewise, while research that has 
brought together nationalism, militarism and gender in its analysis is limited, it has also 
concentrated on women and femininity, rendering monolithic and uncritical accounts of 
masculinity.  
This thesis takes the perspective that such phenomena as nationalism, militarism and 
masculinity cannot be understood without examining how these are co-constitutively 
constructed and it argues that in studying any one we need to look at its relationship to 
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the other two. Cyprus presents a case of post-armed conflict society where nationalism 
and militarism and their underlying masculinity were constructed against the outcomes 
of the armed conflict, resulting in the division of the country into two artificially 
homogenous, ethnically separate geographical spaces. A manifestation of this three-
fold relationship will be illustrated to be the construction of post-war Cyprus as a ‘nation-
in-arms’. By concentrating on certain catalytic events in the conflict situation following 
the opening of the borders in April 2003, this thesis aims to illustrate not only the co-
constitution of the three but also the ability of this relationship to readapt itself to new 
social and political parameters.  
Without understanding the subtle gendering of masculinist discourse, our analysis of 
nationalism and militarism, especially in post-armed conflict situations such as in Cyprus, 
will always be limited. For example, we will not be able to adequately understand the 
centrality that certain ideals of masculinity, inherent to the post-war national struggle for 
liberation and the politics of defence, as well as the role of masculinity in the ‘changing 
understanding of struggle’ in recent years, have sought to undermine the militarist frame 
of the struggle. However, demonstrating this significance of masculinity in post-armed 
conflict societies requires a questioning of the following understandings: 
 a) that masculinity and militarism in nationalism, at the level of identity relate 
predominantly to the construction of ‘militarised masculinities’ for men  
b) that masculinity is an issue that relates predominantly to male conscription and to 
conflict and armed defence being an exclusive calling for men 
Thus, the thesis contends that masculinity is a wider discourse, which mobilises the 
military institution as a platform for the exemplification of certain constructions of 
masculinity to the larger society. This discourse is embodied in the state and also 
creates the position of the given post-armed conflict society as a perceived unified 
nationalist, militarist masculinist body that resists feminisation from certain ‘positions of 
power’. We can call this ‘nationalist militarised masculinity’.  
Nationalism, militarism and masculinity are not distinct; they are inter-linked, co-
constituent, and supportive of each other. The significance of addressing the 
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relationship between these is discussed in detail in the analysis of my empirical data in 
chapters that will follow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Chapter four: Methods 
4.1. Qualitative methodology  
Qualitative research is an umbrella term for an array of attitudes towards, and strategies 
for, conducting inquiries that study social phenomena in their natural setting, aiming at 
discovering how human beings understand, experience, interpret, and produce the 
social world (Sandelowski 2004: 893). Then, qualitative research is distinguished from 
other forms of research as it is a situated activity that, by locating the observer in the 
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world, aims to understand the meanings that participants give to the issues of research 
enquiry (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 4).  
The justification for qualitative methodology is long established (Becker, 1963; 
Silverman 1993; Atkinson and Silverman 1997). Qualitative research allows for multiple 
perspectives and stories to be embraced; to accumulate understandings of the complex 
world in which we live and thus to reflect on the many different and changing social and 
organisational cultures, histories and contexts, (Flick, 2002). Therefore, by allowing a 
window into the variations and often-contradictory social behaviours, beliefs, opinions, 
emotions, and relationships of individuals in context, qualitative research provides the 
opportunity to obtain complex and multiple descriptions of how people experience 
specific issues of research enquiry. As such, qualitative methodology allows 
researchers to study subject areas in their entirety and to represent their complexity, 
ambiguity and variability and, in this way, diversity can be found, valued and interpreted.  
Qualitative research methods have been a pillar of sociological methodological literature 
since the first half of the twentieth century (Becker; 1970; Denzin, 1978; Filstead, 1970; 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Webb, 1966; Silverman, 2013; Lewis-Beck et al. 2004).   In 
sociology, the work of the ‘Chicago School’ during the 1920s and 1930s founded the 
importance of qualitative inquiry for the study of social life (Dewey, 1930; Mead, 1934; 
Thomas and Swaine, 1928). With the ground-breaking work of the Chicago Department 
of Sociology in the 1930s came a substantial sociological way of looking at the world 
(Berg, 2009:12; Herman, 1995; Becker, 1963; Blumer, 1969).  
The appropriateness of qualitative methodologies in the research environments of 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity is long established. Harris (2002) has conducted 
qualitative empirical research to study nationalism in Slovakia and Slovenia and, more 
specifically, Yoshino (2013) used face-to-face interviews to study nationalism in Japan. 
Furthermore, Vuga and Juva (2012), based on their experience of researching the 
Slovenian Armed Forces for the last two decades, have illustrated the suitability of 
qualitative empirical research methods for the study of the army and militarism. Likewise, 
Castro (2013) has illustrated the appropriateness of qualitative empirical research for 
the study of the army and militarism, by discussing the experience of ten researchers 
that have conducted empirical research on the Brazilian army. Also, Pini (2005) 
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conducted interviews to examine the masculinities engaged by male leaders of an 
Australian agricultural organisation. Furthermore, qualitative empirical research has 
been previously used in researching ultra-nationalist and guerrilla groups. Sluka (2007) 
has conducted participant observation and interviews with ultra-nationalist groups in 
Northern Ireland. While Kruijt (2012) has discussed more specifically how his 
development of a specific style of interviewing was necessary in researching Latin 
American military and guerrilla leadership.  
Moreover, qualitative empirical research has also been previously used in researching 
nationalism and masculinity or the army and masculinity. Kwon (2000) has conducted 
qualitative empirical research on nationalism and male military conscription in South 
Korea. Also, Kim (1993) has conducted qualitative empirical research on the South 
Korean military and masculinity. More specifically, Barrett (1996) used life history 
interviews with male military officers to examine the construction of hegemonic 
masculinity within the US Navy.  
In relation to the case of Cyprus, in recent years there has been a growing body of 
qualitative empirical research on G.C. nationalism, which has focused on how it is 
constructed but also negotiated at the everyday level (for example Hadjipavlou, 2007; 
Dikomitis, 2005; Christou, 2006; Spyrou, 2006; Hadjipavlou, 2006; Dikomitis, 2004; 
Webster & Timothy, 2006). This qualitative body of scholarship has made a significant 
contribution to the knowledge on G.C. nationalism by reconsidering the level of analysis 
from the macro to the micro, given that earlier research on nationalism in Cyprus had 
mostly adopted a macro-analytical approach on the dividing aspects of the conflict 
(Attalides, 1979; Bryant, 2004; Papadakis et al., 2006; Hadjipavlou, 2007b; Anastasiou, 
2008; Papadakis & Bryant, 2012; Mavratsas, 1996; Brown and Theodossopoulos, 
2004). Qualitative empirical research has also been previously used to investigate 
gender in the context of the Cyprus conflict (for example, see Hadjipavlou, 2010) and, 
more specifically, to study nationalism and gender in the context of women crossing the 
borders (Hadjipavlou, 2006).  
This research project examining the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and 
masculinity in post-2003 Cyprus was designed, from the beginning, as qualitative. As 
the literature review has revealed there is a need for this kind of research and analysis, 
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as it addresses distinct unexplored areas of empirical research and the co-contingency 
of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in Cyprus.   
Qualitative methods are most appropriate for this project because they are suitable for 
getting at how the co-construction of nationalism, militarism and masculinity creates 
obstacles for reconciliation in the post-armed conflict society Cyprus. That is, qualitative 
researchers attempt “to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them.” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 5). Therefore, the 
appropriateness of qualitative empirical research for this project relates to the aim of the 
research to analyse the ways in which both ordinary people, the presumed recipients of 
these ideologies, and politicians and policy makers, the presumed producers of these 
ideologies, construct nationalism, militarism and masculinity through discourse and 
social interaction, and the meanings they make out of these discursive and ideological 
practices. The next section will discuss the appropriateness of the choice of using 
interviews as the research tool in this project.  
4.2. Interviews  
Interviewing is currently the central resource through which social science engages with 
issues that concern it (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997). The use of interviews in research 
suggests that the views and interpretations of certain social actors, and the certain 
meanings that participants come to attach to phenomena or events (Taylor and Bogdan, 
1998: 98) are important to the research questions. Interviews allow the use of open-
ended questions that give participants the opportunity to respond in their own words, 
rather than forcing them to choose from fixed responses. Open-ended questions have 
the ability to evoke responses that are meaningful and culturally silent to the participant, 
unanticipated by the researcher and rich and explanatory in nature. Also, the face-to-
face interaction of the interview enables a ‘special insight’ into subjectivity, voice and 
lived experience (Atkinson and Silverman; 1997). However, the choice of using 
interviews as a research tool has also attracted criticism, with a recurring one being that 
of the time and cost factor, (Gillham, 2000: 9).  
The focus of this research project has been to elicit the views and interpretations of G.C. 
men and women living in Cyprus about certain events, ideologies and discourses. Partly 
the research aimed to investigate the meanings that people participating in institutions 
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associate with them. Therefore, interviewing provides a necessary, if not always 
completely sufficient, avenue of inquiry, (Seidman, 1991: 4). Moreover, it needs to be 
noted that public discourses (including media, policy documents) were included in the 
analysis. Whilst these were not included as part of the data analysis, they had been 
implicitly drawn upon in understanding the socio-political context the research was 
focusing on. The research was investigating the way in which social actors of a broad 
spectrum of social and political backgrounds take up discourses associated with 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-2003 Cyprus and the meaning they make 
out of them, thus also how they change and re-moblise them. In effect, a systematic 
examination of public discourses fell out of the investigating focus of the research.  
 
Semi-structured interviews  
Research based primarily on semi-structured interviewing has become a very popular 
and important form of qualitative research across the social sciences, especially in 
sociology and anthropology (Edgerton, 1993; Spradley, 1979). In the context of this 
research, the choice of face-to-face, semi-structured interviews served a number of 
main objectives. Semi-structured interviews can be a most productive way of conducting 
interviews in studies like this, where the goals of the investigation are exploration and 
discovery of both the collective and diverse interpretations and meanings that 
interviewees make out of specific complex social events and political processes 
(Robnett, 1996; Ray, 1999). This is because semi-structured interviews have set 
objectives and structures, but at the same time allow room for the subject’s individual 
concerns and needs to be articulated and addressed (Flick, 2002; Bryman, 2004).  
The structure of this research tool provides an efficient means of obtaining rich, detailed 
and in-depth data by allowing space for objectives to be met with each interviewee.  
More specifically, interviewing afforded me the opportunity to obtain accounts on 
specific issues generated from the responses of the participants of a variety of 
institutions, in diverse sectors and spectrums of G.C. social life. 
Moreover, the negotiable structures of this research tool are equally valuable in studies 
like this. These endorse an increased scope of flexibility for insightful avenues of inquiry 
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to emerge outside of objectives, in contrast to structured interviews or other research 
methods, which usually generate single-statement answers. This flexibility is a gate into 
“breadth and depth of information”, (Blee and Taylor, 2002: 92) that might have only 
arisen spontaneously during the research (Hammersley 2000; Bryman 1984, 2004; 
Okeley 2007). Thus, they provide the opportunity to the researcher to discover the 
respondent’s experience and interpretation of reality and to access people’s ideas, 
thoughts, and memories in their own words, (Blee and Taylor, 2002: 92). As the 
researcher is able to reflect back on the interviewees’ answers, rather than relying on 
discrete statements, he/she can further access the context of the respondent’s answers. 
Moreover, semi-structured interviews are an efficient means of obtaining rich, detailed 
and in-depth data, without committing the investigator to prolonged involvement in the 
lives and activities of the respondents (Blee, 2001), which is usually the case in life 
interviews.  
Furthermore, the structure and the flexibility of this type of interview have also been 
valuable in interviewing ‘powerful’ people, (Fitz and Halpin, 1994).  The structure has 
been useful in accommodating these interviews in the short time offered by the elite 
interviewees, by allowing them to focus their responses on the specific topics under 
investigation, whilst the flexibility allowed space in the interview with the ‘powerful’ for 
new topics to emerge, (Hertz and Imber, 1995; Fitz and Halpin, 1994).  The next section 
will explore the careful reflection the conducting of the interviews invites in terms of the 
relationship of interviewer – interviewee; given that the main instrument of qualitative 
research is the researcher him/herself. 
 
4.3. The relationship of interviewer – interviewee: bias, reflexivity and research identity  
The crucial importance of the relationship between the interviewer and interviewee has 
been long addressed (Benney and Hughes 1956: 142; Oakley 1981; Dexter 1970; 
Fontana and Frey 1998). The recurrent concern with bias in the social sciences (Becker, 
1967: 245; Gouldner, 1971; Hammersley, 2000) has often signalled the crucial 
importance of efforts to sustain a separation of the researcher and the researched. Yet, 
the claim for neutrality of the researcher in the research process positivism has strived 
for (Dunne, Pryor, and Yates, 2006: 31), has long been critiqued by feminist 
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researchers (see for example, Oakley, 19 1). Therefore, it is argued that “research 
cannot provide the mirror reflection of the social world that positivists strive for, but it 
may provide access to the meanings people attribute to their experiences and social 
worlds,” (Silverman, 2006: 126). Interviews create “situated understandings grounded in 
specific interactional episodes”, (Denzin and Lincoln, 199 : 36), as the interview is “a 
reflection of the personalities of the participant and the interviewer and the ways they 
interact”, (Seidman, I. E., 1991: 72), and “both are assumed to be individuals who reflect 
upon their experience”, (Acker, Barry, and Esseveld, 1991: 140).   
Reflexivity is a longstanding hallmark of feminist methodologies (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2007). Reflexivity, “urges us to explore the ways in which a researcher’s 
involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon and informs such research”, 
(Nightingale and Cromby, 1999: 228). Therefore, the role of the researcher is subject to 
the same critical analysis and scrutiny as the research itself, (Carolan, M, 2003: 6). 
Moreover, building rapport is also a key ingredient in successful qualitative interviewing 
as it enables the participant to feel comfortable in opening up to the interviewer, (King 
and Horrocks, 2010: 48).  
Respect towards each other and trust are some important elements of building rapport, 
see Miller (2001) and Glassner and Loughlin (1987). Trust is a key element in the 
relationship between researcher and the researched. There is a symbiosis in the trust 
relationship, which, if undermined, can destroy the validity of the research, and perhaps 
more importantly undermine the interviewees’ trust in the research.  
For me as a researcher, reflexivity has meant that the understanding of myself through 
the research process and of my interviewees cannot be taken for granted and that we 
can both influence each other. Thus, I maintained the understanding that we were both 
in ‘a process of becoming’, ‘rather than being’ (Hall , 1996b: 2) and that ‘our identities’ 
through the interview process are an issue that invites careful reflection.  
The need to adopt reflexivity was further instigated by the fact that I interviewed 
interviewees from a diversity of social and political backgrounds as well as conducting 
interviews within the army. This created an interesting combination of varying and 
complex power relationship dynamics, both in and out of the interviews, which I needed 
to reflect on and manage.  
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The relationship of interviewer – interviewee when researching the ‘powerful’, whether 
this is politicians or military officers, is an issue that invites its own reflection. 
Researching the ‘powerful’ has often been raised as an example of ‘researching up’ 
rather than the more conventional ‘researching down’, (Cohen, Manion and Morrison 
2007: 127; Odendahl and Shaw 2002; Fitz and Halpin 1994: 42). Yet, the feminist 
thought has taken the examination of power in the research process one step further, 
illustrating that the power dynamic between the researcher and elite informant not only 
shapes the interview process but also defines how knowledge is created, (Conti and 
O’Neil, 2007: 67).  Therefore, the play of power in these settings is of the utmost 
importance as knowledge is produced through the relationship.  
The  ‘researching up’ conceptualisation, while it implies a conceptualisation of “power as 
‘possessed’ by an individual” (Conti and O’Neil, 2007: 80), it also obscures the on-going 
dynamics within the creation and operation of power relationships. Therefore, while it 
undermines the status the ‘powerful’ can ascribe to academia, it also undermines the 
ability of the researcher to analyse the micro-politics of the situations shaped between 
interviewer and interviewee around the research. Moreover, also it undermines his/her 
ability to develop a strategy of how a careful presentation of the research project and 
researcher identity performativity (Butler, 1990) can empower the position of the 
interviewer, who can then negotiate the play of power. 
The next part of the chapter presents the research design I developed in conducting this 
research, whilst the subsequent one discusses the implications of interviewing each 
group of interviewees, including the different form of trust and reflectivity these different 
sets of relationships necessitated. 
 
4.4. Research Design 
The fieldwork was carried out in one phase in which I conducted all interviews and one 
informal discussion with refugees. The interviewees fall under three main groups: public, 
soldiers and military officers, and politicians (this group also includes youth sections of 
political parties and independent political youth groups and policy related military 
personnel of the Ministry of Defence). My aim has been to interview some people from 
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all the main strata of Cypriot society, in order to understand how both ordinary people of 
a fair range of social and political backgrounds, soldiers and military officers, and 
politicians and policy makers construct nationalism, militarism and masculinity and what 
meanings they created of these discursive and ideological practices.  
During an intensive four-month period of fieldwork (11th May- 11th September 2011) I 
conducted 57 semi-structured interviews with Cypriot men and women living in Cyprus, 
aged between 18-83 years old, with representatives of youth sections of political parties 
and independent political youth groups, soldiers and military officers,  some politicians 
that were central to the topics under investigation and one informal discussion with 
refugees. Throughout this time, I was conducting an internship with PRIO Cyprus 
Centre. Out of the abovementioned 57 interviews, 15 were conducted with soldiers and 
officers in a camp of the National Guard of Cyprus, while more soldiers and officers 
were interviewed outside the army, usually on their day off. Interviewees from all groups 
were contacted to arrange interviews throughout my time in Cyprus. The period in which 
I conducted the fieldwork became significant for the research project and the design of it 
in a number of ways. I will first discuss this to contextualise the research project and 
design and I will then proceed to discuss my strategy of recruiting from each group of 
interviewees.  
The period in which the interviews were conducted  
In my endeavour to arrest a ‘complicated-ever-changing-reality’ in the course of the 
fieldwork, I had to accept the transverse section of social time as an important element 
in developing and understanding the intersection of the ‘social’ and the ‘political’ and the 
possibility of the innovating dynamics between them. The strategy of not interviewing 
each group of interviewees during different time periods of fieldwork coincided well with 
the collapse of my hypothesis, however it posed both advantages and limitations. The 
original hypothesis I had entertained before heading into the field, namely that the co-
constitution of certain nationalist, militarist and masculinist ideologies persisted following 
the opening of the borders, fell flat. My interview with Kyriacos Mauronicolas -Minister of 
Defence when the borders opened- and a few members of the public and reserves in 
the first few weeks, shaped an overall shift in my interest. This shift in interest was from 
providing an analysis of the social and political ideological and discursive mechanisms 
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for the reproduction of certain ideologies and their patterns of practice in society, to 
understanding the factors that underpin and brought about their weakening.  
Moreover, time did not elapse within the duration of the fieldwork, as the occurrence of 
a certain event  (the explosion of the naval base in Mari on the 11th of July 2011), 
became central to the research process and interviews. This had created a series of 
political and military implications and reactions from the public, including major 
demonstrations, which repeatedly reminded me of the ‘research present’. As it will be 
discussed later on, the explosion of the naval base had worked in my favour in terms of 
getting access to the army. Moreover, it had also brought to the surface certain issues 
about defence policy, the military and the political reasonability and responsibility over 
the National Guard (NG), generating much political and public discussion alike. My 
strategy was not to add any questions about these issues that followed the event in 
order to allow the interviewees to raise them if it was important to them. Indeed, the 
interviewees brought up the event extensively and all the issues this reflected for them. 
Therefore, this fieldwork was conducted during a time where certain issues of inquiry 
were in a process of change and transformation, such as the rising phenomenon of 
draft-dodging, the general undermining of militarism as well as the event of the naval 
base in Mari surfacing certain political and social defence issues and firing up the rising 
public criticism of the undermined Defence sector. This aspect of the fieldwork 
significantly added to my predicament of repeatedly coming up against one of perhaps 
the most frustrating and insightful limitations of fieldwork: data gaps and incongruities in 
the data. In confronting the cultural level of practice, usually this results from the fact 
that what is taken for granted escapes explication. Here my strategy of not interviewing 
each group of interviewees during different time periods of fieldwork helped me in many 
cases to fill in lacunae and silences in the data.  
Dealing with such issues whilst conducting the interviews with the general public was 
significant in providing me with an array of opinions, interpretations and feelings about 
such policy changes and emerging phenomena. However, these accounts from the 
general public were most often unable to explain the factors underlying these broader 
changes. Whereas politicians and military officers repeatedly provided insightful 
accounts that helped me fill in these lacunae in the data. Clearly, needless to say, this 
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relationship also worked in the opposite direction. Politicians I talked to often pointed me 
to political actions, which have significantly shaped public perception, opening new 
avenues for discovery in my interviews with the public.  
However, conducting interviews with politicians at various points of the fieldwork also 
posed limitations. Throughout the fieldwork, accounts offered by the members of the 
public pointed me to political actions that have influenced their perceptions. However, 
as I had interviewed some politicians, who were particularly important to the research, 
at the very beginning of the fieldwork, I had foreclosed the opportunity of addressing 
these issues in my interviews with them.   
Furthermore, certain ‘buzz-words’ quickly began to acquire importance in the interview 
process with all groups of interviewees; my understanding of the interviewees and their 
understanding of me and were crucial in building or undermining trust. The political 
events central to this research have deposited layers of meaning to certain ‘buzz-words’ 
that signify and reveal one’s positioning towards certain issues. As Dunne, Pryor and 
Yates  (2005: 32) argue: the researcher and respondent are caught in 
contemporaneous social dynamics that invade the social space of the interview. The 
case that acquired the most significance was the phrasing used to describe the 
‘borders’. Since the opening of the borders in 2003 there has been further significance 
ascribed to this. The word ‘border’ most often reveals a liberal positioning towards the 
conflict. While the word ‘barricades’, that is used in illustrating the temporality of them, 
reveals a right wing and conservative positioning. A use of an oppositional reference to 
the ‘border’ from the interviewees’ political beliefs could significantly challenge their trust 
towards me as a researcher and by extension their trust towards the interview overall. 
Coming from a liberal family I have always referred to them as ‘borders’, however in my 
interviews with the public, I adopted a diplomatic phrasing naming the ‘border’ as ‘Green 
Line’, which does not indicate any political beliefs. However, in my interviews with 
politicians, military policy makers, military officers and ultra-nationalist the same 
technique would have not been successful. These were settings that did not allow any 
space for lenience for an alternative phrasing from the state and most dominant rhetoric 
that insists on the naming of ‘barricades’.  Below I discuss my strategy of recruiting from 
each group of interviewees, then the development of my interview agendas and the way 
in which I analysed the interviews.  
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Sample and Strategies of finding interviewees  
Sub-set one: Public  
Table of interviewees from the public (25 out of 57) 
Demographic information about interviewees from the 
public sphere of Cyprus  
 Total number 
25 
Females  10 
Males  15 
Cities of Origin  Nicosia: 11 
  Limassol: 5 
  Larnaca: 3 
  Paphos: 2 
  Kyrenia 2 
  Famagusta: 2 
University educated out of the total number 19 
Refugees out of the total number 14 
Interviewees with missing persons in their family out of the total 
number 
3 
Reported to be heterosexual  23 
Reported to be homosexual  2 
 
Out of my interviewees there was a higher representation of men and women who, at 
the time of interviewing, were between the ages of 20 and 60. Whilst this age selection 
of participants did mean they were aware of military matters, the men of the group were 
not old enough to have been 18 years old in 1964, when the conscription law was 
enforced. Thus, almost all of my male interviewees (excluding a few cases that were 
exempt for health reasons and one who was 83 years old) were conscripted in the army 
as soldiers, and subsequently reserves and militia. A few of my interviewees had, 
following their conscription, draft-dodged their service. Also, more than half of them are 
refugees and a few of them had missing persons in their family. Furthermore, the 
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informal discussion with refugees was of a representative sample of age groups, 
including first and second-generation refugees.  
 
The five largest cities in Cyprus (by size of population) were, on the whole, fairly 
represented in the selection of interviewees.  Thus, most of the interviewees were from 
Nicosia, followed by Limassol, then Larnaca, Paphos, Kyrenia and Famagusta in 
decreasing numbers.  
There was a higher representation of interviewees who lived in cities in contrast to 
villages. A lot of them did originally come from villages but now lived in the city. This 
higher representation can be explained by the extensive urbanisation that has taken 
place in Cyprus following the war in 1974. However, it also occurred due to solidly 
practical reasons. Being the only researcher in this research project it would have 
required a much longer period of time and substantial costs to find interviewees from all 
of the largest villages around Cyprus and travel there. Indeed, choosing to use 
interviews as a research tool over other research methods poses the ‘time-cost’ factor 
(Gillham, 2000: 9). These implications, however, are factored into the overall research 
framework.  
Social class, even if this has no clear form in Cyprus, was represented fairly in the 
collection of participants. With the major population of Cyprus being middle-class, most 
participants were middle class, with fewer working-class, a few upper-middle class and 
substantially fewer upper class. This was clearly matched by my interviewees’ level of 
education. More than half of them were educated to degree level and very few were not 
educated to school level.  
Strategies of finding interviewees from the public  
My attempt to find interviews from the Cypriot public in the first several weeks of the 
fieldwork was an on-going process of developing relevant strategies. My first strategy 
was to ask members of my family and acquaintances to ask people they knew if they 
would be willing to take part in the research. Then I asked these interviewees if they 
could ask people they knew who would also be willing to take part. However, this 
strategy was short-lived as I came to realise that between these interviewees there was 
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a reproduction of similar social backgrounds, levels of education and age, which posed 
issues of representativeness.  
As a result of the inadequacy of this first strategy, I realised the need to give up the 
insistence on well-organised fieldwork and instead to provide space for more innovative 
ways of entering the Cypriot public sphere. I decided to take up any opportunity in 
finding interviewees, yet to also create these opportunities for myself. I drove in different 
and diverse part of cities and stopped at shops, coffee shops and such like and took 
every opportunity possible to ask people if they would be interested in taking part in the 
research. I then asked these interviewees if they could put me in contact with others 
who would be willing to take part in the research. The Cypriot culture is welcoming, so 
people were most often helpful. As it turned out, within a very short time, I had created a 
strong network of interviewees that kept expanding.   
 
Sub-set two: politicians and other ‘elite’ informants  
Table of politicians and other ‘elite’ informants (8 out of 57) 
 
 
 
 
 
Role under which interviewed     Political party (if relevant) Surname & name  
Former Minister of Defence (2003-
2006)  
EDEK 
Mavronicolas 
Kyriacos 
Ambassador of Sweden  N/A Ingerman Lindahl 
Counsellor of Germany   N/A Ralf Teepe 
Chief Lawyer on the case of Missing 
Persons in European Court of 
Human Rights and Domestic Courts  
N/A 
Achilleas 
Dimitriadis 
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Former Major General of the Cypriot 
National Defence and Defence 
Minister Adjutant  
N/A  
Marios Andreou 
Former President of Cyprus (1993-
2003), Acting President of Cyprus 
(1974) and President of the Cypriot 
Parliament (1960-1974)  
DHSY  Glafkos Clerides 
President of EDHK EDHK Loukas Stavrou 
Acting representative of ELAM - 
President of the student division and 
member of the Steering Committee  
ELAM 
Andreas 
Yiallouridis  
 
As the above table illustrates all of the politicians I interviewed were G.C. males. This 
fairly represents the political sphere of Cyprus being extremely male dominated, but it 
also reflects the reluctance of the state in appointing women to important public 
positions, (Lacovou-Kapsali et al., 2008).  
 
Arranging to interview politicians 
I chose the politicians that were most relevant to the issues under investigation and then 
devised a number of strategies in arranging an interview with them. Getting each 
politician that I interviewed to accept to be interviewed required its own strategy each 
time. Gatekeeping has been repeatedly highlighted in researching the ‘powerful’, 
(Gewirtz and Ozga, 1994: 192-193; Fitz and Halpin 1994). I come from a G.C. family, 
which belongs to the so-called political class of Cyprus. In effect, my family’s position in 
G.C. society allowed access into interviewing certain politicians, which otherwise it 
would have been difficult to do so. Thus, the research stages assisted by personal 
contacts were the interviewing of some of the politicians and the access into the army. 
Moreover, having granted a certain status to the research through these stages, 
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significantly assisted me in conducting more interviews with politicians, which I had no 
association to, and also more generally succeeding research goals.  
Some of the politicians I interviewed were family friends that I grew up with. In these 
cases, I asked a member of my family or theirs to let him know of my intention to 
conduct an interview with him.  The individual would then confirm that they accepted the 
next time they saw me. I then arranged the details of the interview with a family member 
of his or secretary.  
In getting to interview politicians that I am not linked to I always contacted them 
personally. In these cases, I utilised the fact that I had interviewed two important 
politicians in the context of Cypriot politics at the very beginning of my fieldwork as a 
means of presenting the project as significant, and a way of also exerting pressure on 
them to accept. This strategy proved to be most successful, with them often proposing 
without prompting other politicians who would be useful to interview and seemed to be 
happy to arrange these for me. 
Furthermore, getting the leaders or representatives of ultra-nationalist parties to be 
interviewed was a tricky task. Interestingly, the issues I faced in arranging these 
interviews were unrelated to the ones faced with politicians of mainstream political 
parties. Distrust about my own person and the intention of the interview were perhaps 
the biggest obstacles I faced. Every single attempt to ask other nationalist politicians to 
arrange these interviews for me failed flat, as they refused to take the responsibility. But, 
most importantly, these parties do not respect other political powers. As, 
characteristically, one of their main slogans says: ‘against everyone’. As such, I decided 
to attempt using a completely different strategy. I carefully selected the person used as 
the contact, placing paramount importance on how both my person and project would 
be presented. Crucial to this presentation of the project and me, as it will be discussed 
in the reflection section, was that I had not revealed any specific political outlook.  
The issue of how to present oneself is an important and continuous question, 
(Becker,1956; Fontana and Frey, 1998). The specific projection of my research identity 
in the interviews with the ‘powerful’ was as a distinct expert, which most often instigated 
their interest in hearing my views on the issues discussed, as they had not often had 
encounters with social scientists working in their terrain.  
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Dress code, presentation of ‘self’ and behaviour in these situations is fundamental in 
ensuring the success of purpose. Dress code in these situations needs to be 
conceptualised as a configuration of identity and not as a set identity to be met. In all of 
my interviews with the ‘powerful’ I dressed like I dress in my everyday life, smart-casual. 
Politicians in their everyday encounters with other politicians are not that formal to each 
other; it is everyone else that is formal with them. Therefore, dressing too formally 
creates an unbalanced relationship of power, favoured on the side of the politician as it 
indicates the absence of the required cultural capital, (Bourdieu, 1986). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub-set three: representatives of youth sections of political parties and 
independent political youth groups   
Table of interviewees: representatives of youth sections of political parties and 
independent political youth groups (4 out of 57) 
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Name of 
Organisation  
 
Political Party of 
which Youth 
Section  
Political 
Agenda  
Person 
Interviewed  
Position in 
the 
Organisation  
NEDHSY DHSY 
Centre- 
Right Wing 
Panagiwths 
Sentonas 
Vice-President 
METWPO 
Independent 
Ultra- Right 
Wing 
Andreas 
Georgiadis 
Press Officer 
DRASIS- KES 
Independent 
Ultra- Right 
Wing 
Stylianos 
Soteriou 
President 
AGONAS EDEK 
Social-
democratic 
Hrodotos 
Nicolaidis 
Vice-president 
 
I arranged the interviews with politicians of the youth section of political parties through 
personal contacts. Here, the similarity in age and the fact that in almost all the cases 
they were also students made the process of arranging these interviews much easier, 
greatly assisting in developing an empathetic understanding of the significance of 
interviewing them for my project.  
 
 
 
Sub-set four:  soldiers and military officers  
Table of interviewees: soldiers and Military Officers (20 out of 57) 
Soldiers and Military Officers  
Total number 
20 
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Military officers Interviewed whilst off duty  3 
Military officers Interviewed in the National Guard  6 
Soldiers Interviewed in the National Guard  9 
Soldiers Interviewed whilst off duty  2 
 
I conducted 20 interviews with military officers and soldiers. Out of this number, 15 
interviews were conducted in the National Guard (NG) with military officers and soldiers. 
I cannot reveal detailed demographic information about this group or the military units 
they came from, as this was part of my agreement with the NG. However, I have 
interviewed both non-commissioned and commissioned officers of a good 
representation of different military units and age, and both first and second year 
soldiers. Also, the city of origin of soldiers, the percentage who were refugees as well as 
the number of them who had missing persons in the family was roughly similar to the 
public group of interviewees.  
 
Arranging access to the National Guard  
Obtaining permission to conduct interviews with soldiers and military officers in the 
National Guard (NG) was, unsurprisingly, a difficult undertaking. This had to be given by 
the Minister of Defence himself (see appendix 1 for access letter)., because no one 
inferior to him was allowed to make the decision. I was aware beforehand that when 
others, in the past, had asked for permission to conduct social research within the army 
they had been denied it. Therefore, it was clear to me that simply requesting access on 
the basis of necessary research material was not a sufficient avenue.  
Together with a politician who was also a family friend and a former high-ranking officer 
of the NG I developed a strategy. We agreed that I would send a letter to the Minister of 
Defence, requesting access and that they would then call him and support my claim. 
They had also brought me into contact with the personal secretary of the Minister, who 
proved to be of great assistance in my quest. I faxed the letter to the Ministers’ 
secretary, called her to inform her that I had and very soon after I received a call from 
the Ministry letting me know that my request had been approved and that this would 
now be sent to the headquarters of the army.  
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After waiting for several weeks, I had to return back to the U.K. and, therefore, I 
contacted the relevant office to check on the progress of granting the access. The army 
had already received the order, but had not taken action in arranging the research. The 
tragic explosion of the naval base that had taken place in the time in-between acted in 
my favour. The army was extremely weary of being portrayed as unorganised and 
ineffective once more, given also the political influence that was already tied to the 
project. After explaining that everything had to now be arranged and completed within a 
few days, from that point onwards the headquarters of the army treated the situation 
with a lot of gravity and urgency, being extremely helpful and effective in arranging 
everything for the research.  
All of my research requests were fully heard. A mixed unit military base was assigned 
for the research and the exact number of soldiers and officers were provided for 
interview. Now I will proceed to discuss the interview schedules I developed in 
interviewing each one of these groups of interviewees.  
 
Interview schedules 
I devised a general interview guide, which was the one used with the public, and then I 
used these thematic areas in designing a separate interview schedule for soldiers, 
officers and politicians. For each politician I designed an individual one; tailored to their 
role and my research interest in it.  
I had run a pilot study using the ‘general interview guide’ prior to beginning the fieldwork 
with three G.C.s living in Brighton and then revised the questions. These pilot interviews 
were not included in the final analysis.  The pilot interviews led into a lot of questions 
becoming merged. Then, I revised my ‘public agenda’ for the first few weeks of the 
fieldwork after each interview, subsequently leading to only having an informal 
‘checklist’. This provided great assistance in ensuring that, by the end of the interview, 
all major themes were, to some extent, investigated, but at the same time not overly 
formalising questions and responses (Flick, 2002; Bryman, 2004) and allowing space 
for the interview to be shaped and directed by both parties. As Douglas (1985) suggests, 
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‘forgetting the rules’ and the ‘how-to’ ways in conversations can lead to unknown roles 
and areas where a synergy between the researcher and the researched develops.  
Once a meeting had been arranged with the participants, I opened the interview with 
introductions: I presented an overview of the research project and I gave an explanation 
of the nature of semi-structured interviews. I elucidated that I would want them to talk 
most of the time and that I would not ask specific questions expecting specific answers, 
as I was interested in their opinions regarding certain issues, and that, in this way, it 
would not be like an everyday discussion.  
The general interview guide used with the public is composed of five sections and a 
total of sixty-eight questions. No single participant was asked all sixty-eight questions; 
some questions were included in the interview guide merely as prompts to solicit more 
details in the event that a general question did not evoke a full response. The sections 
were organised to move from socio-demographic questions about themselves and their 
families, to specific questions designed to draw out the respondent’s personal 
understandings, opinions and experiences. The interview guide included the following 
sections: Socio-demographical; Nationalism/National Identity; Militarism/Defence issues; 
Masculinity; Future.  
The socio-demographic questions were situated at the beginning of the interview for 
mainly one reason: to create a more familiar and comfortable environment and a bridge 
to the more personal questions that would have followed. Interviewees most often felt 
slightly uncomfortable at the beginning of the interview, as they had not been 
interviewed before. Therefore, these socio-demographic questions, which were quite 
straightforward, and most often were questions that the interviewees had been asked 
before many times, where a way of guiding the interviewee more comfortably into the 
later questions which were quite personal and, for the interviewees, often significant or 
even traumatic issues and events.  
The main body of the interview agenda covered themes directly or indirectly relating to 
social, military, institutional and political events and processes that have been formed, 
became formative and have been contested during and following certain political events 
that had taken place since 2003. These mainly include the opening of the borders 
(2003), the Annan Plan referendum (2004) and the accession of Cyprus to the 
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European Union (2004). All interviewees were aware of these events and knew a 
substantial amount of information about them.  
The penultimate section of the interview guide related to the interviewees’ hopes and 
expectations for the future of Cyprus. This included three main questions: the first 
asking about how they evaluate the present G.C. politics in relation to the conflict, 
whether there are lessons we should collectively learn from the history of the conflict 
situation and whether they would like Cyprus to be heading towards reunification. The 
second asked whether they feel that the current G.C. masculinity is one necessitated for 
their own vision/expectations of the future developments in the conflict situation. The 
last related to where they locate T.C.s in their imagination of the future Cyprus.  
The last section of the interview guide included two questions: one asking if there was 
anything that the participant wanted to add to what had been discussed. The second 
was asking whether there were any issues related to the research topics that the 
participant felt they had not had the opportunity to discuss.  
In my interviews with soldiers, reserves and militia that were held outside of the military 
barracks, I used the same interview guide as with the public adding one more section. 
This was a set of specific questions about their experience of serving their military 
service, reserve and militia forces respectively and some information about their division, 
role and rank. My decision to construct their interview schedule in this way related to the 
fact that they were being interviewed whilst off duty. Therefore, I approached them both 
as citizens and soldiers. This view has been an important part of the research that has 
inspected certain issues through the concepts of ‘citizen-soldier’ and ‘nation-in-arms’.  
In my interviews with men who had draft-dodged their military service, another section 
was added that replaced that of the soldier’s. This related to their social experience of 
being someone who had not completed his military service, as well as their experience 
of the processes of getting out of the army, as one first needs to be conscripted to then 
be exempted from military duties.  
The interview schedules with soldiers and military officers were again a revised version 
of the general interview guide used for the public, but were shorter, focusing more on 
their experience and the meaning they attribute to the military service. The sections 
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were again organised to move from socio-demographic questions about themselves 
and their families, to specific questions designed to draw out the soldiers’ and officers’ 
personal understandings, opinions of and experiences in the NG. Both schedules with 
soldiers and officers ended with the same question: ‘How do you envision the Cypriot 
army in the future and how would you like it to be? Shall we continue with conscription 
or have a professional force?’ 
The agreements made between the head of the force and myself meant limited space 
for follow-up questions. As it will be discussed below, the interview agendas I used in 
my interviews in the NG, had to be approved by the head of the force. Clearly, in this 
case, interviews were more structured. Yet, these cannot be classified completely as 
structured as, following several issues I had to manage during my time in the army, 
discussed later on, there was enough scope for flexibility to ask follow-up questions 
within the pre-agreed areas of interest.  
I gave an information sheet explaining what the research is about and how the 
information would be used to all soldiers and officers. The NG had also prepared a 
consent form that soldiers and officers had to sign before the interview (see appendix 2). 
This explained that they were voluntarily taking part in the research.  
Lastly, interview agendas for politicians and representatives of youth sections of political 
parties and independent political youth groups were devised according to their role and 
its relevance to the research questions, still in line with the thematic sections of the 
‘general interview guide’. The reason I devised the initial schedule differently for each 
politician is because I was interviewing them under their current or former political role 
and not as a member of the public. Therefore, in devising the schedule accordingly, I 
researched about the political career of the respective politician for specific information 
that related his political roles and goals to the issues of my research enquiry.  
The time before turning on the Dictaphone was most central in establishing trust with 
politicians. There is not much doubt whether a politician would have said something that 
he would not have been comfortable for me to use. Yet, a clear explanation of how the 
interview would be used seemed to always lay a good foundation of trust. Thorough 
preparation and careful selection of the questions to be asked were proven, from my 
first interview with a politician, to be fundamental in the conduct of this type of interview. 
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Well-considered and concise questions draw the picture of a professional researcher 
and shows respect towards the position or ‘power’ of the politician, as the researcher in 
this way shows they value the politician’s time.  
Interviews with all participants were conducted face-to-face. Interviews with the public 
lasted between fifty minutes to a little over one hour. With politicians they lasted 
between one to one and a half hours, and with soldiers and military officers from thirty 
minutes to an hour.  The interviews were conducted in a variety of places (including the 
interviewee’s house and mine, and quiet coffee shops). In all of these places, I ensured 
the environment was private and comfortable. In the next section I discuss some of the 
strategies I developed to deal with the relative need of interviewees to offer accounts 
that would please me.  
 
Strategy on follow-up questions and taking notes  
In the first few interviews I conducted I noticed that by taking notes whilst interviewees 
were responding, they often felt that what they were saying was important or it was the 
“right” answer and motivated them to expand on the response given. It is indeed the 
case that the interviewee most often feels a certain need to satisfy the interviewer.  In 
addition, it started to become evident that the invitation to expand on an opinion offered 
is often interpreted by the interviewee as your agreement to their response. Thus 
encouragement to say more is interpreted as encouragement of their position. In this 
way a ‘double hermeneutic’ is in operation, (Miller, 2000: 130-131).  
The strategy I developed to deal with this issue was to stop taking notes, as everything 
was recorded. Furthermore, when I asked an interviewee to elaborate, I would always 
also reveal to him/her the reason I was interested in exploring this further with them. 
This created further reciprocity between us, as the interviewee in this way was not 
assuming the importance ascribed to certain accounts.   
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4.5. Analysis of interviews  
I completed the analysis myself. By reading the transcribed interviews several times I 
identified certain recurring themes and sub-themes across interviewees accounts. I 
selected the themes that appeared more often in these accounts as well as the ones 
which showed opposition or differentiation to the most dominant themes.  Then, by 
using Nvivo software I organised all of the data under these themes, so I could 
subsequently choose which themes should be included in each chapter. The main 
themes related to 'the impact of the opening of the borders', 'the weakening of the 
'fighting spirit'', 'the weakening of the National Guard' and 'the westernization and 
europeanisation of the society. 
One of the most important parts of transforming embodied interviews into usable data is 
transcription (Tracy 2012). A professional translator had conducted the translation from 
Cypriot or Greek to English and full transcription of all interviews and the focus group.  
There were advantages and disadvantages in my decision to give the role of 
transcription to a professional translator. Apart from freeing up more time for me to write 
up the findings, the translator is a native Cypriot and given that Cypriot is a dialect she 
was able to translate all of the particularities and euphemisms of the language that I 
would have not been able to. However, as Wengraf (2001: 209) suggests, the slow work 
of transcription forces “the delivery to your conscious mind of as many thoughts and 
memories as you can.” My strategy to overcome the fact I hadn’t done the transcription 
myself was to listen to the recording while conducting the first reading of each transcript.   
Furthermore, at different points of the analysis when I felt that I had become 
comfortable with the themes and narratives constructed I went back and read the data 
outside of the thematic parameters. Also, given that writing is an active form of thinking, 
during the writing up phase I frequently went back to the data to look at it in news ways, 
as the analysis pointed me both to the lack or overuse of certain accounts, often at the 
expense of others. Still, one of the main difficulties I faced in the analysis and writing-up 
process was the limitation posed by the method I employed of constructing narratives.  
In my endeavour to find some form of structure through which to make sense of the 
different accounts and give meaning to them, I constructed a number of narratives that 
represent the most recurring accounts on a given issue. However, telling a narrative is 
94 
 
 
only a practical solution to the problem of legitimising diverse and distinct accounts. In 
writing our own narratives and identities, we are seeking what Ricoeur (1984) calls 
‘narrative hospitality’ in the reader. Yet, the nature of representations and their relation 
to the reality they point to is always problematic, because in the categorical unfitness 
the complex diversity of accounts might, to some extent, be lost. Also, the reader cannot 
know how I have decided to construct these categories and not others.  
I have employed a number of techniques to minimise my impact on constructing these 
narratives. In my effort to embrace diversity to the widest extent possible I have 
constructed as many narratives as possible. Additionally, I included as many 
interviewee accounts as possible in each narrative, in order for the reader to have the 
widest range of data to make his/her own interpretation of the data and the narratives 
constructed. Moreover, I have tried to give a voice to the interviewees through the text 
by either including interview extracts or using their own words to present the given 
argument. In an attempt to allow complexity to be voiced through the narrative, I 
included accounts that illustrate diversity and often conflict within the narrative. Also, I 
included as much information as possible about each interviewee, for example, apart 
from age and gender in many cases I also exposed the political beliefs of the 
interviewee and occupation in my effort to provide the reader with adequate information 
about interviewees. Moreover, in this study I have consistently used the first person to 
present arguments and to articulate experiences, feelings and perceptions in order to 
convey the sense of not only the research process, but also to remind the reader how 
my arguments are solidly my own interpretations. I am aware that these data can then 
be interpreted by an alien logic (Rapport and Overing, 2000) to mine. The next part of 
the chapter will explore issues that emerged with each distinct group of interviewees in 
arranging and conducting the interviews. 
4.6 Reflecting on issues that emerged with each distinct group of interviewees  
This part of the method chapter is going to explain the distinction between the sets of 
people I interviewed and some of the issues I faced with that particular group.  
Interviews with the Public  
In my interviews with the public, I took a great deal of care to create an equal power 
relationship with my interviewees. Rapport and reciprocity were central values in 
95 
 
 
conducting the interviews. In these interviews trust was mostly established by ensuring 
confidentiality and anonymity and creating a safe and comfortable environment for the 
interview. Also, the academic profile of the research seemed, in the interviewees’ 
perception, to be trustworthy.  
It is indeed the case that by treating the other person as an equal person and asking the 
questions person-to-person it becomes more likely that the questions will be answered 
fully. In most cases I did not avoid getting involved in ‘real conversations’ and offered 
responses to the interviewees answers or to their questions, and thus became involved 
in an interactive process whereby the interview becomes a joint exploration of the 
issues of inquiry and where both the interviewee and interviewer together take part in 
the knowledge that is produced.  
However, being an insider posed both advantages and limitations, which had to be 
overcome. While reflexivity became more complicated by the fact that I was interviewing 
people from diverse and distinct social and political backgrounds, often oppositional to 
my background, coming from the same society I was able to relate to people’s 
experiences in concrete ways and show familiarity and empathy towards certain issues. 
A certain introduction at the beginning of the interview assisted me in adopting the role 
of alien/foreigner, when I needed the interviewee to explain something from scratch or 
to elaborate extensively on widely known realties in Cyprus. Thus, I always made it 
clear that ‘given that I am also Cypriot I will ask questions that might sound odd as I also 
know the ‘answer’; however, what I am interested in is your interpretation, opinion and 
understanding of certain social and political issues.’ Moreover, as it will be later 
discussed, in my interview encounters with ultra-nationalists I was actually interviewing 
people whose social and political beliefs I have always been strongly opposed to in the 
context of Cyprus.   
Lastly, I always took care at the end of the interview to invite the interviewee to come 
back to the present, as the research topics often instigated traumatic or difficult 
experiences, for example, some interviewees talked about their missing relatives or 
about their experiences of the war.  
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Interviews with politicians  
In previous sections I have discussed ‘gate-keeping’ and ‘access’, here I will focus on 
the actual interview encounter with the ‘powerful’ interviewees. I will argue that carefully 
creating and upholding a balanced power relationship in these interviews, to whatever 
extent possible, is of the utmost importance, as lowering one’s position in the power 
relationship can potentially foreclose access to the desired information and potentially 
have an impact on the knowledge being produced throughout the interview. 
To my surprise, the interview process with politicians who were also family friends was 
not much different from the ones I didn’t have any prior connection with. From my first 
interview with a family friend it straightaway became apparent to me that the family 
relationship got me the interview but was not at all part of the interview process. In 
these interviews a very clear renegotiation of the relationship took place immediately 
upon my arrival. However, in all interviews with the ‘powerful’ the fact that they did not 
know what to expect from the interview or from me as an interviewer, given that they are 
not used to conducting non-journalist interviews, opened up the power relationship for 
negotiation.  By carefully presenting the project and myself I was able to gain their 
respect but also encouraged a sense of curiosity about the project. 
One also needs to accept that it is unavoidable that the politician has better political 
skills than the researcher. In most of these interviews, there were moments where 
certain interview goals were defeated by the experience of the politician; the most 
common case being the interviewee thinking he understood what I was getting at before 
I finished my question, interrupting me, not letting me complete the question and 
providing an answer that did not fully answer the intended question. In such situations, 
one needs to show sensitivity to the micro-politics of the given situation. Insisting on 
getting an answer to a question can seriously undermine rapport. One needs to respect 
that it is part of the role of the politician to reveal some bits of information and not others. 
This became particularly evident in my interview with the former President of Cyprus, 
where I rephrased and asked a specific question three times, to only get a diplomatic 
answer in which he did not touch on my question. At that point, I realised that I should 
not insist further. Reflecting on this later, I realised that it was the question that was 
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wrong. I was actually asking something that he could not admit to in regards to a policy 
that perhaps he also felt uncomfortable about enforcing.  
Interviews in the National Guard  
On the day that the research would have commenced I was stunned by how well 
everything had been arranged by the National Guard (NG). Yet, a major difficulty was 
just about to emerge. I was asked to provide the headquarters with the interview 
questions beforehand. While I had sent this in time, the officer in charge of the research 
had informed me that the research could not commence until they received the approval 
of the Head of the NG, they were still waiting for this.  
To my disappointment, the Head of the NG decided that since I was asking questions 
regarding the ‘enemy’ and generally what he called ‘political questions’, the Minister of 
Defence had to also approve the questions. I was asked to leave the camp and that 
they would contact me about the Minister’s decision. However, I had to return to the U.K. 
within days and I knew that the process of re-arranging access would not be quick or 
simple. Thus, the situation called for drastic solutions.  
I contacted the Minister of Defence’s secretary, who would have been able to speed up 
the process, to ask whether the questions had been received for approval from the 
Minister. Then, I contacted one of the highest-ranking officers of the headquarters of the 
army who spoke with the head of the military, who informed me that he was concerned 
about confidentiality of such military information and by whom my writings would be 
read. This discrepancy in the way my research was perceived at the Ministry of Defence 
and headquarters of the army is interesting in itself; illustrating much of the suspicion of 
the ‘military mind’, (Huntington, 1957).  
After discussing this with the aforementioned officer, we decided to avoid a long 
process of sending the questions back and forth between the Minister and head of the 
army.  We proposed removing some of them with the agreement that I would return 
back to the camp promptly. Removing certain questions did not pose a problem for the 
research as by that time I had acquired these types of accounts already, especially from 
reserves, officers and soldiers I had interviewed whilst off duty.  However, the situation 
had becoming very charged. The above-mentioned officer had made it clear that since 
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he called for a meeting with the head of the military in which he represented me; the 
responsibility was now on him. Thus, if I deviated from what was agreed I would be 
betraying him. The next working day, I was again at the gate of the camp. During the 
whole of my time in the army, the military was extremely helpful in every way, making 
sure that I had everything I needed and, as they said repeatedly from the headquarters, 
they wanted to ‘deliver a good service’.  
 
Power relationships within the army  
The army is a system of hierarchy, oppression and, most of all, power relationships. 
Therefore conducting research within the army could not escape from that system of 
power relationships. The fact that my research was approved by the Minister of Defence 
and the head of the army, within the army barracks it seemed to translate as being 
directly linked to them. This acted in my favour, as in all of my communications and 
relations with and within the military I enjoyed a great deal of respect. Also, my clothing 
being non-military within a military environment had ascribed my identity with a certain 
level of power. I had been understood as a high level academic conducting important 
research. Moreover, given that the research is something very different from the 
everyday routine in the army, this was treated as a positive event and officers showed 
much enthusiasm and curiosity about it. However, my age (26 at the time) posed the 
issue of having to renegotiate power relations at certain points of the research within the 
army barracks.  
 
Going to the military camp; take one!  
My relationship with the military officer in charge of the research was of utmost 
importance in successfully conducting the research in the army. In this case, I had 
dressed formally given the particularity of the setting. Yet, my only concern was that 
given the profile they had constructed about me; my age could have reconfigured the 
power relationship, where I could have ended up being in the position of the ‘soldier’ if I 
was to be perceived as a student doing some study and nothing more. This scenario 
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ran the risk of creating several obstacles to my research process and collection of data, 
including negotiations on how the research was to take place within the camp. 
My fear was proven to be true within the first 10 seconds of my arrival to the military 
camp. Immediately, the officer in charge told me ‘I was expecting to see someone much 
older’. With my age revealed a space was open for renegotiating the relationship of 
power. The issue of the disclosure of identities in researching the powerful has been 
raised by Fitz and Halpin, (1994: 35-36), whilst Conti and O’Neil (2007: 73) note how 
they devised a set of strategies for dealing with the dismissiveness of their respondents 
and altering the authority relationship in the interview. I was aware that I had to find a 
way to gain back my power in the relationship. My strategy was to draw on my 
academic background and, it worked! From that point onwards, he started several 
discussions on current national and international politics, occasionally trying to impress 
me with his opinions. He then introduced me to other officers as ‘Professor’.  
 
Going to the military camp; take two!   
Following the events and repeated negotiations over my re-entrance to the army, the 
situation became much more tense and liable to becoming interjected again.  I knew 
that in the interviews I had to strictly stick to the questions agreed with the head of 
military if the research wasn’t to be interrupted again, and to also not betray the high 
ranking officers who become involved in convincing the head of the military to agree to 
my re-entrance.  Yet, this generated another set of issues that I had to manage.  
It was clear to me before entering the army barracks for the second time that the 
relationship that I would developed with the officer in charge of my research could have 
impeded the accomplishment of all of my research goals in the army. However, my task 
was a complicated one; I had to gain his trust that I would follow what had already been 
agreed, without becoming obedient to him. Therefore, establishing respect towards my 
person was key in balancing the relationship of power. I knew that by not deviating from 
the questions agreed and being careful in my approach to the soldiers and officers 
would establish a certain level of trusting rapport. Yet this role construct of a lawful 
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researcher obeying the pre-agreed terms gave almost the feeling of a soldier acting 
under an officer’s commands. This was undesirable and I had to regain my power! 
In doing this, I developed a strategy based on a few steps. I will elaborate on the first 
step, by way of example.  Based on my belief that the time between being picked up 
from the gate to getting to the office where I would conduct the interviews was critical in 
setting the dynamic of the relationship I aspired to between the officer and myself, I had 
already planned that I would create a discussion were I would state two points.  ‘You 
see that I arranged everything in a way so that we could meet again very soon’ I said. 
This was a claim of political power on my behalf. Indeed, he asked: ‘How did you 
manage to arrange it so soon?’ I replied, ‘I proposed to the head of the military to take 
these measures, deleting the questions that he did not agree with’ he appeared 
impressed and he asked me, ‘did you speak with the head of military himself?’ I had 
already planned my answer, which is what actually happened, ‘I had someone 
representing me to him,’ I said; knowing that, at that point, the power relationship was, 
to an important extent, restored.  
 
Relationship to soldiers  
The relationship between the soldiers and I, in the way the setting was arranged by the 
army, could not escape a certain relationship of power, as my academic status became 
interwoven with the military hierarchical power structures. The description of my 
research proclaimed in the camp morning report had already painted a professional 
academic profile of me to the soldiers. Also, my arrival to the grounds where the 
interviews were conducted with the officer in charge of the research had somehow 
linked me, in the soldiers’ perception, to the army itself. Of noteworthy mention is that 
the soldiers would stand up every time the officer and I entered the establishment. 
The setting and set-up of the interviews in the camp clearly showed its military character 
and created an influence, to some extent, over the interview process. The soldiers were 
waiting to be interviewed in the reception room and an officer was with them calling the 
next interviewee to come to the room. In our very first communications soldiers treated 
me as someone hierarchically superior to them. I took certain measures to minimise the 
101 
 
 
power relationship, and, therefore, its impact on the production of knowledge throughout 
the interview. When soldiers entered through the door I immediately said that I was not 
related to the army in any way. I also made it very clear that they were allowed to 
express anything they wanted and that their accounts would be anonymised. This 
technique proved to be successful as soldiers did generally become much more relaxed 
following my introduction. The fact that soldiers most often took the opportunity to 
express difficulties they were facing in the camp also illustrates that the power dynamic 
that the pre-set situation had created was, to some extent, overcome. Nonetheless, I 
struggled to escape the formality the military environment created and my relationship 
with the soldiers, even if much less so than at the beginning, was quite formal.   
 
 
Interviews with Ultra-nationalist Politicians  
In this section I will reflect on my interview encounter with ultra-nationalist politicians. 
Before proceeding to discuss this, I will first elaborate further on some of the remarks 
made earlier in the research design section about arranging these interviews, as certain 
issues faced call for further attention.  
 
Arranging to interview ultra-nationalist and issues of trust in these interviews  
As it was discussed above in arranging to interview ELAM, which is perhaps the most 
extreme ultra-nationalist party, I very soon realised that a ‘top-down’ approach would 
not be effective. I carefully selected an acquaintance who is a friend with one of their 
leading figures. The selection of him was particularly strategic as he is not politicised 
and therefore would not have revealed any political outlook on my part. We had had a 
very thorough discussion in advance about how he would portray me. He presented me 
as a student doing research in which their views would have been very valuable to my 
project.  As it turned out, the respective politician accepted my request following a 
phone conversation between the two of us and him being granted permission from the 
board of the party to represent the party.  
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On another occasion, I used a completely different strategy in my attempt to get an 
interview with EDHK, a smaller ultra-nationalist party. I wrote a letter in purist Greek 
language (which is hardly used any more) to the president of the party, hoping that he 
would be more inclined to accept my request, given that nationalists in Cyprus and 
Greece are continuing the use of purist Greek language. Indeed, he called me and 
warmly accepted to be interviewed.  
Furthermore, trust with representatives of ultra-nationalist parties was a complicated 
issue and often posed a significant barrier that needed to be overcome. This level of 
distrust towards the interview was clearly illustrated by the fact that in two cases the 
respective representative turned up to the interview with other party members. There 
was also a certain form of anxiety regarding what we would be discussing. In some 
cases, I had to send the interview questions in advance. In my effort to overcome the 
trust issues, I adopted a certain level of diplomacy, describing the topic of the research 
as national identity and male identity in Cyprus. It would have been rather tragicomic to 
ask to interview an ultra-nationalist politician by telling him that I was conducting 
research on ultra-nationalism. Also of great assistance was proven to be a clarification 
on my part that I am an academic researcher and thus not a journalist. My efforts to 
build trust and some rapport became successful, as, after a certain point in these 
interviews, informants came to view it in positive terms. Mainly understanding it as an 
opportunity to share their views with the world.   
Now I will proceed to discuss the interview encounters I had with the two major ultra-
nationalist parties of Cyprus, ELAM and EDHK (thus excluding two ultra-nationalist 
youths, namely Metwpo and Drasis-Kes), as these posed more significant issues in 
terms of the interview process and the overall situation created.  
 
Finding the President of EDHK 
I had left Nicosia early in the morning as I had to drive for a few hours to get to where 
Loucas Stavrou, the president of EDHK, insisted on meeting. I had sent him a letter to 
which he responded with a phone call clarifying that if I was to interview him ‘I had to go 
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and find him where he lives’. To my surprise, he lived in one of the most remote villages, 
on the slope of Troodos (the highest mountain of Cyprus: 60,404 ft.). 
I was excited to be facing a potential new world of unexplored data on the issues of 
inquiry, however I was not quite sure what to expect from the imminent encounter with 
an outspoken advocate of ultra-nationalism. The media presented these parties, mostly 
through some violent incidents, as some sort of street-gang with strong ideological 
dogmas.  
I arrived at the village and called him; he then gave me some directions and told me to 
wait in the grounds of a church. These few minutes of waiting seemed to last forever, 
and it became clear that the stakes change when one decides to look into the face of 
extremism. As he entered the grounds of the church, I identified him not by his face but 
from his walk, which resembled the steadiness and assurance of a military walk.   
As we walked along the strand, we exchanged pleasantries. Here I was in the company 
of an ultra-nationalist, in a village in the middle of the mountains. He suggested that we 
conduct the interview in a nearby restaurant. The staff at the restaurant clearly knew 
him, but were somehow distant in their communication with him, which was clearly 
identifiable in their body language. During the course of the interview, the tone of the 
conversation ranged from convivial discourse of ‘educated men’, to moments when our 
political incommensurability was laid bare. I had prepared all questions with great care 
and had thought selectively of the phrasing that I would use; to not reveal strong 
antithetical political beliefs to him yet also to not use phrasing that would upset him and, 
thus, undermine his trust in the interview. However, I soon realised that what I 
considered to be a rational statement or question was very different to his 
understanding and in such ways my value-free performativity was repeatedly 
undermined. For example, I had phrased this specific question very carefully, however 
he shocked me with is reply:  
Interviewer: Exactly what type of solution would you like for our national issue and 
which solution do you believe is possible today?  
Loucas Stavrou: The solution is beyond possible! The solution that we ought to 
propose is a solution acceptable by the terms and values of Europe. This of course 
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might not be possible under the current circumstances, but what it is, is that it will 
constitute the basis of the armed claim of liberation, because I believe that the only 
possible solution is an armed claim. 
Interviewer: You do? 
Loucas Stavrou: Yes, but we must prepare this first diplomatically and then […]  
What are you asking for? We are asking for democracy! We refuse to sell our land, not 
even a handful of it! 
Interviewer: Do you believe that we have the capability of an armed claim? 
Loucas Stavrou: Of course there are the capabilities today especially if we consider 
that Turkey is a giant with bronze legs. Let’s not believe in the propaganda that Turkey 
is a massive force. 
 
Meeting a representative of ELAM 
Driving to meet the representative of ELAM at a coffee shop that I had proposed, I was 
thrilled by the opportunity to interview him, so thrilled in fact that I forgot to arrange how 
we would identify each other. Walking into the coffee shop, I immediately realised that 
identification would have never posed a problem; a well-built young man with a huge 
moustache and a motorcycle helmet waved at me.  
His appearance portrayed his political beliefs. This created an interesting yet heavily 
charged environment, as the people sitting at tables around us kept staring at him. I did 
not predict the anxiety he felt. As we were getting ready to begin the interview his 
anxiety clearly showed by his hands slightly shaking. Also, there was a certain effort by 
him to satisfy me, which underpinned the interview process. We might have been 
speaking two very different political languages, but this encounter was also about 
uncomfortable resemblances. We were of a similar age, graduates, came from the 
same city and have a friend in common.  Even though we approached the same issues 
from a very different angle, we were interested in the same common issues and had 
shared concerns. For example, the breakdown of Cypriot community and the 
directionless defence policy, which we admittedly had different approaches to but we 
were equally engaged in an exploration of these issues in the context of Cyprus. He 
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was as willing to hear my opinions, which he appeared to value, as much as I was 
interested in hearing his.  
Moreover, by allowing me to enter his world; I began to understand the emotional depth 
in which such nationalist and militarist beliefs, that I have always been opposed to yet 
have chosen to concentrate on in my research, were interwoven with his way of looking 
at world issues.  These feelings of deep emotional attachment to national sentiments 
can be interpreted through the primordial understanding of nations that often 
characterises the nationalist thought and provides an understanding of national kinship 
that extends beyond clear-cut kin connections (Puri 2004: 44; Smith 1986: 12; Hearn 
2006: 20; Horowitz 1985: 57-64; specifically on Cypriot nationalism see Papadakis, 
2008: 5).   
The developing rapport between us became even more present and yet further 
complicated, when, half an hour after the interview began, two other party members 
appeared and sat with us. The relationship between the interviewee and me had 
already been established as warm with sympathy being openly revealed from both sides, 
as such the other members accepted me and we ended up spending the whole evening 
together as a group. Moreover, it was very interesting that they had done their 
homework about me. This became particularly apparent when, while discussing draft-
dodging, the fact that I had also draft-dodged slipped through the lips of the interviewee; 
revealing that they had looked at my military record. However, in all cases they treated 
such instances with a great deal of care and sensitivity so that rapport would not be 
broken.  
After I had turned off the Dictaphone, the most interesting political and military 
conversations were sparked. Clearly, when working with extremist organisations of any 
sort one has to, as Sluka (2007: 267) points out, “learn how to walk softly. Be sensitive 
to what sorts of questions may be asked and what sort of questions are taboo.” Having 
established rapport I was able to disregard these taboo areas and ask questions that I 
had never assumed would have been received as appropriate.  
In my endeavour to deepen my understanding of them, they also increasingly shared 
with me some of the difficulties they were facing in Cypriot society and political circles 
due to their extreme political beliefs. In these cases, I had showed sympathy to the 
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difficulties they were facing. However, are the commitments of polyphony that 
postmodern theory proposes the same if one is sharing interview authority with 
outspoken advocates of fascism?    
Taylor’s notion of perspicuous contrast is useful here. As he writes: “It will almost 
always be the case that the adequate language in which we can understand another 
society is not our language of understanding, or theirs, but rather what one could call a 
language of perspicuous contrast.” (1985: 125).  
However, it is possible that in the effort to give voice to what appears alien to us we can 
push the ethics of understanding to its limits. These uncomfortable congruencies, 
including the fact that I had, to some degree, related to him as another human being 
who ascribes emotional importance to what he perceives as significant, undercut any 
simple separation between researcher and research subject, or between the liberal and 
fascist. In this sense, there is no neutral place for Weber’s value-free social scientist to 
stand. As it has been already discussed, there has been much debate in sociology 
about the issue of bias. Becker summed up this problem in his well-known essay 
‘Whose side are we on?’ He notes: whatever side we are on, we must use our 
techniques impartially enough that a belief to which we are especially sympathetic could 
be proved untrue.’ (1967: 246). 
I will take a moment to explore the two main questions that have troubled me following 
the interview: How are the ethics of investigating ultra-nationalist power implicated in 
these strange acquaintances – necessitated by the research itself – and the desire to 
understand the advocates of nationalism and intolerance towards anything perceived as 
an ‘other’? What does this extreme case, where I was almost researching a political and 
ideological opponent, raise in relation to the place from which I make interpretations and 
strive to understand this interviewee?   
When I left this interview I spent a long time alone contemplating the rapport that had 
built up between us during the several hours we had spent together and what that 
meant about me as a researcher. Perhaps what had shocked me the most is that, by 
allowing me to access their own world, I had come to understand that, contrary to my 
previous thoughts, the arguments and statements advocated by them, which I have 
always been opposed to, were in their own world engaged with a rational reasoned set 
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of debates. Also, these involved deep emotional attachments to ideas, which appears to 
me as alien and irrational. Besides, apart from the differences between us there were 
also similarities.  
During and after the interview, I was trying to understand if a combination of dialogue 
and critical judgment could be possible in my effort to find a place in which I could stand 
to interpret this somehow unique and new-fangled research encounter.  However, 
dialogue and critique do not necessarily need to be different. It is possible for both sides 
to be destabilised whilst critically evaluating the naturalised predispositions of the 
interviewee.  
What I have come to understand is that contrary to my previous belief, ultra-nationalists 
are also humans with concerns, feelings and rationality and I have thereafter ceased to 
‘caricature’ ultra-nationalists as violent, irrational monsters. This has allowed me to 
understand them as fellow-human beings and, therefore, to further interpret the way in 
which they construct different beliefs and ideologies through the importance they 
ascribe to certain ideas in the realm of rationality and emotion. I also came to realise 
that in my endeavour to understand the ‘other’, I need to ‘use’ the ‘other’, as a reflective 
mirror for looking back at myself in order to keep reminding myself that the differences 
that make us different are much finer than we always assume, as there is a great deal 
of congruence. Thus, it is within the fine intersections and apartness of similarity and 
difference that we can best interpret what, at first sight, appears to us as alien. As 
Crapanzano (19 0) has argued, in learning about the ‘other’ we learn about the ‘self’.  
 
 
5. Chapter five: Nationalism in post-2003 Cyprus  
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I seek to understand post-2003 Greek Cypriot (G.C.) nationalism through 
examining the constellation of social, political and state-institutional processes and 
discourses that followed the opening of the borders between North and South Cyprus in 
2003. In doing so I wish to understand post-2003 G.C. nationalism, as a discourse 
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formulated, on what I understand as its formative, post-war elemental components. 
These are, ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ (In Greek: Δεν Ξεχνώ και Αγωνίζομαι), 
‘defence’(In Greek: Άμυνα), ‘occupation’ (In Greek: Κατοχή), and the issue of the 
‘mothers, wives and sisters of the missing persons’ (In Greek: Οι μάνες των 
αγνοουμένων).   
I am not seeking to describe an escalation or a downfall of G.C. nationalism but rather 
to map and identify the intersection of discourses created during and following the 
period of 2003-2004 in Cyprus. Thus, I am seeking to identify certain changes, reactions 
and reiterations within the discourse of G.C. nationalism created as a response to the 
following events: the opening of the borders, the Annan Plan referendum, and the 
accession of Cyprus to the European Union (EU). I will do this by studying the G.C. 
community’s perception of the national struggle in this new space and the crossings 
from the one side of the island to the other that occurred following the opening of the 
borders, from and towards the ‘green line’ and the choice of not crossing.  
The purpose that this inquiry would serve is to contribute to the overall argument of this 
thesis that, in  post-conflict European Cyprus with open borders, masculinist 
endeavours of nationalism and militarism are continuing under certain new social and 
political parameters and in a setting where the perceived threat has been undermined to 
perpetuate a co-constitutive relationship of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. The 
concept of nationalist militarised masculinity, introduced in the first chapter, is used in 
the chapter on masculinity to illustrate how the resistance to cross and the significance 
of the discourse of ‘occupation’ for G.C. nationalism that this chapter reveals are an 
expression of a broader discourse of masculinity co-constituted to nationalism and 
militarism that appeals to the whole social body and is integral to the viewpoint the 
community adopts in the conflict situation.  
The overarching argument of the chapter is that following the opening of the borders 
whilst there has been a perceived weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’ (I struggle) for 
liberation from ‘occupation’, there is an enduring invocation of victimcy (I do not forget) in 
relation to ‘occupation’, which is symbolically illustrated through the significance the 
community continues to ascribe to the mothers of the missing persons. This becomes 
particularly clear in the most prominent narrative of my interviewees on their perception 
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of the effect of the opening of the borders and crossings as undermining the status of 
the conflict as ‘occupation’. Therefore, the analytical centrality that is given to the 
opening of the borders relies on the understanding of this event creating a new 
discursive space of dynamics for defining and interpreting an on-going and unresolved 
problem. Yet, in the post-opening of the borders, the discourse of ‘occupation’, 
formative of post-war G.C. nationalism, will be illustrated to condition the ‘right’ to cross 
(I do not forget). Whereas, a prominent G.C. reality is the perceived weakening of the 
‘fighting spirit’ (I struggle) tightly linked to the opening of the borders. This will guides us 
in understanding further the centrality the borders were given in the overall 
conceptualisation of the conflict as an ‘occupation’.  
The accession of Cyprus to the European Union is also perceived as undermining the 
‘fighting spirit’ of the struggle in the G.C. community. This is mostly linked to the 
accession providing relative public security in relation to the fear of a second invasion 
by Turkey. Conversely, the diminution of the fear of war also ensues the presence of the 
perceived ‘other’ on the South part of the border, which, following the war in 1974, is 
controlled by the Republic of Cyprus. This has helped many G.C.s to ease numerous 
preoccupations about the previously ‘imagined’ (Anderson, 1983) threatening ‘enemy’ 
yet the limited interaction illustrates how this is also delimitated through the ‘occupation’. 
The ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle I found as being affected by the cultural 
impact of Western individualist and consumerist values and ideals on the G.C. 
community since this is understood as weakening the unified community predicated on 
the common national struggle for ‘defence’ and liberation from ‘occupation’.   
In this manner, as it will be discussed in the following chapter on militarism, the opening 
of the borders, the accession to the EU and certain cultural developments are also 
undermining the militarist framing of the struggle and the role of men within it as 
‘defenders’. Furthermore, the chapter on masculinity will illustrate these weakened 
masculinist discourses to be now taking place in specific nationalist and militarist 
adapted iterations.  
Moreover, I will argue that the emergence of organised ultra-nationalist parties and 
political youth groups only following the opening of the borders are a discursive 
response to this opening, the perception of the weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’ in the 
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G.C. community, the undermined ‘defence’ and the weakening of masculinist militarist 
discourses of the national struggle. Whereas the financial crisis and the migration 
challenges faced by many EU states has been tightly linked to the rise of ultra-right wing 
parties across Europe, my concern here is what made these political parties possible 
from within the post-opening of the borders in Cyprus. Therefore, the analysis that 
follows seeks to understand the intersection of discourses within the post-opening of the 
borders co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity that made them 
possible.  
This chapter begin by looking back at the creation of the discourse of the national 
struggle in post-1974 Cyprus. Then it places the importance on the failure of political 
events (the opening of the borders, the accession of Cyprus to the EU, the Annan 
Referendum) that held the potential of reunifying Cyprus and their role in re-formation of 
the national struggle. Within this new setting then there is a reiteration of the invocation 
of victimcy expressed through G.C. resistances to crossing the ‘occupation’ and not 
interacting with the T.C. in the South. This so created space of victimcy is what ultra-
nationalist fractions have been preying upon. 
 
5.2. Looking back through post-war Cyprus: discourses of ‘I do not forget’ - ‘I 
struggle’ and the ‘borders’  
 
Following the war of 1974 the broader yet also official state conceptualisation of the 
conflict as an invasion and a continuous ‘occupation’ by Turkey was inextricable from 
the construction of the idea of the national struggle. This framing of the conflict opposes 
its alternative (and internationally prominent) that is a ‘bi-communal conflict amongst 
two ethnic communities; G.C.s and T.C.s’. This section will discuss the idea of the post-
war national struggle and its relevance to the aforementioned conceptualisation of the 
conflict.  
In this analysis the use of the term ‘occupation’ is argued to be a certain discursive 
practice of the conflict situation, supported by the state and mobilised through its 
institutions, tied to the national struggle for liberation and the ideology of defence. As 
Foucault (1977: 200) argues, a discursive practice is “embodied in technical processes, 
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in institutions, in patterns for general behaviour, in forms of transmission and diffusion, 
and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them.” This discourse 
crystallised the position that the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus means that Cyprus has 
been a victim of the ‘‘enemy” (I do not forget). Consequently, ‘returning’ meant liberation 
of the ‘occupied’ land whilst ‘defending’ the community and ‘free areas’ of Cyprus, and 
‘protesting’ against ‘occupation’ (I struggle). Therefore, in the G.C. community 
‘occupation’ is understood to be what Bourdieu (1991: 107) terms as ‘authorised 
language’. This is understood to provide resistance to new patterns of thinking or action 
that lay outside of it (ibid). ‘Occupation’ meant ‘borders’; ‘remembering’, ‘struggling’ and 
‘defence’.  
The official state rhetoric following the war and partition of the island in 1974 has rested 
on cultivating the struggle for a unified country, largely predicated on keeping the 
memory alive of the ‘occupied’ part of the island (I do not forget) and fighting for 
liberation from ‘occupation’ (I struggle). The relevance of the national struggle to 
nationalism in Cyprus lies in the analysis of the nation as a discursive formation 
(Calhoun, 1997) as well as an 'imagined political community’ (Anderson, 19 3). This 
allows its members to envision a deep affinity with each other by creating their history, 
which is largely a shared narrative of the common struggle for survival (Hobsbawm & 
Ranger, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Renan, 1990; Kedourie, 1994; Smith, 1998) of the G.C. 
community through time. Following the war in 1974, and the resulting partition of the 
island, state-funded schools, as Christou (2006: 286) reminds us, have sought to 
educate a new generation of G.C.s by helping them to remember the ‘occupied’ part of 
the island and to maintain the struggle for a unified country.  
Then the state mobilised slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ was constructed of two 
ideological instructive components11. The former (I do not forget) embodied the promise 
of the G.C. political leadership and people that the territory that was lost due to the war 
would not be forgotten. Nationalist memory that hereinafter will be addressed through 
                                                          
11
 It needs to be noted that the slogan first appears in Cyprus following the events of 1974 as ‘I don’t 
forget’ and promptly becomes a permanent feature of G.C. school life (see: Christou, 2006). Then the 
slogan was modified to ‘I don’t forget and I struggle’. In 2001 the slogan was modified again to ‘I know, I 
don’t forget and I struggle’,(see: ibid). In this thesis I refer to ‘I don’t forget and I struggle’ except if 
specified otherwise. This is as the importance ascribed to this slogan in post-war Cyprus was ascribed to 
‘I don’t forget and I struggle’.  
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the policy instruction of ‘I do not forget’ has assisted in maintaining the territory of the 
ROC that G.C.s no longer control, and were also unable to visit in the G.C. nationalist 
imagination (Anderson,1983). Therefore, memory, which in this instance takes the form 
of the official pronouncement of ‘I do not forget’, has been a function of resistance 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). The later (I struggle) ideological instructive component 
means that by using any means possible and available, what was lost will be regained 
through struggle, which will finally lead to the ‘liberation from the Turkish conqueror’. 
This statement, which is also a popular slogan (In Greek: απελευθέρωση της Κύπρου 
από τον Τούρκο κατακτητή), is inextricable from the state mobilised historical narratives 
of the “Greek nation”12. This discourse of nationhood comprises both Greek and Cyprus 
states under a “Greek nation” that liberated itself from the Ottoman conqueror in 1 21, 
maintaining the “Greek” ‘fighting spirit’ that will again liberate its “Ottoman re-
enslavement in 1974”.  
‘I do not forget and I struggle’ became the symbol of the post-war G.C. identity. This 
slogan was visually presented in state institutional settings, such as schools and the 
army; non-governmental organisations, associations, groups and individuals themselves 
also used it. In Cyprus, it is not uncommon at all that someone has a sticker proclaiming 
‘I do not forget and I struggle’ on their car window or on their house door.  
Hence, resisting the forgetting of lost homelands maintained a romanticised ‘image’ of 
the ‘occupied’ land, which the G.C. community ideologically turned into the need to 
‘struggle’ and to ‘return’. In this discursive space, the existence of the un-crossable so-
called ‘Green-Line’ in Cyprus had become a symbol of the polarisation and opposition of 
the two communities on the island yet also of the need to ‘struggle’. Consequently, the 
opening of the borders, in the analysis that follows, is seen as of paramount importance 
to the continuation of the G.C. national struggle.  
The closed and heavily militarised border that divided Cyprus between the ‘free’ and 
‘occupied’ parts has stood as the most major symbol of the ‘occupation’ of Northern 
                                                          
12
 When I use the term ‘nation’ I refer to the nationalist construction that Cyprus is part of the “Greek 
nation”. This becomes particularly significant when discussing the ideology of defence. The constructed 
ideology of defence referred to the defence of the whole “Greek nation” from the expansion tendencies of 
Turkey, which is further illustrated by the establishment of the Single Area Defence Doctrine Cyprus-
Greece.  
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Cyprus. It has fuelled the need for ‘defence’ from the ‘occupation’ forces and the need 
to protest against the existence of the border, therefore the need for liberation from 
‘occupation’. The importance of military guarded borders in relation to nationalism in a 
divided country like Cyprus is of the utmost importance and a cause for much public, 
political and academic discussion  (Demetriou, 2007; Çaykent, 2010; Diez et al., 2008; 
Hadjipavlou, 2006 & 2007a). Greek and Turkish nationalisms took place during the 
colonial period in Cyprus (1878-1960) (Attalides, 1979) and became a tool for forming 
an ethnicised sense of personhood into the masses through separate educational 
systems (Bryant, 2004). The inter-ethnic violence that broke out in December 1963 
(Kyriakides, 196 ) resulted in the creation of the ‘Green Line’, a dividing line in the 
capital of Nicosia, to keep the two ethnic communities apart. The Turkish invasion (1974) 
and  ‘occupation’ of the northern third of the island led to the present division into two 
artificially homogeneous ethnic spaces by the rearrangement of the ‘Green Line’ into the 
‘Attila Line’ (112 miles long) in August 1974. G.C. nationalism thereafter has been 
predicated on the memory of the war of 1974 and the continuing ‘occupation’ of 
Northern Cyprus (Papadakis et al., 2006; Hadjipavlou, 2007b; Anastasiou, 2008; 
Papadakis & Bryant, 2012).  Characteristically one of the most prominent official and 
public G.C. slogans in relation to the conflict situation is that ‘Our borders are in Kerynia’ 
(in Greek: “Τα σύνορα μας είναι στη Κερυνεια”). This means that these post-1974 in-
land borders are not our genuine borders; our borders are from the one side of the 
island to the other.  
Furthermore, the existence of closed un-crossable borders has been fundamental in the 
construction and specific ‘imagination’ (Anderson,1983) of the threatening, generalised, 
and undifferentiated national ‘other’: the ‘Turks’, (Spyrou, 2006: 97-99), as the ‘enemy 
within’ (Kanaaneh, 2013), namely the ‘occupation’ forces.  
G.C. post-war nationalism has rested on this specific rhetorical plan of ‘othering’ the 
‘Turk’ that existed across the border. Through the discourse of the ‘existential threat’ 
from the ‘enemy within’, the notion of a unified community predicated on the need for 
‘defence’ and ‘liberation’ was constructed and sustained. The notion of ‘existential threat’ 
in post-war Cyprus was presented by the state as a dominant discourse as not only a 
threat for the G.C. community by a second invasion from Turkey, but also for the whole 
of the “Greek nation”.  
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The national goal, as also clearly evoked and manifested through the official and 
unofficial discourses of the national struggle, was that these borders would one day be 
overthrown and the ‘enemy within’ will be thrown out of Cyprus. As one of the most 
popular G.C. post-war slogans says: ‘All Turks out of Cyprus’ (In Greek: Έξω οι Τούρκοι 
από την Κύπρο): by achieving their expulsion G.C.s will, in some way, re-gain what was 
lost. Characteristically, as another very prominent G.C. post-war slogan states: ‘May all 
the refugees return to their homes’ (In Greek: Όλοι οι πρόσφυγες στα σπίτια τους).  
Most centrally, the idea of the G.C. national struggle did not merely involved the political 
struggle to bring the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus to an end, but required the 
commitment of the complete social body. For example, anti-occupation marches and 
protests, which have been extremely frequent following the division of the island, were 
organised from a widest spectrum of political and social fractions of Cypriot society. 
Noteworthy is that the first anti-occupation march was organised by a small number of 
women on 20th April 1975 (Χamatsou, 2011). Another significant commitment by civil 
society has been the annual student anti-occupation over-night protest on the borders, 
which involved all schools across the country, and the annual Cyprus Federation of 
Motorcyclists march.  Moreover, the strongest commitment of the community to the 
national struggle is illustrated by the “letting” one’s son and/or husband (if between the 
ages of 18 and 55) be conscripted in the NG under the role of soldier, reserve or militia 
(see National Guard Law, 2011). Even women are conscripted in civil defence when 
they turn eighteen and men following their discharge from the militia service at the age 
of fifty-five are supporting the civil defence (see Civil Defence Law 1998). 
The NG and the ideology of defence, which as the next chapter will illustrate is the 
version of militarism that appeared in post-war Cyprus, was perhaps the most central 
manifestation on the part of the nationalist militarist ‘struggle’. Whilst ‘I do not forget’ 
was an active policy with great appeal and adherence amongst the public, it also 
provided the platform for the existence and purpose of the army; i.e. you are not going 
to ‘forget’ because you are going to ‘defend’; one justified the other. The role of men in 
post-war Cyprus was ideologically fused into the national struggle. This ideological 
script provided that the NG manifests the will of the G.C. men involved as soldiers, 
reserves and militia in defence of the G.C. community. The NG maintains a high 
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‘fighting spirit’ with the goal of liberation of the ‘occupied’ North part of Cyprus to enable 
the refugees to return back to their homes.  
In this section, I have argued that, following the war in 1974 and the partition of the 
island, the specific conceptualisation of the conflict by G.C.s as an invasion and 
continuous ‘occupation’, as well as the existence of an ideate threatening ‘other’ across 
the border conveyed by a considerable military was discursively responded to with the 
need to ‘not forget’ the ‘occupied’ territory across the border. As well as responses with 
the ‘struggle’ to push back the border and liberate the ‘occupied’ land in addition to 
‘defence’ of the border from the ‘occupying’ forces. Theorising the borders that exist in 
Cyprus in this way leads one to notice not only the significance the borders were given 
by G.C.s to the integrity and continuation of G.C. existence, but also the discursive 
centrality they were given to the overall conceptualisation of the ‘Cyprus problem’ as a 
continuous ‘occupation’. Therefore, because of the central role of the borders to the 
conflict’s conceptualisation, changes made on those borders have the potential to 
reshape the G.C. interpretation of the conflict itself and consequently the understanding 
of the national struggle for liberation from ‘occupation’. 
5.3. The ‘struggle’ following the opening of the borders  
Following the opening of the borders, the collectivity of the national body rests on a new 
dynamic situated within the ‘I do not forget’ and ‘I struggle’ narratives. In this dynamic 
the public national imaginary maintains conflicting longings. Declaring both a wish for 
the sustenance of a collective memory of the war events (1974) and places (I do not 
forget), and also acknowledging that the ‘fighting spirit’, thus the morale and wish for ‘I 
struggle’ to recover what was lost, is becoming weaker. Since the opening of the 
borders the public understanding of ‘struggle’ contains conflicting desires, which 
generate a range of often contradictory responses such as: 1) an apparent continued 
adherence to the collective ‘I struggle’ 2) the criticism of the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ 
in the community and 3) the personal unwillingness to ‘I struggle’ in the defence and 
liberation of Cyprus. The discursive synergy of the opening of the borders, the Annan 
Plan and the accession of Cyprus to the EU, which took place within a period of 2 years 
(2003 and 2004), apart from being, at the outset, clearly political events, have been 
formative of the re-adapted iterations of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in G.C. 
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society. I argue that the synergy between these three socio-political conditions is 
creating a new discursive space of dynamics for defining, interpreting and visualising 
the future of the G.C. national struggle for an on-going and unresolved conflict ‘problem’.  
This section addresses the weakening ‘fighting spirit’ (I struggle) within this new 
discursive space to ‘remember’ and ‘liberate’ Cyprus from ‘occupation’. Whilst, later on 
in this chapter it will be illustrated that the multiple public and state resistances that have 
been put in place regarding not crossing the border are a manifestation of the reiteration 
of G.C. nationalism. So, it appears that following the opening of the borders, there is a 
reiteration of a certain nationalist stance of victimcy in relation to ‘occupation’ (I do not 
forget), whilst the ‘fighting spirit’ (I struggle) is perceived as undermined.  
The opening of the borders has resulted in a destabilisation of the national ideological 
discourses that were conceptually anchored on the borders, and this has impacted on 
the ideological reproduction of the nationalist militarist ‘struggle’. The national struggle, 
for the larger G.C. community, in a divided country like Cyprus, which used to be 
predicated on the idea of ‘opening’ the closed borders in terms of recovering the 
‘occupied’ land, became conflicting and contradictory in a new unforeseen reality of 
opened borders whilst the ‘occupation’ continues. Importantly, the opening of the 
borders was a decision of T.C. leadership and did not come about as a result of G.C. 
struggle. For the small segment of the Cyprus community that sees the ‘struggle’ as 
reunification the opening of the borders did not undermine their struggle, on the contrary 
this group viewed the opening as a significant opportunity for reconciliation. However, 
the crossings that have taken place from both sites of the divide have not resulted in 
any further substantial interaction between the two communities (Hadjipavlou, 2007b; 
Dikomitis, 2005; Demetriou, 2007; Sahin, 2011; Christiansen, 2005; Webster & Timothy, 
2006). Most G.C.s had limited or no interaction with T.C.s (Sites, Latin & Lazio, 2007 
and Webster & Timothy, 2006) because coming closer to the ‘other’ (as revealed 
through the data) is understood as undermining the ‘occupation’.  
The Annan Plan referendum (2004), was defeated by the G.C.s (75. % voted ‘no’), 
illustrating that they did not wish to live with T.C.s (see Bordignon, 2008), under a 
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collectively formed community and shared state authority13(see Russell & Cohn,2012), 
at least not under the specific arrangements of the plan. Yet, this socio-political process 
had created in the public perception a tangible possibility of an end to this long-lasting 
conflict, while such a possibility has been further sustained in the public perception, by 
the repeated negotiations thereafter (Spilling et al. 2010: 41). Moreover, today, the 
understanding of ‘I struggle’, changes towards a ‘European solution to the Cyprus 
Problem’. The accession of Cyprus to the EU, as it will be discussed in more detail in 
the following chapters, marked a particular turning point in the G.C. ‘struggle’.  The EU 
for G.C. become an instrument for the struggle through EU political pressures on Turkey 
(Demetriou, 2008; Bryant, 2004; Joseph, 1997; Yakinthou, 2009), contributing to a 
disengagement of the community from an ‘I struggle’ position, whilst also, as the next 
chapter will discuss, reducing the defence budget.  I discuss that ‘I do not forget and I 
struggle’ is a discourse which requires and facilitates a nationalist, militarist masculinist 
culture.  When that culture begins to weaken, due to unforeseen events, the discourses 
which sustain that culture also begin to unravel.  
Polemical discourses and nationalistic imaginaries such as the ‘struggle’ to push the 
borders back whilst ‘defending’ the borders from the ‘enemy within’ to prevent further 
‘Turkish aggression’ (I struggle) and the maintenance of the memory of what is now 
‘occupied’ by Turkey (I do not forget) become bleary and antithetical when the partition 
of the two communities is no longer conceptually predicated on the existence of un-
crossable military guarded borders. 
Understandably, the perceived undermined ‘fighting spirit’ generated multiple and 
intense reactions amongst my interviewees. However, there was a general feeling of 
unease and desolation about this. Crossings are seen as undermining the 
understanding of the conflict as ‘occupation’ because they are translated as accepting 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as legitimate. This was clearly 
depicted in an interview I conducted with the Minister of Defence when the border 
opened, Kyriacos Mavronicolas, who commented that soldiers began to question 
whether it was really that necessary to serve their military service, i.e. actively take part 
in the ‘struggle’, when seeing the movement of people from one side of the border to the 
                                                          
13
 The Annan Plan was rejected by 75.8% of G.C.s. While 64.8% of the T.C. population voted in favor of 
the plan, (see Russell, J. & Cohn, R., 2012 and Bordignon, 2008 for an analysis of the results).  
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other. Indeed another contingent underside of the weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’, the 
next chapter will reveal, is that within the aforementioned space the need for ‘defence’ 
has been challenged, contributing to the weakening self-understanding of the 
community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, and of men in the military national struggle.   
In such ways, the people I talked to expressed their desolation that both the G.C. 
community and political leadership have allowed the conflict to reach the current 
disappointing point where the ‘fighting spirit’ of the community is significantly weakened. 
In this context, interviewees also linked the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ to the accession 
of Cyprus to the EU due to an emerging notion of security. The lessening of the fear of 
war with Turkey linked to the EU as a protective power was an issue raised by most 
people I talked to and was treated with a lot of gravity. As Xristos (man, 27, unemployed) 
explains:  
“The fact that there might be a war or that Turkey could attack us, doesn’t even 
cross my mind. However, I think that if anything happened, many countries would 
help us, mostly because of the EU”.  
The opening of the borders, with the resulting crossings, the T.C. existence in the South, 
and the accession of Cyprus to the EU have resulted in a general public feeling of 
safety that a war between the RoC and Turkey is now unlikely (Demetriou, 2005; 
Vassiliou, 2004: 12; Lordos and Kaymak, 2007: 16). This created a feeling of relative 
ontological security (Giddens, 1990: 92) in the G.C. community in relation to the 
previously felt ‘existential threat’ with the possibility of a second invasion by Turkey and 
a ‘full occupation’ of the island.  
Such changes in the public perception of G.C.s have contributed to destabilising the 
image of the ‘other’. This image was constructed as an ‘enemy within’ against whom 
there was a national ‘fighting spirit’, both of which were challenged by a Europeanisation 
of the conflict situation and a relative assimilation of the ‘otherness’ with the ‘normality’. 
This weakened image of the national struggle and an “enemy” thus ousted the feeling of 
fear of that “enemy”. A non-Commissioned Officer (35, interviewed whilst off duty) of the 
NG provides an understanding as to how the opening of the borders has resulted in an 
undermining of the fear of war but also a challenge to the idea of the Turks as the ‘other’:  
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“When I joined the army, I heard the word “war” maybe even twice a week; we 
feared that a war could break out at any time. When I was a kid, if I ever saw a 
Turkish man I thought that he would kill me. Nowadays, soldiers don’t experience 
this …There is the possibility for a rapprochement and, for example, in 2003 
when the borders were opened, people who are soldiers today were 9-10 years 
old at the time. They have grown up differently…”  
Cleary the above account enunciates that these generations have grown up differently 
as they have been able to cross and experience T.C.s in the South with whom they can 
interact. The diminution of the fear of war in a divided and highly militarised country like 
Cyprus, is both of political and social importance as it signals the creation of, what 
Foucault terms, counter-discourse (for example see, Terdiman, 1989). The counter 
discourse was built against the most prominent G.C. discourse of ‘occupation’  which 
was underlined by the feeling of fear of another military conflict with Turkey. In post-war 
Cyprus, ‘defence’, as the next chapter will discuss, was framed by both the state and 
the public as of existential importance. G.C. militarism involved the commitment of the 
whole social body that was mobilised by the state as a ‘nation-in-arms’. Then the 
relative, yet significant, decrease in the fear of war in the public perception holds the 
potential to reconfigure the perception of need for defence.  
In the transition period, from having to ‘struggle’ to defend the borders to having the 
possibility to cross, two narratives emerged: there was a shared perception of the 
communal need to care and ‘struggle’ for the community but also a diminishing need to 
deploy a militaristic protectionism. In the fieldwork research I conducted it was 
systematically clear that interviewees felt a responsibility to ‘struggle’. This was evident 
in that interviewees often and systematically reproduced the G.C. state official discourse 
of nationalism to ‘remember’ the ‘occupied’ part and ‘struggle’ for liberation from 
‘occupation’, whilst reproducing aspects of nationalistic state institutional constructions 
of identity in their agendas. Yet, in most cases, they personally maintained a passive 
stance towards the conflict and the national struggle, while condemning this public 
process of letting these ideals fade away and felt dejected about it. In this transit socio-
political situation, my interviewees found themselves in a somewhat problematic 
situation. This paradox emerged in most interviewees’ accounts and perhaps it can be 
theorised as a gap between the idea of enacting memory and deliberation. Xristo’s (man, 
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27, unemployed) account summarises some of the main arguments and feelings 
evoked in relation to the public’s association with the conflict situation:  
“Xristos: Psychologically...I don’t have the Cyprus Problem in mind all the time. 
Of course everyone is concerned about the Cyprus problem. But, in our everyday 
life, at my age, I am personally not preoccupied with the question as someone 
older would. You can say I grew up with this, but I don’t stress about it all the 
time. I am not constantly worried. However, it is wrong that people are settled, 
and they have reassured themselves that everything is fine. It’s wrong that they 
don’t have that desire that older people have to return and take back our homes. 
Interviewer: So do you believe in this...? 
Xristos: I mean, if someone told me now that the borders would be closed, and 
we had to stay here and they had to stay there, I might not react, do you 
understand? I don’t say that I want to stay like this and forget about the rest 
(translators note: meaning the ‘occupied’ land). But, it is not something that 
bothers me constantly and concerns me that much in my everyday life.” 
The paradox becomes immediately apparent as, while the man above confirms that he 
is not preoccupied about the Cyprus Problem, he acknowledges that he has been 
brought up to be concerned about it and he then criticises the reality he has just 
portrayed and everyone who is taking part in it. In this context, it is interesting to note 
that the ‘I’ is used to evoke one’s personal journey through the inactiveness towards the 
‘Cyprus problem’. Yet, when that is placed in the context of the broader reality of the 
conflict the ‘I’ becomes “they” and converts into a criticism of the reality the observer is 
now confronted with.  
It should also be noted that when I asked him to clarify if he meant that he believes in 
the national struggle, he uses the borders as the main way of illustrating if one cares or 
not, and he goes on to evidence his inactiveness with how he would have responded to 
changes made on the borders;  “if someone told me now that the borders would be 
closed I might not react, do you understand?”. Interestingly, by placing the borders in 
the centre of his description he then reproduces the same paradox as above. What 
comes out of the nexus he reproduces is a divergence, of which importance is further 
121 
 
 
analysed throughout the empirical chapters, between the preservation of ‘national 
memory’ and engagement in the ‘national struggle’: “I don’t say that I want to stay like 
this and forget about the rest. But it is not something that bothers me constantly and 
concerns me that much in my everyday life.”  
Indeed most interviewees referred to national commemorative events, anti- 
occupational marches and protests, strongly advocating national heroes and defence 
issues, which in the post-war G.C. nationalist discourse inhabited a sacred place 
representing the ‘fighting spirit’, as something of the past or school, and commented on 
such values and ideals fading away in expressing and portraying the broader 
undermining of the ‘fighting spirit’. These masculinist discourses of nationalism and 
militarism that today are weakening, as the next chapters will further illustrate, have 
been a central part of the ideological basis for the culture of the ‘national struggle’. 
Maria’s (woman, 27, translator) response was a rather typical one of people of that age; 
when I asked her to comment on how she feels about national commemoration events, 
she notes that: 
“When I hear the national anthem for example, I am moved but these are things 
of school mostly and thus, in general, I don’t feel that I have to do something for 
my country in terms of national conscience.” 
The above quotation immediately presents us with an interesting reality. When I asked 
her to elaborate on how she feels about national commemorations she did so through 
drawing a clear correlation with how much she is willing to do for her country. Thus, she 
examined her feelings in relation to national commemorative events as compared with 
how much she is willing to ‘struggle’, in metaphorical terms. 
The dichotomy that both the interviewees above, Xristos’ and Maria, drew between an 
individual’s preservation of the ‘memory of the war events and lost lands’ and the extent 
to which one is concerned and ‘proactive about the conflict situation’, represents larger 
social and institutional structures and processes of the prominent campaign of ‘I do not 
forget and I struggle’. Nationalism is often reproduced and materialised through its own 
populist slogans.  
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Changes observed by my interviewees in the national ideals and values of the national 
struggle at the collective level were often expressed in a negative relation to some of 
the most popular G.C. slogans about the conflict. The two main ones discussed were ‘I 
do not forget and I struggle’ and ‘our borders are in Kerynia’.  These two slogans have 
acquired much importance in G.C. society; being deeply socially and culturally 
reproduced and strongly projected through political and institutional discourse. In 
presenting my arguments regarding the national struggle following the opening of the 
borders, I will tie the following analysis further to the use of these slogans by my 
participants. What I wish to highlight here is the manner in which national slogans, 
which in the past expressed the position of the G.C. community at large in relation to the 
conflict and more specifically the ‘occupation’, were now most often sharply criticised by 
my interviewees, or treated with irony when placed in the context of the current G.C. 
situation.  
The persistent use of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ by my interviewees to verbalise their 
observations reminded me of how individuals and groups of any form in the G.C. 
community refer to this slogan not only as a generalised slogan, but also as a 
collectively understood reality; expressing and embodying widespread concerns and the 
national goal of the G.C. political leadership and people: ‘to not forget the lands lost and 
the war events’ and to ‘struggle for liberation’. The importance of ‘I do not forget and I 
struggle’ to G.C. nationalism, specifically to the creation of consciousness of victimhood 
against the Turkish aggressor, has been long addressed (Bryant, 2005; Yakinthou, 
2008; Hadjipavlou, 2006; Efthymiou, 2011). “I don’t forget and I struggle” has been a 
function of G.C. nationalism, in symbolically constructing  (Cohen, 1985), the post-war 
G.C. community yet also ‘imagining’ (Anderson, 19 3) its future, (see Christou, 2006: 
299). The account of Andros (42, company director) who is a refugee and a reserve 
illustrates this clearly:  
“I try not to forget ‘I do not forget’ and I try to teach my children in this way. If we 
stop thinking like this, it’s like admitting that we have lost everything for good.” 
Interviewees most often referred to and discussed the slogan ‘I do not forget and I 
struggle’ predominantly denoting the national struggle for liberation and the national 
promise underlying the fight that what was lost will not be forgotten, will not be forgiven, 
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in their effort to verbalise the relative yet evident (for them) loss of the ‘fighting spirit’ in ‘I 
struggle’.  
Many people talked about such slogans with disappointment and anger, as they felt let 
down by the political direction the conflict situation has followed. They talked about the 
G.C. community ‘forgetting’ and not ‘struggling’, explaining that the open borders and 
crossings undermine the understanding of ‘occupation’ and, in synergy with the 
perceived security provided by the EU, the community does not feel the need to 
struggle. As Louca (man, 63, civil servant) a refugee from Kerynia comments:  
“’I do not forget and I struggle’ was just in the beginning; we thought that by 
saying all these slogans, we were achieving something. ‘Our borders are in 
Kerynia”. Where is Kerynia now? We will never get our cities and our villages 
back.’  
Similarly, Xristalla (woman, 51, owner of a small convenience store) notes:  
“‘Xristalla: ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ was very good but it couldn’t last 
forever. 
Interviewer: But it continues to exist. 
Xristalla: Yes but my daughters who have an age difference of 15 years, the 
younger one couldn’t understand ‘I do not forget’. The older one knows a few 
things at least. If the slogan was used correctly, it could have had a duration of 
50-60 years but then we said the same about Constantinople: ‘As time and years 
go by, once more, it shall be ours’, is this valid today?” 
In the above accounts, the ‘pushing’ and ‘pulling’ that occurs within the discourse of G.C. 
nationalism is reflected. This is understood as discursive tensions created between 
aspects of institutional nationalism and popular current nationalism. It is evident from 
the accounts presented above that these people used to believe and support the 
existence of these nationalistic slogans, yet in their present accounts there was anger, 
frustration and criticism about such slogans not representing the way in which the 
national struggle has developed. While these accounts are apparent of a perceived 
weakened ‘fighting spirit’, at the same time they are strongly expressing dejection and 
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grief for what is, to some extent, lost from G.C. society.  Even though Front (In Greek: 
Μετωπο), one of the most right-wing political parties for youths, represents a small part 
of the population as it takes a particular political view, the account of the press officer of 
Front below clearly depicts the weakening ‘fighting spirit’ in the community through the 
understanding of  ‘I do not forget and I struggle’: 
“People unfortunately have forgotten …In the past, you could see Greek flags 
everywhere but now people will call “fascist” or “extreme nationalist” a person 
who is holding a Greek flag….  If a father is forgetting about our history how will 
his son care? …. we forget about ‘I do not forget’’.  
Front was created a few years ago with its main aim to awaken the national morale of 
G.C. youth and has as its motto: ‘Do not forget the I do not forget’. The creation of ultra-
nationalist political formations in the space created following the opening of the borders 
is specifically addressed in the last section of this chapter.   
Specifically, the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ was often used as a reflective 
mirror of both personal and community national sentiment. One of the two main 
narratives commented that both strands of ‘I do not forget’ and ‘I struggle’, are 
weakening in contemporary Cypriot society. As Xristos (man, 27, unemployed) 
comments:  
“I believe that people at my age are not so much connected to ‘I do not forget 
and I struggle’. We may have learned it at school but people are forgetting and I 
don’t see anyone taking action.” 
However, the most prominent narrative expressed that it is only the latter that is lost, 
thus the ‘I struggle’. Elina’s (woman, 33, teacher) account represents this narrative 
clearly:  
“Elina: ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ in my opinion means that in the past these 
places were ours and the ‘fight’ part is lost but the ‘I do not forget’ part, we need 
to keep it in our hearts and we need to convey it to the next generations.  
Interviewer: Why do you say that the ‘fight’ part is lost? 
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Elina: Because, I don’t see anyone fighting, I don’t see anything happening. If 
not forgetting means fighting then ok it still exists. As long as I live I will try to talk 
about this at school and I hope that this won’t fade away through the years.”  
Usually, this observation, which is used later on to explain the resistance of crossing the 
borders, was narrated by noting that general G.C. society does not choose to fight for 
the conflict further, but that national memory (I do not forget) is broadly sustained and 
that this is a form of struggle. This could be theorised in the sense of moralising the loss 
of struggle and grieving for its loss. Thus, the struggle is maintained since memory is 
sustained. Discursively, national memory presented in the form of struggle seemed too 
often to provide, at least, a temporary solution to the tension expressed between the 
loss of the broader sense of struggle in society, not desiring to let go of the national 
memory and of the war events and territories lost. For example, Xristina (woman, 35, 
civil servant) formed her position similarly to Elina: 
“These places were ours and the “fight” part is lost but the ‘I do not forget’ part, 
we need to keep in our hearts and minds.  We might never get them back but we 
shouldn’t erase them from our memory.”  
Interviewees, stating their observations towards ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ more 
often than not expressed their thoughts with disappointment, regarding both the Cypriot 
political leadership and community repudiating the goal of liberating the ‘occupied’ areas 
of Cyprus. In the chapter on masculinity, through the theorisation of nationalist 
militarised masculinity, it is illustrated that this disenchantment relates to the fear of a 
G.C. devaluing of a masculinist defensive and assertive position of power in the national 
struggle for ‘defence’ and liberation from ‘occupation’.  
The notion of the community not ‘struggling’ was often tied to the understanding that the 
political leadership had lost its sense of struggle, while not managing to bring the 
conflict to an end after such a long time. This disappointment towards the political and 
state level struggle seemed to significantly contribute to the broader loss of the sense of 
struggle by the G.C. community. The G.C. public collectively understood the national 
struggle for liberation following the war of 1974 through a concept of an assemblage of 
forms of struggles: political, military and public. A clear intersection of the public and 
political struggle, which as it will be illustrated in the next chapter is today also 
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weakening, has been the militarist frame of the struggle that was constructed through 
the idea of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. Often, the people I talked to talked 
about feeling deceived by political leadership that had called the community to commit 
to the struggle, but now they felt that leadership itself is not struggling as it should. As 
Spiros (man, 27, accountant) commented: 
“They do it for their own benefit and I am sorry to say this but they refer to the 
Cypriot problem at their own convenience in an attempt to assist their political 
campaigns.”  
These accounts were often narrated by also noting that any form of public struggle 
would now be ineffectual; as they felt that the power was not anymore in people’s hands. 
As Evroula (woman, 30, teacher) says: 
 “I do not think that we are fighting. We are not fighting because even if we 
decide to continue the struggles that our ancestors had started, they will not bring 
any results, simply because it’s not the people’s decision.”  
The above account guides us in understanding the disengagement of the social body 
from its involvement in the national struggle, a point which is further illustrated in the 
next chapter specifically in relation to the weakening understanding of the community as 
a ‘nation-in-arms’.  
While this disappointment was a generally accepted reality across age groups, people 
often emphasised that it is the youth that is the most indifferent segment of the 
population in relation to the so-called ‘Cyprus problem’. This was most often supported 
in two ways. The first was by explaining that the youth has been most disappointed by 
the political leadership that has not resolved the ‘Cyprus problem’. The second was that 
the cultural shift towards a new privileging understanding of society, consisting of 
entrepreneurial, rights-bearing individuals associated most often with ‘being European’, 
has mostly affected the youth segment of the population and this posed an obstacle in 
the struggle.  
It was indeed often the case that younger interviewees talked about how their 
disappointment towards politics has made them less engaged in the national struggle. 
These accounts were often narrated by noting that they do not trust the politicians, but 
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also that they feel that they have no political or national leader to look up to. As Anna 
(woman, 32, teacher) further notes: 
 “I think that it’s hard because we don’t have modern standards, we don’t have 
politicians that we can look up to, they don’t give us motives, they don’t deserve 
our trust.” 
The absence of motivating political leadership and the distrust towards the political 
leaders that they would be able to bring the conflict to an end was broadly understood 
as counteracting the sustenance of the national goal for liberating Cyprus from the 
‘occupation’ forces. This was a rather commonly understood reality expressed in some 
way by most people I talked to, but understandably this created multiple reactions.  
Furthermore, as indicated above, interviewees often saw the economic prosperity, that 
is often linked to the ‘economic miracle’ Cyprus (see appendix 3) experienced following 
the partition of 1974 (Gergakopoulos, 1999; Kammas, 1992), and the impact of Western 
capitalist ideals and values of individualism and consumerism on G.C. society, at the 
expense of the ‘fighting spirit’. This prominent narrative in my interviewees’ accounts 
was most often expressed with the explanation that this is the case especially since the 
problem has been so complicated and on-going, while in contemporary Cyprus there 
are no everyday reminders of any threat to this new comfortable situation. 
In Cyprus, a greater acceptance of cultural pluralism and individualism and 
strengthening of both consumerist and material values has contributed to the formation 
of a G.C. culture that challenges the subordination of individual considerations to 
collective goals of the community, thus most centrally the national struggle. Neo-
liberalism, globalisation and migration are generating changes in Cypriot society, which 
is becoming more open, individualistic, and materialistic rather than tradition orientated, 
and significantly more liberated from the shackles of the nation-state, as it existed in the 
post-independence era. The accession of Cyprus into the EU has meant further 
liberalisation of the Cypriot economy, yet also greater cultural liberation of Cypriot 
society from the confines of the nation-state. The process of globalisation undermining 
the seclusion of state boundaries (Martell, 2010) has exposed Cypriot society in recent 
years to increasing cultural flows of Western notions of multiculturalism, individualism 
and understandings of success. Cypriot society was really quick in picking up Western 
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cultural ideals such as extensive acquisition of material wealth and financial and 
professional success.  
Interviewees explained that Cypriot society is now focussing on one’s ‘image’, 
explaining that G.C.s today mostly care about their own rights, success and public 
projection of material wealth. Maria’s (woman, 27, translator) understanding was a very 
typical one:  
‘All that Cypriots care about is having a financially rewarding and stable career 
and to buy expensive things, the times of heroism have died’  
This cultural shift was generally seen as mutually exclusive to the ‘fighting spirit’. Many 
pointed out that Cypriot society is an individualistic, settled and comfortable one. And 
that, in conjunction with general society not feeling any immediate threat, new 
generations have been brought up with values aspiring for material wealth and socio-
professional hypostasis, at the expense of national conscience, but above all at the 
expense of the ‘national struggle’. As Stiliani (woman, 30, teacher) typically told me:  
“Because of the advancement of society, modernisation, settling down and the 
comfortable lives we live, young people don’t care about history or politics, they 
just care about easy money. Their goal is to have fun, to live their lives without 
worrying too much and then comes the rest (economic crisis, the Cypriot problem 
etc.).”  
Generally, my interviewees highly doubted that the young generations would wish to 
jeopardise their personal goals and comforts in order to ‘fight’ for what was lost due to 
the war of 1974, especially since there are no everyday reminders of threat to the 
community. Indeed, as it will be discussed in the next chapters, draft-dodging 
conscription and the weakening value of heroism have been often linked to the 
individuals’ priorities and goals being placed above those of the community.  
Besides a certain modification by the state of the ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ slogan, 
supports the above argument. A directive that has been sent to all elementary schools 
by the Ministry of Education and Culture in recent years, Christou (2006: 291-2) informs 
us, is entitled “Upgrading the goal of ‘I know, I don’t forget and I struggle.’” The upgrade 
of adding the instruction to ‘know’ illustrates the argument of the weakening ‘fighting 
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spirit’ of the younger community in the national struggle. Indeed, the memo noted that 
several inquiries had shown a decline in student interest and knowledge about the 
‘occupied’ part; therefore it requested teachers to dedicate some teaching periods to 
this goal (Ibid). However, the upgrade also illustrates the instructiveness of the 
discourse of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ in constructing the G.C. community through 
mirroring a specific post-war identity; ‘to not forget’ the ‘occupation’ and ‘struggle’ to 
liberate the ‘occupied’ land. Indeed, following up with suggestions to incorporate this 
theme in particular classes, “the memo remarked that, in addition to knowledge and 
information, it is important that students (a) maintain their unwavering morale to struggle 
and (b) understand, without prejudice or intolerance, their rights and responsibilities in a 
semi-occupied” country (ibid: 292).  
The observation of the Ministry of Education and Culture was repeatedly illustrated 
through my interviewees’ accounts to be a general agreement that the youth today is 
less preoccupied about the conflict and not as proactive in the national struggle as 
young generations used to be. Clearly such a reality, even if broadly shared, generated 
multiple and diverse reactions. While some interviewees such as Xristalla (woman, 51, 
owner of convenience store) commented: “It will pass, everyone will forget.” Others 
such as Stiliani’s (woman, 30, teacher) expressed resistance to the aforementioned 
process:  
“Look, I think that ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ is a national idea, history is 
engraved in our memory, it’s something very important so we cannot just forget it, 
we cannot just erase “I do not forget and I struggle”, it’s like renouncing our 
identity.” 
Moreover, a small group of interviewees, who most often held left-wing and/or bi-
communal views, expressed their disagreement and anger regarding the mobilisation of 
this slogan and the meaning it acquired in state-institutional settings, especially schools, 
and commented to have moved completely away from such understandings of the 
conflict. For example, Pavlos (man, 23, student) said that: 
“I remember ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ everywhere, that’s wrong! I think that 
they filled our minds with ideas but they didn’t give us the choice if we wanted to 
support those ideas or not. We have to learn to move forwards and to open our 
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minds and our eyes.  This slogan means I won’t go on with my life until the Turks 
leave from Cyprus.” 
Lastly, it was interesting that a small number of interviewees provided an account 
intersecting the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ that is clearly a discourse for the 
preservation of memory which projects its own vision of the future by balancing their 
positioning between ‘memory’, ‘progress’ and the ‘future’. As Stelios (man, 37, airport 
worker) comments: 
“I don’t think we will ever forget and we shouldn’t forget, but we have to get on 
with our lives. It’s good to progress and to remember at the same time.”  
Others provided this type of account while at the same time highlighting their difficulty in 
moving on. For example, Dimitris (man, 44, entrepreneur) comments that:   
“No, I wouldn’t forget but as time goes by I will try to compromise even though it’s 
a lot harder for me to forget because I am a refugee.”  
These accounts above illustrate a strong sense of ‘agency’ in relation to their identities, 
(for example see Hall, 1996a, Giddens, 1991 and Butler,1990, 1993). My interviewees’ 
strong sense of agency, in the two accounts above (needing to move on with their lives) 
is, for them, directly interrelated with their own identity that they present as rather ductile. 
These accounts express a partial or almost complete transgression to the limits 
imposed upon their thought and identity by the discourse of ‘I do not forget and I 
struggle’, in which they both reported to previously being coerced in.  
The accounts of my interviewees, broadly, brought about discussions about the 
institutional structures of nationalism, the shaking of these structures and the space 
opened for the ‘self’, the ‘I’ as distinct from the nationalist ‘struggle’. Besides being a 
socio-political process of transitions through several events, the years between 2003 
and 2004 opened the possibility for inspecting the construction of the ‘self’ and thus 
restructuring as well. There was a relative self-detachment from the ‘nation-in-arms’ 
discourse which had constructed –and limited- G.C. identity. Foucault’s term “limit-
attitude’’ is useful here. As Kiziltan et al. (1990: 365) note the “limit-attitude can be fully 
realised only in the form of historical investigations into our understanding of ourselves 
and our representations of the world around us”. The end of this “historico-practical” 
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investigation, according to Foucault, is to separate out “from the contingency that has 
made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, 
do, or think.” (in Rabinow, 19 4: 3 ).  
The “limit-attitude”, therefore, in the positioning of the two above interviewees towards ‘I 
do not forget and I struggle’ can be conceived as a unique combination of a discerning 
interest in what political historic, cultural, “natural” and inner “reality” is for them, with a 
personal “imagination which transgresses the limits imposed upon [their] thought and 
identity” (Kiziltan, Bain and Anita,,1990: 365). Examining and remembering where the 
national, and personal, identity of a continuous threat of war had come from provides a 
reflective framework that can be transgressed. In the words of Marios: ‘It’s good to 
progress and to remember at the same time. ’  
This section has illustrated that, following the opening of the borders, the national 
struggle rests on a new dynamic between a dispirited ‘I struggle’ and the need to 
maintain the ‘remembrance’ of ‘occupation’. The next section will illustrate that the 
tenacious ‘I do not forget’ is part of the construction of post-war Cyprus as a feminised 
victim of ‘occupation’. This theorisation of the data is used later on in this chapter to 
explain the resistance of crossing the border.  
5.4. The relationship between a victimised Cyprus and the mothers of the missing 
persons  
Following the opening of the borders and the accession of Cyprus to the EU, Cyprus 
continues to be depicted as a victim of ‘occupation’. In this section, I focus on the 
persistent nationalism of victimcy following the opening of the borders that is illustrated 
through a certain enduring, symbolic position of the mothers of the missing persons in 
society by first providing an account of this discourse in post-war Cyprus. I will argue 
that this collective G.C. position of victimcy in relation to the ‘occupation’ of Northern 
Cyprus positions the crossings as a feminisation of the national struggle. Crossing as an 
act is translated as acceptance of the ‘occupation’ and thus forgetting that Cyprus has 
been the victim of the war in 1974 - the very memory that people should ‘not forget’.   
The post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity has been 
cantered on a dynamic between a 'victim' and a ‘protector’. Militarism and nationalism 
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invoke the dichotomy of the male protector and the protected female, which coincides 
with a broader binary of active male protector versus passive female victim. Cyprus 
post-war nationalism has been one of victimhood (Constantinou, 2008). Militarism and 
masculinity on the other hand, as also the personal anecdote discussed in the 
introduction with my captain in the NG revealed, have played the role of the protector 
with masculinist discourses of virile militarisation, preparedness and defence. The role 
of men in the national struggle, as defenders of the community, have thus discursively 
internally responded to the victimized depiction of Cyprus. This type of relationship 
between the three was mobilised and supported by the state. 
 
The post-war discourse of ‘victimcy’ and the mothers of the missing persons  
The accounts of interviewees across the spectrum of political and social beliefs and 
readings of the conflict revealed that the mothers, wives and sisters of the missing 
G.C.s undoubtedly today still occupy and maintain a sacred place in the encapsulation 
of the national struggle for the G.C. community. In post-war Cyprus, the idea of national 
struggle was interwoven into the mobilisation of the broader ‘imagination’ 
(Anderson,1983) of post-war Cyprus as a victim (Constantinou, 2008) in which the 
mothers of the missing persons symbolised the maternal long-suffering bond awaiting 
liberation, (see Yakinthou, 2008). This symbolism of post-war Cyprus through these 
mothers was constructed at the political-state level and transmuted to the community 
through the adoption of a collective position of feminised victimcy in relation to 
‘occupation’, which was predicated on the idea of Turkey as a barbarian invader. This is 
the understanding that in the way in which Turkey ‘barbarically’ invaded Cyprus and 
illegally ‘occupied’ its Northern part, it also killed or captured G.C. soldiers and deprived 
the right to the truth of their women. Therefore, in this post-war discourse of victimcy the 
pain experienced by these women has become an inextricable representation of the 
pain experienced by the G.C. community caused by the invader and ‘occupying’ force 
Turkey.  Then the mothers of the missing persons, by becoming constructed through 
and becoming the most clear and iconic manifestation of this discourse of national 
victimcy (see appendix4), adopted an indispensable part in the post-war construction of 
the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. This nationalism of 
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victimcy, as the next chapter discusses, was internally responded to by the muscular 
assertion of the rescuer state with its attentive masculinist discourses of virile 
militarisation, and the role of men in the national struggle as defenders of the 
community.  
Feminist literature has repeatedly guided us in understanding that, in some nations, 
there is a use of a woman’s reproductive role to articulate policies of national survival 
(see Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989; Yuval- Davis, 1998). In the context of post-war 
Cyprus, the centrality of femininity in the projection of the need of national survival by 
the use of these women was naturalised by using the mothers, wives, and sisters and 
by these means they were politically effaced from the institutional and public structures 
they are integral to. The mothers of the missing persons became an integral part of the 
relationship the state of post-war Cyprus has mobilised between its international and 
internal agendas (discussed in the next chapter in relation to ‘defence’). They were used 
by the state to project the specific conceptualisation of post-war Cyprus to the 
international community as a victim, while they became an integral part of the internal 
politics of national resistance and ‘defence’; depicted in the official pronouncement of 
the trauma and need for liberation from ‘occupation’; ‘I do not forget and I struggle’.  The 
mothers of the missing persons were centrally mobilised through official and unofficial 
discourses of post-war national identity, appearing on brochures and posters published 
by the state. As Achilleas Dimitiradis, the lawyer who defended cases of the families of 
missing persons against the Republic of Cyprus before the Domestic Courts, notes:  
“Mrs Palma [One of the wives of the missing persons] was instrumental in the 
campaigns that the missing did, she appears on a number of brochures used by 
the government, with children, she was in all demonstrations, she was essentially 
the face of the missing persons”.  
The mothers of the missing persons have been deeply interwoven into the post-war 
conflict structures (Yakinthou, 2008) and the use of these women in representative 
terms is part of the broader conceptualisation of post-war Cyprus as relentlessly 
suffering and in need of deliverance. Therefore, whilst these women were not an official 
part of the struggle, the state mobilised this specific symbolic femininity of victimcy, 
which it constructed through this symbolism of the mothers of the missing persons, to 
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represent post-war Cyprus. This specific symbolism of the mothers of the missing 
persons through imagery published by the state and other institutional organisations 
related to the war, “lies in the silent image of their tragic figures that speaks for itself, 
without words, and especially without calling attention to itself.” (Christou,  2006; 295). 
As Yakinthou (200 : 16) argues “the symbol of the tormented woman (mother or wife) 
dressed in black and holding a photo of her missing loved one to a silent sky is the most 
powerful symbol of G.C. suffering.”  
Furthermore, the major people displacement tragedy in 1974 that led to the Cyprus 
refugee issue ‘has been usually portrayed through the images of weeping women 
refugees …  holding pictures of sons and family members … killed during the invasion.’ 
(Christou,  2006: 295). Therefore, this conceptualisation of post-war Cyprus was 
manifestly engendered through the iconic image of the mothers of the missing persons, 
whose compulsive expression of pain has constituted the image of them as an 
embodied constant reminder of the pain and sorrow of the G.C. community caused by 
the events of 1974. A poster that appeared in Cyprus after 1974 presented such a 
picture under the title “Our Martyred Cyprus” (Anthias, 19 9: 155).  
Yet this specific presentation of the mothers of the missing persons respectively also 
portrayed them as a symbol of national resistance and struggle for liberation from the 
‘occupation’ forces. This interlinks with the broader discursive formation of nationalism 
(Calhoun, 1997) in post-war Cyprus that portrayed Cyprus through the tragic figure of a 
mother who is painfully waiting for liberation. Thus, the specific depiction of femininity 
through the enduring pain and hope of these mothers to find their children symbolises a 
unified national body of resistance and struggle. For example, a motto that often 
appeared above images of the mothers and wives of the missing persons is: ‘A mother 
who is waiting, a loving mother, a son, a daughter. Me and you. We still wait …. (in 
Greek: Μια μάνα που περιμένει. μια αγαπημένη. Ένας γιος.μια κόρη. Εσύ .Εγώ. Θα 
περιμένουμε ακόμα ....). This specific conceptualisation of maternal post-war Cyprus 
that awaits for liberation was also expressed through literature and poetry (see 
appendix 5).   
Nations often rely on maternal or paternal archetypes to invoke national unity.  The 
mothers of the missing persons, whilst been used as a symbolic representation of post-
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war Cyprus at the political and state level, this position of national victimcy that acquires 
its power by remembering the ‘occupation’ (i.e. I do not forget) becomes transmuted at 
a discursive level to a community position of feminised victimcy, which needs rescuing 
by this muscular militarised state. Thus, the construction of post-war Cyprus through 
this discourse of feminised victimcy symbolised through the mothers of the missing 
persons is constitutive of the ‘nation-in-arms’ that was previously manifested on the un-
crossable borders. Characteristically in a speech by the Minister of Defence in an anti-
occupation event dedicated to the mothers of missing persons, on the anniversary of 
the Turkish invasion  (20th of July  2013), he notes:  
‘You were crucified by them mother, 
they stabbed you in the heart with a knife, 
they took your child away from you, 
but you still endure. 
You are our Cyprus; 
our Mother, our Wife, our Sister. 
I kneel before you and kowtow to you.’ 
Militaries, as Enloe (2000) argues, have existed on the contradiction of appearing 
completely male, but being dependent on a cooperative long-suffering and self-
sacrificing female presence. Therefore, in the G.C. community while women are 
excluded from the archaic yet continuously reproduced male notion of the protector, 
they occupy an important symbolic place in the national struggle as the caring mother of 
the nation; a mother who is suffering and who waits for liberation. Thus these ideals of 
femininity used to construct the idea of post-war Cyprus as a victim of ‘occupation’ 
came “to actually enforce the militarisation of masculinity.”(Enloe, 2004: 103).  
This discursive symbolic conduction between ‘feminised victimcy’ and ‘rescuer state’ 
was chiefly manifested on the borders. The mothers of the missing persons have been 
presented through images in agony on the borders and they have frequently protested 
on the borders themselves. In symbolic terms, this has been the most prominent 
reminder of the need for national struggle and liberation of the victim post-war Cyprus; 
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the purest form of resistance, which was co-constitutively materialised by the 
masculinist G.C. military guarding the borders.   
The post-war discourse of victimcy in the post-opening of the borders  
Today in the post-opening of the borders European Cyprus in the minds of G.C.s the 
mothers of the missing persons are still the heart and the purest form of the ‘fighting 
spirit’ of the G.C. national struggle to remember ‘occupation’ and ‘liberate’ Cyprus from 
it. This enduring attachment of the community to this position of victimcy through the 
symbolism of these women becomes further revealed when taking into account that, in 
recent years, the construction of the case of the mothers of the missing persons by the 
post-war political leadership has been, to some extent, revealed.  Recent court cases 
won at the District court of Cyprus (namely Pashas and Palmas vs Republic of Cyprus), 
on behalf of the families of missing persons, have begun to reveal that the case of the 
missing persons has, to an extent, been a political expediency of the Cypriot state and 
no more than a construct. As Achilleas Dimitriadis, the lawyer who defended these case, 
noted:   
“For me it’s now obvious that for reasons yet unverified the government of the 
Republic of Cyprus saw fit to be ‘economical’, to say the least, with the truth. And 
by not telling the truth to these women, and by creating doubts in their minds, 
they actually made them think that there was a chance for their loved ones to 
return, when in fact on a number of occasions they knew, or should have known, 
that these people were dead and buried on our side.”  
Moreover, the following quotation captures the three most prominent narratives about 
the mothers of the missing persons articulated by my interviewees and reveals that the 
primordial nationalist attachment to the symbolism of post-war Cyprus as a feminised 
victim that demands justice and thus liberation from ‘occupation’ encapsulated through 
the iconic image of these mothers persists. Dimitri’s (man, 27, travel agent) account 
provides a point of departure:  
“I think that most of them know that the missing persons are dead but I also think 
that they have the right to be asking for justice. There is no one who doesn’t want 
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to bury their dead child. To me, every group of the population who resists and 
remembers is something positive.”  
Almost all of my interviewees stated that they understand that these people are no 
longer missing, but are dead; most often stating awareness of the political exploitation 
of the case of the missing persons. Yet all of the people I talked to across the full 
spectrum of political and social ideologies, and regardless of their view on the conflict 
and willingness to participate in the national struggle, expressed deep sadness and 
sympathy for the pain experienced by the mothers of the missing persons and most of 
them expressed how for them this pain is the purest form of resistance. Thus, the 
enduring pain experienced by these mothers and wives and their resilient hope that they 
might find their children for G.C. continues today to be intuited as national strength in 
the milieu of the national struggle. For example, Lampros (man, 34, teacher) who had 
not expressed any strong nationalist beliefs and in many cases condemned nationalist 
views still reproduces a similar narrative to the above:  
“A few people are experiencing all this pain, the indignation, and the yearning to 
go back and find those missing persons. Ok, we have reached a point where the 
hope of finding them is starting to fade away but they still believe that they might 
find their children one day. They will never stop hoping.”  
Stelios (man, 37, airport worker) account also clearly illustrates this: 
“I mean that the mother of a missing person won’t ever forget about the invasion, 
she won’t stop caring. To me, this is very important.”  
What is most central here is that the case of the mothers of the missing persons that 
was constructed into a discourse presenting them as the clearest symbolism of the 
post-war Cyprus as a victim of ‘occupation’ is, in this new setting, sustained. This 
illustrates the continuing position of victimcy of the community in relation to the 
‘occupation’ that appears to have become an inextricable component of the post-war 
national identity centred on remembering that the community is a victim as the land 
across the border is ‘occupied’; an understanding of oneself that was articulated by 
interviewees across the spectrum of political and social beliefs. This is interesting for 
G.C. nationalism as it means that its main internal opposition; the identity of ‘Cypriotism’, 
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as discussed in the literature review, which is clearly associated with the liberal fraction 
of Cyprus (Mavratsas, 1996;   ) also reproduces the discourse of ‘occupation’.  
My argument is that the mothers of the missing persons are an integral function of the 
reproduction of the discourse of ‘occupation’, since their suffering and perseverance are 
directly linked to ‘occupation’. ‘Occupation’ is a discourse that, as this thesis argues, is 
sustained in the post-opening of the borders. The case of the missing persons, 
presented through their mothers, in G.C. nationalism is inextricable from ‘occupation’ 
since they are understood to be an outcome of the invasion and the continuous 
‘occupation’. Therefore, whilst the interviewees are aware that these soldiers are dead 
and not missing they still feel empathy towards the pain felt by these women, as for 
them they symbolise the pain the community has been going through because of 
‘occupation’. Concurrently, these women that refuse to accept the faits accomplis of the 
Turkish ‘occupation’ that has resulted in the death of their loved ones but still 
relentlessly hope that they will find them; symbolise for the community that the yearning 
to liberate the ‘occupied’ land is alive. The depiction of women as bodies of national 
resistance is part of a larger discourse on the nation as a body (Haraway, 1991). Dimitri 
(man, 27, travel agent) characteristically comments:  
“They are the tragic figures of the invasion. They are the people who have been 
suffering since and they will never stop suffering. They will never forget and they 
are a part of our society who will always be in pain, who will always think about 
this, who will always wait and fight.” 
It is argued therefore that in the post-opening of the borders nationalist structures, 
where there has been a perceived weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’, the specific 
conceptualisation of post-war Cyprus as a woman in need of deliverance (symbolised 
through the mothers of the missing persons) has become a central function of the 
moralisation of the sense of struggle (I struggle) through the sustenance of memory (I 
do not forget). As Christou has argued: ‘for these young people, the intensity of the 
women’s protest and the persistence of their presence at the Green Line 
[…borders…]—especially in contrast with the perceived lack of ‘action’ by anyone 
else—constitute the highest form of struggle’ (2006: 295).  
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The specific femininity embodied in the idea of these women as bearers of the ‘fighting 
spirit’ represents  a G.C. ‘soul’ (in Greek: ψυχή), that remains ‘free’ and Greek; 
“something internal, pure, and natural (as opposed to imposed)”, whilst the body 
(Cyprus) is enslaved and forced into allegiance to foreign rulers  (Bryant, 2002: 511-513) 
and thus ‘occupied’. 
These women, in the post-opening of the borders nationalist discourse in representative 
terms, as articulated in the accounts of my interviews, act as a function of resistance; 
the enslaved ‘soul’ that will not be surrendered by the community that continues to 
remember that it is only temporarily enslaved, thus ‘occupied’, but remains ‘free’ (I do 
not forget). Whilst most often my interviewees accounts, in regards to their position 
towards the issue of the conflict, were differentiated by the type of solution supported 
and the acceptance or not of the T.C.s, they all in some way articulated the discourse of 
‘occupation’ and the relentless need for remembrance of the land that is ‘occupied’.  
Today the remembrance (I do not forget), thus the sustenance of the discourse of 
‘occupation’, the next section will discuss, is mainly expressed through the resistance to 
cross the border. Most characteristically, today photos of the mothers of the missing 
persons, but also of the missing soldiers, have been placed on the crossing checkpoints 
on the borders on the South site of the divide. Therefore, this instruction of memory 
through the nationalist discourse of victimcy (I do not forget) in relation to ‘occupation’ 
that has been depicted through the mothers of the missing persons is today printed on 
the checkpoints. This function of memory in relation to a now open and thus crossable 
border reflects the adapted reiteration of the G.C. nationalism of victimcy that poses 
crossing as ‘forgetting’ the ‘occupation’ and, therefore, the feminisation of the ‘I struggle’ 
to liberate the North side of the border – hence accepting that the land that is 
considered to be ‘occupied’ is lost. 
5.5. Enacting national memory and deliberation; crossings and ‘occupation’  
'I do not forget', as the previous section has illustrated, is a persistent discourse in this 
new setting to not forget that the G.C. community has been the victim of the invasion of 
Turkey in 1974 and continues to be a victim through the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus 
by Turkey.  Then, as this section will illustrate, in the post-opening of the borders to not 
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cross, cross again, or to not come close and interact with the ‘other’ is to maintain 
oneself within the discourse of ‘occupation’ (I do not forget).  
Statistics inform us, as already discussed in the historical chapter, that in the first year 
of opened borders (from April 2003 to the end of 2004) a total of 2,347,792 G.C. s and 
3,595, 979 T.C.s had crossed the checkpoints14, (Hazou, 2005). In 2013, newspaper 
‘Alitheia’ (in Greek: αλήθεια) commented that since 2003, thus within about 10 years, 
there have been 22 million crossings, (see Alitheia – Aλήθεια,(2013). However, 
studying the border crossing figures in Cyprus one also observes that many G.C.s did 
not cross the ‘Green Line’ at all (Hadjipavlou, 2007b; Dikomitis, 2005; Webster & 
Timothy, 2006).   
In the scene of a peaceful and seemingly rather comfortable existence of the T.C. 
presence in the South and the many positive stories of G.C.s visiting the North, this 
section will illustrate that the most prominent narrative perceives the “unjustified” G.C. 
crossings to be further weakening the ‘fighting spirit’ (I struggle) from the G.C. 
community’s perspective, as crossing is to accept ‘occupation’. In this context, a strong 
agenda of ‘who’ and ‘why’ one should cross determines G.C.s choice of crossing. This 
discourse on the crossings will be illustrated to be an adapted, reiterated invocation of 
G.C. nationalism within this new space created following the opening of the borders of 
remembering ‘occupation’ (I do not forget).  Thus the resistance of crossing is an 
adapted discursive mechanism of reproducing the discourse of ‘occupation’. For the 
purposes of this section I separate and address consecutively the crossings of T.C.s to 
the South from the crossings of G.C.s to the North illustrating that for G.C.s both are 
framed through the discourse of ‘occupation’.  
The ‘other’ on ‘our side’ 
A crossing of G.C.s to the North needs to be conceptualised as a separate type of 
interaction with T.C.s crossing to the South, yet both are deliberated through the 
discourse of ‘occupation’.  The quantitative significant crossing of T.C. s to the South 
provides a qualitative opportunity for G.C. s to become engaged with their ‘ethnically 
                                                          
14
 The overall population of the whole of Cyprus in 2003 was 817, 095 (see World Bank, World 
Development Indicators). Therefore, the statistics mentioned include G.C.s and T.C.s, who live abroad. At 
the time it was a historical moment and G.C.s and T.C.s from all over the world visited Cyprus to cross 
the border. 
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divided other’. However, this opportunity has been conditioned through an adaptive 
reiteration of the discourse of ‘occupation’ following the opening of the borders that 
keeps both ‘self’ and ‘other’ separate.  
The flow of people between the borders, as also discussed above, is an unequal one, 
as a significant number of T.C.s cross to the South daily. Crossing to visit one’s house 
in the North side of the divide and perhaps for chiefly sentimental reasons presupposes 
a very different social and psychological setting than the G.C. community accepting the 
existence of T.C.s in everyday life in the South15. The embargo placed on the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus by the international community due to the ‘occupation’, and 
the larger economy of the RoC, drives a lot of T.C.s to cross the border on a daily basis 
for work, study, shopping and so forth.  
The daily flow of T.C.s to the European South was clear in  the accounts of many of the 
people I talked with to have resulted in challenging former preoccupations in relation to 
the T.C.s as the ‘other’ and understanding the similarities T.C.s have with G.C.s, 
especially in terms of culture and outward appearances. The threatening and unknown 
‘enemy within’ that for 37 years lived across the border now became a human entity in 
the everyday life of G.C. society. For example Pavlos (man, 23, student) typically 
comments:  
“I met one because he is a friend of my family and I also met two guys with whom 
we were working together for some time. They are people, just like us. I don’t 
hate them. 
I don’t think that I have a problem living with them. They are not so different than 
us, on the outside as well as culture-wise and mentality-wise.” 
 
Interestingly, a group of the people I talked to, who worked in the fields of business and 
industry, emphasised how the opening of the borders had an immediate effect on the 
collaboration of business and industries across the border and that it is through this 
opportunity that they themselves came to meet and cooperate with T.C.s. As Marios 
(man, 40, entrepreneur) who is a refugee notes:  
                                                          
15
 In this context, it should be noted that T.C. are eligible for Cypriot citizenship and other democratic and 
legal rights in the RoC.  
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“Yes, when I was in some companies, right after the opening of the borders, we 
had some contacts with T.C. businessmen because we had the same distributors. 
There are a lot of open-minded businessmen and they have good dealerships 
and there are some of them who speak Greek. We cooperated very well.”  
Indeed, research has stressed the effective business collaborations between the two 
sides, (Yorucu et al., 2010; Webster et al., 2009), and the effect of this on facilitating 
peace-making (Gokcekus et al., 2012; Hatay, Mullen and Kalimeri, 2008). However, in 
the most prominent narrative, whilst there was relative humanisation of the ‘other’ in the 
G.C. nationalist imagination, interviewees reported to have had very limited or no 
interaction with T.C.s, and accounts where any form of relationship or deeper interaction 
had taken place were somehow limited. In this narrative people took a clear political 
stance regarding interaction with T.C.s asserting in many cases the discourse of 
‘occupation’ in which they clearly articulated the notion of a need to maintain a distance. 
Xristos’ (man, 27, unemployed) account was a very typical one:  
 “I am not against a friendship with them but while the situation remains the same 
(translators note: referring specifically to ‘occupation’) I will not go after one.”  
Clearly for Andreas the distance he feels that he needs to keep from the ‘other’ is 
delimited by the discourse of ‘occupation’, where coming closer undermines the 
‘occupation’. Other interviewees went further to analyse the distance they feel they need 
to keep due to the difficulty they would have found in conducting some type of 
interaction with T.C.s. For example Stiliani (woman, 30) a teacher who was given a 
class were a number of students were T.C.s explained her difficulty of overcoming past 
prejudices:  
“10 years ago a friend of mine was dating a Turk and I remember telling her ‘why 
would you date him, aren’t there any other men in the world?’ Now I have 
changed a bit, because of the fact that I had T.C. students, but it’s very hard.”  
Crossings have not resulted in an integration of the two communities and nor in a 
substantial interaction between them. Even though, as noted above, many of the people 
I talked to reported to have become rather comfortable with the T.C. existence on the 
Southern part of the island and some have formed bi-communal relationships and 
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collaborations, the accounts of my interviewees on the whole point to interaction 
between the two communities in the South as been limited and, in many cases, absent. 
The fear that sustains the need for a distance from the ‘other’ and therefore the fear that 
penetrates coming closer to the ‘other’ appears to be created by the discourse of 
‘occupation’, where coming closer undermines ‘occupation’. I will now proceed to 
illustrate that the strongly expressed G.C. agenda of ‘who’ is and ‘how’ one is allowed to 
cross is also conditioned by the discourse of ‘occupation’, where crossing “unjustifiably” 
undermines the discourse of ‘occupation’. 
 
To not cross and the discourse of ‘occupation’  
Drawing from the fieldwork research I conducted in Cyprus in 2011, many had never 
crossed out of protest for the need to show their passports and thus, in their view, 
acknowledging the ‘pseudo-state‘ of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, whereas 
others did not cross because of their unwillingness to forgive; ‘I do not forget and I 
struggle’. Many others who had crossed to the North, only did so once or twice. While a 
much smaller number of interviewees had crossed repeatedly or on a number of 
occasions.  
The many G.C. resistances that have been put in place defining ‘who’ and ‘why’ one 
should cross are delimited by the understanding of the conflict as an ‘occupation’. This 
provides us with certain insights into post-opening of the border G.C. nationalism and, 
as the next chapters will illustrate, its inter-relationship with militarism and masculinity. 
Today, the remembrance (I do not forget), thus the sustenance of the discourse of 
‘occupation’ is mainly expressed through the resistance to cross or re-cross the border. 
‘I do not forget’, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is in certain ways now moralising 
the loss of ‘I struggle’ in the community as the resistance to cross is sustaining in the 
G.C. nationalist imagination (Anderson, 19 3) the discourse of ‘occupation’ that 
embodies the post-war victim notion that the land is theirs and only temporarily 
‘occupied’.  Aggelos’ (42, vice-director of a company, refugee) account, which was very 
typical of the people that had crossed, provides a point of departure: 
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“I have crossed three to four times. The first time, we went to see our house. It wasn’t a 
very good experience. It’s horrible to see your mother touch the house and cry. It was 
just me and my mother, my father couldn’t go then, it was too hard for him. They were 
both very sad. The rest of the times we went to Apostle Andreas and Kerynia. It’s not a 
great experience though. I felt like a tourist in my own country and I didn’t like that. Signs 
are in Turkish, the place is not developed. I don’t want to cross again because I feel that 
I am not doing any good by going, it is not ethical. Only the fact that I show my identity 
card and give them money to as an insurance, that’s horrible. I would like to go, just to 
visit all the beautiful places of my country, but I went a few times and it still doesn’t feel 
right given that Turkish occupation continues.” 
In the above account it is clear that the discourse of ‘occupation’ conditions the choice 
of whether Aggelos should cross again. The crossings and perception of the weakened 
‘fighting spirit’ in the most prominent narrative of my interviewee accounts fires up the 
discourse of ‘occupation’ in the face of the fear of it being undermined. 'Occupation' is 
an instructive discourse that is the internal integral facet of 'I do not forget'. 'I do not 
forget' meant to not forget the war events and their outcomes, which in this discourse 
are defined as 'occupation'. Then ‘occupation’ is a discourse, thus ‘ready-made and 
reconstituted ‘experiencing’s’ displayed and arranged through language’ (Hall, 1977: 
322) that provide resistance to new patterns of thinking or action that lay outside of it 
(Bourdieu 1991: 107). The accounts presented in this section, I argue, reveal that 
crossings can potentially lead to new spaces of contact and new experiences that will 
transform nationalist preconceptions towards forming new experiences and constructing 
new histories between the two communities that will be based on those shared 
experiences. I argue that it is this possibility my interviewees compulsively foreclose 
through the discourse of ‘occupation’.  
The opening of the borders and the crossings are understood as threatening the 
discourse of ‘occupation’. The opening of the borders after 30 years, in April 2003, 
during Rauf Denktas’ time as president of the  Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, as 
it was discussed in the historical chapter, came as a surprise to G.C. s. Yet, this 
surprise and the subsequent crossings of G.C.s to the North, for the G.C. community at 
a national ideological level, were perceived as what Foucault names as a counter-
discourse (for example see, Terdiman 1989) to the ‘occupation’. The account of General 
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Pandreou (pseudonym), who was a Major General of the NG when the borders 
opened16, further provides a point of departure:  
“In my opinion we were caught by surprise. We hadn’t studied the situation 
thoroughly and we hadn’t informed the people properly. If we had the time to do it, 
we could have informed everyone and the opening of the borders wouldn’t have 
affected us this much. It affected us negatively because only by passing through 
the borders it was like recognising the existence of a fictitious state and also the 
military structures were shaky. The fact that people could pass through the 
borders, certainly changed everything …” 
The above quotation guides us in further understanding the centrality in which the 
borders have been placed in the overall conceptualisation of the conflict situation and 
the attendant ideology of defence. Yet, it also illustrates the urgency with which the 
state and its institutions framed the occurring crossings as threatening the definition of 
the conflict situation as ‘occupation’. The borders on the part of G.C.s were the very 
manifestation of the ‘occupation’, as the utility of their existence was to protect the 
respective population and territory while the state was ‘defending’ the community and 
‘fighting’ for the liberation of Cyprus from the ‘occupation’ army, namely Turkey.  
The reasoning articulated by the most prominent narrative of my interviewees as to ‘why’ 
and ‘who’ has the right to cross; reflects the governmental statements that began to be 
made shortly after the opening of the borders. Within days of opened borders, 
Demetriou (2007: 998) informs us, “government statements appeared that distinguished 
between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for crossing … the epitome of this 
process was the self-enacted practice by individuals of imposing prohibitions that did 
not officially exist… a code of conduct between the state and its subjects was created 
that was beyond law”. These statements illustrate that the state has a vested interest in 
maintaining the discourse of ‘occupation’.  
The qualitative research conducted by Boedeltje & Houtum (2007) supports the above 
argument. As they point out “the terminology used by the Greek Cypriot officials to 
                                                          
16
 General Pandreou has held various roles in the period that this thesis is concerned with. From 2003 to 
2005 he was an Adjutant to the Minister of Defense. In 2005, he was promoted as the Manager of the 
Military Office of the Minister of Defense. I will refer the role he held when discussing a specific period, 
otherwise I will be referring to him as General Pandreou.  
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describe border movement illustrates vividly current attitudes: the Turkish Cypriotss do 
not cross the Green Line, but ‘enter’ the ‘free areas’ … The Greek Cypriots on the other 
hand ‘travel’ to the ‘occupied’ areas and ‘cross’ the Green Line.” (ibid: 1 ). Similarly, 
Webster & Timothy (2006: 176) comment drawing on their quantitative research on the 
crossings that most of those who have not crossed “resist because it offends their 
sense of ethics – travelling to the other side of the island would demonstrate tacit 
recognition of the existence of the other political entity on the island”.   
These observations direct us to the ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ campaign, discussed 
above, a state mobilised binary position between ‘remembering’ and ‘fighting’ that came 
to symbolise the national struggle for liberation from ‘occupation’. Thus, crossing is to 
forget the ‘I do not forget’ and to abandon the ‘I struggle’ as crossing is translated as 
accepting that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (an illegal ‘occupation’) is 
legitimate.  
It appears, therefore, that through the co-constitution of G.C. nationalism, militarism and 
masculinity these symbolic representations of post-war Cyprus as a feminised victim of 
‘occupation’ operating at a national level, as discussed in the previous section, become 
transmuted to this idea of a feminised population in the face of ‘occupation’ that denies 
and resists crossing which would mean accepting ‘occupation’. Thus, the co-constitution 
of this three-fold relationship interprets the crossings as emasculating the G.C. 
masculinist position of power in the conflict ‘to not forget’ that the community is a ‘victim’ 
of ‘occupation’ that needs to be rescued by the muscular state through ‘struggle’ for 
liberation of the entire ‘occupied’ land that would allow all G.C. refugees to return to 
their houses and land.  
Let us now take a moment to examine in more detail how crossings have been linked to 
the discourse of ‘occupation’ through further diversity in the data. 
Whilst many of the people I talked to have never crossed to the North; clearly 
articulating the discourse of ‘occupation’ in their reasoning, the ones that had crossed at 
least once or twice had sentimental, but most often, positive experiences to report 
regarding their experience in the North and their interaction with the new inhabitants of 
their house, (see also Hadjipavlou, 2007b: 54 for similar observations).  These accounts 
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repeatedly illustrated a humanisation of the ‘other’. Giorgos (male, 26, accountant) who 
is a second generation refugee typically describes his experience:  
“We had also met the people who were living in her [his grandmothers’] house 
and even though they were settlers and they are of ill fame, they were very nice 
people. They had kept my grandmother’s photos, they gave them to us, they 
gave us oranges from the garden and they told us they wished we could go back 
and be able to live in peace.”  
Still, out of all the people I talked to who had crossed, most of them  illustrated some 
humanisation of the ‘other’ in their accounts and explained that they crossed once or 
twice to visit their house or their parents’ or grandparents’ house, clarifying that they 
would have preferred not to cross again as there would be no reason to do so under the 
given circumstances of ‘occupation’ (most prominent narrative). Kostas’ (2 , man, 
banker) account was most typical of this narrative:  
“Kostas: When I crossed I felt really strange, I felt like I was in a foreign country, 
but it is our country! I had a strange feeling and a sense of injustice because 
even though I am not a refugee, it’s our land which is being trespassed 
(translators note: meaning occupied) and which was invaded. My mother started 
crying when she saw the house; she had a lot of memories coming back. In 
moments like this, we realise that it is not the people’s fault and that it’s the 
government’s fault and the fact that Turkey has an expansive policy. However so 
long as the occupation continues there is no reason for me to go there again. 
Interviewer: Have you ever met any Turkish-Cypriots? 
Kostas: Yes. In the place where I work we have Turkish clients because it is a 
Federal Bank of the Middle East. In my job I collaborate a lot with Turkish people 
and there are also two Turkish-Cypriot women who work in the Customer Service 
Department to enable this communication and they are very nice.” 
Kostas’ account above articulates the most prominent narrative on the crossings whilst 
his liberal beliefs are revealed by his acceptance of T.C.s and Turks. This rather typical 
account on the crossings further illustrates that this form of civic nationalism supported 
by the identity of ‘Cypriotism’, as discussed in the theoretical chapter, is the main 
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internal opposition to G.C. nationalism, which is by definition more accepting of and 
engaging with the T.C. community and is clearly associated with the liberal fraction of 
Cyprus (Mavratsas, 1996; 88) still opposes as it understands the conflict as 'occupation'. 
Thus this G.C. civic nationalism appears to also reproduce the discourse of ‘occupation’. 
Whilst this argument explains the resistance of crossing expressed by participants who 
had liberal beliefs it also illustrates how the reproduction of nationalism itself is not an 
exclusive endorsement of the nationalist or right wing fractions of society.   
Having said that, however, a very limited number of interviewees had crossed 
repeatedly (second most prominent narrative), expressing the curiosity to explore the 
Northern part of the island further. The accounts of these interviewees, who most often 
had strong bi-communal and liberal political beliefs and/or had been to private schools 
and/or had often lived for a long period abroad, illustrated a “stepping out” from the 
discourse of ‘occupation’. For example, Stalo (35, camera woman) commented that:  
“Personally, ok I was always curious, I wanted to see the ‘occupied’ part. I have 
seen some places, I went a few times ... In the beginning it was weird for me to 
spend the night there but when I did, then I felt a lot better.” 
 
Another group of interviewees, young enough in age to not have lived before the 
partition of the island, interestingly noted that they have no attachments with the other 
side therefore nothing is driving them to cross or cross again (third most prominent 
narrative). As Pavlos, (man, 23, student) comments: 
“Pavlos: I went once or twice. But then I never went back … I was very young to 
think about certain things, I didn’t think about anything in specific. It was just an 
unknown place to me that I was visiting for the first time. 
Interviewer: But you never went back there after that?  
Pavlos: No, I didn’t bother. I didn’t even think about it. I don’t know if I would go 
in the future however.” 
 
Interestingly, these accounts illustrate a “stepping out” from the discourse of 
‘occupation’ in a reserve manner to above. Thus the weak construction of these 
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interviewees through ‘occupation’ due to their age allows them to cross without facing 
the ethical barrier, which other interviewees expressed, however it also undermines 
their motivation to cross due to the lack of memories, even if constructed, which connect 
them to the ‘occupied’ part. This perhaps illustrates what was argued earlier on in this 
chapter that the ‘fighting spirit’ to regain what was lost has faded most in the younger 
generations. These findings explain the modification of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ to 
‘I know, do not forget and I struggle’ discussed above.  
 
Still, the most prominent narrative evoked a strong sense of right and responsibility as 
to ‘why’ and ‘who’ should cross. Indeed, as Webster & Timothy (2006: 176) argue “there 
appears to be a moral or ethical barrier against crossing”.  
The ‘ethical barrier’ against crossing is the discourse of ‘occupation’. It is argued, 
therefore, that in the nationalist discourse of ‘I do not forget’ when the border opened; a 
shift of focus occurred, from being against the existence of the border to what crossing 
the border ‘means’, which again translates to the same; ‘occupation’. Clearly, the 
resistances for crossing expressed by my interviewees where delimitated by 
‘occupation’.  
Perhaps the most conspicuous G.C. resistance my interviewees expressed in crossing 
is the issue of showing one’s I.D. This is perceived as an acknowledgment of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a legitimate state, which therefore contests the 
status of the conflict situation as an ‘occupation’. The reality of the bureaucratic process 
of crossing the checkpoints to the North, which involves filling out some paperwork and 
showing one’s passport or European I.D., was mentioned by most of my interviewees 
as the main reason preventing them from crossing the borders or ever crossing again. 
Angeliki's account, (woman, 25, translator) was a most typical one:  
“What bothers me is the fact that I need to show my passport to go through the 
borders. It’s Cyprus; it’s my own country so why should I have to show my 
passport to go there?”  
Showing one’s passport to cross the borders is an issue that has concerned and has 
been discussed extensively by the G.C. community, state, political powers and media. A 
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common G.C. expression that my interviewees repeatedly used as a statement for not 
crossing and having to show a passport was ‘I am not going to be a tourist in my own 
country’. Dikomitis (2005) has also noted that in her fieldwork research G.C.s asserted 
the same statement, (see also Dikomitis, 2004). These nationalistic arguments soon 
after the opening become visible in slogans appearing near the checkpoints, Demetriou 
(2007: 999-1000) comments, “declaring, in the first-person singular, that one should ‘not 
need a visa to visit one’s own house’ (dhen thélo víza na báo spídi mou). The order of 
the verb here is significant, because it harks back to the older rhetoric of the 1980s 
campaign against losing the memory of ‘our lands’, entitled ‘I don’t forget’”.  
Clearly, in these accounts a fear penetrates the possibility of crossing where the 
discourse of ‘occupation’ provides the understanding that crossing translates into 
accepting the ‘loss’ of the G.C. community. Thus, crossing here means relinquishing the 
fight of liberating Cyprus from ‘occupation’ and accepting that the territory understood to 
be temporarily occupied is forever lost and thus no longer occupied. This construal of 
crossings appeared as a banner hanging in checkpoints saying ‘This is not the [correct] 
way to return’ (In Greek: Αυτος δεν ειναι ο δρομος της επιστροφης), see (Dikomitis, 
2005).  
Spending money in the Turkish Republic Northern Cyprus was another reason 
preventing many of the people I talked to crossing the border or crossing again, which 
was again framed through the discourse of ‘occupation’. Spending money in the North 
was broadly understood as enhancing the development of the “pseudo-state” of North 
Cyprus and thus fuelling the ‘occupation’, (see Webster & Timothy, 2006: 173 for similar 
observations). Kostas’ account (man, 28, banker) represents the most typical narrative:  
“I don’t want to spend more money there. We had spent very little and it was for 
the insurance of the car. I wouldn’t want to go back as a tourist and have fun 
there or anything like this. I don’t want to visit different cities, go for coffee etc. I 
went once, and it was only because I wanted to see my grandmother’s house 
and that’s it.”  
The openings that occurred on the borders practically allow free flow of people from 
both sides. Yet, the narratives of resistance presented above, which reflect the official 
and unofficial G.C. rhetoric that has emerged, direct us in understanding the 
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seriousness with which many G.C.s approach the crossings in relation to the discourse 
of ‘ ‘not forgetting’ that the G.C. community is a victim of ‘occupation’.   
Being a refugee or owning a property in the Northern part of Cyprus to visit was the 
main criterion that most interviewees used in deciding whether or not they should cross 
or cross again. For example Xristos' account (man, 27, unemployed) commented to not 
‘have a valid reason’ to cross since he is not a refugee and that for this reason he does 
not want to spend any money there. As Webster & Timothy (2006: 172) have argued 
“the choice of crossing into the ‘occupied’ zone was largely a function of having a 
previous personal family connection with the north”. Sitas, Latif & Loizou (2007: 14) also 
comment that “with very few exceptions, most refugees have crossed to revisit their 
houses or property.” ‘Refugees’ do not threaten the discourse of ‘occupation’. On the 
contrary these are refugees of the ‘occupation’ who, at a discursive level, reproduce the 
idea that the G.C. community is a victim of ‘occupation’; ‘I do not forget’.  
Whilst most interviewees’ accounts on crossing or not are centred on their refugee 
status, this was a generally agreed judgement of the G.C.s who cross without a 
substantiated reason. Stiliani (woman, 30, teacher) who reported she held strong 
nationalist political beliefs rather assertively yet quite typically stated:   
“It is justifiable only in the case of refugees who need to go in order to see their 
homes and in the case of the people who are not refugees they just want to go to 
find out what happened to these places. These are the only attenuating 
circumstances”  
The above account describing the reasons for which one could cross closely draws the 
discourse of ‘occupation’. As Styliani above explains, only two categories can cross 
‘justifiably’  a) ‘refugees who need to go in order to see their homes’ who are held 
hostage by the ‘occupation’ and b) the non-refugees who ‘want to go to find out what 
happened to these places’ who are held hostage by the ‘occupation’. This most typical 
discourse of reasoning reflects the governmental statements that began to be made 
shortly after the opening of the borders (see Demetriou, 2007).  
The refusal to cross the border is a function of resistance against ‘forgetting’ 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983), the ‘occupation’ and relinquishing the ‘struggle’, hence 
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accepting that what was temporarily ‘occupied’ is lost. Consequently, those who cross 
without the ‘right’ to are ‘forgetting’ that Cyprus has been a victim of the ‘occupation’ and 
thus are ‘surrendering’. This reveals the importance of the borders to the G.C. 
conceptualisation of the conflict as ‘occupation’. The definition of the conflict as 
‘occupation’ however is an integral part of the post-war G.C. identity of victimcy 
discussed above. Therefore, ‘occupation’ relates not only to the definition of the conflict 
but to the G.C. ‘self’ that is constituted vis-à-vis ‘occupation’. This nationalist post-war 
‘self’ understanding of the community, as the previous section illustrated, presents post-
war Cyprus as a victim of ‘occupation’ through certain constructions of femininity 
centrally manifested through the iconic symbolism of the mothers of the missing 
persons. As such, I argue that for those that resist crossing, the discourse of 
‘occupation’ “provides resistance to new patterns of thinking or action that lay outside”, 
Bourdieu (1991: 107),  ‘occupation’ vis-à-vis the G.C. ‘self’ of victimcy. Thus, the 
‘occupied’ part of Cyprus for those that choose to not cross, remains ‘imagined’ 
(Anderson,1983) through constructed memories of the ‘authorised language’ of 
‘occupation’ mobilised by the state.  
These findings lead us in understanding that following the opening of the borders there 
has been an adapted nationalist invocation in maintaining the nationalist imagination 
(Anderson 19 3) and thus ‘not forgetting’ the ‘occupation’ by not crossing the now 
crossable border. However, the ‘imagination’ of the ‘occupation’ that is maintained by 
‘not forgetting’, in some cases, illustrated a certain difference between interviewees who 
had right wing or liberal political beliefs. Repeatedly, the former group of accounts 
illustrated that ‘occupation’ was reproduced by keeping ‘self’ separate from the ‘other’ 
and ‘other side’. Whilst, the later group illustrated a much more reconciliatory approach 
to the ‘other’ yet reproduced ‘occupation’ as the  ‘other side’. 
Therefore, to ‘not forget’ by not crossing is an adaptation of G.C. nationalism in this new 
space of open borders that reproduces the discourse of ‘occupation’ vis-à-vis the 
above-outlined G.C. post-war identity of victimcy, by keeping ‘occupation’ as ‘imagined’ 
(Anderson 1983). However, for liberal interviewees often the imagination of the 
‘occupation’ did not necessitate, and thus did not include the T.C. as the ‘other’.  
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5.6. Demanding closure of the borders: the appearance of ultra-nationalist 
political formations and ‘occupation’  
The appearance of ultra-right wing parties and political youth groups, new and old (I 
have studied ELAM, EDHK, DRASIS-KES and METWPO), only following the opening of 
the borders (apart from Drasis-Kes) raises certain questions about the dynamics 
created, following this event, within the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and 
masculinity, that made them possible. The political agenda of these parties is for the 
most part a continuation of ultra-nationalist politics that appeared shortly after the 
independence of Cyprus against independence17. However, their more recent views 
appear to be also fused, to one extent or another according to the party or group, with 
neo-Nazi ideologies mostly of pure race, ethnic origins and junta-phile para-military 
views.  Even though their political agenda is primarily a continuation of ultra-nationalist 
politics that had appeared following the independence, these parties and groups have 
only been formed, and have gained some political power following the opening of the 
borders. Therefore, the main question that arises is: what has made these parties 
possible from within the post-opening of the borders co-constitution of nationalism, 
militarism and masculinity?  
Each one of the empirical chapters will address this question by accordingly discussing 
the specific expression of nationalism, militarism or masculinity by these parties and 
groups. These expressions will be also sketched out by comparing them with the most 
prominent narratives expressed by the public. In this chapter, the first issue to be 
discussed is their view on the opening of the borders. This event and the crossings 
have been illustrated throughout this chapter to be largely understood by the public as 
undermining the discourse of ‘occupation’ and the ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle. 
However, these parties and political youth groups have a more extreme view on this 
                                                          
17
 These ultra-nationalist political sectors are tied to the ultra-nationalist politics that appeared shortly after 
the independence; against independence. At that time the ultra-right-wing nationalistic ideology was 
mobilised by EOKA-B. This was a G.C. paramilitary organisation formed in 1971 by General Georgios 
Grivas-Digenis. This organisation had the ultimate goal of achieving union (in Greek: ένωσης) of Cyprus 
with Greece. These political sectors during the formative years of the post-war national struggle, even if 
usually embedded within wider activities and campaigns of the official state authorities, were relatively 
politically peripheral and had not formed an autonomous political force. These ultra-nationalist, neo-
fascist and junta-phile elements were dispersed across other right-wing parties, which, is perhaps also 
today one of the reasons for their small size. Yet, following the opening of the borders they became 
organised, formed ultra-nationalist parties. 
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issue and have made the closure of the borders as one of their main objectives. The 
below account of the President of Drasis-Kes tells its own story:  
“I remember in particular a woman around 50 years old who told us [translator’s 
note: referring to Drasis-Kes who was protesting on the borders demanding their 
closure…] … it was just as the borders closed for the day and she wanted to 
cross over to go to the casino: “you don’t know who you are talking to”, “who are 
you…?” we replied “My brother is one of the missing persons”, and one of our 
members there told her “by going there and by spending your money there it will 
be like you are paying for the bullets that killed your brother” and the woman 
burst into tears and left. So, unless one speaks directly to people’s hearts, unless 
the issue affects their immediate families or their wallets they are not as bothered 
about their country as they are about their comfort. That’s why we are trying to 
open their eyes, because by having a country you will also have an economy, a 
home, a family, a job and everything else. If you don’t have a country you have 
nothing … We are the first and only ones who carry on the struggle to close the 
borders’”  
ELAM, a newly formed political party (founded in 2006), which is the fraternal party of 
Golden Dawn of Greece, also states on their website that ‘as part of our political 
positions we require: “The immediate closure of the checkpoints that are the gate which 
maintains the occupation army and the  “pseudo-state”’ (see ELAM, 2014). As a 
representative of ELAM (ROE) noted in an interview I conducted with him:  
“The barricades should be closed immediately! We are subsidising the conqueror 
financially”  
These parties and groups, share their interpretation with the most prominent narrative in 
the accounts of the public presented above, that the opening of the borders and the 
subsequent crossings is recognition of the “pseudo-state”. This directly opposes the 
status of ‘occupation’ and is detrimental for the negotiating tools of the G.C.s for the 
G.C.s, which significantly undermines the ‘fighting spirit’ and is inextricable from 
‘forgetting’. However, in the accounts provided by these four political parties and youths 
it was clear that for them this effect of the opening of the borders had further 
significance. They expressed a strong and assertive understanding that the closure of 
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the borders is a clear step in restoring and strengthening the ‘fighting spirit’, as this 
translates into returning to the state of ‘occupation’ and war. Therefore it appears that 
for them the opening of the borders is undermining a specific type of national struggle, 
which they support. As Loucas Stavrou, President of EDHK, comments: 
“The borders should close for many reasons; because we have to return to a 
state of war and because we shouldn’t support the occupation and because we 
have to free our land… The opening of the borders is an act of negation as well 
as this back and forth and the collaboration with the invasion forces … The 
borders should close, end of! Sirs, you are occupying our country, end of!”  
As the ROE also comments: 
“We organise protests at the borders regarding the closing of the borders… we 
try to promote this as much as we can in order to make people understand all the 
negative aspects that brought the opening of the borders” 
This view is further supported by the president of Drasis-Kes who states:  
“I believe that the borders should close; we will be holding an event next week in 
favour of the symbolic closing of the borders in order to promote and project 
some messages, we have done this 3-4 times in the past.”  
These parties and groups have made, as a pivotal axis of their political positions and 
objectives, the interrelated, in their perspective, objective of closing the borders and 
strengthening the ‘fighting spirit’. This is inextricable from their grand objective to 
reinstall awareness of the national struggle in the G.C. community as a way of 
combatting ‘forgetting’ and thus firing up the ‘fighting spirit’. As ELAM notes on their 
website, part of their main political objectives is: ‘The immediate growing of fighting spirit 
in people and combating the climate of defeatism.’ (see ELAM, 2014). Moreover, in my 
interviews with these parties and groups, the way in which they had used ‘I do not forget 
and I struggle’ as a way of illustrating the weakened ‘fighting spirit’ and the ways in 
which they have modified this slogan, illustrate a central part of the struggle they aspire. 
Characteristically the ROE commented: “Now it’s an empty phrase and nothing more”. 
While the Press Officer of Front has come to acknowledge that:  “Unfortunately as the 
years go by, we forget about the important things, we forget about ‘I do not forget’. In 
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this context, he explained the meaning of the slogan that the community should have 
sustained. The opinion that is representative of all of these parties is that: 
“If Turks give us 10% out of the 37% of our land, I do not forget that all of it is 
mine. And if they tell us but it’s been 36 years that the settlers live here, I do not 
forget that before that, there were no settlers.” 
For these parties and groups forgetting has clear implications on the type of national 
struggle they support. This is further illustrated by the way in which they have modified 
the slogan of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ to fit the perceived ‘forgetting’ and 
weakened ‘struggle’, intensely projecting it mainly through the media to the community. 
For example, ELAM has come to assert ‘Never Forget’. While Drasis-Kes has created 
this slogan as their key pronouncement: ‘You have forgotten’.  For these political parties 
that support union of Cyprus with Greece (Cyprus is viewed as an extension of Greece), 
the ‘forgetting’ is the deterioration and self-destructive process of the, for them, ‘Greek 
Cyprus’.  As the Press Officer of Front comments: 
“‘I don’t forget and I struggle’ means that I am not talking about the situation 
today, I am talking about what I had and what you stole from me.”  
Therefore, under this framework forgetting manifests the national destruction of the 
understanding of the conflict as an ‘occupation’ and, therefore, forgetting means 
relinquishing the heroic and military national struggle, as the next two chapters will 
reveal, for liberation of Cyprus from the ‘occupation’ forces. Without ‘I do not forget’, 
thus active national memory of the war events and lost lands their interpretation of the ‘I 
struggle’ part, of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’, becomes dispirited. As the Press Officer 
of Front continues:  
“As I already said, people forget, and that’s how the slogan ‘I don’t forget the I 
don’t forget’ emerged, which we have been using for about 5 years now, it acts 
as a reminder…”  
Clearly, for Front the “I don’t forget the I don’t forget” slogan is part of their own ‘I 
struggle’ to reinstall the ‘fighting spirit’. Yet, it is important to clarify: who forgets for them, 
and who is perceived as the accused? The President of Drasis-Kes comments: 
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“I don’t consider them to be my enemies [the G.C. s who cross the border], they 
are victims of this situation ‘we’ve forgotten, let’s have a good time, it’s over’”   
What is most central here is that these parties and groups see the weakening of the 
community, cultural shifts towards individualism and focussing on one’s image as 
significantly leading to the breakdown of the unified mono-ethnic community of ‘Greece 
of Greek Christians’ (In Greek: Ελλάς Ελλήνων Χριστιανών) 18  predicated on the 
collective national struggle. The reference to the community as, “let’s have a good time, 
it’s over” relates exactly to this criticism of the adoption of an individualist self-interested 
attitude of the general community at the expense of the unified national struggle. 
However, these parties mainly direct their disapproval of the current situation towards 
the government. Besides, ELAM posted recently on their website (see ELAM, 2012) that:  
“In recent years the current political leaders follow a methodical policy leading 
mathematically from the ‘I don’t forget and I struggle’ to ‘delete memories and 
compromise”’.  
The disappointment  of these political parties and youths with the political direction the 
Cyprus conflict is heading towards following the opening of the borders and the 
community’s acceptance of this, has meant that they felt that political parties or political 
youth groups need to be formed that will restore their version of the post-war national 
struggle. Part of this objective is to awaken the ‘fighting spirit’ in the G.C. community by 
pointing to the need to ‘Never Forget’, as ELAM’s slogan goes. This is also evident in 
that they are aiming to demonstrate that there are G.C.s who don’t forget: ‘Nobody 
Forgets Nothing is Forgotten’ (In Greek: Κανενας Δεν Ξεχνα Τιποτα Δεν Ξεχνιεται), this 
being a widespread and prevalent slogan used in the rather newly formed ultra-right 
wing area of the political scene of Cyprus.  
 
                                                          
18
 The phrase of ‘Greece of Greek Christians’ was one of the political strongest slogans uttered by the 
dictator of Greece, Georgios Papadopoulos (1967-1974). 
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5.6. Conclusion  
The discourse of ‘occupation’ is the ideological platform in the milieu of the national 
struggle for liberation of the Northern part of Cyprus from ‘occupation’, which, as 
discussed in the next chapter, has been inseparable from the development of the 
ideology of defence and the construction of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’.  
The general fading of the ‘fighting spirit’ has been rigorously tied to the opening of the 
borders by the interviewees. The opening of the borders has challenged formative 
components of post-war G.C. nationalism as these were predicated on the closed 
borders; which were the central manifestation of the discourse of ‘occupation’ and, 
therefore, in the milieu of the national struggle the borders represented the protest and 
need of liberation from ‘occupation’.  
The national struggle might have shifted towards the aspiration of an EU solution to the 
conflict, yet, in the G.C. community, the struggle is a weak discourse today. The 
crossings of G.C.s to the North have been broadly understood through the discourse of 
‘occupation’ as follows: crossing means ‘forgetting’, thus returning back as ‘a tourist’ 
rather as liberators of the ‘occupied’ land is an acceptance that the land across the 
border is not ‘occupied’ but that the island is divided, which defeats the national struggle 
for liberation from ‘occupation’. In this manner, the opening of the borders, in the next 
chapters, is also discussed as feminising the masculinist militarist framing of the 
struggle. 
The memory of the war events and lost places (I do not forget) is understood in post-
opening of the borders G.C. nationalist discourse to be acting as a function of 
resistance (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983), that seems in many cases to be moralising the 
loss of struggle; the enslaved ‘soul’ that will not be surrendered by the community that 
continues to remember.  
The crossings menace the definition of the conflict as an ‘occupation’ in the public 
understanding that now asserts as resistance the discourse of ‘occupation’. The specific 
conceptualisation of post-war Cyprus as a woman in need of deliverance (symbolised 
through the mothers of the missing persons) that is embodied in the slogan ‘I do not 
forget and I struggle’ is a central function of the moralisation of the sense of struggle 
through the sustenance of memory. Building on these observations the chapter on 
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masculinity will reveal that the strong position put forward by the majority of informants 
that crossing undermines the ‘occupation’ illustrates the contingency of this discourse to 
a certain perceived masculinitist collective position of power of the community in the 
conflict situation that has now become reiterated under these new social and political 
parameters.     
The new ultra-nationalist parties and political youth groups believe the borders should 
close. They strongly assert the need for their immediate closure as they expect this to 
restore the ‘fighting spirit’. For them, the closure of the borders translates to returning to 
a state of ‘occupation’ and war and the expectation that this will fortify anew the national 
struggle for liberation.  
The next chapter builds on the observations on the opening of the borders and the 
undermined ‘fighting spirit’ discussed in this chapter, and examines the weakening 
militarist framing of the struggle; the ideology of defence.   
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6. Chapter six: Militarism in post-2003 Cyprus  
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter examines the decline of the G.C. ideology of defence (In Greek: Άμυνα) in 
Cyprus since the opening of the borders between North and South in 2003 and 
illustrates its co-constitutive relationship to nationalism and masculinity. ‘Defence’, as 
discussed in the first section, is the specific version of militarism (Huntington, 1957; 
Enloe, 2004) that appeared in post-war Cyprus. ‘Defence’ has been a co-constitutive 
part of post-war G.C. nationalism and masculinity, as it has been a central expression of 
the ‘fighting spirit’ and served as an integral function of ‘I struggle’ manifested in Cyprus 
following the invasion of the island (1974). ‘Defence’ was a type of militarism constituted 
by its elemental discourses of: ‘nation-in-arms’, ‘high military investment’ in the face of 
‘existential threat’ and the ‘enemy within’. This specific ideology of militarism 
materialised through state policies of successive governments, receiving great public 
adherence and becoming a vast social and economic investment.  
 
The overarching argument of this chapter is that the ideology of defence is weakening in 
both state and public domains following: the opening of the borders, the process of the 
Annan Plan referendum and the accession of Cyprus to the European Union, which all 
took place in the early 21st century. Therefore, while the previous chapter has illustrated 
the changing relation of ‘I do not forget’ and ‘I struggle’, this chapter addresses the 
weakening militarist frame of the struggle. Here it will illustrate that the declining 
ideology of defence has meant the relative disengagement of both the political 
leadership and community from the idea of Cyprus as a technologically advanced 
potent ‘nation-in-arms’ against the ‘occupation’. The analysis that will follow seeks to 
contribute to the overall argument of the thesis by providing the understanding that the 
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fading idea of post-war Cyprus as a ‘nation-in-arms’ encapsulates the changing 
components of the relationship of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. Whilst, the 
weakening nationalist militarist idea of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ illustrates 
the disengagement of the community from its previously strong commitment to the 
‘defence’ of post-war Cyprus presented as a feminised victim of ‘occupation’, which 
points us to the weakening masculinist discourses of the struggle, examined in the next 
chapter.  Through discussion of the factors that have undermined ‘defence’ and the 
reactions to this reality, I will not only illustrate the ‘Europeanisation’ of ‘defence’, but 
also the contradictory directions for militarism’s present and future. The weakening 
militarism has impacted civil-military relations; strengthening the boundaries between 
the civil and military sectors, on which fragmented boundaries the ‘nation-in-arms’ 
model operated (Rapoport 1962).  
The decline of the ideology of defence is illustrated in this chapter to be a broadly 
understood reality yet one treated with criticism and creating public and political 
reactions. It will be argued that these reactions are a product of ‘defence’ being deeply 
embedded into the post-armed conflict structures through its inter-dependency on 
nationalism and masculinity. My effort here, therefore, is to investigate the social and 
cultural arenas within which the centrality of defence military matters have been 
produced and reproduced by the state in post-war Cyprus. My goal is to illustrate that 
the changing understanding of the national struggle for liberation under the auspices of 
the EU and the opening of the borders, which has undermined the ideology of ‘defence’, 
has found itself in opposition to the post-war conflict structures that have been largely 
constructed on the discourse of ‘occupation’. With the wider public acceptance of the 
decline of militarism, in the public sphere the discourse of ‘occupation’ generates public 
anxiety by a feeling of defencelessness, asserting the nationalist masculinist need for 
‘defence’ from the ‘occupation’ forces. Hence, in this chapter the previous arguments 
made in relation to the discourse of ‘occupation’ are substantiated by illustrating the 
inextricability of the understanding of ‘occupation’ from ‘defence’.  
 
After discussing the formation and significance of ‘defence’ in post-war Cyprus  I use 
the qualitative data I collected in 2011 to argue that certain factors reflecting the 
contiguous parts of ‘defence’: ‘investing’, ‘trusting’ and ‘serving’ in the mass-conscript-
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army, have contributed to its weakening and seek to provide an understanding of the 
militarism situation in this new setting through its co-constitution to nationalism and 
masculinity. On examining the weakening of the militarist framing of the national 
struggle following the opening of the borders, we come to understand the social and 
cultural concerns related to (and derived from) the armed forces, war and provisions for 
‘national security’ in the European Cypriot society with open borders.  
 
6.2. Looking back: the development of the ideology of defence 
The scenery of Cyprus is coloured by the heavy military presence on insland with 
military vehicles, outposts and soldiers of six armies: the Greek Cypriot National Guard 
(NG), the Hellenic force of Cyprus (ELDYK), the Turkish Cypriot Security Force (TCSF), 
the Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Cyprus (KTBK, which are considered by the G.C. 
as the ‘occupation’ army), the British Forces of Cyprus (BFC) and the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Nicosia, the capital, remains divided into 
two zones of Cypriot and Turkish armies buffered by the UN forces located in the middle.  
‘Defence’, the version of militarism that developed in Cyprus following the events of 
1974, can be seen in the discourses and policies mobilised and implemented by 
successive governments and the deeply entrenched commitment of the population to its 
idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’. Following the invasion of Cyprus, and the ‘occupation’ of the 
Northern part of the island by Turkey, ‘defence’ for Cyprus has not only been a 
militaristic issue, but also a central expression of the ‘fighting spirit’ to push back the 
‘occupation’ forces. However, ‘defence’ has been the internal front of the Janus-faced 
international and internal agenda the state of RoC mobilised for itself. Following the 
invasion and division of the island, the state has been portraying itself internationally as 
a victim that is in ‘existential need’ of the international community, and internally as the 
‘defensive’ potent saviour of that victim.  
 
The state of the Republic of Cyprus and the post-war development of the ideology of 
defence 
The ideology of defence is a focal mechanism of the relationship the state of post-war 
Cyprus has mobilised between its international and internal agenda. This relationship is 
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fundamental in the co-constitution of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity. One 
of the most significant features of the conflict in Cyprus since its inception has been “the 
concentration of political discourse on appeals to the international community.” 
(Demetriou, 2007: 991). As it was discussed in the historical chapter, the bi-communal 
clashes of 1963-64 led to the state of the RoC being controlled only by G.C.s, as, since 
1964, the T.C. seats have remained vacant. This has given “G.C.s complete control 
over the governance of the country, not just in domestic terms, but in the eyes of the 
world” (Ker Lindsay, 200 : 109). 
G.C. post-war nationalism, as discussed in the previous chapter, has been centred on 
explicit gendered notions of victimcy (Yakinthou, 2008; Christou, 2006; Hadjipavlou, 
2006), mobilised by the state through the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. The 
iconic image of mothers of the missing persons has a symbolic function for G.C.s to 
remember a certain image of the state as a victim. Ultimately, in this particular 
discursive space of victimised, national, self-understanding anchored around ‘I do not 
forget and I struggle’, the discourse of ‘defence’ has operated as a predominant form, 
existing through ‘struggling’. 
 
The projection of post-war Cyprus by successive governments to the international 
community as a victim was internally constitutive of the masculinist post-war internal 
politics of ‘We have been victims but we can still win; we will defend ourselves’. In the 
most dominant nationalist discourses following the division of the island, Cyprus was 
presented to the international community “as small and unprotected, a ‘little Cyprus’ (i 
mikrí Kípros) suffering from the unjust bullying of a Turkey with a large, strong and 
vicious army at its disposal” (Demetriou, 2005: 16). Certain results of the war, including 
the population displacement and the case of the missing persons (symbolised through 
the mothers of the missing persons), were part of the nationalist gendering of post-war 
Cyprus that was strongly projected to the international community to venture the image 
of Cyprus as a victim suffering from the violation of human rights and injustice at the 
hands of Turkey. This projection has been internally constitutive of self- ‘defence’.  
 
The official state political rhetoric called for the international political powers to 
understand the need for justice of two legally equal communities, the majority G.C.s and 
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the minority T.C.s. Within this rhetoric, ‘justice’ meant achieving a solution that was 
based on international law (Demetriou, 2005: 11; Bryant, 2001). However, at the same 
time, the projection of the conflict by G.C. political leadership to the international 
community sought to create an image that specifically connected the ‘division’ with 
‘injustice’ for the G.C.s19. This, in turn, meant a solution based on the recognition of the 
G.C. leadership as the only legitimate government on the island (Demetriou, 2005: 11). 
This G.C. discourse appealed to international bodies such as the United Nations and, 
later on, to the EU for foreign support and political intervention.  
 
These points were reiterated in an interview I conducted with Glafcos Clerides, who was 
the President of the Parliament of the ROC when the invasion took place, and President 
of the RoC for most of the period (1993- 2003) when the NG was chiefly upgraded and 
modernised. While discussing his efforts to advance the NG when he was the President 
of the Parliament he commented that the purpose of the force should be to delay the 
Turkish military forces and not allow them to occupy the whole of the island until the UN 
could interfere and oblige them to start the negotiations. The G.C. political leadership 
and community, as discussed in detail further on in this chapter, have perceived the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU as the principal instrument for a G.C. solution to the 
‘Cyprus Problem’ and this has informed all of the components of the discourse of the 
national struggle.  
 
The Cypriot state asserted itself through the ideology of ‘defence’ as a masculine 
militarist entity against the ‘existential threat’ by the ‘occupation’ forces and mobilised 
the population for collective aims with the construction of the community as a ‘nation-in-
arms’20. Therefore, the armed forces were presented as a way in which the state had 
established and reproduced its legitimacy (Tilly, 1975; Giddens, 1985). The extensive 
mobilisation of human and financial resources, which the ‘defence’ entailed (see 
appendix 6), figured strongly in the consolidation and strengthening of the state in 
relation to the dangers to national security (Huntington, 1957: 67). The ideology of 
defence was reflected, reinforced and refracted against the 112 mile long border that 
                                                          
19
 See Bryant (2001)
 
for a historical perspective on G.C. understandings of ‘justice’ in political terms.  
20
 This particular relationship between society, state and armed forces that asserts the state as a 
masculine militarist entity has been repeatedly also identified in other post-armed conflict divided 
societies, (for example, regarding Israel see Ben Eliezer, 1997 and 1998, and Ehrich, 1987).  
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divides the island and was heavily guarded by both armies. Constructed on the G.C. 
collectives’ need for survival, ‘defence’ inextricably gave rise to the notion of 
preparedness for another military offensive on the part of Turkey; the ‘enemy within’ 
already occupying about one third of Cyprus’ territory.  
 
The border in Cyprus presents an uncommon situation as it signified the need for 
‘defence’ from its creators but also the protest against its existence (I struggle). The 
ideology of ‘defence’ made the border the NG’s first priority; ensuring that the ‘enemy 
within’ would not overthrow it and occupy the rest of the island, whilst fighting for 
liberation of the ‘occupied’ part of Cyprus. In this ideological setting, the idea of the 
‘nation-in-arms’ and thus the state-led militarisation of the whole society is integrally 
related to the notion of Cyprus being a distinctively small country needing to be 
militarised throughout because it is threatened by the ‘enormous enemy within’.  
The sense of ‘existential threat’ in Cyprus, just like in Israel, (see Ehrlich, 19 7), has 
been, in certain ways, systematically repeated and used by the state and its 
representatives to gain and maintain legitimacy, to define standards for the distribution 
of resources, to shape the post-war public culture and the lives of individuals. Therefore, 
the protection of the population was built into the ‘existential threat’ within the discursive 
system the state created and mobilised through patterns of embedding militarism in 
society.  
The state led a nationalist politicisation of the mass army within society through 
solidification of the idea of the G.C ‘ethnic community’ that still needs to defend its 
existence. Therefore, the embedded nature of the ‘existential threat’ within society was 
an effort by the state to culturally homogenise an ‘ethnic community’ as a ‘nation-in-
arms’. A clear example is the amount and specificity of NG broadcasts on state 
television. A TV programme (‘Defend your Country’, in Greek: αμύνεσθαι περί πάτρης) 
focuses exclusively on Cyprus’ defence issues and news from within the force; it runs to 
the present day on the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (RIK) channel. Also, the NG 
and defence issues still appear on mainstream media almost on a daily basis.  
The ‘nation-in-arms’ is a focal point of the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, 
militarism and masculinity in terms of the vast investment in ‘defence’ and the extensive 
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length of the conscription and reserve service. This nationalist and masculinist militarist 
expression became the main institutional arena, as well as the socio-political 
mechanism for the construction of ‘defence’ and protest against the ‘occupation’ (I 
struggle).  
 
The construction of post-war Cyprus as a ‘nation-in-arms’ has been instrumental in the 
pursuit of the establishment of the ideology of defence by the state. The state, as part of 
the effort to reproduce its legitimacy against the ‘occupation’, marshalled financial and 
human resources to create a ‘nation-in-arms’ that would have defended the community 
from the ‘existential threat’ from ‘occupation’. In other words, the construction of the 
‘nation-in-arms’ represented a state-led integrative response against the ‘occupation’ 
forces where a state and society had lost the 1974 war and their territory was now 
‘occupied’ from the ‘enemy within’. This point was reiterated in the interview I conducted 
with General Pandreou who commented that the G.C. community needed to create the 
NG in order to face the Turkish expansion policy and the fact that Turkey wanted to 
occupy the entire island of Cyprus. 
In this ever-present possibility of danger, the ideology of ‘defence’ was the nationalist 
masculinist resistance to the emasculating tendencies of circumstance. This existence 
of danger framed a realist thinking about the ‘other’; (see Odysseos, 2002: 417). For 
G.C.s, ‘defence’ was a national promise that the collective ‘fighting spirit’ for the 
liberation of Cyprus would be sustained against overwhelming odds and that, if political 
negotiations failed, the well-equipped and technologically advanced NG (with the will of 
the soldiers, reserves and militia to sacrifice their lives) would hold back the ‘enemy’.  
 
The state projected its military prowess through the extensive procurement of arms and 
the technological modernisation of the armed forces. The post-war political era was 
characterised by major defence procurements, especially in the 1990s, with the most 
prominent and popular example being the purchase of the surface-to-air defensive 
S300s missiles from Russia in 199 . The ‘economic miracle’ Cyprus experienced in the 
post-war years (Gergakopoulos, 1999; Kammas, 1992), made possible the diversion of 
extensive resources for military uses. Defence spending is an everyday reality for G.C.s 
living in Cyprus who pay ‘defence tax’ almost in all of their financial transactions (see 
appendix 7). The extensive financial investment in defence has been comparable to the 
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investment of human capital from the community in military service. The NG is an army 
of nearly 100,000 soldiers (conscripts, reserves and militia) and officers, (see European 
Defence Agency (EDA) and European Defence Information (EDI). Therefore, at any 
time the NG involves 12 % of the total population of the RoC in its operations 21. In more 
detail, the NG is estimated to consist of 10,000 conscripts, 70,000 reserves and militia 
(50,000 of whom are readily available) and 12,500 military personnel, (see European 
Defence Agency). A clear illustration of the ‘nation-in-arms’ model mobilised in Cyprus 
is that, to the present day, most reserves and militia maintain a military gun, usually a 
G3 military riffle, and ammunition in their house. This translates into almost every house 
in Cyprus having guns of the NG. As a prominent slogan mobilised by Vassos 
Lyssarides, a central figure in Cyprus politics in the post-war years, goes ‘every home a 
castle, every patriot a soldier’ (in Greek: κάθε σπίτι και κάστρο, κάθε πατριώτης και 
στρατιώτης).  
 
Furthermore, an important event in the development of the ideology of defence was the 
creation of the Single Area Defence Doctrine with Greece (In Greek: Ενιαίο Αμυντικό 
Δόγμα Ελλάδας-Κύπρου, hereinafter SADD) in the 1990s. This sought to expand the 
G.C. defence and military capabilities in relation to Turkey, (see appendix 8). In the 
nationalist popular discourse this was perceived as strengthening Cyprus’ defence with 
a joint military defence agreement and cooperation between Cyprus and Greece. SADD 
created the enlargement of military borders and the area covered by both the Cypriot 
and Greek states was considered, for ‘defence purposes’, unified. In the wider public 
understanding at the time, this was perceived as a defence shield for Cyprus who would 
no longer have to present a defence force alone against Turkey. Under the SADD 
defence spending increased significantly (see UN military expenditure data). This 
change in defence policy is also reflected by the sharp rise of arms imports during the 
1987- 1997 period, which, as a share of total imports, rose by more than 300% (3.35% 
of the GDP), when compared to the previous ten year period (1977- 1987), (ibid). This 
change in arms procurements as part of the SADD signified the new defence policy 
aiming for the further advancement of the military capabilities of the NG in cooperation 
with the Greek military forces against Turkey. As a popular saying that appeared at the 
                                                          
21
 In 2011, the population of Cyprus was slightly more than 800,000 (exactly
: 
838,897), (see Statistical 
Service Republic of Cyprus).  
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time, in the national media of both countries, goes: ‘Every gun that strengthens the 
defence of Greece strengthens the defence of Cyprus also’ (In Greek: Κάθε όπλο που 
ενισχύει την άμυνα της Ελλάδας ενισχύει και την άμυνα της Κύπρου).  
 
Post-war Cypriot society and the ideology of ‘defence’ 
Collective memories of the war, division of the island and the territories lost reproduced 
through popular discourse connected the ideology of defence with the cultural means by 
which it was constructed.  ‘Defence’, the ‘army’ and notions of ‘returning back’, were 
part of cultural militarism (as Ben-Eliezer, 1995a, 1997 and Kimmerling, 1993 argue in 
relation to Israel) and became central organising principles in post-war G.C. society. 
Therefore, while ‘defence’ was an ideology centrally mobilised by the state and 
exemplified through the NG of Cyprus, it “become a part of the way people live both 
inside and outside military barracks (Enloe, 2000: 3-4), as it involved and appealed to 
the entire social body that framed national survival as an urgent priority, committed to 
defending the threatened and vulnerable homeland; ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. 
 
In the G.C. community, the legitimacy of the national struggle and ontological security 
was dependant on the association with military goals, (Enloe, 2004: 145), with the 
obligatory involvement of the male community, an issue that will be specifically 
addressed in the next chapter on masculinity. The centrality of the demand for ‘justice’, 
the end to the violations of ‘human rights’ in relation to the war events and ‘occupation’ 
in public and political discourse, (see: Demetriou, 2005), created a naturalisation of the 
need for defence. Militarisation is both a social and discursive process, “involving a shift 
in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimise … the 
organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tributes 
used to pay for them” (Lutz, 2002: 723).  
 
‘Defence’ has been embedded into the public understanding of the national struggle and 
ontological security following the invasion and subsequent ‘occupation’ of Cyprus by 
Turkey. In such ways, in the G.C. community, the culture of militarism and the broader 
commitment of the community in ‘defence’, just like in India and Ireland (Banerjee, 2012: 
45), underscored the effeminate tendencies of circumstance. These are the small size 
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of Cyprus, with its army defeated in the war by Turkey and its inability to repel the Attila 
invading forces, which has thereafter been the ‘enemy within’. This was part of the post-
war nationalist discourse that justified the continuation of the masculinist discourse of 
vast investment in military terms, touching upon the ‘existential threat’ for the 
continuation of the G.C community.  
 
The state calling for the need to defend was illustrated and highlighted to the community 
through specific gender symbolisms, which were centrally mobilised through state 
institutions. A key example of this is the portrayal of the mothers, wives and sisters of 
missing persons as a discursive symbolic means to project and sustain the notion of 
Cyprus as a victim of the ‘enemy’ (Yakinthou, 2008). Such feminine articulations of 
powerlessness and victimcy of Cyprus appeared, as they were co-constituted with a 
gender angle alongside the iconography of this ‘enemy’ in dangerous hyper-masculine 
terms. An example of this is the picture (see appendix 9) named ‘Attila’s boot’, which, in 
addition to other places, was present in public school classrooms. This illustrated a 
Turkish soldier mercilessly attacking the whole of Cyprus whilst stepping with vigour on 
a G.C. soldier. What is perhaps most crucial here is that this Turk is pictured as being 
able to invade the whole island with brutality.  
 
These gender discourses were part of the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, 
militarism and masculinity. Mobilised by the state, these discourses, portraying post-war 
Cyprus as a feminised victim in need of protection and deliverance, were internally 
responded to with the masculinist ideology of ‘defence’ and, therefore, the need for the 
community to invest and stay committed to ‘defence’.  
 
In this section, I have illustrated that the post-war state of Cyprus has used various 
channels to formulate a response to the tragedy of the 1974 war both internally and 
internationally. Internally, it created a masculinised ‘nation-in-arms’ through the means 
of cultural intervention, such as extensive presentation of defence issues in national 
media, through the conscription of men from almost every family and through legal 
enforcement, such as defence tax. Internationally, the geographical size of ‘free’ Cyprus 
was transformed into a gendered, victimised state that sought the intervention of bigger 
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political entities. In the next section I illustrate the weakening of this internal response of 
‘defence’ following the opening of the borders.  
6.3. The social forgetting of ‘defence’ 
In this section I will illustrate that the opening of the previously un-crossable internal 
border has undermined the ideology of defence and, its underside, the commitment of 
the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ that were, along with nationalism and masculinity, 
predicated on guarding that border. This is clearly reflected in the increased 
unpopularity the NG is facing with the mass public and the declining legitimacy of the 
armed forces in the G.C. community.  
 
The previous chapter illustrated that the weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’ in the ‘I 
struggle’ was tightly linked to the opening of the borders. Here my aim is to understand 
the militarist frame of ‘I struggle’, the wearying ‘defence’, predicated on the borders, as 
a specific expression of the weakening of the  ‘fighting spirit’. The next chapter 
advances this argument by addressing the weakening and adapted reiteration of the 
discourses of masculinity inter-depended to nationalism and militarism.  
 
My argument in this section is that the G.C. community became deeply ambivalent 
about the state-mobilised masculinist idea of ‘defence’ (co-constituting nationalist, 
militarist and masculinist ideals, predicated on the closed border) when faced with 
opened borders and the ‘enemy within’ crossing them. Since coming into existence the 
border has stood for the separation of the two communities (Demetriou, 2005). This 
protectionist militarism was supported by its cooperative side- the conceptualization and 
projection of Cyprus as a victim of ‘occupation’- and was scaffolding the normativisation 
of a specific masculinity. The active meaning of military service as a male defence duty 
against and for the border becomes defeated against the opened borders. Demetriou’s 
(2007: 999-1000) observation provides a point of departure: 
“In Cyprus, although the decision was a governmental one, the opening of the 
border and the crossings that followed were definitively outside institutionalized 
practice … The Greek Cypriot society that one knew and lived in had been 
reconstituted, ‘at random’, in a place that, however one chose to define it, was 
out of the state’s control. This was a moment when the interpellatory capacity of 
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the state, the epitome of the success of its ideological apparatus (Althusser, 1971: 
170-177), was removed.” 
 
In the accounts of members of the public, politicians and military officers I spoke to, the 
openings that occurred on the border and the subsequent crossings were repeatedly 
commented on. These opening, in which the absence of ethnic violence has been 
noteworthy (Papadakis et al., 2006), is seen as defeating the purpose of the NG and, 
more specifically, the guarding of the border. The role of the NG since the events of 
1974 has been to hold the South part of the border ensuring that the 'occupation' army 
will not 'occupy' the whole of the island. The role of the 'occupation' army on the other 
hand is to protect the land on the North part of the border that it has already 'occupied'. 
Therefore the role of the 'occupation' army in this setting has remained potent and has 
not been overthrown by the openings.  
 
The effect the opening of the borders has had on the disorientation of the force became 
particularly clear in the interview I conducted with Kyriacos Mavronicolas, Minister of 
Defence when the borders opened, who emphasised that due to the age of conscript 
soldiers the Ministry had to re-mobilise the idea of an able National Guard whilst also: 
“A new concept of the way of controlling the dividing line had to be developed”. 
 
General Pandreou, who at the time was a Major General of the NG, further exemplified 
this in his account by commenting that following this event the mission that is ‘to react in 
order to prevent any offensive action taken by Turkey’ has not changed but the 
mentality of the force has, emphasising that: “We should have kept the morale of our 
soldiers a bit higher.” 
These two accounts at a political level illustrate that the undermining of the ideology of 
defence is part of the weakening ‘fighting spirit’ discussed in the previous chapter and 
that the masculinist military ‘fighting spirit’ weakened also at the political level following 
the opening of the borders. However, as the previous chapter also illustrated this 
observation is most often commented with criticism both at the political and public level. 
The account of Giannos’ (man, 5 , owner of local dry-cleaning shop), who is a reserve 
refugee now living in Nicosia, is clear of the link between the demoralisation of the role 
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of the NG by the opening of the borders and the crossings and the criticism of this 
reality. He notes with disappointment:  
 
“Now, they have opened the borders, the occupation forces give us electricity, 
G.C.s pass to the other side to go to casinos... What does the army stand for in 
the end? The value and the role of the army are degraded by this ‘movement 
‘towards the occupied part.”  
 
Furthermore, it was repeatedly evident in the accounts of both politicians and members 
of the public, that the period of the Annan Plan has further contributed to the weakening 
of the ideology of defence. It is argued that the border on which the ideology of defence 
was predicated and manifested in the period of the Annan Plan becomes a platform for 
expressing hope for the reunification of Cyprus; yet also fear for the future and 
uncertainty of the need for defence. General Pandreou who, at the time was an Adjutant 
of the Minister of Defence, commented that this was a shortcoming of theirs at the 
Ministry as there was a “slackening”: “[…]and it was because of the little time given 
between the Annan Plan and the opening of the borders and because people weren’t 
properly informed.” 
 
It is the case that in this period, the continuation of the NG was highly politically and 
publicly questioned, as the reunification plan provided the dissolution of the NG (one 
state, one army), (see Palley, 2006: 223), and as the above account reveals the 
uncertainty about the need for defence penetrates into both the forces and Cypriot 
society. It is argued that this is because both the public and all men related to the NG 
had come to understand and live under the uncertainty that there was a serious 
possibility that the NG would be dissolved and hence the RoC would cease to have its 
own army.  
I was a soldier in the NG at the time; we were all waiting for the results of the Annan 
Plan to see if we were going to be dismissed from the army, feeling that, in due course, 
the purpose of the force and us within it could have simply been non-existent and the 
force dissolved. It is argued that in this conflicting ideological nexus in which the NG is 
caught the possibility of reunification with the perceived ‘enemy within’ completely 
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defeats the purpose of guarding the border from this ‘enemy within’. The possibility of 
reunification, therefore, is also contradictory to the ideologically constructed necessity of 
the ‘nation-in-arms’ and thus, as the next chapter will reveal, of men in the national 
struggle as ‘defenders’.  
 
The opening of the borders and the decline in motivation to serve in the NG  
The decline in motivation to serve in the NG and the creation of the recent phenomenon 
of draft dodging represent the disengagement of the community from its idea as a 
‘nation-in-arms’ which is a clear illustration of the weakening post-war co-constitution of 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity following the opening of the borders. These two 
phenomena are argued to be a clear manifestation of the weakening militarist ‘fighting 
spirit’, which is part of the broader weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’ discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
 
The guarding of the borders has been the first priority of the NG since its establishment 
and the meaning of military service has been a male defence duty to push back the 
border. Yet, being conscripted in an army predicated on guarding a border (now open 
along with a humanisation of the ‘other’ in the G.C. community), has become 
problematic for men expected to serve their duty towards the ‘nation-in-arms’. The 
extensive media coverage and certain parliamentary statements on the issue of inquiry 
provide a point of departure. The appearance of draft-dodging in political, and media 
discussions22, only after the opening of the borders, further supports the argument of 
the weakening ideology of defence following the opening of the borders. This 
phenomenon grew exponentially in the 3 year period following the first press reference 
to it, and, in 2009, became a front line issue for both the government and the Ministry of 
Defence. On 20th July, that is the anniversary of the invasion of Cyprus, Andri 
Thrasivoulou (In Greek: Άντρη θρασυβούλου) writes in the right-wing newspaper 
Simerini (in Greek: Greek: Σημερινή): 
                                                          
22
 The first reference of draft-dodging in the Cyprus press was in 2006 by Simerini newspaper (see: 
Χατζηστυλιανού (2006).  
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“In the year of 2009 … most young people are not only unwilling to sacrifice their 
lives but not even to "lose" 24 months from ... their comfortable lives!” 
 
Previously, on 9th June, the Cyprus Parliament met to discuss draft-dodging, where 
Kostas Kostantinou (In Greek: Κώστας Κωνσταντίνου), MP of DHSY, notes in his 
parliamentary statement:  
 
“This phenomenon is increasingly expanding; deferments due to mental 
disorders exhibit sustained growth over the last decade.”  
 
The subversion of the ideological conscription of men into the military created in the 
scope of these two events (opening of the borders and the referendum) has a clear 
institutional facet. The two institutional structures: ‘The Ministry and the National Guard’, 
understood to be the most central manifestations of the ‘fighting spirit’ of the national 
struggle in divided Cyprus, bearers of the social and political promise that the 
community would remain defended from the face of the ‘enemy within’, are ideologically 
shaken during the period of these events taking place.. Kyriacos Mavronicolas, who was 
the Minister of Defence during this period, commented on young men having an ‘ethical 
problem’ with the army following these events,  particularly whilst experiencing the 
movement over the border. General Pandreou further makes these observations clear:  
“Imagine being at the buffer zone [translator’s note: referring to the referendum 
period] and seeing T.C.s coming and going, people whose identity you don’t 
know. It takes a lot of mental strength in order to face this situation and to 
continue your mission there … The guards have a different role now, they are not 
there in order to guard the “Green line”, they are just watching the Turkish forces 
and the Turkish soldiers… [and] … watching towards our side worrying that 
someone might steal something from them, or take their gun etc. We have 
reached a point where Turkish Cypriot builders work in Greek Cypriot military 
camps.” 
 
The above accounts are indicative of the problems the Ministry of Defence has 
thereafter been facing in maintaining the sense of identity and thus the purpose of 
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remaining committed to the ‘nation-in-arms’ by serving ones military service. The 
example given by a non-commissioned officer (38, interviewed whilst off duty), 
regarding his own soldiers further portrays the role of the ‘nation-in-arms’ becoming 
undermined due to the opening of the borders. Speaking with disappointment in the 
state of the army he comments that:  
 
“There are outposts on the borders in Nicosia, where, if you go and ask a soldier 
why he left his guard, he will reply, ‘Why should I stay? Turkish Cypriots pass 
lawfully to this side so there is no reason for me to be here. Who am I protecting 
and from whom?”  
As another military officer (37, interviewed whilst off duty) characteristically commented:  
“What can I tell him? ‘Stay here and keep guard because the Turks might arrive?’ 
He knows that it’s not true!” 
 
The above accounts summarise what has been argued until this point; that the opening 
of the borders has been inextricable from ideological obscuring the role of the ‘nation-in-
arms’ in ‘defence’ and by extension, as the next chapter will specifically address, the 
role of men in ‘defence’. Yet, these accounts further direct us back to the nationalism 
chapter, where it was discussed that the most prominent narrative expressed a 
significant humanisation of the previously threatening ‘other’- the ‘enemy within’- and 
that this has contributed to an underlying feeling of public security given that there 
haven’t been any ethnic clashes. Clearly, this has deep implications on guarding the 
border and more generally militarism, which I will now proceed to discuss.  
Guarding the border as well as having a nation armed and ready for war have become 
paradoxical when the ‘other’ is a ‘safe’ everyday presence and, to some extent, a 
humanised existence South of the border. The ‘distance’ between ‘self’ and ‘other’ the 
closed borders provided was vital to the ideology of defence and the construction of the 
community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. This distance is central to the “summoning of 
difference, thus the relativisation of the self against the ‘other’”, (Kennedy and Danks, 
2001: 3). As, in order for the ‘fixed truths’ the ideology of defence provided “to remain 
intact, self and other must remain both distinct and separate.” (Whitworth, 2004: 155). It 
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was in the space of this physical distance to the imaginary threatening ‘enemy within’ 
existing across the border, that the ‘existential threat’ from ‘Turks’ was ceaselessly 
reproduced both in and out of the military barracks. In this ideological script, ‘defence’ 
was providing the notion of preparedness that the NG with the ‘nation-in-arms’, would 
provide the deterrent force against this ‘enemy’. The account of a non-commissioned 
officer (38, interviewed whilst off duty), supports this argument about the broader 
disengagement of the social body from the idea of itself as ‘nation-in-arms’ due to the 
necessity of creating distance from the ‘other’: 
“Certain soldiers are not enlisted for various reasons. This also has something to 
do with the opening of the borders. If someone lives in a building where there is a 
Turkish Cypriot family living also, why would he send his son to the army? He will 
think ‘they live with us, why would I make my son waste two years of his life in 
the military?” 
 
The story presented by Giannos (man, 58, owner of local dry-cleaning shop) who is a 
refugee and a reservist, whilst commenting on the impact of the opening of the borders, 
clearly depicts this picture:  
 
“I once went to an outpost one night I was on watch. I went, there were 3 soldiers 
there, so we were 4 in total. I took my gun and the munitions, I learned the code-
words and I asked the other guys what did I need to be aware of and where the 
Turks were. They said, “we don’t now … there are no Turks here”. “’So what are 
we guarding here?’ I asked and then I left the outpost.” 
 
The declining motivation to serve that has also affected the reserve forces illustrates the 
broader disengagement of the community from its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’. Reserves 
are regularly called-up for training and scheduled annual exercises; a “Durkheimian 
ritual in which the group is periodically re-created … [in continuing to be] … oriented to 
shared goals and to the communal means of achieving them.” (King, 2006: 1). Yet, 
almost every reservist I talked to commented that they did not see the purpose in 
continuing to serve under the current conditions, whilst condemning the current state of 
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the force and the futile time needed to be spent in the army each year. A conversation 
with a couple of refugees, who are also reserves, in Larnaca clearly draws this picture:  
“Stephanos (man, 48, airport officer): Last time I went to the army in June, we 
went for three days and we did absolutely nothing. 
Dimitri (man, 27, travel agent): So did you stay in the military camp for three 
whole days? 
Stephanos: Of course not. 
Dimitris: Ok, because I would be surprised if you did! 
Panikos (man, 38, travel agent): The reservists go to the army just to see their 
friends, they don’t go to serve the cause or learn something.” 
 
The decline in motivation to serve and the very existence of a significant proportion of 
draft-dodgers in Cypriot society contests the previously deeply entrenched notions of 
‘defence’. This is argued to be a result of a set of contiguous elements of the ideology of 
defence becoming undermined, which will be illustrated throughout this chapter. Almost 
all of my interviewees were very aware of the recent phenomenon of draft-dodging, 
repeatedly linking this to the opening of the borders and the crossings of T.C.s to the 
Southern part of Cyprus. Miranda (woman, 60, cleaner), a refugee, whose brother is a 
missing person, commented that:  
“Some people claim to have a problem so that they won’t go. However, when my 
children went to the army, things were different, people didn’t want to avoid it. 
This started happening in the past few years.”  
Also Gianna (woman, 55, owner of a convenience store), who is a refugee, noted that:  
“We had 5 boys in the neighbourhood and in the end, no one served in the army. 
They think why should I go when you don’t?”  
The above account points to another contingent part of the ideology of defence 
becoming undermined by revealing how the breakdown of the unified understanding of 
society, discussed in the previous chapter, has contributed to the phenomenon of draft-
dodging. As argued already, the ideology of defence was one of the common goals of 
‘defence’ and ‘liberation’, based on the idea of a unified community.  
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Moreover, the above expressions of popular resentment reveal that some Cypriots 
continue today, more than 10 years after the opening of the borders, to hold high 
expectations when they assess any young man’s willingness to take a personal 
responsibility for Cyprus’ national defence. This said, however, as discussed in the next 
chapter, not every young man in practice has continued to internalise these masculine 
conscription expectations. On the contrary, a central assumption now being questioned 
in G.C. community is that of the centrality of the military service to society and to 
definitions of G.C. manhood.   
 
6.4. The role of the EU accession for the changing ideology of defence  
In this section I will argue that another political event; the accession of Cyprus to the EU, 
has formative implications on the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and 
masculinity. The significant shift in the understanding that the solution of the conflict is 
to be pursued (‘struggle’) through EU pressures on Turkey, the sense of ontological 
security the accession has generated in the community and the intense cultural 
Europeanisation and Westernisation of the community, have all had clear implications 
for the ideology of defence and the commitment of the community to its idea as a 
‘nation-in-arms’, which was predicated on the unified defence of the vulnerable victim 
post-war Cyprus from Turkey.  
By illustrating the weakening of the militarist ‘fighting spirit’ under the auspices of the EU 
I will further substantiate the argument put forward in the previous chapter that the 
accession has undermined the ‘fighting spirit’. Here, in supporting my argument that the 
accession has been having these implications at a number of levels; I will first address 
the cultural level of aspiring to become ‘Euro-Cypriot’, then, the public sense of 
ontological security and then, in the next section, the changing political understanding of 
‘I struggle’ under the auspices of the EU and certain changes in defence policy that 
have taken place under these new social and political parameters.  
 
The ideology of defence under the aspiration of becoming ‘Euro-Cypriot’ 
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The strong appeal of a ‘Euro-Cypriot’ identity and the intense cultural westernisation of 
Cypriot society, as discussed in detail in the previous chapter, had repercussions on the 
co-constitution of post-war nationalism, militarism and masculinity. The ideology of 
defence found itself at odds with the idea of a European Cyprus. In Cyprus, the EU as a 
concept became more and more identical to the concept of Europe, (Demetriou, 2005) 
and for G.C.s has created a deep yearning and a shift from the identification with the 
middle-eastern culture to becoming a ‘Euro-Cypriot society’ and adopting a Western-like 
lifestyle. The on-going Europeanisation of the island however points to a particular 
process of European integration, with issues arising out of an unsolved conflict within 
the EU, (Shaelou, 2010; Stefanou, 2005). 
The particular conjunction of nationalist, militarist and patriarchal values on the one 
hand and a very welcomed process (by G.C.s) of becoming European and belonging to 
a greater whole, as well as the intense adoption of capitalist, individualistic values on 
the other hand, resulted in an arena of cultural contestation that has been inextricable 
from a crisis of national cultural values. In this space, the strongly emerging culture of 
individualism had formative implications on the understanding of the G.C. community as 
a unified ‘nation-in-arms’ predicated on the national struggle. Cyprus, as has been 
discussed in the previous chapter, quick at adopting cultural ideals of Western 
individualist success was said by my interviewees to have contributed to the 
undermining of the ‘fighting spirit’, a part of which is here revealed to be the weakening 
‘nation-in-arms’. This cultural undermine of the ‘fighting spirit’ will be in the next chapter 
further illustrated through the hegemonic masculinity shifting away from it’s identification 
with the national struggle.  
Cyprus today is characterised by a certain decline in the acceptance of G.C. defence 
ideology, especially amongst the younger generations. The broader social adoption of a 
more European, Westernised individualist male identity signalled a shift away from 
collectivist patriarchal and nationalist military values of the ‘nation-in-arms’. Young men 
in Cyprus are aware of the fact that most other European citizens do not serve military 
service and also that they would need to compete in the European labour market with 
them. Whilst experiencing a society that no longer feels constantly threatened by the 
‘occupation’ forces and experiencing the ‘other’ in their everyday lives in the southern 
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part of the divide, many began to question whether it was so necessary to serve their 
military duty.  
 
Individualism has come to challenge the very understanding of the G.C. community in 
which G.C.s were committed to the struggle. As the notion of a unified G.C. community 
weakens, the idea of forced conscription, an extensive reserve service, and the strong 
intersection of armed militarism in and out of the military barracks, which previously 
constituted the cultural basis for the ‘nation-in-arms’, have become culturally 
undermined.  
 
The undermining of the post-war entrenchment of the culture of militarism is evident 
today in Cypriot society. The phenomenon of draft-dodgers is a clear reflection of the 
shift from the collective project of solidarity of the national struggle to the individuals’ 
personal goals and understanding of success. My interviewees very often commented 
on the decline in motivation or refusal to serve in terms of the individualist and 
materialistic modern G.C. culture. Andros’ (man, 41, director of a company) account 
was a typical one: 
 
“It’s because everyone cares for themselves, it’s a social matter. People are 
settled as we said before. Everyone wants to live a comfortable life, and this 
includes the matter of the army.” 
 
These trends can be understood, as Maman et al. (2001: 4) have argued in relation to 
Israel, as the transformation of G.C. society from a ‘mobilised society‘ into a ‘normal’ 
Western society and have resulted in a strongly emerging culture of individualism and in 
attenuation of the state’s capacity to mobilize those groups who were the carriers of the 
national struggle project. The account of General Pandreou who, at the time of the 
accession, was the Manager of the Military Office for the Minister of Defence, clearly 
illustrates the weakening post-war ideology of defence, co-constitutive with nationalism 
and masculinity, in the context of these cultural developments: 
 
“Today young men ‘think that there is no point in serving in the army and that 
they will lose 2 years of their life instead of going to university’… People cannot 
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understand why they should serve in the army … If you don’t explain to them that 
they have to do it for their country’s sake and for their family’s security firstly, they 
will never understand. In the past, they were aware of this, that’s why they didn’t 
want to get a deferment.”  
In more general terms, the widespread assumption that military service for G.C. men is 
a natural, taken-for-granted matter (Sasson-Levy, 2003) has undergone serious decline. 
Military service is counter-posed now to the individuals needs and goals; young men’s 
own career plans and aspirations, rather than the necessity of service to the community, 
which will be further addressed in the next chapter in relation to masculinity.  
 
Ontological security under the auspices of the EU  
Here I will argue that the accession of Cyprus to the EU, even if the EU is not a defence 
union per se, has, as discussed in the previous chapter, created in the Cypriot 
community a new notion of security. And, as I will then discuss, it has also brought an 
alternative rhetoric about a ‘European solution to the problem’ which has contributed to 
the disengagement of the community from its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’.  
The EU has experienced some demilitarisation and disarmament, see (Jauhiainen, 
1997), whereas the idea of a unified European military co-operation is still being 
developed. (Lutterbeck, 2005; Eide & Thee, 1980). Yet, the EU today provides a 
political deterrent force for countries outside of the union wanting attack an EU country 
member.  
The ontological security, felt in the G.C. community whilst sheltering under the EU in 
relation to the ‘existential threat’ of another military offensive by Turkey, is argued to 
have contributed to the social disinvestment in ‘defence’ (previously a vast investment in 
post-war Cyprus to ‘defend’ against the ‘existential threat’ by Turkey).  
The reference to the ‘large European family’ became ever common in the community. 
This “reflected the G.C. expectation that what they would join was an organisation that 
was able to act as ‘protector’ of their ‘rights’ and their concept of ‘justice’” and this was 
therefore “an answer to this large militant bully that spelled the end of ‘injustice’ against 
Greek Cypriots.” (Demetriou, 2005: 16). For the G.C.s, therefore, the accession was, as 
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George Vassiliou (2004: 12), who was the former President of the RoC (1988–93), and 
chief negotiator for Cyprus’ accession to the EU (199 –2003), argues, “undoubtedly the 
most important event since the establishment of the Republic … [as] their feeling of 
safety and security would be dramatically improved … knowing that the danger of a 
second invasion by Turkey is simply non-existent”. Supportive to this argument are also 
the figures available by a quantitative survey conducted by Lordos and Kaymak, (2007: 
16) in May 2005. In this study, EU Security for G.C.s overruled (54.7 %) the security 
offered under the Annan Plan (32.9 %). This change in the public understanding of 
‘struggle’, and ‘security’ significantly undermined the public belief in the ideology of 
defence contributing to the disengagement of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, as 
these were clearly providing the understanding of ‘little Cyprus’ needing to defend itself 
from the ‘large militant bully’, Turkey, (Demetriou, 2005). This shift in the understanding 
of security is clear in the words of Kyriacos Mavronicolas who was the Minister of 
Defence when Cyprus became an EU member: 
“Firstly, I need to point out that the accession of Cyprus to the EU has created a 
stronger sense of safety than before. So, the possibility of a military clash or even 
a military incident is very small, keeping in mind the fact that Cyprus is a member 
of the EU. Secondly and most importantly, Turkey is in a pre-accession course, 
which means that the possibility for a military incident to happen is very low, 
according to the current situation.” 
 
The accounts of foreign diplomats of EU countries on the island further identified but 
also substantiated this feeling of security in relation to Turkey under the auspices of the 
EU. The Chancellor of Germany asserts that:  
 
“Although the EU is not strictly a defence project, in reality it’s a political union, of 
course there are indications for security and I would suspect that an attack on 
one of its members would solicit a strong reaction … being a member of the EU 
has its defence implications … I think Cypriots would worry a bit less now, but I 
can’t see that Turkey would do that.” 
 
The accounts of the Ambassador of Sweden, at the time, further supported this view:  
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“Well, I should say that it’s very unlikely that Turkey would do anything. But, of 
course, if there was a massive thrust to sort of take over the South then of course 
it would have a lot of repercussions on the EU politically”. 
 
The above accounts of politicians illustrate that the notion of EU as a protective power 
undermines the sense of ‘existential threat’ at the political level. This was also 
repeatedly evident in the accounts of my interviewees from the public. Dimitri’s account 
(man, 27, travel agent) was most typical:  
“The fact that there might be a war, or that Turkey could attack us, doesn’t even 
cross my mind. However I think that if anything happened, many countries would 
help us, mostly because of the EU.”  
The most prominent narrative at political and public levels commented that, due to the 
political implications of the EU, a military offensive on the part of Turkey was unlikely, as 
an attack on a member State would have meant an attack on the entire EU (most often 
also noting that Turkey was set on a EU pre-accession course). This new form of the 
EU as a protective power underscores the weakening post-war three-fold relationship 
previously constructed on the conceptualisation of the small and unprotected Cyprus 
needing to defend itself from Turkey.   
 
6.5 The role of the EU in the defence policy  
In this section I will argue that the accession of Cyprus to the EU has resulted in a 
‘Europeanisation’ of the Cypriot defence policy that has formative implications for the 
post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. The successive 
Cypriot governments that followed the opening of the borders and the accession to the 
EU, as well as the general public, came to understand the EU as an instrument of the 
‘struggle’ itself, perhaps the most influential (Demetriou, 200 ). Formerly, the ideology 
of defence that prioritised the nations’ military security over other social and economic 
issues was continually reproduced in relation to the ‘occupation’ and the fear of 
‘existential threat’ in the face of another military offensive by the ‘enemy within’. 
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However, in the scope of ‘Europeanisation of the conflict’, the successive governments 
adopted a policy of disinvestment in the NG, changed some of the mobilisations and 
manifestations of ‘defence’ and in such ways undermined the ‘nation-in-arms’ and 
therefore the high militarist ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle.  
 
I will illustrate the changing governmental policies of defence by discussing the dramatic 
decrease of the defence budget, the non- investment in arms procurement and the 
ambivalent policy in relation to the Single Area Defence Doctrine. Then I will proceed to 
further illustrate this by discussing the systematic cancellations of annual military 
parades and exercises and changes in the mobilisation of ideology in the training of 
conscripts.  
 
The EU has, from the outset, marked a new turning point in the G.C. ‘struggle’ by 
becoming an instrument of the struggle for justice against Turkey. The EU has been 
broadly represented as an external actor who could influence the conflict in comparative 
relation to other external actors, (see Demetriou,2005: 6). The EU has always 
supported the UN’s efforts for a lasting settlement, which would guarantee the basic 
needs, civil, political and cultural rights of all Cypriot citizens (Bryant, 2004; Tocci, 2004; 
Joseph, 1997). This view, in line with the post-war political discourse that represented 
the G.C.s as victims, has linked the EU accession of Cyprus to the conflict by resting on 
the idea that the EU would seek a solution “on the basis of ‘justice’ and ‘human rights’ 
that the EU was founded upon” (Demetriou, 2005: 16). It has been repeatedly argued 
that the accession created the belief that the G.C. side would now have more 
bargaining power, (for example see Demetriou,2008). 
In post-war Cyprus, as already discussed, the governments mobilised an unequal 
relationship between the post-war external and internal political agendas, by appealing 
to the international community to support the G.C. position and internally mobilising the 
ideology of defence. In the European Cyprus it appears that there has been a shift away 
from this unequal relationship. This is to appeal to the EU that has concurrently 
undermined the internal mobilisation of the ideology of defence, which is now, as 
discussed in the previous section, also mobilised against the opened border.  
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However, the impact of these two events together (the opening of the border and the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU) on the national struggle, appears in my interviewees 
accounts to have created another unequal relationship in the understanding of the G.C. 
position in the conflict situation. The opening of the borders, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, has been often seen as significantly weakening the negotiation tools 
of G.C.s, as it is undermining the definition of ‘occupation’, whereas the accession of 
Cyprus to the EU has been broadly seen as strengthening the negotiation tools. 
In the context of the new understanding of ‘I struggle’ where the “I” became “we” as it 
included the EU as an instrument of the ‘struggle’, the successive governments shifted 
the ‘struggle’ away from military antagonisms by undermining the militarist framing of 
the national struggle that has been co-constitutive to post-war nationalism and 
masculinity. Therefore, the ‘Europeanisation’ of the external affairs of the conflict was 
inextricable from the governmental attempt to ‘Europeanise’ and thus to ‘normalise’ 
certain internal politics of masculinist nationalism and ‘defence’. Yet the issue here is 
that this is ideologically and discursively conflicting to the continuation of the ‘nation-in-
arms’ predicated on the defence from the ‘enemy within’.  
 
Perhaps the first sign of this ‘normalisation’ is the governmental acceptance of the 
opening of the borders, as the government could not have asserted such a strong 
nationalistic claim when on the threshold, only a year prior, to the Cyprus EU accession. 
This decision, which has been sharply criticised by certain segments of both the public 
and political leadership; undermines this post-war co-constitution projected on the un-
crossable border. Also, this ideological fit between EU accession and internal public 
nationalist, militarist sentiment has thereafter placed the Cypriot state, which has been 
the scaffold of the national struggle, in a precarious position. Perhaps this explains 
Demetriou's (2007) observation that the state was absent in the first days of opened 
borders, to then re-appear with political statements that sought to create a nationalist 
moralising discourse of ‘who’ and ‘why’ one should cross.  
 
The major change in defence policy is, therefore, argued to be part of the new 
understanding of the ‘Europeanisation’ of the ‘I struggle’ and thus the effort to adopt a 
more EU integrative policy (Lutterbeck, 2005; Eide & Thee, 1980) and reconciliatory 
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face of Cyprus’, in recognition, also, that the ideology of defence is not conducive to 
negotiating with T.C.s. The implications of this on state defence and ideology is 
‘normalisation’ of the G.C. defence politics, thus the extensive attempt of the Cypriot 
defence sector at mobilising both externally and internally a more European and 
reconciliatory face of ‘defence’. These changes have formative implications for the co-
constitution of this three-fold relationship, subverting the ideology of defence and thus 
the high militarist ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle.  
 
In terms of external defence affairs, this change can be clearly illustrated in the 
extensive involvement in EU defence programs and missions23. Yet, internally, this 
change becomes formative for the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism 
and masculinity, which was predicated on struggling for liberation and ‘defence’ from 
‘occupation’. The NG, and the ‘nation-in-arms’ in post-war Cyprus directly portrayed the 
ideology of defence in regards to the ‘existential threat’ that existed across the un-
crossable border. However, I argue that the above changes created an ideological 
conflicting trajectory and public puzzlement of the role of the NG under these new 
parameters, which have been thereafter undermining the ‘nation-in-arms. The 
‘normalisation’ of the internal defence affairs has been conducive to the changing of 
some of the militarist masculinist ideological mobilisations and projections of military 
prowess the state has asserted as part of the ideology of defence.  
 
Whilst the armed forces remain operationally and structurally organised in the same 
way these changes in defence policy have a major impact on the operational abilities of 
the army and the motivation to serve. General Pandreou, Adjutant to the Minister of 
Defence when these changes began to take place, emphasised that, since the Annan 
Plan called for the demise of the NG and they thought that there would have been a 
solution to the conflict from that time onwards, the budget of the NG was reduced every 
year and they stopped buying new equipment and doing so many exercises: 
 
                                                          
23
 Such examples are the collaboration of Cyprus with the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in European Union) and ESDC (European Union Security and Defence College) as well as the 
engagement with the Finabel committee (since 2006 under the status of the observer and since 2008 a 
full Member State). 
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“this is why the NG does not currently have the consistency, the uniformity and 
the obedience it had in the past.”  
 
If we are to first look at numbers, see table below, the notable decrease of the defence 
budget since the early 2000s provides a clear illustration of the change in defence policy. 
The proportion of GDP spent on defence between 2002 and 2011 averaged 2.08% in 
contrast to the defence spending of the 1990s period, which averaged 3.9%24 between 
1987 and 1999.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 The statistics of the above table were taken from the SIPRI military expenditure database (see also 
World Bank Military Expenditures).  
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It is argued that this change in defence policy with the associated defence spending 
reflects a clear change in the state objective to mobilise military prowess, as this meant 
major cuts in the ‘defence arms procurement fund’ leading to no further major 
modernisation and procurement programs. Heavy weapons are not separate from the 
broader culture of militarisation 25 . In post-war Cyprus these procurements were a 
projection of military prowess, publicly demonstrated in the regular military parades, and 
were an indispensable manifestation of the ideology of defence and a high militarist 
‘fighting spirit’ that received great public support. 
 
The defence sector thereafter prioritises the maintenance of major weapon systems, 
(see Phileletheros, 2011). The NG continues as a mass-conscription army with only the 
necessary resources for its overall sustenance. Media sources support this observation, 
as Philelepheros (in Greek: Φιλελεύθερος), (2010), one of the most widespread 
newspapers in Cyprus, notes on Friday 12th November 2010:  
 
“The defence budget for 2011 is reduced, and does not contain military 
armaments and procurement programs, with the exception of ammunition and 
some accessories for existing defence armaments which were purchased years 
ago.”  
 
Following the defence policy of the late 1980s and 1990s with its associated tax 
spending and extensive procurement programs, discussed in the first section of this 
chapter, the major change in defence policy (that did not also translate into the abolition 
of the special levy for defence) generated intense public, media and political 
discussions, which will be presented and discussed throughout this chapter. What is 
most significant about this change of defence policy is that it is clearly undermining the 
post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, .  
 
The account of Kyriacos Mavronicolas who was the Minister of Defence when Cyprus 
became a member of the EU, in response to a question I posed to him in relation to 
where the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ is located in the understanding of 
                                                          
25
 As it is stated in the Global Militarisation Index report 2011: “to determine the level of militarization of a 
country, specific types of heavy weapons have to be taken into account” (see GMI 2011).  
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patriotism supported by the political party he represents (EDEK), provides a point of 
departure into understanding the subversion of the ideology of defence by the state: 
 
“Basically, we need to fight for a united Cyprus, for a modern European army of a 
European member-state without the presence of the Turkish occupying army. 
Certainly, times have changed and we cannot talk about a military solution. We 
are trying through peace talks with the thought that, at some point, Turkey will 
understand the needs and the international developments well enough in order to 
face its neighbouring countries in a more consensual way.” 
 
The above account is illustrative of the political unwillingness to carry through the post-
war assertive militarism of the ‘nation-in-arms’ that is undermining the assertive 
masculinist militarist frame of the post-war national struggle. General Pandreou further 
made this clear by explaining that in this situation there was a certain inactivity from the 
part of the Ministry of Defence and the government:  
 
“[…] because the defensive armouring of Cyprus should continue to exist as it 
was and every officer of the NG should be informed in order to continue their 
tasks as before.” 
What is most central here is that, whilst under these new attended features of the 
governmental politics, the defence policy and the NG are put under pressure to become 
European both structurally and culturally. However, the mission of the NG has not been 
transformed. Rather the state that has evidently undermined the defence sector, and 
has not made its defence plans clear, has sustained the existing military order within a 
defence policy of ‘normalisation’ and ‘non-investment’. The force falls behind in the 
European shift of armed forces to smaller professional militaries (Burk, 1992; King, 
2005;Haltiner, 1998). Professionalisation and modernisation do not take place but are 
periodically discussed in political and military circles and media. Whilst at the end of 
2013 the government began to discuss a potential plan for semi-professionalisation of 
the force (see ΑΝΤ1), Cyprus is today one of 6 out of the 27 EU members that have not 
abolished conscription, and is also the  EU member-state with the longest conscription 
service.  
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Therefore, I argue that whilst the NG is frozen as a mass-conscript army of the same 
size, which continues to require the commitment of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ 
by sustaining a two-year military conscription and extensive reserve service, it continues 
a military mission that today, to some extent, is ideologically empty. However, in this 
socio-political discursive space, as I will now proceed to illustrate, the NG as a state 
institution loses its legitimacy, in continuing to ‘normalise’ its post-war ideological 
representations of defence.  
 
A policy change that is argued to illustrate the relinquishment of the state’s ideological 
conscription of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and its insistence on the preparedness and 
readiness of the ‘nation-in-arms’, is the consecutive cancellation of military parades and 
exercises since the Annan Plan period, in the light of the on-going and intensified 
negotiations for the reunification of Cyprus, as well as the financial crisis. These central 
state manifestations of defence prowess in post-war Cyprus, have been repeatedly 
identified in divided societies to be an evocation of the idea of defence of the community 
as well as resistance and self- reliance (see Ross, 2009; Bryan, 2000; Jarman, & Bryan 
1998, on the role of parades in Northern Ireland) and therefore of a high militaristic 
‘fighting spirit’.  
 
Military parades have, since the opening of the borders, been restricted to one per year 
on the 1st October, which is the independence day of the RoC, with limited major 
weapons displayed. However, it is argued that the ideological statement this parade 
symbolises, because of the specific celebration, is de-anchored from the military dispute 
with Turkey. Whereas, the military parades related to the ‘occupation’, which were a 
way of projecting nationalist military pride, uniformity and strength against the ‘enemy 
within’ were cancelled, which is a clear illustration of a weakening militarist ‘fighting spirit’ 
in the national struggle.  
 
Furthermore, the military exercise 'Nikihforos' (In Greek: 'Νικηφόρος'), which was one of 
the two annual military exercises that included the whole force (the other, which is still 
continuing, is 'Dimitra', in Greek: 'Δήμητρα'), and received significant public adherence 
and media coverage, was cancelled when the Annan Plan was in process (with the 
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exception that it took place in 2006 and not again thereafter). This was cancelled as a 
sign of good will for the negotiations, in conjunction with the cancellation of the exercise 
of Turkeys’ force in Cyprus named ‘Bull’ (In Greek: Ταύρος). The cancellation of 
'Nikihforos' was followed by the abolition of the joint Cypriot and Greek exercises, 
"Nikiforos" and "Toxitis" (in Greek: Τοξότης), since the two were held together. The 
cancelation of "Nikiforos" and "Toxitis" bears a special symbolism in the weakening 
ideology of defence, as the combining of these two exercises took place under the 
Single Area Defence Doctrine, which, as discussed above, sought to enlarge the idea of 
the Defence of Cyprus, by creating this defence union with Greece.  
 
A change in defence policy that illustrates the ‘stepping back’ of the masculinist 
assertion of defence, in the scope of the pressure the Cypriot state underwent in 
customising its defence policy under the EU, is argued to be a policy that created 
ambivalence as to whether the Single Area Defence Doctrine is politically and 
structurally still in place.  In the 1990s the SADD with Greece had become an integral 
part of the ideology of defence, co-constituting nationalism and masculinity, providing 
the aggregation of defence policy between these two states as a matter of “national 
existential threat”. It is clear that such territorial military coalitions and antagonisms are 
oppositional to the idea of the EU. 
 
Even though the abandonment of SADD has never been made official, infrequent 
references to it in the press have repeatedly suggested that it is deactivated. In 2014, 
the term ‘Single Area Defence Doctrine’ does not appear anywhere on the Cyprus 
Ministry of Defence and the NG websites, when it previously did. At the same time, as 
discussed above, the conduct of joined military exercises with Greece that took place 
under the SADD have been repeatedly cancelled. The Ministers of Defence of both 
countries following the early 2000 period adopted a policy of stressing the defence ties 
between the collaboration of two historically linked EU Members; but avoid referring to 
the doctrine directly. Evidence of this, is the reference to the SADD by Cyprus Defence 
Minister, Kostas Papakostas,  on 2nd October 2008 on the Cyprus Broadcasting 
Corporation, as "fireworks that faded", (see Defence News Greece,2008). While he also 
noted that what is in force between Cyprus and Greece is ‘defence cooperation’, (ibid). 
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Similarly, when Greek Minister of Defence, Evangelos Venizelos on the 4th April 2011 
(see Press and Information Office Cyprus Republic, 2011), is asked about it directly by 
a journalist he replies:  
 
“We have said repeatedly that what is in force is the permanent structured 
cooperation between two member states of the EU, related with national and 
historical ties … So what we are saying is what meets the needs of the time.” 
 
This reference translates into a very different defence partnership between the two 
states from the 1990s masculinist “self” assertion of SADD.  
 
Moreover, the state further loses legitimacy, in continuing to ‘normalise’ its post-war 
ideological conscription of defence as it is forced to abolish the draconian legal 
sanctions that existed for those who did not complete their military service, previously 
assisting the sustenance of the ‘nation-in-arms’. These could no longer be enforced 
under the relevant European Directives and, more broadly, were contradictory to 
European culture. Kyriacos Mauvronicolas, former Minister of Defence, made it clear in 
the interview I conducted with him that, as European citizens, young men are allowed to 
refuse to serve military service.  
 
It is argued that the apparent ideology of defence among G.C.s began to unravel in the 
context of the political changes discussed above alongside the cultural impact of 
Western and European, individualist and materialist values and ideals on the broader 
community and more specifically, as it will be discussed in the next chapter, on 
masculinity and its post-war links to conscription. Until the recent political and cultural 
transitions and changes, the deep-rooted social values of defence and conscription had 
not posed a problem of political legitimacy. The successive governments that followed 
the division of the island used the ideology of defence in producing consent to prioritise 
Cyprus’ military defence over other social and economic issues. However, in this 
process of Europeanisation the Cyprus NG is caught up between the old ‘defence’ 
rhetoric and the effort for Europeanisation, where, the aforementioned changes, today, 
are constitutive of the ideological conflicting trajectory of ‘defence’ in and out of the 
military barracks and this underscores the weakening of this three-fold relationship. 
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The position of the National Guard in a conflicting ideological trajectory 
In this section I will argue that the NG, with its concomitant ‘nation-in-arms’ under the 
above-discussed nexus of new social and political parameters and defence policies, has 
thereafter entered into an ideological conflicting situation. In this situation the NG 
struggles as an institution to maintain its sense of purpose and this situation has 
contributed in challenging the commitment of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. This 
is a clear illustration of the weakening militarist frame of the national struggle that has 
formative implications for the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and 
masculinity.  
Key parts and evidence of the ideological undermining of the ‘nation-in-arms’ is the 
weakening morale in the force, emergence of draft-dodging and loosening discipline 
and sense of purpose in the reserve forces. Moreover, the governmental disinvestment 
in defence, the end to masculinist displays of military prowess and the policies of 
prohibiting the reconstruction of specific ‘otherings’ in the force, which will be discussed 
in this section, were a ‘stepping-back’ from ideological manifestations of ‘defence’ in the 
state apparatus. The ‘stepping-back’ from these state ideological manifestations which 
previously assisted the commitment of the community to the ‘nation-in-arms’ (with its 
purpose to protect the ‘free areas’ of Cyprus by the ‘Turk), have contributed in 
ideologically disorientating the purpose of the force. 
Following these developments, as I will now proceed to further illustrate, the 
technologically advanced, organised 'nation-in-arms', which is one of the most 
prominent contingent materialisations of the 'fighting spirit’, is becoming ideologically 
undermined and its purpose obscured. Yet, the government still requires the 
commitment of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ given that it sustains the 
conscription system. However, in this new setting the state has not instructed the NG 
with a new ideology and operational purpose that could have revived the motivation of 
the community to remain committed to its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’. This relationship 
between the decaying ideology of defence, the state and the community as ‘nation-in-
arms’ further ideologically undermines the role of the ‘nation-in-arms’.  
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Those “making changes in an institution’s value system [… referring specifically to the 
army …] at times have a clear idea of the results they seek, in most cases they do not, 
and in any case cannot be assured of achieving the desired results” (Murray, 1999: 135). 
Indeed, General Pandreou, who was an adjutant to the Minister of Defence when these 
polices of disinvestment began to be applied, made it clear that all of these factors have 
affected the morale and the spirit of the soldiers, emphasising that it is expected that 
soldiers will start questioning the purpose of serving when the government and the NG 
shows to the public that they are not interested in maintaining a well-trained and potent 
force.  
In the setting of these political and social developments, it was repeatedly clear in the 
accounts of members of the military leadership, military officers and soldiers I spoke to 
that they have become disoriented in regards to the role they are called to play, an 
issue that is explored in the next chapter in relation to masculinity and the declining 
motivation to serve conscription. In military culture “it is likely that unintended effects of 
reforms on the cultural patterns of an organization may be more significant than 
intended effects” (Murray, 1999: 135). As General Pandreou went on to explain, now 
there is a compliancy in the force but the NG used to be different 
“[…]it was a uniform system which was functioning with certain rules, with 
obedience etc. because of the dangerous situation we were facing…Now our 
soldiers don’t even have a basic level of morale, I don’t know if they will be able 
to react in case of an incident, they are in hibernation mode! ” 
This ideologically conflicting process of the purpose of the force in conjunction with the 
impact of the political events and certain social transformations in subverting the 
ideology of defence, all discussed above, are argued to have had an impact on civil-
military relations, the value of the conscription and reserve service; substantially 
contributing to the exponential phenomenon of draft-dodging and a weakened reserve 
force. This ideological conflicting situation between political leadership, public and 
armed forces is clearly manifested in the declining public support of the idea of ‘nation-
in-arms’ and was widely acknowledged by the military officers I spoke to. The 
ideological disorientation of the mission of the ‘nation-in-arms’ is clearly illustrated by 
the prohibition of a specific slogan in the NG. 
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Prohibition of‘ othering’ the ‘Turk’ in the National Guard  
One of the most significant developments that represents and is represented by the 
ideological disorientation of the mission of the ‘nation-in-arms’ in relation to the ‘other’ is 
the prohibition of the use of the ever-common post-war slogan ‘A Good Turk is a Dead 
Turk’ (in Greek: Τούρκος καλός μονάχα ο νεκρός). It is argued that this comes to further 
disorient the post-war purpose of the force and undermine its ‘fighting spirit’. As 
discussed previously, the opening of the borders resulted in partly diminishing the 
former distance with the ‘Turks’ as the ‘other’, and the accession of Cyprus to the EU 
resulted in a relative ontological security in relation to the ‘existential threat’ from the 
‘other’. Thus, the state institution of the NG, which ceaselessly reconstructed the ‘Turk’ 
as the dangerous ‘enemy within’ and existed under the ascribed purpose of keeping 
ready and trained the ‘nation-in-arms’ that would provide the deterrent force against this 
‘enemy’, is argued to lose significant ideological ground when it is prohibited, under 
certain policies of the Ministry of Defence, from continuing to project the ‘Turk’ as the 
dangerous ‘enemy’.  
The Ministry of Defence has, in recent years, been committed to ‘a series of measures 
to identify officers with extreme nationalist attitudes’, (see for example SigmaLive, 2013). 
Such policy cases began to attract political, media and public criticism and discussion, 
following the 25th July 2009, when the Ministry of Defence launched disciplinary action 
against training officers at the military training boot camps (in Greek: KEN, κέντρο 
εκπεδευσης νεοσιλεκτών) of Larnaca and Paphos, for forcing new conscripts into 
chanting, what was named at the time as, ‘unacceptable slogans’, (see Cyprus Mail, 
2009). In this incident the, at the time, Minister of Defence Costas Papacostas said that 
slogans such as “‘A good Turk is a dead Turk’ could only create more problems for the 
NG”. Adding that: “We want fighters who can deal at any given moment with a hostile 
attack; we don’t want blood-thirsty people, or people who breed hate and passion”, (see 
Maxh, 2011). He called for new conscripts not to shout slogans that the Head of the NG 
did not give his permission for. General Pandreou, who at the time was the former 
Manager of the Military Office of the Minister of Defence, offers an account about the 
impact of these policies on the force by explaining that:  
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“Certain battles cries have stopped appearing during the training. I guess that it’s 
the mentality of the new government. It bothers me enormously when I hear 
some people saying that Turkish-Cypriots are our brothers. They are not our 
brothers. If we continue with this mentality, this will certainly be the end of the 
NG.” 
The above account is illustrative of the significance the specific ‘othering’ of the ‘Turks’ 
has for the force. Furthermore, a few more events come to further verify and contribute 
to this change of policy. In October 2011, an order was given by the 2nd Division of the 
NG to erase certain slogans appearing on the walls of some camps and outposts on the 
border that referred to notions of returning back to the ‘occupied’ part of the island, (see 
Maxh, 2011). Maxh (In Greek: Μάχη, that translates into Battle), a widespread Cyprus 
newspaper with right wing affiliations, on the 30th October 2011, (ibid), comments on 
this situation with criticism and irony as follows:  
“According to the order…[these]… must be erased because they … refer to the 
past … and promote hatred and fanaticism (apparently against the Turkish 
occupation army)!”. 
Moreover, some officers I spoke to (whilst off duty) commented on the fact that 
nationalist history in regards to the construction of the ‘other’ is generally not strongly 
practiced anymore in the NG. Thus, a non-commissioned officer, (37) explains that:  
“In the past, when you joined the army they would tell you ‘In 1974, the Turks 
came, they invaded our homes, they raped our women etc. etc.’ and so the 
soldiers were fanaticised. You create images in your head even though you 
haven’t experienced the war”.  
Today, officers commented it is up to the conscience and willingness of the respective 
Captain to teach this version of history to his soldiers. Such policies are argued to 
undermine contingent parts of the ideology of defence; notably the ‘existential threat’ 
from the ‘enemy within’ and the masculinist, military ‘fighting spirit’ of the national 
struggle for liberation from the feminised tendencies of circumstance i.e. ‘occupation’. 
These policies are understood. as discussed above, to be part of the general effort to 
‘normalise’ politics under the EU accession and in recognition that the ideology of 
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defence, that portrays ‘Turks’ as an ‘enemy within’ threatening the survival of the G.C. 
population, is not conducive to negotiating with T.C.s for reunification. In fact, they are 
oppositional to the very discursive structures of the force that ceaselessly re-
constructed the ‘Turk’ as the arch ‘enemy’. The force has not been given another 
purpose and operationally it is maintained with its original ‘primary necessary purpose’, 
which is to defend and guard the border from the ‘enemy within’. The ideology of 
defence of the ‘nation-in-arms’, which has already been debilitated under the new 
parameters discussed throughout this chapter, cannot be mobilised without its 
dialectical opposite; the ‘Turk’, as the existentially threatening ‘other’, a process of 
identity maintenance that has been prohibited through the polices discussed above. 
Thus, the ‘Turk’, is argued, at the level of ideology to be a necessary ‘enemy’ for the 
‘nation-in-arms’ of the NG.  
The NG has been created and ideologically constructed through the nationalist 
discursive construction of identity that drew on a relation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, where the 
‘Turk’ took the form of the generalised and undifferentiated ‘other’, (Said , 1978),; the 
‘enemy’ par excellence of the “Greek nation”, (see Spyrou, 2006: 97-99). Therefore, the 
masculine representational practices, which construct the G.C. soldier in the NG were 
played in negative opposition to the ‘other’, and thus constructed “the ‘self’ vis-a-vis this 
other” (Doty, 1996: 10).  
One needs to consider that the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ highly displayed in 
the NG was part of the post-war nationalist construction of the memory of the war 
events that pointed to the ‘existential threat’ from the ‘enemy within’, which was turned 
into the need for struggle for liberation (this is also clearly laid out in the revised National 
Guard law that provides the sustenance of conscription, see National Guard law, 2011). 
In the identity construction of the ‘nation-in-arms’, ‘I do not forget’ meant that I will not 
forget what the Turks did to Cyprus and that it is ‘our’ masculine duty to ‘I struggle’ with 
military force for ‘defence’ and for liberation of the vulnerable homeland Cyprus from the 
‘occupation’ forces. This was further symbolically illustrated in the force by the ever-
present slogan: ‘A Good Turk is a Dead Turk’.  
The impact of the prohibition of the projection of the ‘Turk’ as the ‘enemy’ on the sense 
of ‘I struggle’ for the ‘nation-in-arms’ is argued to reflect the changing relationship 
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between ‘I do not forget’ and ‘I struggle’, discussed in the previous chapter. The impact 
of these policies on the changing relationship between ‘I do not forget’ and ‘I struggle’ 
was characteristically depicted in the following discussion I had with an officer (39, 
interviewed whilst off duty):  
“Interviewer: When we were children, we grew up with the slogan ‘I do not forget 
and I struggle’. 
Officer: It applied back then. It was really important for all of us.  
Interviewer: Can you hear it in the army today? 
Officer: No, soldiers come into the army and they don’t even know anything. For 
example, you can ask them where the Turks are and they might say that they are 
on this side of the island. 
Interviewer: Can you find ‘I do not forget’, as a symbol, or relevant images in the 
military camps today? 
Officer: Yes, but that’s it. There are just some photos. Because of our foreign 
policy, these ideologies do not exist anymore. At the time of the referendum 
when everyone thought that we would find a solution to the Cypriot problem, it 
was unacceptable for the NG to fanaticise its soldiers. However, they had still 
some slogans like “a good Turk is a dead Turk.”  
The type of slogans that were provided in exchange for the previous ones further 
support this argument. These were also discussed in the press (see for example Adonis 
Palikaridis, 2010), and were clearly laid out in a discussion I had with two non-
commissioned officers (37 and 38, interviewed whilst off duty) who specified the slogans 
they were allowed to use:  
 
“Officer A: For example “Go, go, green berets” … We are only allowed to say 
things about our unit that have nothing to do with external matters.  
Interviewer: What else is forbidden now? 
Officer A: Just this basically. Whatever has to do with the Turks. 
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Officer B: They just use the ‘harmless’ slogans.” 
The sense of identity of the soldiers, thus ‘us’, these new policies seek to cultivate do 
not include a threatening ‘other’ and therefore neither the notion of defence of ‘us’ from 
Cyprus’ arch ‘enemy’, the ‘Turk’. The way in which the discussion with the two non-
commissioned officers developed, supports this argument:  
“Officer A: Now it is forbidden to shout these kinds of slogans against the 
Turks. 
Officer B: Yes it’s true. There is no more hatred, in fact they are trying to 
erase this hatred but without it, you cannot cultivate the rest. If you don’t 
show them that the men on the other side are dangerous and we need to 
fight them before they fight us, they will just shake hands with them. There 
is no other way! How will you convince them that they are dangerous? We 
can do this only through the army. We should convince them that we 
should keep our distance. 
Interviewer: What did you mean when you said ‘cultivate the rest’?  
Officer A: How will I train them to fight against the Turks when they don’t 
hate them? How will they kill the Turks since they don’t feel that they have 
anything against them? And regarding the slogans we were shouting, 
these slogans brainwash them and they see things differently.” 
Thus, the prohibition of officers from drawing the differentiation of ‘us’ versus the distant 
existentially threatening ‘them’ is an insurmountable obstacle in reiterating the ideology 
of defence, as both ‘self and other’ need to be kept separate for the protraction of the 
identity the ideology of defence is mobilising. These policies further illustrate the 
contradictory trajectory the ideology of defence is travelling on, leading to a very 
convoluting and uncertain understanding of the role of the ‘nation-in-arms’ today.  
In this overall context, it is argued that the identity mobilised through the force, which is 
centred solidly on the part of ‘us’ that feels a relative security and encounters the ‘other’ 
in everyday life, struggles to find purpose or, perhaps more succinctly, a sense of self in 
serving his military duty and to guard the border from the ‘Turk’. Therefore, it is argued 
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that the invigorating commitment of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and the ideological and actual 
conscription of men in the army in Cyprus can only be unremitting so long as the state 
and the NG continues to construct and project the ‘enemy’ as being dangerous to the 
very existence of the “nation” and effectively mobilise this throughout society. In relation 
to these polices there is a vast array of right wing press accounts from that time, which 
were especially preoccupied with these issues, making the point that these polices lead 
to the declining motivation to serve and to the issue of draft-dodging (see H Shmerinh, 
2010 and Maxh, 2011).  
 
The men who were to be conscripted into the NG in the coming years were faced with 
this particular conflicting ideological trajectory; ‘occupation’, needing to defend the 
border and open-borders, the ‘enemy within’ crossing them, the possibility of 
reunification sustained by the intensified negotiations, a society that feels relatively safe 
under the protection of the EU and an ideologically disoriented and undermined force. 
Following this period, draft dodging rapidly became an exponential phenomenon and 
the discipline in the reserve forces became weakened.  
 
In this section, I have argued that these polices create a disorientation of the ideology of 
defence. This ideological disorientation comes to challenge the social body as a ‘nation-
in-arms’ predicated on the ‘existential threat’ from the ‘enemy within’ by undermining 
this type of culture that was mobilising the masculinist nationalist and militarist 
ideological assertions of post-war Cyprus against ‘occupation’ and constituting the 
community as a ‘nation-in-arms’.  
 
6.6. Mourning and melancholia about the undermining defence and ideology      
In this section, I will argue that the governmental and public disinvestment in ‘defence’ 
has found itself oppositional to the post-war societal structures that were constructed on 
defence and the need for liberation from the ‘occupation’ forces. The most prominent 
narrative in my interviewees’ accounts articulated this contradiction: a continued 
upholding of defence as a mobilising frame of protection and liberation, but at the same 
time these defence frames are precisely the issues from which they had disengaged in 
their accounts. In this context, new questions have arisen in and around a variety of 
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topics such as military service, the responsibility of the government over the army 
(especially the use of resources diverted towards military purposes) and the moral and 
legal responsibility of commanders for military issues and accidents.  
 
This puzzling contradiction in my interviewees’ accounts between a continued support 
of defence, and both the feeling of substantial security under the auspices of the EU 
and the personal unwillingness to ‘I struggle’ in defence of the community, generate one 
main question: If the general public feels security under the EU and so many young G.C. 
men are trying to avoid military service, what is the basis for the public’s recently 
mobilised deep resentment of the governmental disinvestment in defence and the 
undermined ‘fighting spirit’ of young soldiers?  
My argument is that the deep public subversion of the ideology of defence resulted in 
the public feeling defenceless and that the ‘fighting spirit’ of the national struggle has 
further weakened. This ideology had, since the division of the island, inculcated into 
Cyprus society the defence of the community as a value of existential urgency and 
centrality and had placed the NG at the heart of the encapsulation of the national 
struggle. Hence, while the most prominent narrative on defence illustrated the ‘social 
forgetting’ of defence and clearly articulated a sense of security due to the EU 
membership, it did express insecurity and disenchantment that the ‘fighting spirit’ has 
weakened when faced with an undermined NG. In this new situation the army is being 
sustained as an essential part of the publics’ ontological security and understanding of 
the national struggle, embedded through the post-war nationalist discourse of 
‘occupation’. It appears to me that my interviewees typically articulated in their accounts 
that the new form of security offered by sheltering under the EU contributes to, but does 
not substitute, the old military ontological security and that the potency of this new form 
of EU struggle continues to be linked to the ‘fighting spirit’ of the army. This is 
expressed clearly in Maria’s (woman, 27, translator) account:  
“We are not alone. We have the EU first of all … Turkey will have to think twice 
before going into a war against us because we are a member of the EU. We are 
not just a small island that they can invade without much effort, the situation is 
not the same as it was in 1974 …. we need to spend a big percentage of this 
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money because of our situation, since half of the island is under Turkish 
occupation, the army should be our first concern.”  
 
The account of Dimitri’s (man, 27, travel agent) who is a young reservist, further 
illustrates this contradiction of feeling ontological security under the auspices of the EU 
but, at the same time, expressing the need for military defence:  
 
“The army needs money, certainly. In the end, Cyprus’ biggest problem is the 
Cypriot Problem! Since we can see that we don’t have a modernised army, we 
don’t buy new weaponry systems … then it’s rational to wonder where all this 
money is spent … Even though we are under occupation, we would never 
imagine waking up to a war tomorrow. Anyway, after our accession to the EU, I 
don’t think that there is any way that we won’t have the EU’s support if Turkey 
decides to attack us… the fact that there might be a war or that Turkey could 
attack us, doesn’t even cross my mind.”  
 
In the post-opening of the borders European Cyprus, the decline in motivation to serve, 
the public support for the decrease of the length of the military service and relative 
support for the exchange of the force to a professional one, discussed below, represent 
the disengagement of the community from its commitment to the ‘nation-in-arms’. 
Whereas, the exponential penetrating phenomenon of draft-dodging is the clearest 
manifestation of this disengagement, pointing us also to the changing hegemonic 
masculinity discussed in the following chapter. However, the disengagement of the 
community from the idea of the ‘nation-in-arms’ does not translate into negation of the 
public support for a strong army in the national struggle. As Kuhlman (2003) observes, 
public support for the armed forces does not mean that the ‘count me out’ inclination 
among civilians has been overcome, quite the opposite is true.  
The undermined ‘defence’ generated intense and multiple reactions amongst my 
interviewees. However, the question of whether the RoC should continue to have its 
own army did not. Only a small minority of my interviewees did not support the 
existence of the army institution. The vast majority of them took a strong position on the 
necessity of a potent army in the national struggle against ‘occupation’. In this context, 
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interviewees most often took a strong critical position towards the respective 
governments and policies that led to the neglect of the NG. Therefore, at the public level 
the NG, under the auspices of the EU and the opened borders, continues to be framed 
as inextricable from the sense of ontological security and understanding of national 
struggle. For example, Giannos’ (man, 5 , owner of local dry-cleaning shop) narrative 
illustrates that the accession to the EU, open borders and the humanisation of the ‘other’ 
does not defeat the role of the army against ‘occupation’:  
 
“When I went to the occupied side I didn’t have any problems with the people 
there. They are nice. But imagine if I told them to leave from my house? Even if 
they are nice. Would they give me my home back? So why would I say that they 
are nice? They aren’t! I should just go and reclaim what belonged to me. Since I 
am not doing this, the army should be maintained and continue with its role.” 
 
Interviewees from diverse political and socio-economic groups expressed the insecurity 
felt in relation to the condition of the army and the unclear ideology of defence mobilised 
by the state, and, while challenging the army’s potency in the national struggle; asserted 
the discourse of ‘occupation’. My argument is that the ontological security and idea of 
the national struggle as integrally tied to the army is a direct product of the remnants of 
the post-war nationalist militarist structures, that today acts as an entrenchment of the 
public need for a potent army against the ‘occupation’.  
 
Almost all of my interviewees commented that the NG is no longer in a condition 
expected to defend the community from the ‘occupation’ forces and most often 
supported that the army needs to regroup and raise its morale and operational abilities. 
Panico’s (man, 27, unemployed) account was a most typical one:  
 
“In terms of human resources I think our army is enough. However, I don’t think 
that we are properly equipped and ready to fight the occupation forces.” 
 
Nonetheless, while under the above-outlined new parameters the G.C. community 
began to question the level of operative and operational abilities of the NG as well as 
the appropriate use of diverted resources to military uses, and it increasingly felt a large 
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measure of dissatisfaction over the system of conscription, especially the length of 
service. The continuation of the conscription system was not defended independently, 
but rather, most often, only if necessary in order to have a potent army. This further 
illustrates the disengagement of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, yet also the 
sustenance of the ontological importance of the army in the public’s perception and it’s 
inextricable role in the national struggle.  
 
In relation to what exactly should be done with the conscription system, interviewees 
revealed multiple opinions: most often there was relative support for a decrease in the 
length of military service and thus the semi-professionalisation of the force, if this is 
possible whilst having a strong army (most prominent narrative). In this narrative, the 
length of the conscription service was almost always counter-posed to the loss of time 
from men’s careers. Elpiniki’s (woman, 33,) account, a private school teacher with 
liberal views, was a most typical one:  
 
 “I think that if they ever decide to do this [translators note: meaning abolish the 
army], I will be terrified, even though I don’t really agree with this institution, but if 
they decide to reduce the military service to a few months then I would agree 
with them.” 
Another group of interviewees expressed the wish for turning the NG into a professional 
force, in order to have a potent army (second most prominent narrative). In this view, 
the poor condition of the force and the decline in motivation to serve and the 
undermined ‘fighting spirit’ of young soldiers, was most often counter-posed to the need 
for potent military defence against ‘occupation’. Most often, interviewees who supported 
this narrative argued that under these conditions young men waste two years serving 
their military service and reserves waste their time when called for training without this 
serving the purpose. Therefore, they commented that they did not see any reason as to 
why men should continue to complete their service. Nico’s (man, 42, entrepreneur) 
account, who is a refugee, was very typical of this narrative:  
 “It would be better to have a professional army. Do you think that the people who 
served or who are serving in the army now will be able to save us? What can the 
youth do today? It’s a shame to waste so much of their time in the army.”  
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Also Marios (man, 29, engineer) who had ultra-nationalist, political views and was 
particularly fond of the army and very interested in military matters still, in his own way, 
articulates this view:  
“Our ‘enemy’ is the Turkish army and we have the obligation to protect our mothers, 
our brothers and sisters. If anything happens, if you don’t go, the person next to you 
doesn’t go etc., then who will go to serve our country? … Concerning the army, they 
should either constitute a professional army or they should keep it the way it is and 
just change the military service duration from 2 years to 1 year instead.” 
Other interviewees like Stephanos (man, 34, accountant) who also held strong 
nationalist views, went further to describe the professionalisation of the army they 
support:  
“We could easily create the alternative; a very strong army with 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 
thousand people in a professional army whose job would be to protect our country! 
These could be Cypriots or foreigners. Whatever, I don’t care! And we could have 
equipment worth 1 billion Euros on the borders so we wouldn’t need to have the 
outposts etc. (translators note: referring to the outposts on the border)” 
Moreover, Kyriacos Mauvronicolas, former Minister of Defence, showed clear 
awareness of the public support for a strong army without the involvement of the 
community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ counter-posing this against a long conscription that 
detains young men from their career plans. He made clear the intention of the Ministry 
to reduce the length of service yet commented on the costly necessary rearrangements 
that will have to be made in the force.  
The two most prominent narratives presented above, illustrate that the weakening of the 
ideology of defence has affected the continuous support for the existence of a potent 
army and calls for its change into a semi or fully professional force. Indeed, it was only a 
limited number of interviewees, who had most often expressed strong nationalist, right-
wing beliefs, which explicitly supported a potent conscript army (third most prominent 
narrative). Interestingly, in this narrative the decline in motivation or refusal to serve was 
most often understood in terms of the poor condition of the force that, as they 
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commented, defeats any sense of purpose for the young conscripts. As Marios (man, 
40, entrepreneur) clearly laid out in his account: 
“The army should remain as it is. Yet, the reality is that someone who would have 
served in the army, if things were different, decides that it is not necessary to do 
it because the situation is the way it is or because it’s not worth it anymore.” 
 
And a very limited number of interviewees supported de-militarisation and the abolition 
of the NG (fourth most prominent narrative). As Louca (man, 63, civil servant) proposed:  
 
“I think we should dismiss our army, compensate the officers and go to the UN 
and declare Cyprus as an “open city” so that no one will be able to invade us.” 
It appears that one of the important consequences of these developments of the 
ideology of defence in G.C. society is that among the majority of the G.C. population 
there has been a significant erosion in the almost sacred status once enjoyed by the NG 
as a mass-conscript army; one of the most central pillars of the national struggle. These 
changes contributed not only to a crack in the popular acceptance of the military service 
as men’s duty, but also to a growing intolerance towards the defence sector. For 
example, Dimitris (man, 44, entrepreneur) commented that there should be an army 
because of ‘occupation’ but that in recent years the NG has become very weak and that 
this makes him feel unsafe. Also, Dimitris (man, 44, entrepreneur) characteristically 
commented that: 
 
“You are supposed to be a soldier in order to serve a cause because of the 
situation we are in, but in reality the Cyprus army is nothing like this. The 
situation in my opinion is tragic.”  
In a discussion that I had with a number of refugees in Larnaca, these remarks were 
clearly laid out. Dimitri’s (man, 27, travel agent) that he is in favour of the army but that 
with the current situation they will not be able to defend themselves, highlighting that: 
“Imagine (that) the reservists will have no idea where to go.” When Myranda (woman, 
39, airport worker): replied that the NG would not be able to react in the case of a war, 
but what would happen:  “Is that they will send the poor soldiers to war and practically 
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kill them.” Stelios (man, 37, airport worker) with irony replied that: “I think that they might 
even shoot some G.C.s accidentally.”  
 
It seems that many groups in contemporary G.C. society are no longer willing to grant 
the NG its previous status of unquestioned potency, and that the status and trust of the 
army in society has been deeply eroded. The reasons revealed in my interviewees’ 
accounts as to why the NG has been undermined all seemed to significantly contribute 
to their distrust towards the government’s policies over the role of the army in the 
national struggle. In general terms, the government is denunciated largely in Cypriot 
society for having deserted the NG; deeply undermining Cyprus’ defence without 
making the plan for defence ever clear to the public. The vast majority of my 
interviewees that commented on this said they understood the undermined state of the 
army as a matter of governmental negligence of the defence sector, absence of interest 
from the staff of the NG to maintain a strong force and bad internal organisation within 
the force and corruption. In this context, the cancellation of military parades and 
exercises was broadly seen as an evident sign of the negligence of the army on the part 
of the government and as a general sign of the deterioration of Cyprus’ military defence.  
 
Moreover, the extensive favouritism and nepotism taking place within the force in recent 
years (see: Transparency International, 2013), which is a widely known phenomenon in 
Cyprus, was evident in a lot of my interviewees’ accounts and has contributed to a 
decline in the status of the army in society and the public distrust of the defence sector. 
In Cyprus, the political power over the military makes it easier for those with political 
influence to avoid conscription or for soldiers and officers to be given a comfortable post 
within the army. This phenomenon, which is also periodically discussed in the media 
(see Simerini, 2011), was noted systematically by a lot of my interviewees as they 
expressed their distrust towards the army with a strong sense of frustration.  
Today, the main purpose of the NG is to ensure the safety and protect the ‘free areas’ of 
the RoC from the ‘occupation’ forces, and has been, to a large extent, defeated by the 
opening of the borders and the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Yet, under these new 
parameters, the discourse of ‘occupation’ on which the ideology of defence was 
constituted on, which in post-war Cyprus called the social body to take part in the 
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defence of the vulnerable homeland through its construction as a ‘nation-in-arms’, is 
now acting as a ‘reflecting mirror’. This is creating public uncertainty and anxiety when 
faced with an undermined NG and directionless defence policy of Cyprus. G.C. 
militarism has been deeply co-constituted with post-war nationalism and any shift away 
from the post-war nationalist discourse of ‘I do not forget’ and the militarist ‘I struggle’ for 
‘defence’ of the community is understood as devaluation of the national struggle and an 
undermining of the ontological security, which fires up the discourse of ‘occupation’.  
The deep public anxiety and distrust felt in relation to the unclear defence policy and the 
bad condition of the army was collectively expressed, as it will be discussed in the next 
section, through the opportunity created by Cyprus’ worst military accident in 2011. 
 
Explosion of the naval base in Mari 
It is argued that the explosion of the naval base in Mari26 , created a platform for 
collectively expressing the public insecurity of a long-lived absence of political and 
military sovereignty and transparent military responsibility in the national struggle. The 
explosion has been covered in depth by the national media, and has become of 
paramount importance for political powers and the public, leading to a number of 
political trials, including the at the time President of the Republic Of Cyprus, the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence and the Head of the National Guard, (see 
Cyprus News Report, 2012). The explosion has been Cyprus’ worst peacetime military 
accident, and has been argued to currently hold the record as the biggest conventional 
(non-nuclear) explosion ever recorded in the world during a time of peace, (see Cyprus 
Updates, 2011).  
The issue of the G.C. public living for the last few decades in a highly militarised ‘nation-
in-arms’ committed to defending the G.C. community, investing money, time and trust in 
the army, was a boiling cauldron which imploded when the naval base in Mari, built as 
                                                          
26
 The Evangelos Florakis Naval Base explosion on the 11
th
 July 2011, was Cyprus’ worst peacetime 
military accident, (see BBC, 2011). The incident occurred when 98 containers of explosives that had been 
stored for some time in the sun on the naval base self-detonated. As a result of the explosion, 12 Cypriot 
soldiers, officers and civilians were killed and sixty-two people were wounded. The blast killed, amongst 
others, the Head of the Cypriot navy, a navy base commander, 2 soldiers and six fire fighters, also 
knocking out the island's biggest power station. The shockwave destroyed buildings on the base and fuel 
tanks at the nearby Vassilikos power plant, as well as destroying several houses and displacing a 
significant number of people. Debris was blown for kilometres around the base (see Cyprus Updates, 
2011). 
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part of the SADD, exploded on the 11th July 2011. The state and political leadership, 
which had already been blamed for the condition of the army, were called to face the 
thousands of Cypriots protesting and asking for the President’s resignation. Pantelides 
(in Greek: Παντελίδης) (2011), writes in an article in the Cyprus Mail:  
 
“The public, which has been able to forget numerous scandals in the past, has 
been demanding justice ever since the blast. It would appear that the Mari 
tragedy has exposed a deeply flawed system where we place people in power 
only to have them deny that their position comes with responsibility.” 
 
I argue that the explosion in Mari created a platform for collectively expressing the deep 
public and political problematisation of state leadership, namely responsibility and 
sovereignty in the national struggle for the liberation of Cyprus from the ‘occupation’ 
forces. The governmental lack of responsibility over the army was understood to be 
largely linked to the weakening of the national struggle itself. Such a fatal explosion for 
the NG provided a space for vocalising the public anxiety deriving from the undermined 
defence in the name of reunification and Europeanisation; leading to the NG 
malfunctioning with clear consequences such as the incident in Mari. Angered by the 
government's failure to dispose of the ammunition, which had been seized by the United 
States Navy in 2009 after it intercepted a Cypriot-flagged, Russian-owned vessel, 
travelling from Iran to Syria in the Red Sea, several thousand G.C.s staged 
demonstrations outside the Presidential Palace where the demand for political and 
military responsibility predominated the scene. As BBC news had noted on the 12th July 
of 2011, (see BBC, 2011):  
 
“Thousands of Greek Cypriots have marched on the presidential palace in 
Nicosia in protest over the deaths of 12 people in a blast at a navy base …. As 
public anger at the incident swelled, police said a crowd of up to 5,000 converged 
on the palace compound and hung a banner on the gate saying ‘(President 
Demetris) Christofias is a murderer and must go to jail’.” 
 
Most of the people I talked to after the incident utilised this event to express their deep 
concern for the absence of military responsibility and the condition of the army. And 
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often, in this context, expressed their distrust of force in a potential war. In a discussion I 
had with some refugees in Larnaca shortly after the incident in Mari, these fears 
become clear: 
 
Myranda (woman, 39, airport worker): “Imagine, concerning the incident in Mari, 
there were mothers who went to the naval base just to pick up their children who 
were serving as soldiers there. 
 
When Stephanos (man, 4 , airport officer) replied: “We could say that in Cyprus 
we don’t have an army, it’s like we are under occupation. (translator’s note: 
meaning that the whole island is under occupation) ” 
 
This was also clearly evoked in the narrative of a soldier (aged 18) I interviewed within 
the NG shortly after the incident, who, while discussing his own role in the NG, 
commented:  
 
"I think that it’s a waste of time. I have never been in an emergency situation, in 
order to understand, in order to see that the Cyprus army is really able to perform; 
I wasn’t even alive in 1974 … I see guns and tanks everywhere but there were 
also things like these in Mari and that exploded.".  
 
The explosion of the naval base in Mari was used by the public as a platform for 
expressing its insecurity of a long-lived absence of political military responsibility in the 
national struggle. The next section will expose that the government has thereafter 
placed much effort in illustrating that it continues to struggle militarily.  
 
6.7. Changing civil-military relations and the Governmental pressure to respond 
to the declining ‘defence’ 
The above findings have clearly illustrated a changing dynamic between G.C. society, 
the state and army. The accounts of the public’s view of ‘defence’, provided by the two 
most prominent narratives, illustrate that the weakening of the ideology of defence has 
affected the continuous support for the existence of a potent army and calls for its 
211 
 
 
change into a semi or fully professional force. Also, the public anger that the incident in 
Mari unleashed illustrates the extensive criticism for the subversion of defence and 
directionless defence policy, directed against the government and the public demand for 
the state to become more responsible over the NG in the national struggle. Moreover, 
certain global cultural flows were illustrated to be catalytic in the disengagement of the 
community from the idea of its self as a ‘nation-in-arms’.  
 
It appears that one of the most important consequences of the weakening of the 
ideology of defence is that it has allowed space for the pressure exerted by global 
developments on the NG to turn into a professional force to emerge as an issue for the 
public. Changes in the military reflect broader social changes and vice-versa (Janowitz, 
1960,1957, 1984). As discussed in the literature review, from the 1990s professional, 
smaller and more cost-effective forces have gradually replaced mass conscript armies. 
Most countries of NATO and the EU have today abolished conscription. This change 
relates mostly to global political, technological and economic developments (Burk, 1992; 
Haltiner, 1998; Cohen, 1995; Shaw, 1991; Van Doom, 1975; Janowitz, 1960; Moon, 
2005a), whilst the EU accession has also been repeatedly identified as a catalyst for the 
professionalisation and modernisation of member state armies, (see: Lutterbeck, 2005; 
King, 2011, 2005). Yet, clearly in the context of divided Cyprus, the global pressure for 
professionalisation and modernisation of the NG unfolds as it enters the dynamics of the 
conflict itself. What is most significant here is the discourse of 'occupation'.  
The on-going so-called ‘Cyprus Problem’ has led to a post-armed conflict situation, 
which perpetuates a military mission on both sides of the divide. However, following the 
opening of the borders between the North and South of Cyprus in 2003, the Cyprus NG 
is sustaining a, by definition, mass conscript army trapped both structurally and 
culturally in the nexus between the continuous dispute with the ‘occupation’ force 
Turkey, European integration, army modernisation, opened borders, and intensified 
reunification talks. Therefore, since 2003 the Cyprus defence sector, I argue, has 
needed to reconcile two poles of reference. On the one hand, the political, military and 
technological developments at both global and European levels, which have been 
exerting pressure on the state to professionalise and modernise the force (which is 
today in an ‘anachronistic’ form) in order to gain competitive combat effectiveness. Also, 
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the accession to the EU and the intensified process of reunification talks have been 
exerting pressure on the state to create a more European and reconciliatory defence 
ideology. On the other hand, the state had to reconcile the 'occupation', thus, Turkey 
'occupying' the Northern part of the border with a significant number of troops, which 
directly translates into the ever-present need of guarding a 112 mile border. However, 
the position of the Cyprus defence sector becomes more complicated yet as, since the 
opening of the borders, the following elements have also gradually entered this 
dynamic: ‘undermined and dispirited National Guard’ and ‘a public that feels 
defenceless’. This overall set of dynamics resulted in a multilateral nexus of pressures 
exerted between the state of the RoC, the G.C. public and the NG.   
 
In this situation, I argue that, whilst the state is under the pressure of the global and 
European developments to professionalise and modernise the NG, it doesn’t. Yet, the 
state exerts pressure on the NG to continue its post-war mission (I struggle) against 
‘occupation’, as a mass-conscript-army. However, in this setting, the state undermines 
the significance of the NG in the struggle  by cutting its funds almost in half and, in the 
name of ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘reunification’, prohibits a large and indispensable part of 
the reproduction of its ideology (‘defence’). Yet, as the following discussion will illustrate, 
in the face of the undermined defence and the public’s strongly expressed 
condemnation of it, the state attempts, but is unable to, effectively reiterate the 
discourse of the ‘nation-in-arms’ in and out of the military barracks and thus fails to 
coerce the public into continuing to take up military responsibility, as its own (Enloe, 
2007: 4). However, what becomes most significant in this situation is that the public 
exerts great pressure on the state to take up complete responsibility of the military 
frame of the national struggle.  
 
The broader global change to professional and modernised armies, which is also 
supported by the G.C. public, reflects not only the need of the armed forces to adjust to 
“a new strategic environment of international relations” (Kuhlmann & Callaghan, 2011: 
4), but also reflects broader cultural developments at the global level that provide 
technical rather than nationalist emotional solutions to perceived military threats. What 
is most central here is that whilst globalisation undermines the state-led national, 
cultural homogenisation that produces these nationalist and militarist social values, it is 
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individualism that consolidates the boundaries between the civil-military domains. The 
strongly emerging culture of individualism in Cyprus and the strong endorsement for a 
‘Euro-Cypriot’ identity, contests the state-institutionalised subordination of individual 
considerations of the collective armed national struggle for ‘defence’.  
The relationship between cultural homogenisation, nationalism and militarisation has 
historically been a state-led process (Conversi, 2007). Both within and outside the army, 
state-led cultural homogenisation consisted of the top-down imposition of a single, 
distilled, purified culture, ushered in by technological advances (ibid: 382). Therefore, 
universal male conscription in Cyprus was not only an effort to mobilise a mass army 
“but, behind it, a whole politicised population” (Best, 19 2:  6). Then the nationalist 
politicisation of the mass army was achieved through the solidification of G.C. 
nationalist militarism throughout the ‘ethnic community’. Most importantly, however, the 
consolidation of G.C. cultural nationalist militarism, of which the manifestation is the 
‘nation-in-arms’, requires that civil and military domains are kept fragmented, so that the 
state can strive in this civil-military space to instil the nationalist militarism and ensure its 
central appropriation into cultural homogenisation.  
However, the wider cultural background in Western societies moving away from 
traditional cultural values, poses a serious challenge to state militaries, as they need to 
adjust to a rapidly changing society. Today’s society is more positively disposed to 
global cultural flows and the “free market, compared with the central state, as a basis for 
economic life” (Kuhlmann & Callaghan 2011: 4) and cultural homogenisation. The 
globalisation of finance, trade, communication, and other vital human activities steadily 
erodes much of the traditional basis (Moskos et al., 2000) of the ‘nation-in-arms’ model 
across the globe and removes the interpellatory capacity of the state, the epitome of the 
success of its ideological apparatus (Althusser, 1971: 170-177), to keep civil and 
military domains as fragmented whilst ensuring cultural homogenisation.  
In Cyprus, the strongly emerging G.C. culture of individualism contests the 
subordination of individual considerations to the collective armed struggle of ‘defence’ 
against ‘occupation’. The decline of social cohesion has also meant a decline in social 
trust (Putnam, 2002) of the heroic praxis of the ‘nation-in-arms’ that has meant a 
stronger reliance of individuals on the state to execute the collective national project of 
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‘defence’. The professional force, that the G.C. public supports, whilst not necessitating 
strong community ties and emotional attachments to nationalist militarist ideals, it still 
solidly relies on the state for resources and support. Therefore, individualism in this 
case transverses the civil-military relations, where the civil domain that clearly still 
supports the need for a potent army is exerting pressure on the state to assume a 
greater role in sustaining the militarist frame of the national struggle. This change is 
especially important in countries like Cyprus where the army was completely reliant on 
the construction of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. The discussion of two officers 
(37 and 38, interviewed whilst off duty) depicts vividly how the consolidation of civil and 
military boundaries and changing civil-military relations undermines the ‘nation-in-arms’:  
“Officer A: Imagine that including the reservists we have around 120-130 
thousand soldiers and everyone has guns in their homes so we are talking about 
130 thousand guns in case of a war. It’s a real army! 
If a British soldier hears that Cyprus has an army of 130 thousand soldiers, he 
will think that we are undefeatable. But it’s not true. Basically we are 130 
thousand useless soldiers. 
Officer B: The issue here is that society intervenes in every aspect of the military. 
For example, in Turkey unlike Cyprus, if a reserve loses his gun from his house, 
they won’t go and take everyone’s guns from everyone’s house with the thought 
that it’s dangerous since the illegal factions will used them. So what if a faction 
steals a gun and kills someone? However, in Cyprus, they make us hide the 
guns. If a gun gets stolen so what? This is how society intervenes in the affairs of 
the army. And this way the army is becoming more and more weakened. Army 
and modern society cannot coexist in Cyprus! 
Officer A: The society has changed as well. Our society nowadays is very 
different, you cannot make soldiers do something. It’s hard to discipline them.  
Officer B: No, it’s the parents who create problems and they bother the captain 
and the commander all the time by calling them and complaining. For example 
they might say ‘My son told me that he wants to be granted a day off on Sunday, 
why won’t you let him come home?’ 
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Officer A: For example, if you hung up on them, which in my opinion it is the right thing 
to do and which the commander has the power to do, they will call to the Ministry of 
Defense to complain. And then the people from the ministry will call the commander and 
tell him that he shouldn’t have hung up on them and that he should have listened to 
their problem. Is this a problem? The fact that the soldier can’t take a day off on Sunday 
to go to a family dinner? They don’t care about the units’ problems.” 
The military officers above are enunciating how individualism is traversing civil-military 
relations. One reserve with the accidental event of his lost gun has the power to bring 
down the pre-institutionalised, structured masculinist collective militarism of the ‘nation-
in-arms’. This illustrates precisely the reciprocal undermining of trust between the 
military and civil domains in the scope of the changing civil-military relations. The 
apparent anger of Officer B is directed towards the degrading impact of modern society 
on the army, as he characteristically claims: “Army and modern society cannot coexist 
in Cyprus”.  
In this way, Officer B is reacting against the emerging cultural stance that focuses on 
individuals’ rights: in the case of someone being killed due to a stolen gun. This is 
perceived as a distinct and alien posture for a ‘real soldier’, protector of the whole 
community from a much bigger threat; the ‘occupation’ army that is also not undergoing 
these social changes. Officer A congruently confirms that an ‘individual’s’ rights’ 
undermine a 130 thousand soldier army and they both conclude by presenting how the 
G.C. family’s ascription of value based on the culture of individualism is traversing the 
importance of the military community.   
Moreover, the effect of individualism on the G.C. ‘nation-in-arms’, I argue, is illustrated 
not only in the public disengagement from its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’, but also in the 
attenuation of the state’s capacity to respond to the declining militarism by re-mobilising 
the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’.  
The Ministry of Defence has, since 2011, placed much effort in creating a resistance to 
the declining motivation to serve; optimising the use of the reserve forces, and raising 
the morale of the NG as well as its status in Cypriot society (see Ministry of Defence, 
2012). It is argued that the political issue was how to manage the ‘nation-in-arms’ well 
enough so that it would not provoke the public further in the face of the weakened NG 
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and thus illustrate to the public that the state has not ‘forgotten’ but ‘struggles’ for 
defence; ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. 
 
This argument is supported by the statement of the, at the time, Defence Minister, 
Demetris Eliades, on 3rd November 2011 (see Ministry of Defence, 2012), who 
expressed the need for ''a joint effort by all to regroup the forces and to raise the morale 
so that the National Guard can play the role for which it has been assigned by the state.” 
New legislations for draft-dodging are designed, (see National Guard Law, 2011), and 
promptly implemented, these provide stricter measures for those who choose to not 
enlist or evade the service and the introduction of a longer period of community or civil 
service as an alternative for draft-dodgers and for conscientious objectors (see 
appendix 10).  
 
The ‘Commission for the Prevention and Treatment of Draft-Dodging’ was established 
under the National Guard Law (2011). In the face of growing distaste for military service 
among the new generation of recruits, political leaders stressed the pride of serving in 
the force and denounced draft-dodging27 (see Ministry of Defence 2012). A meeting 
held in September 2012 by the Commission (see SigmaLive, 2012) chaired by Defence 
Minister Demetris Eliades had, as part of the agenda, the development of further 
programs for students such as visits to military camps but also programs where officers 
visit schools in order to, as the Defence Minister noted:  
  
“properly inform the students and cultivate the spirit necessary to then pass the 
message that to serve the NG is an honor and offer to their country.”  
 
From 2012 onwards, the Ministry of Defence was, for a certain period, announcing 
improvements made in the force due to the new policies (enacted in 2011, see for 
                                                          
27
 An example of this is the speech given by George Barnabas, Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence 
Committee, after visiting one of the main training camps of the force (KEN, Larnaca) in July of 2012: "we 
want to send the message to the recruit soldiers who been conscripted in the National Guard, as has 
already been said by the Minister of Defence, is intrepidity … ". To avoid one’s conscription, he noted, 
claiming some special reasons, it is considered weakness and cowardliness. (Extracts of the speech 
taken from an article published by Sigma Live, 2012B).  
 
Also see Moon (2005a, 78) who describes a similar change in the ideological language mobilized by the 
state to deal with a similar phenomenon in South Korea.  
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example: Politis, 2012). However, both the Ministry and political leadership have 
thereafter mostly remained silent about the issues of inquiry and have ceased 
discussing ‘draft-dodging’. Yet, media sources have repeatedly indicated that draft-
dodging is continuing without ever commenting on a verified decrease in the number of 
draft-dodgers (see for example: SigmaLive, 2013). Moreover, this chapter has illustrated 
a strongly expressed larger public support for the abandonment of conscription and the 
professionalisation and modernisation of the National Guard.  
I argue, therefore, that what we are observing here,  like in other post-armed conflict 
societies that have abolished or are considering abolishing conscription and abandoning 
the ‘nation-in-arms’ model, is an attenuation of the state capacity to maintain the civil-
military boundaries as fragmented. We are also observing an emerging culture of 
individuals focused on their own personal goals and rights, which is now exerting 
pressure on the state to take complete control and responsibility of the defence of the 
country. This dynamic between the civil and military domains is underscored by the 
globally strongly emerging culture of individualism that is strengthening the dividing 
boundaries between the civil and military domains. Similar changes studied in Israeli 
militarism have led to the emergence of new theoretical orientations that now 
emphasise the effort the state has invested in order to constantly keep producing and 
reproducing its legitimacy (Kimmerling 1992; Lustick 1998; Rosenhek 1998).  
  
Indeed, it is the case that while writing this thesis (early 2014) the Cyprus government is 
discussing a plan for radical changes in the NG, which includes a significant reduction 
of the military service with parallel recruitment of professional staff and the procurement 
of special military equipment, such as sensors and cameras, that will replace the guards 
on the borders, (see ΑΝΤ1, 2013). It has been repeatedly raised by the Minister of 
Defence, Fotis Fotiou, that these will be changes without an iota of reduction in security 
(ibid). Therefore, in this setting, whilst the strongly emerging individualism has 
consolidated the civil-military boundaries, the state has now started to become more 
reliant on military technological developments and the specialisation of labour to 
exchange the previous commitment of the community to ‘defend’ itself. They will do so 
with further procurement programs, which will provide better equipment and the 
professional operation of it; constituting a more potent, combatable and effective force. 
218 
 
 
As the Minister of Defence stated himself a few days before the New Year of 2014, in 
the context of putting forward the agenda for the professionalisation and modernisation 
of the force: “this modernisation is a must if we want to have strong, well-trained armed 
forces that can respond to the national mission.” (see Shmerinh, 2013). As such civil 
and military domains diverge creating an empty discursive space. This space, as the 
next section will reveal, gives rise to the formation of ultra-nationalist parties.  
 
 
6.8. Repudiating the declining ‘defence’: The rise of ultra-
nationalist political parties 
New for the political scene of Cyprus are the organised, ultra-nationalist political parties, 
namely ELAM and EDHK, which have emerged following the opening-of the borders. In 
the previous chapter I have illustrated that these parties are a discursive response to 
the opening of the borders, which they perceive as having undermined the ‘fighting spirit’ 
and a version of the post-war national struggle that is supported by them. Here, my aim 
is to illustrate that they are also a response to the undermining of ‘defence’, rendering 
‘defence’ now an extreme discourse placed in the hands of these parties.  
These social sectors that, during the formative years of the armed national struggle, 
were relatively peripheral and had not formed a political scene became organised, 
formed ultra-nationalist parties, and gained some political power, which is directed 
against the aforementioned changes by the state. Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, these discursive expressions of masculinist militarism re-enacted by the 
ultra-nationalist parties are partly constitutive of the ideology of ‘defence’ previously 
enacted by the state, which had become an indispensable mainstream expression of 
the national struggle in the G.C. community taught in state institutions: mainly schools 
and the army.  
These parties, whilst criticising the government for neglecting the militarist frame of the 
post-war national struggle, have reproduced discourses of defence formative of the 
post-war national struggle, which in their hands have become more extreme. The point 
here is that the effort of the state to ‘normalise’ the ‘defence’ politics in negotiating with 
the ‘other’ and the change of the ‘struggle’ taking place under the auspices of the EU 
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has structured the very formation of opposition parties, which are now mobilised for 
collective action against the role of the state in ‘defence’ and call the community to join 
them. Therefore, the strong critical attitudes, discussed above, towards the state for the 
condition of the NG are not only appearing among the groups representing a strong shift 
from traditional social and military-defence values to the European and Western-like 
individualist attitudes and aspirations. Rather they have also appeared-albeit articulated 
in inverse terms-among some of the most vocal newly formed ultra-nationalist political 
parties.  
What is perhaps most central here is that these parties’ main objectives are directly 
opposed to and vigorously criticise the governmental acceptance of having open 
borders, the ‘stepping back’ from militarism, the repeated and intensified negotiations 
for reunification as well as the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ in the community. For them, 
all of these translate as returning to the condition of ‘ragiadismos’ (in Greek: 
Ραγιαδισμος).  
This is a concern of re-enslavement that invokes the shameful ottoman past when 
Greece and Cyprus (for these parties both are constitutive of the “Greek nation”) were 
enslaved to the Ottoman rule. Therefore, they understand the undermining of militarism 
as the danger of forgetting the moments of revolution in which the Greek and G.C. 
masculinist military endeavours assured the national “self”-assertion. Specifically this 
refers to 1821, the Greek war of independence against the Ottoman rule (commonly 
known as the Greek Revolution, in Greek: Ελληνική Επανάσταση), and 1955, the 
beginning of the Cypriot military campaign of EOKA28 against the British rule. Thus 
‘ragiadismos’ for them is the danger of Cyprus becoming a peon again to powers far 
greater than it. The account of the President of EDHK, on the declining militarism, 
clearly draws this picture:  
“This is betrayal, it is the demolition of the army; in essence this comes to 
support a policy of retreat, submissiveness and ‘ragiadismou’. That’s why they 
want to demolish the army, because they clearly state that our aim is to have a 
demilitarized Cyprus, so that we have no army.”  
                                                          
28
 EOKA was a nationalist organisation with the ultimate goal of the liberation of Cyprus from the British 
yoke. 
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Also, the ROE said that the crossings on the borders:  
“To be the definition of immorality, the epitome of immorality […towards…] a 
nation which when it came to protecting its national interest in 1955-59 it was 
making miracles … as a nation we had always supported our national fights from 
1821…”. 
The ideology of defence continues to be carried by groups that stress that only the 
continuation of the affinity between the fortification of armed forces, militarism, armed 
liberation, preparedness of the ‘nation-in-arms’ (I struggle) and constancy of memory of 
the national trauma (I do not forget) and the Greek national struggle through history can 
assure the saving of ‘semi-occupied’ Cyprus from such a shameful self-enslavement. 
For these parties, militarisation and war is seen as an integral part of the national 
struggle, for which Cyprus needs to prepare by fortifying the armed forces, regenerating 
militarism in society and first of all by closing the borders. As the President of EDHK 
comments: 
“The borders should close; because we have to return to a state of war … 
because I believe that the only possible solution is an armed claim.”  
This becomes clearer in the account of ROE who comments that: 
“We must never forget that we are under occupation, with a well-equipped 
‘enemy’, therefore we have to do our very best so that we are powerful, so that 
the National Guard have the capability to liberate at some point these lands even 
by the use of force.”  
These parties see themselves as the only ones who continue the “true” national struggle 
for liberation. Trimikliniotis (2011: 3) comments that ELAM is “claiming that it is the only 
party that speaks for the ‘liberation of our enslaved lands’”. In this rather anachronistic 
yet also modified discourse of the ‘I struggle’, the ‘existential threat’, of which the 
opening of the borders and the accession to the EU has eased in the general 
community, continues to be mobilised by these groups. In the face of the ‘existential 
threat’ felt by these ultra-nationalist groups they keep re-asserting the need for defence. 
As the ROE comments: 
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“By opening the borders we endangered our national sovereignty…they should 
be closed immediately! … [it is] the moral duty that we have towards the dead 
and the ones that are not yet born”.  
For ultra-nationalist groups the policy against ‘ragiadismos’ is integrally related to the 
uprising of a unified military “self-assertion” with Greece through the revival of the Single 
Area Defence Doctrine for Cyprus-Greece,  with the armed liberation of Northern 
Cyprus as the only solution to the conflict. In this context, it needs to be highlighted 
again that these parties support the political union of Cyprus with Greece. The president 
of EDHK explains that the ‘rulers have abandoned this assertive policy as it is pointless 
having two “Greek states” members of the EU. Rather EDHK supports that “the 
strengthening of our defence and the promotion of a new policy focused on liberation 
are interrelated” and fights’ for the strengthening of the SADD:  
“That would revive the hope of liberation and would constitute the basis of a new 
political strategy; if we had the Greek army here, we would be able, for example, 
to extract our gas without becoming vassals to the British and the Jews…we 
would not have retreated on the Cyprus Problem; we would have had a different 
strategy, which could have led to the goal; an armed claim of our ‘occupied’ lands 
and the liberation of Cyprus.”  
Similarly ROE comments that: ‘the situation of the army is disrespectful towards the 
state, we want whatever a state that respects itself wants’. He emphasised that since 
Turks are the enemy, Cyprus should compose an army that has the capability to play 
not only a defensive but also offensive role so as to liberate the ‘occupied’ lands even 
by the use of force:  
 “From there on we expect a lot from Greece, because there is no Greece without 
Cyprus and Cyprus cannot exist without Greece… We want a marine presence, 
Greek ships in Cyprus’ territorial waters…” 
The above accounts explain  why these parties are against the defence policy of the 
state and the state of RoC itself, and are said to have their own militant groups. 
However, it should also be noted that the alliances the government created with 
stronger military powers to provide an armed deterrent force against Turkey (who had 
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been threatening the sovereignty of Cyprus over the gas, see Αντωνιου, 2012)  
following the discovery of gas in the territorial waters of Cyprus, is further interpreted by 
these parties as ‘ragiadismos’. For them, as the above accounts reveal, these threats by 
Turkey are a provocation of war and Cyprus should not rely on foreign military powers in 
this situation. Rather, this should be dealt with by regenerating SADD with Greece, (see 
also Golden Dawn, ELAM (2013).  
Since these parties clearly do not trust the state in doing the “necessary” in the national 
struggle, it appears that they see it as their responsibility to become mobilised for action. 
This perhaps illustrates the junta-phile, neo-Nazi element of their ideology. This was 
made especially clear in a political discussion between members of Golden Dawn and 
its fraternal party ELAM, about the conflict situation in Cyprus, on Golden Dawn’s TV 
Channel, (see The Political Programme of Golden Dawn, 2013). In this discussion it 
was supported that the state exists only to assist the nation and that if the state is not 
serving the nation, then the state should cease to exist and a new one should be 
created. In this discussion the slogan ‘Hurray the Nation, Down the state’ (in Greek: 
Ζήτω το Έθνος Κάτω το Κράτος) was also used.  
These groups are ideologically against the state and their militant groups are 
constitutive of this ultra-nationalist neo-Nazi ideology. Both parties reportedly have their 
own militant groups. In the case of ELAM, they refer to the militants of ELAM, whereas 
in the organisational and administrative structure of EDHK on their website, (see EDHK, 
2009-2013), they include a section about their militant group, which they describe as the 
‘iron fist’ of the movement with the role to:  
“Organize the members of militant action and prepare them for rapid and 
disciplined action in peace or war.” 
In the increasing political investigations into the paramilitary actions of these ultra-
nationalist parties following the murder of Pavlos Fissas (in Greek: Παύλου Φύσσα) by a 
member of Golden Dawn, which is the fraternal party of ELAM, the issue of the militant 
groups of these parties has been intensely on the political agenda in Cyprus and 
Greece. In the scope of these political developments the Cyprus Ministry of Justice has 
begun to investigate these groups under the charge that they organise paramilitary 
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trainings in abandoned camps of the NG. On 24th September 2013, Philelepheros 
newspaper (see Phileleptheros, 2013a) writes: 
“In the abandoned camp of LOK (translators note: LOK are a division of the 
special forces of the NG), … seems that trainings were taking place with 
weapons or replicas of weapons” 
In the scope of the weakening ideology of defence these parties and groups have been 
formed who do not trust the destiny of the “Greek nation” to the state whose role in the 
national struggle and especially in armed defence today is perceived by them as 
submissive. The next chapter will take this argument a step further to illustrate that while 
they perceive the role of the state in the national struggle as submissive, they have 
embodied masculinist militarist discourses in the performativity (Butler, 1990) of their 
own masculinity, which is mobilised against the ‘occupation’ and the intensified 
negotiations for reunification.  
 
6.9. Conclusion  
This chapter has illustrated the weakening of the ideology of defence following the 
opening of the borders, mapped the governmental and public understandings of the 
contradictory directions in terms of defence’s present and future, and showed how these 
developments have been a part of the weakening post-war co-constitution of 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity.  
 
The argument was put forward that whilst the broader governmental disinvestment in 
‘defence’ has been part of the changing understanding of the ‘struggle’ under the 
auspices of the EU, the process undermining the ideology of defence has been further 
underscored by certain cultural developments, the public-felt security and the 
weakening ‘fighting spirit’ in the community, which has in this overall setting become 
significantly less committed to the idea of a ‘nation-in-arms’. The increasing public 
distrust and anger towards the undermined potency of the NG, the directionless defence 
policy and the relative disengagement of the community from the idea of the ‘nation-in-
arms’ represent the conflicting trajectory of the continued public support of defence and 
social disinvestment in defence that illustrates the changing civil-military relations, which 
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call for the change of the NG into a semi or fully professional force. This conflicting 
trajectory is further addressed in the next chapter, which further illustrates this public 
position to be constitutive of an adapted reiterated G.C. position of power in the conflict 
situation.  
The militarisation of G.C. society in the post-war years has been inextricable from the 
creation of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’: where ‘militaristic values and priorities 
were set as one’s own’, (Enloe, 2007: 4). ‘Defence’ has been the most important 
organising principle in G.C. society following the war and division of the island in 1974. 
However, today there is a contradictory gap between acknowledging the need for 
refortifying a strong army in the national struggle, in light of the current condition of the 
army, and experiencing security under the auspices of the EU in comparison with the 
need for men to serve a long conscription. The common attitudes of my interviewees 
toward conscription were that it is a necessity for defence but an unnecessary male 
sacrifice. This ideological disagreement, which was evoked in the most prominent 
narrative of my interviewees’ accounts, represents the turning point for and the yet 
uncertain trajectory the ideology of defence has entered since the opening of the 
borders. In this nexus, there has been a disengagement of the community from the idea 
of itself as a ‘nation-in-arms’ and the phenomenon of draft-dodging and loosening 
discipline in the reserve forces have emerged, issues that will be further explored in the 
next chapter in relation to the hegemonic masculinity moving towards the individualist 
entrepreneur.  
 
Today, the strong widespread support of the army amongst my interviewees presents 
us with a different type of militarisation than the post-war ‘nation-in-arms’. It appears 
that in the scope of the political events and social processes that took place on the 
island following the opening of the borders, a growing antithetical relationship has been 
created in the continuing public support of the army. This is a major public paradigm 
shift of the willingness for the community to offer itself unswervingly to the ‘security’ of 
Cyprus, thus the disengagement of the community as the ‘nation-in-arms’ and the 
continuing support of the army vis-à-vis ‘occupation’. The accounts of my interviewees, 
which have on the whole clearly evoked a strongly emerging culture of individualism, 
mostly point to supporting the existence of the army merely as a requisite for the 
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‘security’ of Cyprus, but not the involvement of the community in this understanding of 
‘security’. The accounts also point to the call for the state to take up complete 
responsibility of ‘defence’ by professionalising the force. Thus, in the discourse of 
‘occupation’ the NG provides an ontological security, which has only been partly 
substituted by the accession of Cyprus to the EU. As the next chapter will further 
illustrate, the ‘fighting spirit’ of the force and the men it involves is contingent to the 
understanding of the potency of the national struggle even under its new EU form.   
In European Cypriot society with open borders ‘defence’ the militarist frame of the 
national struggle, even if weakened, is sustained through the post-war inter-dependency 
of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, as a distinctly and explicitly masculinist 
discourse that fights feminisation in the national struggle. ‘Defence’, as the following 
chapter will further illustrate, opposes retreat and submissiveness of the G.C. ‘defensive’ 
and ‘assertive’ stance in the conflict. Therefore, it is argued that the post-war predication 
of both state and social body on the assertive armed defence of the community from the 
‘occupation’ forces today is a discursive structure in response to the very reverberation 
of defence. This is contributing to the public feeling of defencelessness, as it perceives 
the undermining of the militarist frame of the national struggle through the discourse of 
‘occupation’ to be an explicit and intrinsic illustration of a potent ‘fighting spirit’ in the 
national struggle for ‘defence’ and ‘liberation’ from ‘occupation’. These remarks on the 
weakening co-constitution of this post-war three-fold relationship and the public criticism 
of these realities will be illustrated in the next chapter to be constitutive of the re-
adaptation of this relationship under new political and social parameters.  
 
The ultra-nationalist parties that have emerged following the opening of the borders are 
a discursive response to the recent developments of militarism at both governmental 
and social levels. These parties do not trust the destiny of the “Greek nation” in the 
hands of the state of RoC whose role in the national struggle and especially in armed 
defence today is perceived by them as submissive. In some ways, these parties are a 
reincarnation of the masculinist militarist national struggle, previously strongly mobilised 
by the state, which they re-mobilise against ‘occupation’.  
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7. Chapter seven: Masculinity in Cyprus following the 
opening of the borders      
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates the relationship of Greek Cypriot hegemonic masculinity 
(Connell 1995; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) as well as nationalist militarised 
masculinity with the declining ideology of defence and the changing understanding of 
the national struggle following the opening of the borders between North and South 
Cyprus in April 2003. The openings that have occurred along this border place these 
masculinity discourses mobilised against the idea of closed borders at stake. The 
changing understanding of how the national struggle is to be pursued, by the thought 
that this is to come through European Union pressures and politics rather than ‘struggle’ 
understood as military ‘defence’ and ‘kinetic’ force, further puts into question the 
masculinist and militarist discourses of the national struggle.  
 
The overarching argument of this chapter is that, whilst the G.C. post-war hegemonic 
masculinity is in a process of moving away from the military and heroic male ideals 
constitutive of the post-war national struggle, the discourse of nationalist militarised 
masculinity appears to be adaptively reiterated in its inter-dependency to nationalism 
and militarism. This is illustrated by a certain nationalist militarist masculinist stance of 
the community in relation to crossing the border and the continuing public support of a 
potent army that now calls for its change into a semi or fully professional modernised 
army to act as a deterrent force against the ‘occupation’ forces. This re-adapted stance 
is argued to sustain the G.C. discourse of ‘occupation’, which forms the key political 
discourse for the appeal to the international community for support for liberation from 
‘occupation’. Therefore, the sustenance of the ‘occupation’ in the G.C. community, 
illustrated in the nationalism chapter, and the continuing public support of a potent army 
illustrated in the militarism chapter, are here shown to be focal discursive mechanisms 
227 
 
 
of the re-adapted G.C. stance in this new setting that maintains the discourse of 
‘occupation’, specifically in relation to a masculinist discourse.  
I will argue that masculinity is the silent partner of nationalism and militarism, since the 
ways in which it manifests itself in such discursive processes is greatly naturalised. 
Ideals and notions of male identity and worth are co-constitutive of both nationalism and 
militarism (Massad, 1995; Ashe, 2012). In exposing the changing G.C. hegemonic 
masculinity I seek to situate the role of masculinity within the changing the national 
struggle. In the same way that masculinity is a central part in the making of nations and 
nationalism (Nagel, 1998; Sjoberg et al., 2010; Enloe, 1990), the changing hegemonic 
masculinity of men in the context of post-armed conflict societies, such as Cyprus, can 
point us to the changing understanding of the national struggle. Yet, my research 
suggests that masculinity in nationalist, militarist post-armed conflict societies is a 
broader discourse that, under new social and political parameters, forms the underside 
of the adapted reiteration of nationalism and militarism. It is this mutually constitutive 
relationship between hegemonic masculinity, nationalist militarised masculinity, 
nationalism and militarism I wish to examine in this chapter. 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, I use the term ‘hegemonic masculinity’ to refer 
exclusively to the hegemonic masculinity of men in the G.C. community. I use the term 
‘nationalist militarised masculinity’ to refer to the broader G.C. masculine discourse co-
constituting nationalism and militarism. Thus, arguing that there is a broader discourse 
of masculinity in post-armed conflict, nationalist and militarist societies which does not 
only relate to the identity of men and armed conflict as an exclusive calling for men. 
Without addressing this broader G.C. masculinist discourse we would not be able to 
understand the centrality of masculinity in the ability of this three-fold relationship to 
readapt and reiterate its interdependency in the aftermath of political events that are 
providing new parameters for nationalism, militarism and masculinity.  We would also 
not be able to understand that the re-adaptations and reiterations of the masculinist 
discourse contingent part of this relationship appeal to the larger social body and are 
integral to the stance the community adopts in the conflict situation. I directly relate 
these two concepts and indicate that they are both discourses of masculinity 
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constructed through the European post-opening of the borders Cypriot post-armed 
conflict culture.  
 
This chapter will begin by looking back at the role of masculinity in the formation of the 
post-war national struggle and then proceeds to unravel masculinity from the findings on 
G.C. nationalism and militarism illustrated in previous chapters and will then illustrate 
the role of masculinity in this re-adapted G.C. stance. Finally, this chapter seeks to 
understand the rise of ultra-nationalist political parties amongst the above-outlined 
setting. Here, I propose the argument that the state disinvestment from its own 
masculinist discourses, which sustained the militarist face of nationalism and the 
broader social undermining of these discourses, has given space to the reiteration of 
masculinist militarist discourses by ultra-nationalist movements; a discursive response 
to the perceived notion of feminisation of the national struggle. 
 
7.2. Looking back: the Cyprus Problem, the post-war national struggle and G.C. 
masculinity  
The post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity underpinned the 
national struggle against ‘occupation’. This section will provide an account of the role of 
masculinity in post-war Cyprus because, in attempting to give any account of G.C. 
masculinity, we are immediately directed to the deep-rooted link with the turbulent 
histories that have marked this island and the post-war nationalist and militarist 
discourses, inextricably tied to the army and conscription.  
The continuing presence of ‘enemy’ troops on Cypriot soil in Cyprus’ modern history 
(both the British colonisation of Cyprus and Turkish ‘occupation’) has endowed 
masculinity with armed patriotic quality. Specifically, in post-war Cyprus masculinity has 
been entangled with the national problem of the upkeep of a certain identity, and has 
been used both culturally and structurally by the power system, which has, in certain 
ways, relied on it for its operation. Popular and hegemonic notions of masculinity have 
unquestionably been shaped by these histories.  
In fact, in the collective G.C. nationalist imagination (Anderson,1983) the perceptions, 
every-day behaviours, and the discourses that shape and articulate the daily politics of 
229 
 
 
masculinity have been directly connected with major historical events. These have 
deposited various layers of meaning to masculine acts, masculine behaviour, and, more 
generally, gender performance (Butler, 1990; Goffman, 1976). Indeed, Kovitz (2003) 
has observed that war and conflict are highly gendered and military roles tend to be 
constituted as normative for men as opposed to women. Militarised models of 
masculinities draw from a more general stock of ideas about what constitute ‘‘manly’’ 
traits, aspirations, and behaviours (Nagel, 1998). In the context of post-war Cyprus, 
these traits were connected to the struggle for national liberation. 
The hegemonic masculinity observed in Cyprus in the post-war years can be 
understood better as a militarised masculinity. Theorists have employed the term 
‘militarised masculinities’ to refer to the types of identities that militarised societies and 
organisations constitute for men (see e.g., Higate 2003a, 2003b). For example, Ashe 
(2012: 7) argues that in Northern Ireland after partition, the struggles around the 
constitutional status generated a range of militarised roles for men.  
 
After the partition in Cyprus, the broader and official understanding of the conflict as one 
of invasion and ‘occupation’ involved a discourse of national feminisation in which a 
particular version of femininity was used to symbolise the nation as a victim and in need 
of protection; depicted through the metaphor and image of a suffering woman awaiting 
liberation (Anthias, 1989: 155) and symbolised through the mothers of the missing 
persons (Yakinthou, 2008). This was discursively responded to with the militarist 
masculinisation (Brittain, 1989) of the national struggle for liberation, which generated a 
range of militarised roles for men. A central example of this is that the importance of 
men’s military conscription to G.C. masculinity (and femininity) was set against what is 
threatened and to be protected. As Cynthia Enloe (1993) discussed, the cultural politics 
of militarised masculinity involve selective deployment of femininity corresponding to 
militarised masculinity. Nationalism and militarism, as discussed in the chapter on 
nationalism, are discourses that often invoke the feminine victim and masculine 
protector, which coincide with broader patriarchal structures of active masculinity of the 
fighter versus the passive femininity of the victim (for example see Massad's,1995 
discussion on Palestinian nationalism). This discrepancy is central to the masculine 
conceptualisation of the G.C. national struggle. 
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Memories of the war events and the invasion and ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus were 
entrenched in the nationalist discourse, articulated through victimcy, where femininity, 
was used explicitly in the first part of the most prominent post-war slogan ‘I do not forget 
and I struggle’. This campaign constituted a symbolic means of sustaining the memory 
of the traumatic events using the iconic image of the mothers of the missing persons 
relentlessly suffering and in need of deliverance, (Yakinthou, 2008; Christou, 2006: 295; 
Anthias, 1989: 155). Here, I argue that similarly, the national struggle for liberation (thus 
‘I struggle’) was a masculinist project, which included the masculinist militarist 
assertiveness of the Cypriot state and people over the ‘occupation’ forces and it was an 
issue ascribed only to men. Hadjipavlou (2006: 330) argues that, in Cyprus, issues such 
as victimhood, truth, human rights violations and justice acquire a mono-focal, 
masculinist meaning. Furthermore, Christou (2006: 289) argues that when the slogan 
was modified from ‘I do not forget’ to ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ this “new version, 
which includes a positive stance (I struggle) was perceived by teachers as a more 
affirmative and dynamic assertion of the goals of the educational system”. 
It is central in the analysis that follows to highlight the interpretation of feminisation as 
devaluation of a certain understanding of the national struggle in the G.C. nationalist 
discourse. The broader ideology of defence, discussed in the previous chapter, that 
mobilised the construction of the ‘nation-in-arms’; was a defensive model of military 
readiness, assertion of military strength, protest of the ‘occupation’ and the promise that 
the lost territory would be regained; ‘not forgetting’ and ‘keep struggling’. More 
specifically, the post-war body politic focused on and demonstrated military virility and 
prowess in the national struggle through its construction as a ‘nation-in-arms’. This 
‘defence’ stance was a joint effort by state and community to avoid being perceived as 
weak and feminine in comparison with the emasculating faits accomplis of ‘occupation’. 
These faits accomplis, as discussed earlier, are: being invaded by Turkey- a significant 
military power in the middle-east-; losing a significant part of territory with the NG 
defeated; living in fear of another military offensive by Turkey. Any attempt to negotiate 
or compromise was interpreted by all involved in this masculinist national struggle as a 
sign of weakness or retreat from a position of rightfulness and steadfastness, a stance 
that is later on in this chapter interpreted through the theorisation of nationalist 
militarised masculinity. This masculine construction of the national struggle was 
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opposed to an effeminacy marked by retreat, submissiveness and acceptance that the 
territory ‘occupied’ by Turkey was lost forever; thus no longer ‘occupied’. Therefore, 
against this was set the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. I argue that mobilising 
metaphors and slogans of nationalist movements reflect the fundamental assumptions 
of nationalist thought, which establishes the future gender constitution and gender roles 
of nationalist agents. 
This muscular militarist nationalism, as I will now proceed to discuss, provided a version 
of the national struggle that was linked to heroic and military masculinities. These 
masculinities in the nationalist militarist post-war culture become the hegemonic model 
of masculinity and acted as an arena for ‘‘achieving’’ masculinities (see Higate 2003a 
and Collier  2002: 44).  
The ideology of defence provided a clear separation of gender roles. The closed-border, 
which has been open since 2003, was the platform on which the co-constitution of 
masculinity and femininity of the post-war nationalist discourse was manifested and 
illustrates how both G.C. men and women were ideologically engaged in the symbolism 
and defence of the ‘mother victim’ Cyprus. The guarding of the border, as I also 
discussed in the previous chapters, was a promise of the heroic praxis of the ‘nation-in-
arms’; that the vulnerable and victimised G.C. community would remain intact in the 
face of the ‘enemy-within’ ‘occupying’ North Cyprus whilst fighting for liberation (I 
struggle). Therefore, while the mothers and wives of the missing persons on the border 
holding the photos of their loved ones served as an ideological mobilisation of 
sustaining the memory of the trauma suffered by Cyprus (‘I do not forget’) men had 
another role to undertake; that of defending and protecting the “nation” whilst fighting for 
liberation, (‘I struggle’).  
 
National heroes, masculinity and the national struggle  
Notions of defence, heroism and returning back to the ‘occupied’ territory were central 
discourses of the post-war G.C. hegemonic masculinity and national struggle. The 
continuing ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus by Turkey meant perpetuation of the divide 
that, within the nationalist discourse, was continuing to validate the masculinist national 
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struggle, which was directly linked to the hegemonic model of masculinity. This had the 
effect of fostering and sustaining a very specific nationalist version of heroic military 
masculinity of the ‘nation-in-arms’. I refer to military and heroic masculinity in this 
chapter as central components of the post-war G.C. hegemonic masculinity which has 
been an integral part of the construction of the ‘nation-in-arms’. 
 
In post-war G.C. society the projection, exemplification and honouring of the acts of 
certain national heroes though part of the construction of the cultural ideological basis of 
the collective national struggle have been discourses of an assertive defensive 
militarism. Therefore these discourses of the ‘defence’ part of the ‘struggle’ were 
conductive to the heroic praxis of an everyday organised, mobilised and technologically 
advanced type of ‘nation-in-arms’.   
 
Ideals of national heroes in the milieu of the national struggle framed certain forms of 
masculinity as signifiers of collective resistance and liberation. As Connell (1990: 94) 
argues “the pattern of masculinity must have exemplars who are celebrated as heroes” 
so that hegemonic masculinity is enacted and re-enacted through authoritative symbolic 
activity. In post-war Cyprus through political, public and state institutional mobilised 
discourses (specifically in schools and the army) heroic figures embodied and 
exemplified a narrative between a very central medium of the collective national 
struggle for liberation and the achievement of G.C. masculinity through the notion of 
‘everyday ordinary heroes’. The successive governments of Cyprus following the events 
of 1974 sought to educate generations through an educational curriculum that relied 
heavily on nationalist constructions honouring national heroes (see Christou 2006: 294). 
The remembrance of heroic figures of previous national struggles (see Koureas, 2012 
for discussion on heroism and the anti-colonial struggle) has been conducive to an 
everyday organised type of ‘nation-in-arms’.  
At this level, ‘defence’ has been an everyday consumed ideology in which this particular 
type of heroism is a normative component of post-war G.C. hegemonic masculinity. This 
heroic masculinity exemplified in the national struggle has framed G.C. hegemonic 
masculinity through the understanding of ‘everyday ordinary heroes’ who do their 
military service, then become reserves and then militia (I struggle). Women, as 
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discussed above, acquired the role of memory keepers (I do not forget), supporters of 
the struggle and pain bearers. As Oberschall (2007: 23) writes, in relation to Israel, that 
in “ethnically divided societies, members of each ethnic group trust their separate 
authorities … look for guidance to their own community, and admire heroes who 
sacrificed themselves for their group”.  
Connell and Messerschmidt (2005:  32) argued that hegemonic masculinity “was not 
assumed to be normal in the statistical sense; only a minority of men might enact it, but, 
it was certainly normative. It embodied the currently most honoured way of being a man; 
it required all other men to position themselves in relation to it.” In this G.C. ideological 
script, heroic figures such as Auxentiou and Palikarides, who died at the hands of the 
British whilst fighting in the anti-colonial struggle against the British rule, signified the 
purest form of heroism. Further significant examples are the heroes of the 1821 Greek 
war of independence from Ottoman rule. Taken together, such heroes were portrayed 
as models of masculinity against the Turkish aggressor, and became discursive 
expressions of hegemonic masculinity rooted in narratives of successful liberation.  
Yet, the narratives of the deaths of Tasos Isaak and Solomos Solomou on the border 
(1996), whilst they became a discursive continuation of the narratives of heroism 
presented above, bear a special symbolism in G.C. nationalist discourse. As 
Hadjipavlou (2006: 333) reminds us, the Line has acquired both a symbolic and a 
physical presence in daily life. These two men, who have been broadly considered to be 
the two most recent heroes of Cyprus, were killed on the border following the 
Motorcyclists’ March (see appendix 11), by the ‘occupation’ forces, whilst protesting 
against the Turkish ‘occupation’ of northern Cyprus and demanding liberation. Following 
these events, these two men were exemplified as heroic idols in political and public 
discourse.  Their deaths on the border became a symbolic exemplification of the 
collective active struggle for protest and liberation from Turkey’s military ‘occupation’ of 
northern Cyprus, (see Christou 2006: 296).  
 
More specifically, photos of Solomou climbing the Turkish flagpole and Isaak being 
beaten to death on the border today appear as large photographic displays attached to 
main crossing points on the border. They have been extensively used as a symbol of 
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protest against Turkey's military ‘occupation’ of northern Cyprus and became a key 
symbol of struggle and resistance in political discourse. A speech given by the Minister 
of Agriculture, Natural Resources and the Environment, Fotis Fotiou (6th August 2006) 
who after became the Minister of Defence, at the memorial of the two men clearly 
illustrates the above point: “That afternoon that black Sunday of August, Tassos Isaak 
who was lying in blood beside the borders …  became a symbol of bravery and 
struggle ... With awe we remember today Solomos Solomou the hero-martyr climbing 
up the flagpole to remove the Turkish flag from its mast … he overcame fear and 
refused forever the occupation.” Also, several prominent Greek composers and singers 
dedicated songs to them portraying them as symbols of struggle for liberation (for 
example see appendix 12).  
 
Within the nationalist discourse, narratives about soldier heroes are both underpinned 
by and vigorously reproduce conceptions of gender and nation as unchanging essences, 
(Dawson, 1994: 1). As Onoufriou, (2009: 268) writes, heroic masculinities can take 
many forms in contemporary Cyprus and the young soldier in a land of conflict is 
unquestionably ‘a real man’ with courage and physical strength. In the milieu of the 
national struggle heroic masculinist values and ideals such as fearless determination for 
liberation and courage were projected against the ‘occupation’ to cultivate the organised 
governing marshalling of ideology for the production of a body politic that is militarised 
and protests, demands and is determined for defence and liberation from the 
‘occupation’ forces.   
 
Military service and masculinity  
The military service has, in post-war Cyprus, been a focal axis; interconnecting 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity, since it bears the responsibility of socialising all 
G.C. men in the roles demanded of them by the political leadership, state and G.C. 
community since the division of the island (1974). The ‘nation-in-arms’ ideologically 
constructed through the notion of ‘everyday ordinary heroes’ was relying wholly on an 
extensive universal male military service. Men, who in post-war Cyprus were 
understood to hold in their hands the part of the ‘I struggle’ slogan, were directly 
involved in the project of the national struggle; conscripted to the army from the ages of 
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18-55. Military masculine identities are created and sustained in the armed forces and 
the societies in which they operate (Higate, 2003a).  
The defence of the border was a masculinist project of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and part of 
the constant ‘gender practice’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). The ideology of 
defence with discourses of high investment in defence, military readiness and the 
commitment of the conscripts and reserves in ‘defence’ ensured that the border would 
not be overthrown by the perceived strength of the military ‘enemy’ understood to be 
threatening occupation of the whole of the island.. A similar masculinisation of national 
struggle occurred in Palestine (see Massad, 1995: 473). The Zionist ‘enemy’ was 
masculinised and Palestinian nationalists were urged to equal the ‘enemy’ in martial 
prowess and muscular strength as they defended Palestine; a nation embodied as a 
woman, (see also Moon, 2005a: 79 who described a similar case in the context of South 
Korea).  
Military service, and the training it entails, has been persistently identified in many 
countries as an effort of the state to instil the national ethos and civic consciousness 
(Enloe 19 0; Segal 19 9; Gill 1997), and aims to ‘teach’ the masculinity demanded by 
the national army, (see Baritz 1985: 171; Gill 1997; Kaplan 2006: 135). The Cyprus 
National Guard is a type of ‘total institution’ (Goffman 1961: xiii), which has, since 1964, 
conscripted and thus ‘cut off from the wider society’ all able-bodied G.C. men in military 
service for approximately two years. Therefore, its role in defining and reproducing G.C. 
masculinity is seen as paramount. The NG is “the primary institutional site of hegemonic 
masculinity where turning out ‘ideal’ G.C. males is the ultimate goal” (Philaretou, Phellas 
and Karayianni, 2006: 76). This is to train and socialise males that will ‘defend’ and ‘(I) 
struggle’ to liberate the ‘occupied’ part of Cyprus from the heavily armed ‘enemy within’ 
as part of on-going and unresolved national conflict ‘problem’.  
 
The ideas of serving for one’s country, defence and liberation were specific masculinist, 
militarised notions of the ‘nation-in-arms’ that had a key role to play in constituting the 
hegemonic model of G.C. masculinity in post-war G.C. society. Within these ideological 
and discursive post-war structures the military service has been set as the main rite-of-
passage (Goffman, 1963) of transforming ‘boys’ into ‘men’, (see Arkin & Dobrofsky, 
197 ; Kaplan, 2006: 135; Baritz, 19 5:171). The common G.C. saying ‘he will go to the 
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army and become a proper man’ (in Greek: θα πάει στρατό να γίνει άντρας) clearly 
evokes this transformation of boys into men.  
 
These associations between masculinity and the army in post-war Cyprus extended 
outside the military barracks into wider society where the army assumed a primary role 
in shaping images of masculinity in the larger society and thus mobilised the military 
service as an essential part of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and of becoming a G.C. man. 
Therefore, any changes in the hegemonic masculinity in Cyprus identified in and out of 
the military barracks are argued to illustrate a change in the ideals of masculinity and 
the understanding of the struggle.  
The openings that have occurred along this border and the new EU understanding of 
the national struggle place these masculinist discourses, co-constitutive of post-war 
nationalism and militarism, at stake.  
 
7.3. The transition of a state towards a European masculinity  
The successive governments of the RoC, as discussed in the previous chapter, have, 
following the opening of the borders and the accession of Cyprus to the EU, changed 
some of the assertive masculinist ideological mobilisations and projections of military 
prowess. These have been asserted as part of the ideology of defence against the 
‘occupation’ forces since the partition of the island. Here, I wish to advance the 
argument put forward in the previous chapter by illustrating that this ‘stepping back’ from 
ideological mobilisations and projections of ‘defence’ was also a ‘stepping back’ from a 
certain masculinist assertion of Cyprus entangled in this militarism.  
 
The state is itself gendered in quite precise and specifiable ways (Connell, 1990). The 
specific hegemonic masculinity observed in post-war Cyprus has been attendant to this 
type of organisational power of the state (Rai, 2002 and Elias J., 2007), which sought to 
create a ‘nation-in-arms’. Therefore, it is argued that studying the changing masculinist 
mobilisations of militarism by the state assists us also in understanding the changing 
G.C. hegemonic masculinity, as the operation of localised gender regimes is something 
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that cannot be fully comprehended without also focusing on the mediating and 
supporting role of the state (Rai, 2002). 
 
The masculine prowess of militarism is a dominant and common assertion of national 
character. State power, nationalism and militarism have been repeatedly argued to be 
best understood as masculinist projects, involving masculine institutions and activities 
(see Pateman, 1989; Connell, 1995 and 1990). Therefore, gender ideology at the heart 
of nationalist and militarist thought has been central to discussions on the impact of 
assertive nation building processes (Saigol, 1998). Assertive militarised states can be 
observed in many divided societies like Israel and formerly Apartheid South Africa, 
which, like Cyprus, have been accompanied by a ‘nation-in-arms’ model (see Uri Ben-
Eliezer, 1995; Conway D., 2008).  
 
In post-war Cyprus, successive governments asserted the state as a masculinist 
militarist entity with vast investment and devotion to the NG; constructing a highly 
militarist masculine struggle alongside the political, with both struggles set against the 
border and therefore the ‘occupation’. The virile ideology of ‘defence’ that, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, has been the internal mobilisation of the ‘Janus face’ that post-
1974 governments mobilised, was supported and manifested through masculine 
discourses personified in the RoC. These masculine discourses were previously used to 
support the legitimacy of the state in the national struggle that called for the ‘nation-in-
arms’ to identify with struggle by acting as the protector of the ‘‘free areas’’ of Cyprus 
and the community. This masculinist ideology of defence was materialised through the 
development and projection of a strong G.C. military presence vis-à-vis the occupying 
powers. Military identity is traditionally maintained by means of symbols, rituals, and 
ceremonies (Juznic, 1993). This masculinist military assertion of the state against the 
‘occupation’ forces exhibited publicly, amongst other ways, through regular military 
parades and exercises, was symbolically clear through slogans used in the NG; 
predominantly ‘A Good Turk is a Dead Turk’.  
 
The masculine state fell into crisis, in the nexus of the new dynamics in which it entered 
since the opening of the borders. The European Cypriot state with open borders, in light 
of the on-going negotiations for the reunification of the island and the changing 
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understanding of the ‘I struggle’, wished to show a less assertive nationalist militaristic 
face and a more reconciliatory and European face. This intrinsically involved ‘stepping 
back’ from certain assertive masculinist, militarist, ideological arguments manifested in 
the state apparatus, as it needed to appropriate a different ideological language.  
 
The successive governments of Cyprus that, since 2003, have started to relinquish the 
construct of the state in arms have also relinquished, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, a lot of the public illustrations of military prowess, as they proceeded with 
systematic cancellations of military parades and exercises. Parades are understood to 
be ‘displays of collective strength, of communal unity and of political power’ (Jarman, 
2003: 93). Furthermore, they relinquished the insistence of the state on the readiness of 
the ‘nation-in-arms’ and prohibited the army of ‘othering’ the ‘other’, in the way it did 
previously. This provides a contrast to other divided societies where the masculine state 
fell into crisis as a response to the destabilisation of gendered binaries on which 
nationalism rested. For example, Conway, D. (2008) provided an analysis of Apartheid 
South Africa where she argued that the state had constituted itself as a masculine entity 
in crisis and deployed a number of gendered discourses to negate objectors to the 
military service.  
 
However, these policies, which have aimed to ‘step back’ from the post-war masculinist 
aggressive militarism, stand today in contradiction to the construction of the purpose of 
the force; to guard the border from the ‘enemy within’. This specific construction of the 
‘enemy’ as discussed in previous chapters was presented by the state in the post-war 
years as the dangerous hyper masculine Turk. The words of General Pandreou are 
evocative of the impact that this ideological ‘stepping back’ has had on young men’s 
identification with the ‘nation-in-arms’: 
“They don’t create the right conditions in order to be able to explain to the 
soldiers exactly why they have to serve in the military. That’s where the problem 
is and it doesn’t depend on the soldiers. It’s up to the government and the entire 
system, because it’s the system that needs to keep you on the alert and give you 
a reason to stay.” 
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Clearly the word ‘alert’ here is particularly illustrative of the specific masculinist 
militarism relying on the notion of the need for preparedness of the ‘nation-in-arms’ 
against the perceived threat. Some of my interviewees from the public also used the 
example of the cancellation of military parades and exercises to articulate that the 
government has ‘stepped back’ from its displays of military power in recent years. As 
Dimitris (man, 27, travel agent) comments in disappointment:  
 
“I heard that they stopped organising the parades and exercises because they 
claim that the cost is high. Every country in the world has military parades 
because it’s a demonstration of power.” 
 
In the accounts of some of my interviewees, who most often were particularly interested 
in military issues, the criticism of the undermining of this type of masculinist assertion of 
militarism under these changes was clear. For example, Giorgos’ (man, 4 , 
entrepreneur) account clearly depicts this picture: 
 
“If you have an ‘enemy’ and you don’t fanaticise your soldiers against this 
‘enemy’, what do you expect that they will do? Play with their dolls?”  
 
I argue that the softening of the post-war masculinist militarist assertive ideology of the 
state by successive governments has contributed to the weakening of post-war 
masculinist and militarist discourses of the national struggle in society discussed 
throughout this chapter.  
 
The weakening ideology of ‘defence’ is now calling for the professionalisation of the 
force. The community is becoming disengaged from the idea of itself as a ‘nation-in-
arms’ and is supporting this professionalisation. In this situation, even though a 
masculinist language was again asserted by the government when dealing with draft-
dodging and thus in its attempt to re-mobilise the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, the 
masculinist militarist post-war evocation of the state was not reiterated and the state has 
not re-constituted itself as a masculine entity in the form that it previously did. 
Individualism, as this chapter will further illustrate, transverses civil-military relations. In 
this space the civil domain that clearly still supports the need for a potent army is 
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exerting pressure on the state to assume a greater role in sustaining the militarist frame 
of the national struggle. The government, as discussed in the previous chapter, is now 
preparing a policy for gradually professionalising the force. The state has, therefore, 
now started to become reliant on military technological developments and the 
specialisation of labour in order to replace the commitment of the community to ‘defend’ 
itself.  
 
It appears that the state intends to take up the complete masculinist military role through 
an approach distinct from social and cultural mobilisation. Through rebuilding the army 
on its own with professional soldiers and technology it will embody the role of the 
modernis0ed protector against ‘occupation’. I suggest that in the scope of the above 
developments this process will assert less pressure on individuals to perform (Butler, 
1990) militarised gender roles, which as this chapter will illustrate are already 
significantly weakening. The next section will discuss the moving away of G.C. 
hegemonic masculinity from its militarised side following certain political and cultural 
developments.  
 
7.4. Destabilisation of a militaristically built hegemonic masculinity  
In this section I will argue that G.C. hegemonic masculinity has been in an intensified 
process of changing since the opening of the borders; moving away from the traditional 
post-war heroic military masculinity that was part of the masculinist militarist national 
struggle for liberation. Masculinities created in specific historical circumstances are 
liable to reconstruction, and any pattern of hegemony is subject to contestation, in which 
a dominant masculinity may be displaced (Connell, 1998). The nationalism chapter 
illustrated a perceived undermining of the ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle 
following the opening of the borders. The chapter on militarism addressed the militarist 
framing of the undermining of ‘fighting spirit’. Here, I discuss the issues of masculinity 
entangled in this process undermining the ‘fighting spirit’. Drawing on my fieldwork 
research, I will illustrate this as a case in post-2003 Cyprus in three main ways. I will 
first discuss the influence that western capitalist and neoliberal ideals of male identity 
and success have had on G.C. hegemonic masculinity in order to culturally 
contextualise the discussion that will follow. Then, I will argue that the value of male 
241 
 
 
military service has been not only been undermined in G.C. society, but also that what 
military service represents to those who serve in terms of masculinity has, to an extent, 
become an experience that has become disconnected from the national struggle. Lastly, 
I will illustrate the social acceptance of the changing masculinity through discussing the 
changing relationship between the Cypriot family and the idea of the ‘nation-in-arms’ as 
well as the discounted value of heroism in society.  
 
7.4.1 Western influences on military masculinity in Cyprus                        
Here, I will argue that the weakening ideology of defence, discussed in the previous 
chapter, which is now calling for the change of the force into a semi or fully professional 
force, underpinned by a strongly emerging G.C. culture of individualism, has also been 
undermined by an emerging hegemonic masculinity that is indeed directly informed by 
individualism.  
Today, the emergence of the new understanding of society as made up of rights-
bearing individuals focused on their own personal goals arguably threatens the idea of a 
unified community committed, as a ‘nation-in-arms’, to the national struggle. In post-war 
Cyprus the specific militarist hegemonic masculinity has been part of the idea of the 
unified community predicated on the national struggle for liberation from ‘occupation’. 
These ideas, as argued above, unfold against the broader G.C. nationalist construction 
in which certain heroic military traits of hegemonic masculinity were already shaping the 
cultural milieu since the action of EOKA against the British rule of the island.  
The increasing influence of globalised capitalist neoliberal values on Cypriot society was 
repeatedly and strongly said by my interviewees to undermine the motivation of young 
men in the national struggle. In previous chapters it has been illustrated that the greater 
acceptance of cultural pluralism and individualism and strengthening of capitalist 
consumerist and materialist values has contributed to the increasing focus of G.C. 
society on the individual’s rights, goals and success. This social focus is part of the new 
privileging understanding of society, made up of such entrepreneurial, image-oriented 
individuals focused on their professional success and personal benefits, that is 
challenging the subordination of individual considerations to collective goals of the 
community, thus most centrally the national struggle.  
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Indeed, social scientific studies of globalisation have called for greater awareness of the 
way in which local hegemonic masculinities are shaped by the articulation of gender 
systems with global processes (Connell, 2005: 849; Connell, 1998; Elias & Beasley, 
2009). I adopt Connell’s (199 : 16) perspective, which puts forward the argument that, 
in developing countries, the processes of globalisation have opened regional and local 
gender orders to new pressures for transformation. Therefore, to understand local 
masculinities, we must think in global terms. This was depicted particularly clearly in the 
account of the military officer (40) who was responsible for my fieldwork in the army, 
and whilst elaborating on draft-dodging commented that:  
 
“Lately, this issue has been troubling Cyprus as well as many other counties. The 
society is changing, we are a European country, there are more individuals’ 
rights but young men don’t see it from the correct point of view. They think that 
by not serving in the army, they are gaining more rights and freedom. This issue 
is not just an issue of the military; it’s political as well.”  
 
Kyriacos Mauronikolas, Minister of Defence when Cyprus entered the EU, commented 
with emphasis that soldiers feel injustice because in many other countries of the E.U. 
men don’t serve military service and made clear the Ministry’s wish to reduce it to: 
 
“a period of time which will not be a drawback to the future plans of our young 
men.” 
 
Post-1974 hegemonic masculinity has framed the national struggle and this current 
changing understanding of society has implications on the role of men in the struggle. 
The above accounts are evocative of the impact of the emerging Cypriot culture of 
individualism conditioned through the global capitalist neoliberal, materialist and 
consumerist culture focused on one’s rights and personal goals, which in turn decrease 
the value of serving military service as perceived by young men. Interviewees 
systematically commented on and criticised this cultural shift and the impact it has on 
men’s identity; directly deposing the ‘masculine-proper’ role of men in the national 
struggle and being counter-exclusive to the ‘fighting spirit’ of men, thus somewhat 
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preventing men from identifying with the ‘nation-in-arms’. Maria’s (woman, 27, translator) 
account presents this reality raised by most interviewees with a lot of clarity: 
“Because of the modernisation of society, young men don’t have national values 
and ideals anymore so I think that the undermining of national conscience is a 
part of the modern progressive society”.  
Miranda’s’ (woman, 37, actor) account makes this point regarding de-identification 
clearer: 
“I don’t want to undermine the male identity of our generation in Cyprus but I 
think that they are growing up in a society that doesn’t offer enough concerning 
the cultivation of their national spirit and their personality. Most of them are losing 
this type of identity.” 
The motivation of individuals from current personal benefits and their primary reliance 
on themselves is part of the changing military values, (Kotnik & Kopac, 2002). These 
are clearly contrary to the values of a military organisation, which is based on 
collectivism and camaraderie and commitment to the common good (Janowitz, 1960). 
Often interviewees’ accounts were specifically clear of the contrast between the 
individualistic identity of young men and the commitment of the community to the 
‘nation-in-arms’. Giannos (man, 58, owner of local dry-cleaning shop) who is an older 
militia explains his experience:  
 
"Young men are spoiled … When I went to the army as a reservist there were 
some young soldiers in the camp who I noticed were very self-centred and they 
only cared about their own interest." 
 
This attitude of individualism was often linked to the phenomenon of draft-dodging 
which diverted young men away from the national struggle, which was understood as 
the ‘common good’. Therefore, individualism in this context was most often criticised. 
Maria (woman, 27, translator), further elaborates on this:  
 
“Their goal is to have fun, make money, and to live their lives without worrying 
too much and then comes the rest (the Cypriot problem etc.).” 
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This impact of the broader Westernised capitalist culture on male identification with the 
military service, thus the ‘nation-in-arms’, is a reality that has been repeatedly raised by 
political leadership. As Giannakis Omhrou (Γιαννάκης Ομήρου), head of the Cypriot 
parliament at the time, states on 9th June 2009 when parliament met to discuss the 
issue of draft-dodging, (see Parliamentary minutes on Draft-Dodging 2009):  
 
“In order to have an accurate interpretation of this phenomenon, which has 
developed into a plague for the Defence of Cyprus, we should identify the causes 
of this broader crisis of moral values within Cypriot society … the acclamation of 
easy money making and rampant consumerism as social values, as well as the 
attempt to deplore the patriotic morale and devaluate ‘defence’ as unnecessary 
and futile…” 
 
Interviewees most often condemned this cultural shift and the impact this has had on 
the young men who choose professional and financial success and a comfortable life at 
the expense of the national struggle. Similarly, Christou (2006: 293 - 294) notes that the 
public school students she talked with “doubted that anyone would want to jeopardise 
these comforts in order to regain what was lost.” The adoption of Western male role 
models by the G.C. community was further strongly contrasted to the decline of national 
heroes as role models by the ultra-nationalist political formations I spoke to. The 
representative of ELAM comments with great disappointment that these role models, 
who favour individual success over the community, are ‘sick’ from Western values. 
These role models are part of the capitalist and consumerist society that prevails in 
Cypriot society because of the lack of a national education which turns private 
individuals into citizens who care for the community, for the nation and who would be 
willing to assert themselves for community and be sacrificed as heroes to protect it: 
 
“In 1955 young people, 16-17 year olds [translators note: referring to the heroes 
of the anti-colonial struggle] would give up their lives, grab a gun and go to the 
mountains. They would put themselves in danger for their ideals. Nowadays, they 
are not role models, for many role models are imported; a well-paid football 
player” 
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Even though this Westernised type of individualist male ideal was generally treated with 
criticism from my interviewees, whether directly linking this to the national struggle or 
not, both men and women, in the vast majority of cases, used the same characteristics 
noted above to describe who they consider to be the ideal successful G.C. male. This is 
a point that illustrates that this type of masculinity was not ascribed to a subordinated 
form of masculinity (Connell, 1987: 186), but rather as directly informing the changing 
hegemonic model. Elina’s (woman, 33, teacher) ideal G.C. male was most typical: 
“Someone who has a job, who can support himself financially, who has a house, a car”. 
Giorogos (man, 48, entrepreneur) similarly and typically suggests: “Someone who has a 
good job, money, a wife, a Mercedes car.”  
 
The above discussion points us to the changing G.C. hegemonic masculinity, which, 
while it is incorporating the Western globalised influences discussed above, is moving 
away from the traditional model of military masculinity. This discussion, has illustrated 
that Connell’s (199 : 17) argument that the more egocentric masculinity of the capitalist 
entrepreneur, which holds the world stage, in many ways holds true in the case of post-
2003 Cyprus. The transnational business masculinity, as Connell (ibid) argues, has had, 
as its only major competitor for hegemony, in recent decades, the rigid masculinity of 
the military, whereas rigid military masculinity has now become a globally fading threat 
(ibid) to the emerging transnational individualist masculinity. The chapter will now 
proceed to illustrate that this process also holds true in post-2003 Cyprus resulting in 
military service not being placed as the chief rite-of-passage for young G.C. men.  
7.4.2 From within the barracks towards a soldier's individual goals for prosperity  
This section will show that the phenomenon of draft-dodging and the undermining of the 
nationalist motivation of soldiers illustrates the changing G.C. hegemonic masculinity 
that is veering away from the normative identification with the ‘nation-in-arms’ that was 
interwoven with the post-war national struggle against the ‘occupation’ forces.  
 
The role of men in the ‘nation-in-arms’ has become obscured under the changing 
understanding of ‘I struggle’, discussed in the militarism chapter, the European 
membership superseding the need for national defence and crossings taking place from 
and to the borders as discussed in the nationalism chapter. The decline in the 
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motivation to serve is particularly closely interconnected with the understanding of the 
EU as a protective power. It was repeatedly evident in my young male interviewees’ 
accounts that the cultural reproduction of ideological legitimisations and militarist 
mobilisations of defence in the fear of another offensive by Turkey was undermined by 
the security brought by the EU accession and the humanisation of the ‘other’ in the 
broader G.C. perception. The changing hegemonic masculinity is also part of the 
broader weakening of the G.C. community, which is giving space to the staging of the 
new understanding of society as made up of goal orientated individuals, then strongly 
manifested in the masculinity of young men. While the ideology of ‘defence’ deteriorated 
and values of heroism, social militancy and the idea of the ‘existential need’ for ‘defence’ 
weakened, the G.C. community at large became significantly disengaged from the idea 
of itself as a ‘nation-in-arms’. In this context, the national struggle ceased to be, to the 
same extent, an issue centred on men, allowing discursive space for G.C. hegemonic 
masculinity to be detached from the conflict situation.  
 
The hegemony of masculinity shaped in Cyprus under these new social and political 
parameters does not strictly pose the military service as a way of contributing to the 
national struggle, whereas the struggle is not understood to be a duty performed by 
men at any cost and thus as a perquisite to Cypriot manhood. Hence, it will be argued 
the military service today is not posed as the chief rite-of-passage (Goffman, 1963) for 
becoming a G.C. man in Cypriot society. Rather, it is the professional and financial 
success that defines a man’s place within the social network and constitutes the rite-of-
passage to the ideal of a successful male. However, the following accounts will also 
expose how, even though there is a certain social compliance towards the changing 
masculinity of men, at the same time when this is placed in the context of the national 
struggle, most often a strong disenchantment is also expressed. This paradox will be 
addressed in the section on nationalist military masculinity.  
 
 
Choosing  not to serve in European Cyprus with open borders  
The post-war hegemonic (Gramsci, 1971) idea of conscription, which was predicated on 
militarised notions of serving for one’s country and defence of the community, began to 
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unravel amongst G.C.s in the context of political, military and social developments in 
Cyprus since the opening of the borders. The growing phenomenon of draft-dodging 
conscription clearly illustrates that the military service is today not a desideratum rite-of-
passage in becoming a G.C. man. Yet its intense emergence has further challenged the 
G.C. axiom that military service should be performed at any cost by men and that it is 
unconditionally a national and male virtue. The words of Nicos (man, 19, student) who 
has just evaded his service clearly illustrate that, for him, serving is not a signifier of his 
masculinity:  
 
“You know, some people told me the classic ‘you should go to the army to 
become a man’ I think that I am more of a man now because I stayed faithful to 
my beliefs, I chose to study instead!”  
 
And Giannis (man, 21, student) who has also draft-dodged, elaborates that:  
 
“They say ‘a man should serve in the army to be a true man’. I think that this 
mentality does not fit in the 21st century.” 
However, even though the above accounts reveal that the military service for these men 
is not an accreditation of their masculinity, there was a strong criticism by interviewees 
from across social and political groups about the phenomenon of draft-dodging. In 
discussing this phenomenon interviewees most often counter-posed the need to serve 
to the discourse of ‘occupation’. As Xristalla (woman, 51, owner of small convenience 
store) commented in criticism: 
“They should not avoid their service since our country is divided, at any moment the 
occupation army can invade the entire country.” 
Also, as a conscript soldier (interviewed within the army) comments:  
“Half of Cyprus is occupied. If people stop serving in the army, they will invade us 
completely.” 
The above accounts are clearly reproducing the ideology of defence in relation to the 
discourse of ‘occupation’. My fieldwork has shown that the majority of interviewees 
produced a certain paradox in their accounts between the broader acceptance of the 
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changing masculinity of men away from military types of masculinity but also a criticism 
when placed in the context of the national struggle, as addressed in the section on 
nationalist military masculinity.   
 
Choosing  to complete one’s military duties in European Cyprus  
Military service for those that do choose to serve is clearly a signifier of masculinity, yet 
as it will be argued here for the most part it is not the traditional type of military 
masculinity previously deeply linked to the ‘nation-in-arms’. The value of serving one’s 
military service, drawing from the interviews I conducted with soldiers (of a number of 
different units) in a brigade of the National Guard in 2011, is chiefly either on the 
grounds of personal development, the legal obligation to serve, the pressure exerted on 
them by their fathers who have served, or due to the national need for defence in order 
to continue the national struggle. Consequently, in the dichotomy of individual and 
collective purpose, most of my participants’ accounts of the decision to serve were 
centred on the ways in which completing their service fitted into the life goals they had 
set as an individual rather than for the ‘common good’, represented by the national 
struggle. This directs us back to the discussion of the breakdown of the unitary G.C. 
community predicated as a ‘nation-in-arms’ and to the emergence of the new 
understanding of society made up of individuals centred on their own personal goals. 
The order in which the conscript soldier (19, interviewed within the army) below 
prioritises his reasons for serving, tells its own story and represents the most prominent 
narrative of the accounts of the soldiers I spoke to:  
 
“It takes courage to manage to complete the military service and also in order to 
be able to work afterwards because, it’s difficult to find a job without the military 
discharge paper. And for my country as well.”  
 
Almost all of the soldiers I spoke to in the NG commented on military service merely as 
another obligation one needs to complete after graduating from school; they highlighted 
this as a valued milestone for developing life-skills, acquiring experiences and maturing, 
and they raised the distancing from home as essential in this process. As a conscript 
soldier (18, interviewed within the army) typically notes:  
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“Basically the first reason is that you learn things that you can’t learn elsewhere 
and the second reason is that most people grow up here and they become more 
mature. That’s it.” 
 
It is indeed often highlighted in studies of army and masculinity that the process of 
becoming a ‘man’ and a ‘soldier’ necessitates that recruits are separated from home. In 
this space of separation the military then strives to instil compliance to military values, 
see for example Gill (1997: 533) who describes this process in relation to the Bolivian 
army. Yet, the masculinity portrayed in these accounts of men personally developing 
through military service was rarely related to the national struggle and thus to ideals of 
heroism, defence and liberation. Furthermore, the ‘maturity’ described by young men 
was not concerned with virility, combativeness or a traditional type of military machismo, 
but with going through a difficult situation without giving up and gaining some life skills 
that will be helpful for them in their own lives. As a conscript soldier (19, interviewed 
within the army) explains:  
 
“You learn to live somewhere alone, somewhere different than your home. You 
learn to live without family; you don’t have your mother to make your bed or to 
cook for you”. 
 
However, a lot of the soldiers I spoke to in the army, whose fathers almost without 
exception had served their military service in post-war Cyprus, commented on the fact 
that they were serving in the NG because they felt direct pressure from their fathers or 
other male relatives to do so, or they felt pressured by the fact that their fathers had 
served their military service and/or fought in the war. They feared that they would have 
perhaps let them down or shamed them by not completing theirs, (the second most 
prominent narrative). For example, a conscript soldier (18, interviewed within the army) 
comments that:  
 
“My father might think, ‘I served in the army for the sake of our country so why 
don’t you’’.  
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Since the war in Cyprus is relatively recent (1974), most conscripts have relatives who 
have fought in the war or directly experienced it. As a conscript soldier (18, interviewed 
within the army) explains: 
 
“So we talked about it and since my dad had experienced the war in 1974, he 
told me he wanted me to enlist.” 
 
The understanding of some older men, which provided a clear articulation of the post-
war role of men in the national struggle, was most often contrasted with a criticism of 
the younger generation of men. Arguably this difference in the wishes of men from 
different generations to be involved in the national struggle illustrates the changing 
hegemonic masculinity. Most conscripts felt pressured by the fact that it was important 
to their father that they do it, and almost all specified that for them it was just the 
pressure rather than heartfelt desire or conviction.  
 
Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the fear of having to face legal sanctions if 
they had not enlisted was mentioned by most of the soldiers I spoke to as a key reason 
determining their decision to serve their military service (third most prominent narrative). 
For example conscript soldier (19, interviewed within the army) said:  
 
“A legal obligation. I felt that I would have problems with the government if I didn’t 
do it.”  
 
Clearly, some soldiers strongly asserted the need to serve in the army due to the 
national struggle, situating it within the discourse of threat and need for defence and 
liberation vis-à-vis the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus. Yet, such accounts were few, 
leaving this narrative as the fourth and least prominent. Typical of this narrative was the 
account offered by this conscript soldier (19, interviewed within the army):   
 
“I did want to serve in the army for all the obvious reasons like the fact that we 
have the Turkish army on the opposite side and they are threatening us etc.”  
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In my research these accounts that represent the least prominent narrative as to why 
soldiers were serving clearly depicted the need for defence against the ‘other’. The 
narratives presented previously are missing this, perhaps, most central value of the 
ideology of defence: the articulation of the ‘threatening other’.  
 
Most often, the accounts of this last narrative evoked the traditional post-war military 
masculinity tied to the national struggle. Thus, for them, serving one’s military duty and 
being militarily trained confirms their masculinity in relation to the national struggle for 
the defence and liberation of Cyprus from the ‘occupation’ forces. For example, as this 
conscript soldier (19, interviewed within the army) comments:  
 
“I found the opportunity here in the army to learn some things so that I will be 
able to react and help my country if something happens in the future.”  
 
While these accounts epitomise the post-war hegemonic meaning of military service, 
the accounts that clearly reproduced this rhetoric were not only few but also often 
showed ambivalence and doubt as to whether the struggle, which also includes them as 
soldiers, is being executed competently. The account of this conscript soldier (19, 
interviewed within the army) clearly depicts this:  
 
“In order to protect the land we have left, and supposedly to protect Cyprus so 
that they won’t invade the other half as well.” [Soldier, 19].  
 
As another conscript soldier (18, interviewed within the army) comments:  
 
“Because I think that the Turks might do something at any moment and I think 
that I want to fight in order to protect Cyprus.”  
 
The paradox that emerges from these accounts is that while these soldiers clearly 
reproduced the discourse of the masculinist nationalist military national struggle, at the 
same they doubted whether the struggle is really actually today in place, as they 
respectively noted: ‘supposedly to protect Cyprus’ and ‘I think that I want to fight’.  
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Furthermore, the accounts of military officers were often clear about the need for and 
their own struggle to reassert the masculinist military purpose to soldiers serving in the 
army through the discourse of national ‘threat’, ‘occupation’ and the ‘need’ for ‘defence’ 
from the ‘enemy within’. A military officer (33, interviewed within the army) rather 
typically elaborates on what he would tell a conscript considering evading his service:  
 
“We are under the occupation of the Turks, the Turkish army is right next to us, 
they threaten us etc. and I think that he would see things differently then.”  
 
Evidently, a significant number of soldiers in the last few years were not convinced of 
seeing this differently and went on to get a deferment, which illustrates that the 
discourse of ‘occupation’, ‘national existential threat’ and the ‘enemy within’ no longer 
present the post-war masculinist role of men in the national struggle to the same extent. 
This provides a contrast to my interviewees accounts presented in previous chapters, 
that when they were faced with an undermined army and ‘fighting spirit’, they asserted 
the discourse of ‘occupation’ and said to feel defenceless. Moreover, in the accounts of 
members of the public, draft-dodging was most often strongly condemned. At the same 
time, the understanding of the changing community and identity of men also most often 
accompanied this. Thus, the support of the army-institution did not necessary translate 
into ‘everyday men’ having a direct role in the national struggle. The disenchantment 
that was expressed in relation to the perceived undermined ‘fighting spirit’ of men and 
the acceptance of the changing masculinity, created a certain contradiction within these 
accounts that is addressed in the section on nationalist military masculinity.   
 
What is emerging through the accounts presented in this section is that, when 
compared to the post-war hegemonic masculinity, the normative masculinity in Cyprus 
is changing in such ways that it is moving away from the national struggle and thus from 
identification of men with the idea of the ‘nation-in-arms’. As illustrated through the 
cases of draft-dodgers or enlisted soldiers, completing one’s military service is not 
posed vis-à-vis the discourse of ‘occupation’ and need for ‘defence’ and ‘liberation’. The 
findings drawn by these two sets of accounts illustrate that both serving and not serving 
is a choice taken chiefly on the grounds of personal development and goals, this 
exemplifies that G.C. hegemonic masculinity is becoming individualistic and further 
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substantiates the argument put forward in the previous chapter that individualism is 
traversing civil-military relations calling for the professionalisation of the force. Therefore, 
also since enlisted soldiers’ (and not only draft-dodgers’) values of conscription are 
chiefly on the grounds of personal development, the initial governmental idea that 
combating draft-dodging revives the national struggle is patently false. These findings 
will now be further illustrated through discussing the changing identification of family, 
which has been the cooperative side of ‘defence’, with the role of men in the national 
struggle.  
 
 
 
 
7.5. Social acceptance of the changing goals and desires of a soldier  
 
The Cypriot family, military barracks and masculinity  
The analysis that will follow seeks to contribute to the overall argument of the chapter by 
linking the steering away of hegemonic masculinity from the identification with the 
‘nation-in-arms’ to the family institution. My argument is that in the scope of the 
changing hegemonic masculinity and the societal cultural shift towards the privileging 
understanding of society as a community consistent of entrepreneurial, rights-bearing 
individuals, we can see a shift that challenges the understanding of a unified community 
committed as a ‘nation-in-arms’ in the national struggle. And, in synergy to the general 
public weakening fear of another military dispute with Turkey and public understanding 
of the undermined condition of the NG, the family institution does not identify to the 
same extent with the national struggle as a man’s duty served at any cost. The priorities 
that G.C. families ascribe for their sons override, to some extent, the collective purpose 
of the national struggle, which the army institution has traditionally mobilised. The family 
institution on the whole has undermined the importance it ascribes to military service. 
Given that the family institution has been central to the mobilisation of the ideology of 
‘defence’ in post-war Cyprus, this change is argued to further undermine the ideology of 
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defence and military masculinity. In putting forward this argument, I will be drawing from 
accounts expressed at political, military and public spheres in order to show that this 
reality has been realised in all three.  
General Pandreou enunciates the above arguments providing a point of departure. He 
comments that young men cannot understand now why they should serve their service; 
they consider it a chore that takes two years from their career path, especially since 
they see everyone else abandoning the army. For their fathers there is also a negative 
reaction, and that even though they have served in the army themselves it was under 
different circumstances, so they believe that it will be better for their children to go 
straight to university: 
“Society has changed, the social institutions are looser. In the past, families were 
more composed, we were all united for our country, we talked about our ideals, 
our nation, family and religion were important, everything was within this strong 
link. Now everything is crumbling and that’s why we have these problems 
[translators’ note: referring specifically to draft-dodging].” 
My interviewees generally saw the European integration for Cyprus and the impact of 
capitalist values discussed above as counter-posing the motivation of families to 
support their son’s conscription, as these matters such as serving in the army are based 
on an ideological ground of the national collective purpose. In the army, the officers I 
spoke to repeatedly noted this as well. As this officer (40, interviewed within the army) 
comments in criticism:  
 
“After our accession to the EU, there have been a lot of changes in our society. 
People’s goals, values and principles start from their family. The financial interest 
has affected our society and our youth. Because of Europe, we are only thinking 
about our rights and we are forgetting about our responsibilities and our debt 
towards our country. People see things differently now."  
 
The above account is clear about the impact of individualism on the attribution of 
importance to military service given by the G.C. family. In my older interviewees’ 
accounts, military service was repeatedly counter-posed to the setback of two years 
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from young men’s career paths. It was not that long ago when families not only 
expected their son to serve, but draft-dodging brought shame and dishonour both to the 
young man and his family. The account of the director of the Health Department of the 
National Guard in an interview he gave to Simerini newspaper in 2012, (see antirrisies, 
2012), supports the above argument: 
“In the past, parents insisted on their children being conscripted. Today, things 
have changed … parents come to us and ask us to discharge their son from his 
military service… There is too much harm done, avoiding conscription is no 
longer considered a shame for society and cannot stigmatise the rest of a 
person’s life.” 
 
Indeed, while most of my interviewees, as illustrated in the previous chapter, supported 
the existence of some type of army and some reported that they would have required 
their son to serve, there was a general acceptance of the changing G.C. male and the 
non-conformity of this ‘new man’ to an almost atavistic type of male activity. Public 
support for the army-institution does not mean inclination that the ‘count me out’ 
inclination among civilians has been overcome, (Kuhlman, 2003). This is supported by 
the account of Glafkos Clerides, Former President of Cyprus who observed: 
“I think that most of the Cypriot people, except the people who live in the rural 
areas, would prefer it if there was no military service so that their children 
wouldn’t lose 2 years from their lives in order to serve in the military and so that 
they wouldn’t go through all the difficulties and dangers that people experience in 
a military force.”  
Indeed parents emphasised the importance they ascribe to their children’s career path. 
A minority of interviewees also provided a clear account that they did not particularly 
see it as a requisite responsibility for their sons to serve his military service. Rather, 
they clearly stated that they would have not put up resistance if their son did not wish to 
serve his military duty or would have even assisted him in avoiding it. For example, as 
Marios (man, 40, graphic designer) comments:  
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“I don’t think that I would mind, I would support him in his decision! I might have 
told him you might have a problem finding a job in the future and things like this, 
but I don’t think that I would care in terms of ‘protecting our country’.” 
 
Nonetheless, as the former President of Cyprus above observes, it should not be 
overlooked that in smaller rural communities the social pressure for serving in the army 
is more sustained than in cities. Many of the officers I spoke to drew associations 
between draft-dodging and one’s social background. While this should not be seen as a 
strong underlying link, associations between social class and draft dogging should still 
be drawn. Social class is a vague and undetermined concept in Cyprus but also a 
concept not often academically used in the context of Cyprus. Social background 
demarcation in Cyprus is predominantly based on simple distinction. Since the island 
has not gone through a significant industrial revolution but has been through a deep 
urbanisation, social class is predominantly defined by one’s origins from the city or 
village, which in conjunction with financial capital and social status define the 
individual’s social hypostasis. Consequently, in popular language, Cypriots use the word 
‘villager’ as an equivalent to working class. Likewise, manners, social behaviours, 
values and preferences associated with socialisation in villages are understood as lower 
culture, whereas, an urban, wealthy and predominantly Western like lifestyle is 
understood as high culture.  
Most often, the officers I spoke to commented on the relative social acceptance of the 
individual’s decision to draft-dodge in cities in contrast to villages. They also commented 
that young men coming from villages, who are used to a less comfortable lifestyle are 
more adaptable to life in the army and do not tend to draft-dodge. Whereas those who 
are more likely to consider not completing their military service mostly come from 
socioeconomic backgrounds that offer them enough financial and professional security, 
as these points affect their decision and influence their future prospects. As an officer 
(32, interviewed in the army) comments:  
“Usually a percentage of maybe 70% of the men who draft-dodge, they are 
people who have a backup, people who know that they don’t have economic 
problems and that their family can support them. They know that if they leave the 
army, they will go abroad to study etc.” 
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Whilst in the past the Cypriot family was a strong link between the army-institution and 
the national struggle, with military service as the affirmation of the family’s social 
hypostasis interwoven with the national struggle, today family constitutes most of all a 
weakening link in this nexus. Characteristically, an officer (32, interviewed within the 
army) commented on the people who try to avoid their service;  
“It’s the families they come from. Family is the weakest link.” 
 
Accepting life  without heroes  
The post-opening of the borders situation in Cyprus illustrates the central undermining 
in the cultural reproduction of heroic ideals within the nationalist discourse, which further 
illustrates the social acceptance of the new goals, desires and objectives of young men. 
The ideal of the heroic praxis of the ‘nation-in-arms’ was constructed on defending the 
border to prevent further Turkish aggression and also desiring to push back the borders, 
constructed by the ‘invasion’ and maintained by the ‘occupation’ forces.  
Discourses of heroism, whilst still mobilised by state institutions, have been significantly 
debilitated after the opening of the borders. This points us to the weakening ideology of 
defence that was constitutive of this type of organised collective heroic masculinity of 
the national struggle set against the border, and to the social acceptance of the 
changing hegemonic masculinity discussed throughout this chapter. It will be argued 
that in the shift towards a non-unified understanding of society, discussed above, the 
decline of social cohesion has been also a decline in social trust (Putnam, 2002) in the 
heroic praxis of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and the role of men within it. The changing 
hegemonic masculinity, therefore, has witnessed a shift also from the identification of 
men to heroic ideals of the unitary ‘nation-in-arms’ and a decline of the trust of the 
community that younger men will follow such ideals.  
While these discourses of national heroes have remained intact, and the state mobilises 
and projects them in exactly the same way as before, the G.C. society is on the whole 
now supporting these ideals of heroism much less. This creates a discernible 
discrepancy between state institutionally mobilised discourses and the reproduction of 
these in the public domain. If one was to visit a state school or a military camp of the 
NG in Cyprus one would observe that such ideals are visually and theoretically present. 
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A discussion that I had with two military non-commissioned officers, (37 and 39, 
interviewed whilst off duty) depicts this situation well:   
 
“Interviewer: When I was in the army, we could see photos of our national 
heroes everywhere in the camp. 
Officer A: Yes, it’s very common to do that. 
Officer B: Yes, no one can tell you not to have the photos of our heroes on the 
walls. Why not? The issue is that the soldiers see these photos and they don’t 
even know why these people are heroes.” 
 
Drawing from the accounts of the people I spoke to, both in and out of the military 
barracks, the ideals and values of heroism that were previously deeply entrenched in 
post-war Cypriot society were noted by most of them to have been undermined. Whilst 
the modern heroes of Cyprus were themselves, in some cases, questioned. Yet, most 
importantly perhaps, what was challenged most often was the possibility that young 
men today would act heroically in the name of liberation from ‘occupation’. The 
statement of the press officer of Front (In Greek: Μετωπο), one of the most right wing 
political youth groups in Cyprus, provides a point of departure:  
“People unfortunately have forgotten… Nowadays, people are settled, they have 
a lot of money; they don’t really care about our national issue. If a father forgets 
our history how would his son care? I don’t think that if Isaak and Solomou died 
today, we would honour them as heroes. People would probably say that they 
were just two crazy extreme nationalists. I don’t believe that the youth cares, 
maybe it’s the money, the good life etc. they have lost their values.” 
 
The above account illustrates multiple realities. The beginning of his statement refers to 
the weakening of ‘I do not forget’ and, thus, the memory of the lost territories. He then 
explains that the current society of Cyprus would have not considered the men (Issak 
and Solomou) who only died some years ago (1996) as heroes. Finally, he proceeds to 
argue that the youth of today no longer cares about the national struggle, because of 
the Western lifestyle and individualism they have lost their values.  
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G.C. hegemonic masculinity is steering away from heroic discourses of masculinity that 
vigorously reproduce the role of men as primordial protectors of the ‘nation-in-arms’ 
willing to sacrifice themselves for the community. This changing masculinity and the 
social consent towards it is the replacement of the idea of the unified heroic ‘nation-in-
arms’, with the Western capitalist idea of a society made up of individuals and also one 
of ‘Europeanness’ (Leonard; 1998). This is the understanding of a ‘Euro-Cypriot’ society 
centred on an individual’s professional and financial success, which is relinquishing, to 
some extent, atavistic attachments (Habermas, 1994 and 1998). Most interviewees 
expressed the belief that today young men are too individualistic and therefore they do 
not trust that in a potential military conflict these young men would be willing to fight or 
sacrifice themselves for the community. This claim, a general and strong agreement 
between interviewees from diverse and distinct social and political sectors, was broadly 
associated with a significant feeling of disappointing defeatism, a reality within the data 
that is addressed in the section on nationalist military masculinity. Andros’ account (42, 
company director) was a typical one: 
 
“No, I do not think that we have the young men we need as a nation today; most 
of them will back down in a potential war. When you see someone that doesn’t 
want to work and who still lives off his parents, do you think he will be willing to 
fight for his country? No!”  
 
Interviewees most often articulated this narrative by commenting that young men would 
not jeopardise their comfortable life for the collective national struggle as their ideals 
and values have become much more individualistic and materialistic. The account of 
Evroula (woman, 30, teacher) clearly points to this reality as the result of a consumer 
society:  
 
“I don’t think that young men would become heroes. Because of the 
modernisation of society, young people don’t care about the Cyprus Problem, 
they just care about themselves and easy money.”  
 
The fading value of heroism from the G.C. community is a reality noted by almost all of 
the people I spoke to. This was treated by a lot of them with a relative disenchantment, 
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which is addressed later on in this chapter. In more detail, on the fading value of 
heroism, the most prominent narrative presented a personal change in the attitude 
towards heroes: from ascribing high emotional importance to indifference. As Miria 
(woman, 25, translator) typically commented:  
 
‘I haven’t thought about heroes in years. When I was learning about our heroes 
at school, I was moved. I remember feeling proud. … As years go by I think that 
these people are forgotten little by little’.  
 
The second most prominent narrative elaborated with criticism that the society is, on the 
whole, shifting away from ideals of heroism and the weakening of community while 
asserting the discourse of ‘occupation’. As Marios (man, 29, engineer) expressed in 
disappointment:  
 
“I feel that it is an element which is missing from our generation. Nowadays it 
would be very difficult for someone to follow the path of our heroes. There are a 
lot of people today who don’t even know who our heroes are, about the Turkish 
invasion, who fought for us to be free today and even though we are still under 
occupation those people have fought for certain ideals in order for us to be able 
to live a better life. People don’t care that much anymore… as years go by, 
people tend to forget our problem.” 
 
The third, less prominent, narrative, explicitly stated that the heroic ideals of self-
sacrificing for the nation have no place in the current G.C. society. As Xristalla (woman, 
51, owner of local convenience store) comments:  
 
“It’s useless to create heroes. We can now do things otherwise. We have lost 
many young people; we have a lot of heroes, that’s enough. I don’t have a son 
but if I did I wouldn’t want him to sacrifice his life for our country.” 
 
It would have been easy here to conclude that the people who expressed this narrative 
are left-wing or strongly support reunification; however this is not the case. Most often 
they explicated an account of almost completely moving away from such ideals after a 
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certain point in their life. Interviewees who seemed to hold left-wing or reconciliatory 
political beliefs were dispersed across the above narratives illustrating most often, on 
the one hand the ingrained nature of such discourses in the post-war culture and, on the 
other hand their intolerance of these in the present situation. Overall the above 
accounts have illustrated a weakening of the value of heroism in the G.C. community 
whilst the difference between the different narratives was how this reality is expressed.  
For institutionally created discourses of heroism to sustainably protract the ascription of 
social and cultural value and thus perpetuate the discourse itself, they necessitate being 
continuously, culturally and socially supported. Thus, while heroism is most often an 
individual act, it is the given culture and time that make heroes possible. The changes 
observed in the public support of the idea of heroes and more broadly heroism, illustrate 
further the undermining of this type of heroic masculinist discourse cultivated in the idea 
of the G.C. community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ predicated on the national struggle and the 
social acceptance of the changing G.C. masculinity. Yet, the case of ‘Isaak and 
Solomou’, who have broadly been considered to be the two most recent heroes of 
Cyprus, is here seen as a platform for further examining the understandings of this 
discourse of heroism in the post-opening of the borders.  
In the beginning of this section the accounts presented reveal the general public 
understanding that followed the death of these two men. This understanding at the 
collective level was short lived. The above accounts today represent one of the least 
prominent narratives presented by my interviewees as regards these two men. Christou 
(2006: 296) has argued in relation to a group discussion she had with students in a 
public school of Cyprus in 2000, thus 11 years before I conducted the qualitative 
research I will precede to draw on, that “these icons [referring to Isaak and Solomou] 
were sometimes questioned as far as their heroic dimension was concerned.” The use 
of the case of ‘Isaak and Solomou’ by a lot of my interviewees to illustrate the dying 
value of heroism was the most prominent narrative in the case of these two men. Whilst 
some of them commented that they personally still respect and feel proud of them, at 
the same time noted that this is not the case for the G.C. community in general. These 
accounts further substantiate the argument put forward here that heroism is a fading 
value in the milieu of the struggle for liberation and does not inhabit a central place in 
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the cultural reproduction of G.C. hegemonic masculinity. For example, Stella (woman, 
25,computer scientist) said she felt proud and that their death was unfair: 
“There aren’t many people nowadays who have this kind of drive. We honoured 
Isaak and Solomou in the beginning it’s true but then nothing. We have forgotten 
them. Now, certainly in Paralimni where they were born, they surely remember 
them and think about them a lot, but this is not the case for Cypriot society in 
general. As years go by I think that these people are forgotten little by little, and 
they are forgotten more easily than the heroes of 1955-1959 [EOKA].” 
Heroism necessitates the act of sacrificing one’s life for the nation but also requires the 
respective national, cultural and social discourses to support that action as heroic, or 
more specifically; it necessitates the discourses that create and maintain the idea of a 
hero out of an individual’s act. The measure of comparison Stella is drawing above with 
EOKA fighters, like Afxentiou and Pallikarides, whose deaths signified the purest form of 
heroism, was systematically used by some of the people I talked to as a way of 
illustrating that these two recent heroes, directly related to the Turkish ‘occupation’ of 
the Northern part of Cyprus, are today the ones that are mostly fading away from the 
conscience of the national struggle. The argument put forward by the press officer of 
Front, quoted at the beginning of this section that if these two men died today “people 
would probably say that they were just two crazy extreme nationalists.”, was a reality 
indeed supported by the accounts of some of my interviewees who often commented 
that these men are young and driven by their adrenaline.  
Heroism as a social discourse necessitates a certain form of social trust and cohesion. 
In post-war Cyprus, heroism directly related to the idea of a unified community as a 
‘nation-in-arms’, which as a social discourse entailed the promise and public trust that 
men as soldiers, reserves or militia would choose to fight and risk dying for the 
community. However, my interviewees’ accounts most often illustrated a significant 
decline in social support of these ideals and this social trust of the heroic praxis of the 
‘nation-in-arms’. This decline has been part of the broader undermining of unitary 
community masculinist assertion of the post-war national struggle.  
In the milieu of the emerging individualist idea of G.C. society, the changing values of 
G.C. hegemonic masculinity are moving away from notions of heroism towards the ideal 
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of an entrepreneurial, ‘Euro-Cypriot’ image and wealth-oriented male. This further 
substantiates the argument put forward in the previous chapter of individualism 
traversing civil-military boundaries, disengaging the community from the idea of itself as 
a ‘nation-in-arms’ and calling for the semi or full professionalisation of the NG. Yet, as 
highlighted above, while this shift has been a widespread understood reality it was most 
often treated with disenchantment, which creates a certain paradox that I will now 
proceed to discuss. 
 
7.6. Criticism invoking anxiety of the community’s own loss of fighting spirit and 
commitment to struggle  
The puzzling contradiction in my interviewees’ accounts between the broader 
resignation at the decline in motivation to serve in the army and the weakening value of 
heroism, and the criticism of these realities provides a point of departure in raising 
certain questions that emerge from specific incongruities within the data. This paradox 
emerges through all of the empirical chapters that, whilst my interviewees’ accounts 
show a broad relative support of the changing national struggle resulting from EU 
pressures and acceptance of their personal disengagement and practices for avoidance 
of the national struggle, at the same time there is a strong discomfort and criticism 
about precisely this disengagement of the G.C. community and the collective practices 
of avoidance. Moreover, interviewees most often specifically criticised young men for 
their practices of avoiding the ‘national male role proper’ to defend the community and ‘I 
struggle’ for liberation of Northern Cyprus from ‘occupation’. What is central here is that, 
in the majority of these accounts, when people were faced with the reality that there has 
been a general shift in the community away from these nationalist militarist masculinist 
ideals constitutive of the national struggle illustrated through the weakened ‘fighting 
spirit’, they expressed strong disenchantment, felt defenceless, and asserted the 
discourse of ‘occupation’. As argued above, this discourse has been tightly linked to the 
understanding of the community needing to be predicated as a ‘nation-in-arms’ in the 
national struggle. However, in these aforementioned and subsequent accounts, the 
strong disenchantment was mostly specifically directed towards men, as in these 
accounts men are understood to hold in their hands the ‘defence’ of the community and 
the ‘I struggle’ for liberation. For example, a typical account illustrating the assertion of 
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the discourse of ‘occupation’ when faced with the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ of men 
was of Marios (male, 40, entrepreneur) who commented in disappointment: 
“No, I don’t think that young men are fighters, they don’t care about the national 
problem. You will meet people who are not refugees and they might tell you ‘I don’t 
care if you ever get your homes back’ [translators’ note: referring to the homes in the 
‘occupied’ part of Cyprus]. I don’t feel that we are ready to fight.” 
Similarly Siliani (woman, 30, teacher) commented that:  
“I think that young men should be more assertive and they should care more about 
our country. They should know more things about our history of occupation” 
Also as Dimitris (male, 44, entrepreneur) asserts:  
“Do you think that the people who served or who are serving in the army now, will be 
able to save us from the ‘occupation’ forces? I don’t feel safe”  
These expressions of popular resentment clearly articulate that most G.C.s continue 
today to hold high expectations when they assess young men’s commitment to ‘defence’ 
and the national struggle. Yet, this creates a paradox to what was illustrated earlier that 
the community has relatively disengaged from the masculinist nationalist military idea 
that in the national struggle it needs to be committed as a ‘nation-in-arms’.  
As explained in  the chapter on militarism it is the security felt under the auspices of the 
EU that has contributed to the undermining of the ideology of defence and its 
concomitant idea of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. Also, in the chapter on 
nationalism, the opening of the borders  was illustrated to have created a familiarisation 
with the ‘other’ contributing to this sense of security. Yet, this paradox becomes stronger 
within the data when observing that the idea of the ‘nation-in-arms’, and therefore the 
perceived necessity of ‘everyday men’ to remain strongly committed to the national 
struggle, has been undermined to the extent that most of my interviewees, of diverse 
political views and age groups, supported the semi or full professionalisation of the force 
and thus the abolition or decrease of military service. At the same time the government 
is designing a plan for a semi-professionalisation of the force and the procurement of 
military equipment that will replace the guards on the borders, (see ΑΝΤ1,2013). These 
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changes supported by the public, as it was discussed in the militarism chapter, were 
proposed as a way of having a potent army and having a military defence from the 
‘occupation’ forces. And, indeed, the government has repeatedly made it clear that 
these will be changes that will not affect security.  
Moreover, the broader support of the changing ‘struggle’ towards an EU solution has 
been illustrated as an undermining of the public need for a strong commitment of men in 
the national struggle. Furthermore, the ontological security offered by the NG, as the 
above accounts also reveal, has been illustrated to not translate into public support for a 
conscript army and, hence, support for the involvement of ‘everyday men’ in the army. 
Therefore, it appears that this notion of security is not one that necessitates men to 
reproduce the post-war heroic and military types of masculinity. Yet, a certain paradox 
emerges from within the data as; firstly, the perceived undermined ‘fighting spirit’ of men 
seems to be translated as a dispirited national struggle; secondly, the perception of the 
weakened ‘fighting spirit’ of men fires-up the discourse of ‘occupation’, which in this 
context undermines the sense of ontological security. Then the puzzling gap between 
the apparent public anger against and discomfort towards the broader disengagement 
of the male community from the national struggle and the support for the new form of 
EU struggle that is accompanied by the accepting of personal relative disengagement 
and practices for avoidance from the national struggle, raises several questions: How 
does the perception of the weakened ‘fighting spirit’ of men fire-up the discourse of 
‘occupation’, given that the new form of EU struggle undermines the significance of the 
‘nation-in-arms’ and thus the role of ‘everyday men’ in the struggle and when there is a 
general understanding that masculinity has shifted increasingly towards one’s own 
ambitions and goals? Also, how have the popular ideological common-sense 
expectation and affirmation of male conscription values and the expectation for men to 
self-sacrifice been maintained, when many of them do not want to join the army, and 
parents or relatives help them to avoid conscription to the army whilst supporting the 
professionalization of the force? Besides, is it feasible for most G.C.s today to combine 
individualistic self-interested attitudes with the continued belief that, given the on-going 
‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus and the continuous threats of Turkey, which recently 
have been staged around the gas extraction in territorial waters of the RoC, men’s 
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sacrifices achieve or should be achieving the deterrent force against threat to the G.C. 
community? 
In the above accounts, it appears that the 'fighting spirit' of 'everyday' men in the 
national struggle is understood as being entangled with the overall 'fighting spirit' of the 
national struggle. The perception of the weakened ‘fighting spirit’ of men in the national 
struggle is argued to represent the undermined discourses of military masculinity and 
undermined heroic male ideals which are part of the general undermined commitment of 
the community to the unified idea of itself as a ‘nation-in-arms’. This illustrates the 
inability felt by male social actors to fully reproduce the post-war hegemonic masculinity. 
Therefore, it appears that this inability to reproduce a certain type of post-war 
masculinity, which in post-war Cyprus has been linked to the national struggle, is 
interpreted as undermining the national struggle even in its new EU form. And 
interpreted as also undermining the public sense of ontological security, as it is 
somehow representing the 'fighting spirit' of the national struggle itself. This nexus in 
which the paradox is contained precisely reveals the co-contingency of nationalism, 
militarism and masculinity, where when one of the components of this three-fold 
relationship weakens it undermines the relationship on which the national struggle is 
constructed.  
The criticism that emerges from these accounts therefore is not of young men but of the 
wider communal disengagement of the national struggle. Thus, people understand the 
young men but lament the communal ‘apathy’ towards the ‘struggle’. It is argued then 
that the issue of masculinity expressed in these accounts extends beyond the 
masculinity of actual men to a broader discourse of masculinity that is constitutive of the 
collective G.C. position in the national struggle. Therefore, the inability of these men to 
produce the military and heroic aspects of the post-war masculinity is interpreted by the 
wider public as a collective community devaluation from a certain position of power in 
the national struggle vis-à-vis the emasculating tendencies of ‘occupation’. The 
masculinity discourse co-constituting this position is what I have named ‘nationalist 
militarised masculinity’, the significance of which I will now proceed to illustrate.  
 
The undermined ‘fighting spirit’ of men and nationalist militarised masculinity  
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This thesis argues that nationalist militarised masculinity is a contingent discourse in 
post-armed conflict societies that co-constitutes nationalism and militarism. This inter-
relation creates the ‘imagination’ (Anderson, 19 3) of the community as an empowered 
masculine unified body that defends itself and fights for liberation. Then nationalist 
militarised masculinity is key in understanding how the inter-dependency of nationalism, 
militarism and masculinity at a given time creates the stance of ‘power’ adopted by the 
broader community against the ‘enemy’. Perhaps what is most significant about 
nationalist militarised masculinity is that it enables us to understand how any move 
away from this inter-related stance is perceived as a devaluation and thus a 
feminisation of a position of power in a conflict situation.  
In the case of the European post-armed conflict Cypriot society with open borders, it is 
argued that the public disenchantment with the inability of young male social actors to 
reproduce certain post-war masculinities and the assertion of the discourse of 
‘occupation’ in this context is an expression of nationalist militarised masculinity. 
Nationalist militarised masculinity in these accounts relates to the fear that this inability 
weakens the post-war nationalist militarist masculinist assertive stance of power of the 
larger G.C. community, which becomes devalued and feminised. This G.C. masculinist 
stance of ‘power’ in a conflict situation relates to maintaining the discourse of 
‘righteousness’ through the understanding of said situation as ‘occupation’ (thus ‘I do 
not forget’). And also the maintenance of the ‘justice’ and ‘steadfastness’ discourses 
against Turkey which are projected to the international community for its support and 
adopted in negotiation talks for solutions, thus, ‘I struggle’ for liberation of the ‘occupied’ 
part of Cyprus and ‘return’ of refugees to their homes in the territory that is now 
‘occupied’.  
Therefore, the assertion of the discourse of ‘occupation’ in this context does not suggest 
that men remain committed to the national struggle and to the values of the ‘nation-in-
arms’ that reproduce the post-war heroic military masculinity. Rather, it recalls that 
certain post-war military and heroic masculinities of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and the 
‘struggle’ were an integral manifestation of the nationalist militarist masculinist co-
constitutive stance of the community in the conflict situation. Therefore this fear is 
generated because G.C.s have learned to think of the ‘fighting spirit’ of ‘everyday’ men 
that serve their military service and are willing to sacrifice themselves for the collective 
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heroic praxis of the ‘nation-in-arms’ as a clear inseparable manifestation of the strong 
‘fighting spirit’ of the community in the national struggle. Thus they have learned to think 
of military activity as the special calling of men, (Enloe, 2004), inextricably linked to the 
‘fighting spirit’ of the struggle. This spirit is one that will always fight for liberation and will 
never accept the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus by Turkey as legitimate; a collective 
stance that has been embodied in the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. As Marios 
(also quoted above) characteristically commented in disappointment: 
“No, I don’t think that young men are fighters, they don’t care about the national 
problem. You will meet people who are not refugees and they might tell you ‘I don’t 
care if you ever get your homes back’ [translators’ note: referring to the homes in the 
‘occupied’ part of Cyprus]. I don’t feel that we are ready to fight.” 
Clearly ‘fight’ here does not refer to a military clash but to the ‘fighting spirit’ of the 
national struggle for liberation and return of the refugees to the now ‘occupied’ territory 
of Cyprus by Turkey. In the chapter on militarism, the same association as above was 
illustrated in the most prominent narrative of my interviewees, between the changing 
defence policy and changing face of the defence sector and a perceived undermined 
‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle. This again directs us back to the co-constitution 
of nationalism, militarism and nationalist militarised masculinity that creates the 
undermining of masculinist militarist expressions in the national struggle and the 
devaluation of the assertive stance of power of the larger G.C. community in the conflict 
situation against ‘occupation’.  
Through the theorisation of nationalist militarised masculinity, I argued that the fear in 
my interviewees’ accounts that the inability of men to reproduce certain post-war 
masculinities is related to a general undermining of the ‘fighting spirit’ and is the 
expression of the concern of devaluing an earlier assertive position adopted by the 
broader community in the national struggle. The following section seeks to extend this 
argument.  
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7.6.1 The re-adaptation of nationalist militarised masculinity under new social and 
political parameters          
It is the argument of this thesis that ‘nationalist militarised masculinity’ and its possible 
transformation or reiteration in post-armed conflict societies plays a crucial role in 
particular periods of political, social or ideological change in the construction and 
negotiation and adapted reiterations of nationalist and militarist ideas and processes. 
Nationalist militarised masculinity is a linchpin in the co-constitution of a nationalist, 
militarist and masculinist culture which is embodied in the state and which also 
penetrates and represents the stance of the given post-conflict society as a masculinist 
unified body that resists feminization from a perceived position of power.  
In the case of European post-armed conflict Cyprus with open borders, the re-adapted 
interdependency of the discourse of nationalist militarised masculinity to nationalism 
and militarism can be illustrated mainly in two ways. Firstly, by the strong and broader 
public resistance of crossing the borders; this is a masculinist nationalist militarist 
stance adopted against ‘occupation’ that largely poses the crossings as an undermining 
of the G.C. understanding of ‘occupation’ and therefore as feminisation of the G.C. 
position of power in the conflict situation. Secondly, it is illustrated by the continuing 
public support of a potent army in the context of the weakening ideology of defence that 
now calls for its change into a modernised semi or fully professional force, with a 
European persona. This public support of a potent army, accompanied by these 
changes and technological upgrades for defence from ‘occupation’, points to the re-
adaptation of this three-fold relationship under the Europeanisation of the conflict, and 
other social, military and political developments discussed above, which are in turn 
influenced by broader cultural developments at Western and European levels. G.C. 
society, as already discussed, is one that is moving away from collective ideals to the 
emergence of the understanding of society as one made up of rights-bearing individuals 
focused on their personal goals. This has also implications on how the struggle is 
perceived by the public. The focus on an individual’s rights and personal goals has 
meant a relative acceptance of personal disengagement in the struggle, yet also a 
stronger reliance on the government to take up the role of the national struggle and fulfil 
the individual’s expectations of the struggle. This cultural shift is illustrated by the strong 
public reliance on the governmental appeals to the international community and 
international bodies (especially the EU) for support and intervention in the national 
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struggle, and the larger public support for the profesionalisation of the NG.  
 
The above remarks guide us in understanding that, whilst the public still believes in 
‘occupation’ and the need for ‘defence’, nationalist militarised masculinity has re-
adapted its interdependency on nationalism and militarism; disengaging in this way the 
community from the idea of taking up responsibility of armed defence (‘nation-in-arms’) 
against ‘occupation’, and asserting the community’s responsibility to not cross the 
border, which action is perceived as undermining the discourse of ‘occupation’. 
Before proceeding to further explain the re-adaptation of nationalist militarised 
masculinity in this context, it should be noted that there is a certain masculinist 
interdependency between the borders and the G.C. discourse of ‘occupation’ that is 
inextricable from the co-constitution and continuous re-adaptation of nationalism, 
militarism and nationalist militarised masculinity. In the European Cyprus with open 
borders, the borders continue to echo a masculinist sensibility in the G.C. nationalist 
‘imagination’, (Anderson, 19 3). Any changes made in relation to the borders are 
responded to by the G.C. community with a nationalist militarist masculinist assertion of 
the discourse of ‘occupation’. The community maintains a perceived position of power in 
relation to this discourse. As argued earlier, following the division of the island, the G.C. 
inter-relationship of nationalism, militarism and masculinity was manifested and 
projected in relation to the borders. This is because in the nationalist imagination, 
(Anderson,1983) the borders are the material and symbolic clear illustration of the G.C. 
understanding that conflict is an issue of ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’. Thus, since the 
division of the island, the existence of the heavily guarded border meant that G.C.s 
couldn’t visit or live in the Northern part of Cyprus; this border was keeping the land that 
they consider theirs ‘occupied’. Therefore, the borders are, in ideological terms, the 
container of the understanding of the conflict situation as ‘occupation’. In other words, 
my argument here is that the definitional and discursive imperativeness the borders 
inhabited in the G.C. ‘imagination’ (Anderson, 19 3) was responded to by a co-
constitutive nationalist militarist masculinist community stance projected on the 
existence of the border.  
Then, within the co-constitution of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity there is 
an integral symbiotic discursive relationship between the existence of the border and 
271 
 
 
the discourse of ‘occupation’, where the co-constituted nationalist militarist masculinist 
stance of the community in relation to the existence of the borders unrelentingly protects 
the G.C. understanding of the conflict situation as ‘occupation’. For this reason, under 
social and political developments related to the conflict situation, the stance of the 
community in relation to the reality of open borders readapts in such ways as to sustain 
the discourse of ‘occupation’. This stance in relation to ‘occupation’ can be seen as 
symbolically represented and embodied in the slogan, ‘Our borders are in Kerynia’, 
which in popular discourse means that these are not our borders but the ones of 
‘occupation’.  
This is evident in that, whilst today G.C.s can cross the border, there is a largely shared 
resistance to doing so whilst the land across the border remains ‘occupied’. This choice 
to not cross is a clear expression of the re-adaptation of this collective stance of the 
larger community in relation to the border. Through this re-adapted stance the border is 
now being replaced by an ideological border where the choice to not cross sustains the 
discourse of ‘occupation’ in the nationalist imagination (Anderson,19 3) i.e. ‘I do not 
forget’. Thus, the use of the ‘Our borders are in Kerynia’ slogan today illustrates the 
imagination needed to sustain the idea of an ‘occupied’ city across a now crossable 
border. This open border has turned into an ideologically un-crossable border.  
The sustenance of the discourse of ‘occupation’ is most significant for the G.C. 
community in the politics of the conflict, as this is the understanding that the RoC is the 
only legitimate and internationally recognised state on the island which translates into 
the idea that Turkey is illegally occupying Northern Cyprus beyond the border. This G.C. 
stance in the politics of the conflict has, since the events of 1974 to the present day, 
formed perhaps the strongest political tool for the appeals to the international 
community (Demetriou, 2007: 991). This is argued to be a feminised appeal of post-war 
Cyprus as a victim, symbolised, as argued in the nationalism chapter, through the 
mothers of the missing persons. In Demetriou’s (2005: 16) words the “small and 
unprotected … ‘little Cyprus’”, needs the support of the international community to 
liberate Northern Cyprus from the illegal ‘occupation’ by Turkey, which has “a large, 
strong and vicious army at its disposal.” (ibid). This directs us back to the chapter on 
militarism where it was argued that ‘defence’ has been the internal front of the Janus-
faced international and internal agenda the G.C. state mobilised for itself.  
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Therefore, the re-adapted inter-relationship of nationalism, militarism and nationalist 
militarised masculinity, which today is refracted in relation to the open borders in such 
ways that sustain the discourse of ‘occupation’, relates to the agenda that the G.C. 
community projects to the international community. Hadjipavlou (2007: 71) aptly raises 
the point: one sometimes wonders if the ‘crossings’ have become, as has often been 
the case in Cyprus, part of the status quo. ‘Occupation’ is a discourse that sustains the 
position of power that the RoC is the only legitimate state on the island for the 
community in the politics of the conflict. As it was illustrated in the nationalism chapter, 
within the G.C. nationalist discourse today the memory of the war events and lost lands, 
thus the discourse of ‘occupation’ which is symbolised through the slogan ‘I do not 
forget’, is acting as a function of resistance that seems, in many cases, to be moralising 
the loss of ‘I struggle’ in the community. Then the moralisation of the loss of ‘I struggle’ 
through ‘I do not forget’ relates precisely to the sustenance of ‘I struggle’ through the 
discourse of ‘occupation’, which is projected to the international community for its 
support of ‘I struggle’. While the above theorisation explains my interviewees’ deep 
anxiety (presented in the nationalism chapter) that the crossing of the borders threatens 
the understanding of the conflict as ‘occupation’ and undermines the ‘fighting spirit’ in 
the national struggle, it also explains their largely shared continuous support for a potent 
army.  
The continuous support for a potent army that is now calling for its change into a semi 
or fully professional force, which is a product of the re-adapted nationalist militarist 
masculinist posture of the larger G.C. community, is also integrally related to the internal 
front of the Janus-faced international and internal agenda of the G.C. community. The 
sense of the community’s ontological security of being protected by the military from the 
‘existential threat’ by the ‘occupation’ forces is part of the internal front of the projection 
of Cyprus to the international community as a victim of ‘occupation’. As such, the 
military defence from the ‘occupation’ forces integrally relates to the sustenance of this 
double-faced discursive agenda of ‘we‘ need to act as ’our‘ ‘protector’ to remain ‘victims’ 
who require the support of the international community to liberate ‘ourselves’  from 
‘occupation’. Thus, how would the G.C. community be a victim of ‘occupation’ if it does 
not sustain a sense of threat by the ‘occupation’ forces and needs the military to protect 
the non-occupied territory from them? How would the definition of the conflict situation 
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be maintained as one of being a victim of military ‘occupation’ if G.C.s are unconcerned 
about crossing the border to the ‘occupied’ territory? And, therefore, how would the G.C. 
discourse of ‘occupation’ continue to be projected to the international community if 
G.C.s abandon the above-explained nationalist militarist masculinist stance that 
preserves the discourse of ‘occupation’?  
In conclusion, whilst the hegemonic masculinity in the post-opening of the borders 
European Cyprus has moved away from the identification of men with the ‘defence’ of 
the community and the national struggle, nationalist militarised masculinity in the 
context of these social developments and developments in the politics of the conflict 
becomes re-adapted to its co-constitution to nationalism and militarism in sustaining the 
position of power of the broader community against ‘occupation’. This stance, as 
discussed above, preserves the discourse of ‘occupation’ and is projected to the 
international community in appealing for support for liberation from ‘occupation’.  
 
7.7. Ultra-nationalist groups and masculinity 
The hyper-militarist masculinised character in which the newly formed ultra-nationalist 
political parties, such as ELAM and EDHK have risen in the last few years (2008 and 
2009 respectively) is argued to contain elements of the state post-war masculinisation 
and militarisation of the national struggle and neo-Nazi elements. Their emergence in 
an organised form is argued to be a discursive response to the government 
undermining of the armed part of the national struggle, the acceptance of having open 
borders, and the undermining of the masculinist militarist discourses of the struggle in 
both state and public domains. It is argued that these groups perceive this in ideological 
terms as a feminisation of the struggle, especially the role of the Cypriot government in 
the national struggle. As it will be illustrated, the masculinity of the parties discussed 
here, as Horschelmann (2013: 138) has argued in relation to Neo-fascist groups in 
Germany, challenges the assumption that non-hegemonic masculinities of these 
specific parties become subordinated forms of masculinity. These groups that personify 
a distinct masculinity from the dominant definitions of transnational entrepreneurial 
masculinity described above; assert their hegemony over others. 
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The aim of restoring the masculinisation and militarisation of the Cypriot national 
struggle is colouring the persona of these new parties in Cyprus. They see themselves 
as the only ones who continue the struggle, who officially request the closure of the 
borders, the fortification of armed forces and the revival of the Single Area Defence 
Doctrine with Greece. ‘The true nationalist do not forget’: one of the most projected 
slogans of ELAM, speaks for itself. They see the rest of the Cypriot public, and the state, 
as forgetting the national struggle, and ELAM is taking the role of re-establishing this 
struggle in Cypriot society. ‘Don’t forget’: another one of the most projected slogans of 
ELAM also speaks for itself.  
These political parties aim to reinvigorate these masculine and military discourses of the 
post-war national struggle against the ‘occupation’ forces; aiming for the liberation of 
Cyprus. However, as it was illustrated in the previous chapter, since they do not trust 
the state to do the “necessary” in the national struggle, they take up an independent 
struggle from the government because they see this as their responsibility. Whilst 
ELAM’s and EDHK’s political influence in Cyprus is limited, they believe that a small 
group of people can drive the nation to liberation, and it is characteristic of them to have 
a strong devotion to their leader. A slogan used by ELAM is: "Standing in a world of 
ruins; the last faithful believers". My argument is that when the state in a post-armed 
conflict society moves away from the nationalist masculinist militaristic discourses it 
previously mobilised, this can contribute to the masculinist militarisation of ultra-
nationalist groups. An article posted recently on the website of ELAM, (see ELAM. 
2012), by a member clearly illustrates this:  
“For the Nationalist People's Movement, the National Guard is the backbone of 
the existence of the morale and protection of our country… The anti-Hellenic 
state of Cyprus showed once again its intentions … its willingness to allow the 
weathering of the National Guard … hurting, to a criminal degree, its militancy 
with the most visible threat for Cyprus to become a state without defence. The 
National People's Front undoubtedly today provides the only deterrent force that 
is at the forefront of the struggle”.  
Both parties, as it was discussed in the previous chapter, reportedly have their own 
militant groups, though it is not clear, and also in the scope of this analysis not argued, 
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that they wish to use these for the purpose of war. This is here understood to be a 
discursive response to the government undermining the masculinist militarism perceived 
by them as necessary for the national struggle and their perceived inability to pursue a 
revival of this through politics. Specifically, ELAM on their website discuss cases where 
they had to act by themselves. Cases like this include confronting the police who denied 
access to a fighter of EOKA to pay a tribute at the ‘Imprisoned Graves’29, (see ELAM, 
20th April 2011). Another example is the removal of street signs in Larnaca bearing 
Turkish names requiring their replacement with Greek names, (see Sigma Live, 
2013a).  
Whilst the masculinist militarisation sets the basis for the character of the national 
struggle that ELAM and EDHK strive for, the groups fight for concentration of the 
masculinist and militarist discourses in the national struggle, but they do not trust the 
government to do this. These groups have been clothed with a hyper-masculine 
militaristic cloak in defiance and repugnance of the Cypriot government’s undermining 
of the role of the armed forces in the national struggle. The hyper masculinity mobilised 
by these movements is sure of its militaristic character, which is typical of neo-fascist 
groups in Europe, (see Horschelmann, 2013: 129-131).  
ELAM actions, such as a march, protest, or appearance in many ways are often 
apparent of their militarist character. Though drawing the image of ELAM members’ is 
not an easy task, the fashion in which they chant whilst marching, as well as the 
slogans they have chanted in recent marches begins, perhaps, to help us form a picture. 
ELAM, who has recently attracted much public and political attention, is generally 
presented through a military hyper-masculine image and mien. ELAM marches, which 
have been rather significant to the movement’s activity, are carried out in a rigorous 
military fashion. Marching in military alignments and cadences they chant holding Greek 
flags and often motorcycle helmets. In some cases, ELAM members have appeared in 
settings such as marches and protests standing in units, aligned taking the commands 
of a given leader who, even though he does not hold an official army rank, seems to 
hold equivalent respect from ELAM members.  
                                                          
29
 ‘Imprisoned Graves’ is a small cemetery located in the central jail of Nicosia, where 13 EOKA fighters 
were interred during the 1955-1959 struggle for the liberation of Cyprus from British rule. 
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This masculine militarisation of ELAM is a reality given much importance and attention 
from ELAM’s leadership and members who are ‘fit and disciplined', as ELAM 
announced following a training ‘Nationalist Camp’ which they organised in 2011 in the 
Troodos Mountains. It is interesting to observe some of the required items on the list 
published by ELAM for the members attending the camp (see ELAM, 26th July 2011):  
1 pair of boots or something similar 
1 pair of camouflage trousers or other similar military style 
2 Tops Black 
1 Survival Knife 
It is important to shortly describe one of the many videos they have published, as these 
videos have been important in the identity and solidarity of the group. The youth division 
of ELAM organised an anti-occupation march through Nicosia (15th November 2010) 
and uploaded the video to their website with the title ‘Student march for the 
condemnation of the pseudo "state"’. The video is introduced by titles appearing on the 
screen: 
“At the same time when some were in concerts with their “brothers” [translators note: 
meaning T.C.s] and they were singing about “a united country” as well as about Greek 
Turkish ‘friendships’.”  
At the same time when some others were in coffee shops drinking their coffee, stress-
free.  
At the same time some others-the uncompromising ones-have come, disciplined, 
unrepentant and nationalist to agitate the calmness of the day.  
The video begins with the youths of ELAM marching in military alignments and 
cadences chanting loudly and uniformly. The video of the march is interchanged with 
images and titles appearing on screen, as above, and a military rhythmic song playing 
in the background. The young men of ELAM chant:  
“ELAM race, blood and honour 
We will be back and the earth will tremble  
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Morality??? Blood! 
Turks, Mongols, Murderers 
The Turks of Cyprus are not our brethren 
Listen to what the wolf said: one day we are going to return to take our land.  
Solomou, Isaak the border is going to break!” 
The titles appearing on the screen, mentioned above, refer mostly to Cypriot society, 
which they condemn for its passiveness in the national struggle, and a call to join them 
in an assertive struggle. Through their hyper-masculine militarist performativity (Butler, 
1990) they come to claim and assert the masculinist heroic and militarist debilitated 
ideological link of the ‘I struggle’ of the Cypriot state and society, while they actively call 
the public to join them in the struggle.  
Therefore, the effort of these parties to raise awareness of the need for a strong army 
and an armed liberation of Cyprus from occupation is embodied, retained and reiterated 
through expressions of masculinity, which have been historically central discourses of 
the ideology of defence and the idea of “Greek self” assertion, previously mobilised 
strongly by the state. They aim to bring awareness of the fading ideals of heroism to the 
G.C. community and in this way re-instil the necessary ideals in the national struggle, 
whilst they see themselves as the only ones who continue to substantially honour 
national heroes. As one of the most prominent slogans of ELAM states: ‘We honour, not 
forget’. They clearly state that for them national heroes are the role models we need to 
follow in liberating Cyprus. They organise anti-occupational marches, attend, but also 
organise ceremonials and informative events about national heroes. As the ROE 
comments: 
“That’s what we mean with ‘We honour, not forget’ because honour for a hero and a 
person is to find someone to carry on their purpose”  
Passmore (2003: 171) makes a similar observation about men who subscribed to 
conservative ultra-nationalist ideas in France. She comments that these men embodied 
the notion of virile ‘true men’ who would restore the nation to glory and prominence 
through heroism and bravery. The president of EDHK, Loucas Stavrou, similarly 
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asserted that without heroes there is no society because it is the heroes who establish 
liberty and it is upon liberty that everything else is built: 
“Now, as we’ve already mentioned with the phenomenon of draft-dodgers etc. 
youngsters have drifted away from these standards.”  
The Representative of ELAM further asserted that we need to understand that heroes 
were people just like us and not demigods: 
“They just had the right guidance, the right education … We need to learn from 
their character ... to carry on their struggle.” 
Thus, he enunciates the need for ‘active leading’ (Foucault, 2007, 19 3) of the G.C. 
community in order to be shown onto the “right” path i.e.  that of heroes of pervious 
struggles.  
The masculinity embodied and performed by their groups of militias is used against 
‘occupation’ yet also the perceived feminine role of the state in the national struggle for 
liberation from ‘occupation’. The latest action of the militants of ELAM relates to the new 
rounds of negotiations for reunification in early 2014.  
These parties denote negotiations as a form of solution to the so-called Cyprus problem, 
which they see as a feminized G.C. posture in relation to ‘occupation’. For them, ‘the 
only solution is liberation’ of the ‘enslaved lands’ (which is one of their most prominent 
slogans, in Greek: Απελευθέρωση η μόνη λύση). In this scenario the ‘occupation forces’ 
will be expulsed from Cyprus (which is a post-war slogan that has become another of 
their most prominent slogans, ‘All Turks out of Cyprus’, In Greek: Έξω οι Τούρκοι από 
την Κύπρο). Loucas Stavrou, President of EDHK, revealingly says in his Presidential 
election manifesto (see Loucas Stavrou, 2013):  
“Greeks of Cyprus those [translator’s note: referring to the government] who … 
have opened the borders, those who even though we have said ‘NO’ to the 
Annan reunification plan are supposedly seeking the right basis for the solution 
and are now preparing a new reunification plan! … young people of Cyprus the 
basis of the Cyprus Problem is none other than the imprisoned graves! From 
there we will start, from there will begin the struggle again, the path of liberation 
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and self-determination that would result, if necessary, in the prepared, armed 
conflict with the occupation forces”  
In the scope of the intensified efforts by G.C. and T.C political leadership for 
reunification, the T.C. liberal political leader (and former President of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus) Mehmet Ali Talât gave a speech on 26th March 2014 in 
the RoC (at the Municipal Cultural Centre Panos Solomonides of Limmassol) 
encouraging reunification. Members of ELAM, who wore helmets, pushed aside the 
police and stormed into the Municipal Cultural Centre, breaking glass entrances, 
chanting slogans and insults and threw firecrackers and a lit torch towards the T.C. 
speaker. ELAM, announced both outside the building and on their website (see Cyprus 
News - ELAM) that: 
“This is a provocation that could not have remained without a response by Greek 
nationalists … The message is that as long as there is occupation in Cyprus, 
missing persons, refugees they will find us in their face”  
A number of police interrogations of members of ELAM took place the next day. 
Following the imprisonment of the press officer of the party, ELAM’ press office 
announces (see ELAM, 2014):  
“Unfortunately in a semi-occupied country those who oppose the Turkish occupation 
and Attila go to prison, yet this is an imprisonment of honour … this political persecution 
is not going to quench our will for new consecutive struggles until we reach the final 
victory and the liberation of our country.” 
With the efforts of the new Cypriot ultra-nationalist political parties to restore the 
masculinist militarisation of the Cypriot national struggle; they embody and reiterate 
integral parts of the post-war masculinist militarist nationalist discourse, previously 
strongly mobilised by the state, but with this now being fused with neo-Nazi and junta-
phile ideological elements. The masculinity their groups of militants embody and 
perform is directed against the ‘occupation’ and the state of the RoC.  
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7.8. Conclusion  
The opening of the borders and the accession of Cyprus to the EU created a new space 
of dynamics for negotiating an ongoing and unresolved conflict. But, it also shifted the 
politics of the conflict towards an EU solution, as opposed to military nationalist 
antagonisms; a transition that in synergy with the cultural influence from capitalist 
neoliberal ideals in the community had implications for men’s post-war traditional roles.  
In post-war Cyprus the emphasis on ideals of manhood, in the assertion of masculinist 
martial prowess for the defence and liberation of Cyprus, was part of the ideological 
narratives that called on men to identify with the national struggle, and also the broader 
community to understand ‘defence’ as the role of men. It was against the background of 
these narratives and traditional militarised masculinities that new forms of masculinities 
emerged, which relate to the idea of a ‘Euro-Cypriot’ entrepreneurial wealth oriented 
male.  
The increasing influence of Western capitalist and neoliberal individualist values and 
ideals on the island developed a cultural platform that has contributed to the 
undermining of the idea of the unitary G.C. community predicated as a ‘nation-in-arms’, 
and to the emergence of the new understanding of society as made up of rights-bearing 
individuals focused on their own personal goals. Therefore, this change of hegemonic 
masculinity, which is weakening its deep ties to the national struggle, was perhaps 
mostly instigated at a cultural level. Yet, with this broader cultural change, G.C. 
hegemonic masculinity had as its deterrent force the deeply ingrained military 
masculinity (Connell, 1998: 17). As the borders opened, against which the masculinist 
discourses of the national struggle were set, reunification negotiations intensified, and 
the politics of the conflict changed, moving towards the aspiration of an EU solution; 
post-war masculinities became arenas of contestation. In the space of this changing 
cultural milieu and national struggle, the image centred rights-bearing entrepreneurial 
‘Euro-Cypriot’ masculinity has contested the strong identification of men with the 
collective goal of the national struggle.  
However, the post-war social militancy and military masculinity, which 
was mobilised and sustained vis-à-vis the defence of the border, was part of the 
broader conceptualisation of the conflict as one of ‘invasion and occupation’. State 
militarism in post-war Cyprus was an internal assertion of nationalist masculinist military 
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prowess projected against the ‘occupation’ forces. The representation of militarised 
masculinities in state institutions as well as in the public domain as patriotic men serving 
their duty towards the country were naturalised and unchallenged notions, upholding the 
need for protection, protest and liberation from the ‘occupation’ forces. This identity of 
men had grown out of the general effort of the unitary community to resist against a 
potential and recurring (following 1974) feminisation of Cyprus’ defensive posture in the 
conflict. This muscular nationalism was structured on the creation of corresponding 
female images within the national struggle; the post-war Cypriot nation as a victim and 
in need of protection and deliverance that was projected to the international community 
for its support in liberating Cyprus from ‘occupation’. The masculinity component of this 
stance has been argued to be nationalist militarised masculinity.  
Nationalist militarised masculinity has perhaps historically in Western societies been 
embedded in the identity of men. Yet, the broader shift of Western and European 
armies towards their professionalisation (Haltiner, 1998) illustrates how cultural and 
political developments undermine the current popular masculinity of men in the public 
and political perception of security and national struggle.  
In the European Cyprus with opened borders, nationalist militarised masculinity has 
become re-adapted in its co-constitution to nationalism and militarism. In this context 
this inter-dependent three-fold relationship forms the stance of the larger community 
against ‘occupation’, without this relationship necessitating the previously strong 
identification of men with the national struggle. In this new social and political milieu 
while the ‘I struggle’ has shifted towards an EU solution to the so-called Cyprus Problem, 
the memory of lost lands as being ‘occupied’ by Turkey (I do not forget) operates in the 
community as the predominant form of ‘I struggle’. Thus, the discourse of ‘occupation’ 
constitutes the portrayal of victimcy through which Cyprus appeals for the support of the 
international community and a solution to the conflict that will be based on the principles 
and values of the EU and the UN. Therefore, my fieldwork clearly illustrates that post-
war traditional nationalist militarised masculinity, such as state military virility projected 
through extensive defence acquisition, military parades and notions of heroic and 
military masculinity of the ‘nation-in-arms’, has been undermined. Certain notions of 
devalued femininity uphold the masculinist preservation of ‘occupation’ as a discursive 
structure of victimcy in the most dominant nationalist ‘imagination’ (Anderson,19 3), 
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symbolically embodied in the slogan ‘I do not forget’. Thus, certain discourses of 
femininity are maintained in the post opening of the borders European Cyprus as 
integral parts of the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and nationalist militarised 
masculinity. These integrally relate to this masculinised position of victimcy vis-à-vis 
‘occupation’, which is projected to the international community to gain its support in the 
conflict situation.  
Then, in symbolic terms, ‘I do not forget’ is a discourse that continues to feminise any 
potential compromises or shifts away of the nationalist militarist masculinist defensive 
position of power of the G.C. community in the post-opening of the borders European 
Cyprus, and rekindles the discourse of ‘occupation’. The G.C. idea of the borders as 
integrally related to the understanding of the conflict situation as ‘occupation’ is 
significant in this setting. In this setting the re-adapted posture of the community in the 
conflict situation, which rests on the re-constitution of nationalism, militarism and 
nationalist militarised masculinity, presents the choice of crossing the now ideological 
border and shows the undermined NG as directly devaluing the position of power and 
thus as feminising the national struggle. Therefore, the echo of the border, even with the 
openings, resonates a masculinist sensibility.  
The possibility of crossing harks social actors back to the discourse of ‘occupation’. 
Since the crossings are understood as a form of forgetting the ‘occupation’ they are 
translated as further undermining the ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle. As 
discussed in the chapter on nationalism, they were portrayed by most of my 
interviewees as the humiliation of the national struggle and as accepting that the 
territory ‘occupied’ is lost forever. Thus they viewed opened borders as a defeat; 
asserting notions of national pride and liberation from ‘occupation’ in their reasoning not 
to cross.  
The ultra-nationalist parties that appeared following the opening of the border demand 
the closure of them in order to return to a state of ‘occupation’, where war is rendered 
once again visible to the community’s eyes. They demand the regeneration of the post-
war masculinist militarism in the national struggle, which they assert along with the need 
to follow once again the ideals of heroic figures as a way of successfully liberating 
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‘occupied’ Cyprus. Moreover, these groups’ ideals and assertions are  fused with neo-
Nazi ideological elements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8. Conclusion: Assimilating nationalism, militarism and masculinity with 
‘normality’  
The main aim of this thesis was to provide an analysis of the ways in which Greek 
Cypriot nationalism, militarism and masculinity have been co-constituted following the 
opening of the borders between North and South Cyprus in 2003. It was recognised 
from the outset that there was a gap in the literature addressing the significance of the 
co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-armed conflict societies. 
The research was inspired by my own personal experience of serving as a soldier in the 
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National Guard from 2003 to 2004 straight after the borders opened, and while the 
Annan Plan referendum took place.  
In the past, when scholars have studied nationalism and militarism, they have most 
often focused on studying these issues independently and, when they are brought 
together, the issue of gender has been neglected. In recent years, scholars who have 
studied nationalism, militarism or both in post-armed conflict societies have begun to 
adopt a gender lens when looking at these issues (for example see Dowler, 1998). 
However, in these cases, the study of gender has been most often understood as 
synonymous to the study of the role of, and impact on, women (for example see 
Aretxaga, 1997; Cock, 1989). This focus on women and femininity has sidelined 
masculinity as an issue of research enquiry itself and as an issue for research 
investigation in studies on nationalism and militarism (McKeown and Sharoni, 2002; 
Ashe 2012).  
Most importantly, however, this literature has neglected the significance of addressing 
the co-constituency of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-armed conflict 
societies. It is this gap that this thesis was intended to address. The co-constitution of 
this three-fold relationship is significant in the perpetuation of an identity, which exists 
beneath the politically symbolic or institutional level and hinders the bringing together of 
the two Cypriot communities. As Kızılyürek, (2002) aptly points out: in Cyprus, the 
politics of identity played a central role in the rise of inter-communal tension and the 
creation of the Cyprus problem.  
8.1. Research objectives revisited  
As I began this research, I intended to show the significance of approaching G.C. 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity as a co-constitution by pointing to their inter-
relating outcomes. By illustrating this through the case of post-armed conflict Cypriot 
society, my broader aim has been to illustrate that, when looking at nationalism, 
militarism or masculinity in a post-armed conflict society, we need to address the way in 
which there is a three-fold co-constitutive relationship. 
This project was guided by four objectives. Firstly, when beginning this project, I sought 
an understanding that linked G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity. Secondly, as 
a result of the initial findings produced through the fieldwork research, it became clear, 
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and thus I began to want to demonstrate, that nationalism, militarism and masculinity 
are co-constituted in such a way that social and political developments and events can 
contribute to the re-imagination and, thus, re-adaptation of this relationship under new 
social and political parameters. Therefore, the initial findings guided me in 
understanding that, while this relationship is co-constitutive, it is made and remade 
through social, political and symbolic activity. Thirdly, by illustrating the adapted 
reiteration of this co-constitutive relationship I aimed to address both the first and 
second objectives.  
Finally, my thesis is located within broader contemporary debates on Cyprus, providing 
a masculinity lens of analysis for a better understanding of G.C. nationalism and 
militarism following the opening of the borders, which was the fourth objective. I drew on 
empirical research conducted with different G.C. social and political groups to address 
these objectives. By analysing the interview transcripts I identified emerging themes. I 
then identified different narratives expressed within each theme and used these themes 
and narratives to construct broader arguments.  
8.2. Limitations of the study  
The interviews were conducted during a concentrated period of four months. Choosing 
to use interviews over other research methods presents the availability and the ‘time 
and cost’ factor (Gillham, 2000: 9). As repeat interviews were not possible, the 
opportunity to address issues raised by members of the public with those I had already 
interviewed and issues raised by members of the public with politicians and vice versa 
did not arise. I did not, therefore, have the opportunity to address contradictions in or 
new directions within the data with all of my interviewees. The implications of this were 
factored into my overall research design and the sequence of the interviews across the 
different groups. I developed the strategy of interviewing, within the allocated ‘time’, as 
many people as possible from each group of interviewees and, within the ‘availability’ 
and ‘cost’ confines, conducting interviews with each group and sub-group of 
interviewees. e.g. liberal and right-wing interviewees, throughout the fieldwork. For 
example, a number of my daily schedules involve interviews with a politician, a military 
officer or soldier and a member of the public all on the same day.  
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Addressing the same issues with members of the public as well as military officers and 
politicians is a strength of this project, as due to this I gained access to more varied 
accounts and information, especially on the perceived significance of political events 
from the perspective of the personal, the military and the political. The combination of 
these perspectives allowed a scope of different interpretations of the significance of 
these events, such as the opening of the borders, and other issues relevant to the co-
constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, which may not have become 
apparent through speaking only with members of the public, military officers or 
politicians. I also believe that by meeting face-to-face with each participant, and having 
the opportunity to explain all aspects of the research and build rapport (Miller, 2001), I 
was able to gain their confidence, to some extent, which allowed for them to be candid 
in the interviews (King and Horrocks, 2010: 48) and to become more engaged in the 
project itself. 
8.3. The co-constitution of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity  
Early readings of the data led to the identification of a number of preliminary findings. 
For example, although nationalism and militarism, nationalism and masculinity or 
militarism and masculinity are often said to support the reproduction of their co-
constitution through popular discourse and ideology, I have demonstrated that the co-
constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity can, under social and political 
developments, also contribute to the weakening of each one of its components. This 
was, for example, illustrated in the way that the opening of the borders and the 
accession to the EU have led to a perceived undermining of the ‘fighting spirit’, to a 
humanisation of the ‘other’ in the G.C. nationalist ‘imagination’ (Anderson, 19 3) and an 
ontological security associated with the EU as a protective power. This context has 
contributed to the undermining of the ideology of defence, and the concomitant idea of 
the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, which has been the concrete manifestation of post-
war nationalism, militarism and masculinity. The undermining of the ideology of defence 
was illustrated to have further instigated the move of hegemonic masculinity away from 
its identification with the national struggle and towards a transnational entrepreneurial 
model (Connell, 1998, 2005). The changing hegemonic masculinity also undermines the 
ideology of defence and its attendant idea of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, as 
well as the idea in the community that the ‘fighting spirit’ is sustained.  
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Later readings of the data led to the identification of more themes, as discussed further 
below. The most pivotal finding relates to the significance of studying the co-constitution 
of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-armed conflict societies. This thesis, 
through the case-study of Cyprus, has demonstrated the integral relationship between 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity. Further, it has illustrated the case that social 
and political developments and events can have a formative effect to this co-constitutive 
relationship. Besides this, this thesis has also demonstrated that in the context of post-
armed conflict societies the weakening of this co-constitutive relationship can precisely 
entail its adapted reiteration under new social and political parameters. This could be 
used to explain phenomena such as nationalist and militarist reiterations and the rise of 
neo-Nazism in situations where the political and military threat has been undermined.  
8.4. Key findings  
Five key themes were identified in this project: the centrality of the borders in the G.C. 
understanding of the conflict situation as ‘occupation’; the significance of the discourse 
of ‘occupation’ in the encapsulation of the national struggle; the impact of the accession 
of Cyprus to the EU on the understating of the national struggle and the ideology of 
defence; the role of masculinity in the perception of the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ in the 
national struggle and defence as well as in nationalist and militarist adapted reiterations; 
and the idea that the ultra-nationalist parties embody, evoke and mobilise the post-war 
pre-opening of the borders co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, in 
which they fuse with neo-Nazi and junta-phile ideological elements.  
The opening of the borders and the crossings, addressed in the first and second themes, 
were illustrated in the nationalism chapter to have resulted in a familiarisation with the 
‘other’ and a perceived weakened ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle. However, at 
the same time, as illustrated in the militarism and masculinity chapters, these 
developments are defeating the purpose of serving in the NG, in the face of which the 
discourse of ‘occupation’ has been most often asserted. 
Through my interviewees’ accounts, it became clear that the borders took a central 
position in the G.C. nationalist ‘imagination’, (Anderson, 19 3), defining the conflict 
situation as ‘occupation’ and that changes made in relation to the borders such as their 
opening and the crossings result in the fear of diminishing the understanding of Cyprus 
288 
 
 
being a victim of ‘occupation’. These observations confirm Webster and Timothy’s (2006) 
argument that most of those who have not crossed resist, because it offends their sense 
of ethics, and crossing is interpreted as recognition of the existence of the “pseudo 
state”.  
The interviewees’ accounts further illustrated that the reluctance to cross the border is a 
form of resistance (‘I struggle’) to accepting the ‘occupation’. This is very well illustrated 
in the post war-slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. ‘I struggle’ and not crossing the 
borders is a way of not forgetting the ‘atrocities of the invasion’. ‘I do not forget’ is to 
continue maintaining the nationalist ‘fighting spirit’. These observations confirm 
Demetriou’s (2007) remark that the nationalistic slogans that appeared on the crossing 
points against crossing hark back to the older ‘I don’t forget’ campaign. In this manner, 
as argued in the masculinity chapter, crossings are interpreted as devaluing the G.C. 
masculinist position of power in the conflict to not forget and struggle for liberation of the 
entire occupied land so that refugees could return back. These observations support 
Hadjipavlou’s (2007b) argument that the ‘crossings’ have become, as often has been 
the case in Cyprus, part of the status quo.  
The third theme, the impact of the accession of Cyprus to the EU on the understanding 
of the national struggle and the ideology of defence, was often apparent through 
contradictions in my interviewees’ accounts. Through the most prominent narrative of 
my interviewees’ accounts, in the nationalism and militarism chapter, it was illustrated 
that the ‘I struggle’ was broadly understood to have changed because of the accession 
of Cyprus to the EU, towards an ‘I struggle’ for an EU solution to the conflict. This new 
form of struggle was clearly understood as strengthening the G.C. position in the conflict 
and confirms Demetriou’s (2005) observation that the EU became an instrument in the 
struggle for justice against Turkey from the outset. However, at the same time it was 
also evident how, in this new context, the ‘fighting spirit’ of the community becomes 
undermined. 
In these accounts there was a strongly shared feeling of substantial security under the 
auspices of the EU in relation to the ‘occupation’ force, Turkey. This confirms 
Demetriou’s (2005), Vassiliou’s (2004) and Lordos’s and Kaymak’s, (2007) observations 
that the accession created a general public feeling of safety that a war between the RoC 
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and Turkey is now an unlikely event. However, as illustrated in the militarism and 
masculinity chapters, there was also criticism that this security and the new 
understanding of struggle is further undermining the ‘fighting spirit’ and the motivation of 
men to commit to their military service, and more broadly, to fulfil their masculine duty in 
the national struggle.  
Furthermore, it was illustrated in the empirical chapters that the Cypriot aspiration of 
becoming European as well as the cultural impact of Western individualist and 
consumerist values on the G.C. society was understood as weakening the idea of a 
unified community that was predicated on the common national struggle for liberation 
from ‘occupation’.  
Taking these observations into account in the chapter on militarism, I developed the 
argument that the ideology of defence, which was constituted on the discourses of 
‘nation-in-arms’, ‘existential threat’, ‘fighting spirit’ and ‘I struggle’ has weakened. The 
undermined ideology of defence has been demonstrated through the state 
disinvestment in defence, the relative but broader disengagement of the community 
from its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’, and the broader public support for the semi or full 
professionalisation of the force. Pivotal to this disengagement of the community and 
further instigated by it, has been illustrated, in the masculinity chapter, to be the 
undermining commitment of the family as the cooperative site of the armed struggle for 
the defence of the community. These observations confirm Haltiner’s (199 ) perspective 
that in the short term, national sentiments can delay the decline of a mass conscription 
army but cannot prevent it.  
The first strand of the fourth theme, the role of masculinity in the undermined ‘fighting 
spirit’ in the national struggle and defence, was identified through a conflict in my 
interviewees’ accounts. This conflict was between a broader understanding of the 
masculinity of men moving away from military and heroic male ideals towards becoming 
more Western and European-like and the criticism of this situation. The second strand 
of the fourth theme, the role of masculinity in nationalist and militarist adapted 
reiterations, was identified through strong nationalist assertions and criticism mostly in 
relation to the crossings, the perception of the undermined ‘fighting spirit’, and the need 
for a potent army.  
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In the chapter on masculinity, following the above readings of the data, I illustrated that 
masculinity has a role to play and is affected by the weakening ideology of defence and 
changing understanding of the national struggle. In this chapter, it has been established 
that in the scope of the intense cultural Westernization and Europeanisation of the G.C. 
society, these processes have affected the roles of men in the national struggle, whilst 
further instigating the shift of G.C. hegemonic masculinity towards a transnational 
entrepreneurial masculinity. In this now changing hegemonic masculinity, heroic and 
military aspects- that have been central to the ideology of defence- have been 
undermined. It was illustrated that in this context the military service - the clearest 
commitment of the community to its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’ - is not seen to the same 
extent as a rite-of-passage in becoming a man. These findings seem to validate 
Connell’s (199 , 2005) argument that certain versions of hegemonic masculinity are 
reshaped at the global level, with the more egocentric masculinity of the capitalist 
entrepreneur holding the world stage today, (Connell, 1998: 17), whereas the rigid 
masculinity of the military is now globally a fading threat (ibid) to this change. Moreover, 
in this chapter I argued that, in this space that has marked the reconstitution of 
hegemonic masculinity in the post–opening of the Cypriot borders, we need to not only 
focus on the changing hegemonic masculinity of men. In addition, we should also 
address the concept of what I have named in this thesis as nationalist militarised 
masculinity which has been a linchpin in specific nationalist militarist re-adaptations and 
reiterations.  
 
Therefore, this thesis argues that we need to challenge the understanding that 
masculinity in nationalist militarist societies is an issue that exclusively relates to male 
conscription and armed conflict. Further, it argues that masculinity is a contingent part of 
a wider and deeper masculinist discourse, which includes the mobilisation of exclusive 
male callings, shaping certain roles for women as well. While this co-constituency could 
also be embodied by the state, it has been argued that it penetrates and represents the 
stance of the given post-armed conflict society as a masculinist uniform body that 
resists feminisation.  
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8.5. Changing identities: in-between ‘I do not forget’ and a new ‘I struggle’  
The findings of the research clearly outlined a broad public criticism towards declining 
motivation to serve the army; a continuing public support for a potent army (semi or fully 
professional force), which would defend against ‘occupation’ and a public resistance 
towards crossing the border. Yet, these findings brought to the surface a certain 
paradox within the accounts of my interviewees’ as they were articulating two poles of 
reference: a) a broadly shared understanding, and in some cases personal compliance, 
of the weakening of post-war nationalist, militarist and masculinist ideals in the national 
struggle and b) the criticism of these broader shifts’ and continuing adherence to them. 
This, in turn, formulates three main questions: firstly, how has the ideological ‘common-
sense’ expectation of male military conscription been maintained given that the broader 
social acceptance of G.C. masculinity has shifted towards a transnational 
entrepreneurial masculinity? Secondly, how has the ontological security tied to the army 
as a defensive unit against ‘occupation’ been maintained when my interviewees’ 
accounts clearly illustrate that the accession of Cyprus to the EU has led to a new 
ontological security that a potential military offensive by Turkey is now impossible? 
Thirdly, in the new understanding of the national struggle through EU pressures on 
Turkey: a) how could the reluctance and resistance to cross the border have been 
understood as fighting the perceived undermining of the ‘fighting spirit’? b) how has the 
militarist form of the struggle continued to be supported as ‘necessary’? 
Broadly speaking, the post-opening of the borders Cypriot situation creates a paradox of 
accepting, in the face of the EU, a new protective power that also acts as a form or path 
of ‘struggle’, still keeping the identity of a ‘struggling’ G.C. community. Indeed, the so 
created paradox has an important role to play in readapting notions of nationalism, 
militarism and masculinity against ‘occupation’. I illustrated that masculinity is readapted 
to incorporate the individualistic Western entrepreneur; nationalism is now providing 
space for EU interventions; militarism is now expressed through the support for the 
professionalisation of the force and military coalitions with foreign military powers. 
These three overlap and co-constitute themselves. They are conditional, contingent 
parts of an adapted reiteration of the co-constitutive relationship of nationalism, 
militarism and masculinity against ‘occupation’. 
292 
 
 
Therefore, I argue that, through the adapted reiteration of this co-constitution, the 
broader G.C. stance in the post-opening of the borders can be explained. Central to this 
argument has been the role of masculinity as a broader discourse in post-armed conflict 
societies. Nationalist military masculinity is an adaptive discourse. What is most central 
here is that nationalist military masculinity contributes to the sustenance of the 
unresolved conflict by constructing a masculinist post-armed conflict culture that fights 
and resists perceived feminisation of certain ‘positions of power’. The significance of it 
rests in that it re-adapts in fighting feminisation under new social and political 
parameters, even in times when there might not be an immediate security threat, or 
when the perceived threat has, for some reason, been undermined.  
This thesis has examined the way in which this re-constitution constructs new 
ideological borders that have now replaced the previously closed un-crossable ones. 
These ideological borders result in crossings that have been viewed by the larger G.C. 
community as a defeat and, thus, feminisation of the national struggle, whereas not 
crossing is an expression of pride that the ‘fighting spirit’ is sustained. As such, to not 
cross is to maintain a perceived position of power in the conflict situation. These 
observations appear to confirm Cockburn’s (2004) and Hadjipavlou’s (2010) comment 
that the stakes of the conflict have been constituted in masculine terms.  
Another case through which we can see the adaptive working of nationalist military 
masculinity is that the weakening of the ideology of defence has affected the continuous 
support for the existence of a potent army and calls for its change into a semi or fully 
professional force. This is a re-adaptation that directly relates to maintaining a perceived 
position of power against ‘occupation’. This is also evident in that in the face of the 
changing civil-military relations exerting public pressure on the state to proffesionalise 
the force, the state then proceeded to illustrate to the public that the military frame of the 
national struggle continues on, whilst also showing a clear intention to take up complete 
responsibility of ‘defence’.  
What is most significant about the above outlined adaptive workings of this G.C. 
masculinist nationalist militarist stance is that it creates obstacles for reconciliation. The 
G.C. discursive understanding of the conflict situation as ‘occupation’, a discourse that 
continues to be discursively and symbolically anchored through the specific 
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representation of mothers and wives of the missing persons, is contingent to this G.C. 
nationalist, militarist masculinist stance with its re-adaptations. Thus, the relationship 
between them is manifested in the material and symbolic ideological existence of the 
border. As such, this relationship between them intrinsically projects the image of post-
war Cyprus to the international community as a victim suffering from ‘occupation’, and 
therefore the appeal for support for liberation from it. This binary position of power, that 
is used to appeal for the support of the international community, inhibits the creation of 
mutual understanding of the traumas of both communities and restricts the creation of a 
vision of the future that extends outside of the discourse of ‘occupation’ to a solution 
that will serve the interest of both communities.  
As mentioned above, although the three elements characterising the readapted post-
war Cypriot society are co-constitutive, they are very much weakened independently. 
This is what the fifth theme addresses. This looks at the newly created ultra-nationalist 
political parties and political youth groups, which have been formed following the 
opening of the borders. I analyse these phenomena as a discursive response to the 
process of the weakening post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and 
masculinity. As illustrated in the empirical chapters, the role of the government in the 
national struggle, particularly defence policy and negotiations, and the fading ‘fighting 
spirit’ in the community are perceived by these groups as submissive and effeminate 
postures. The argument that these parties continue to embody, evoke and thus reiterate 
this post-war pre-opening of the borders co-constitution was demonstrated clearly by 
comparing these accounts with the ones of the broader public. These parties and 
groups were created as a disagreement to the re-adaptation of this co-constitution.  
The demand for the closure of the borders precisely and integrally relates to this non-re-
adaptation of these groups’ position under the new parameters discussed in this thesis. 
The refusal to accept the open borders allows them to continue mobilizing their 
nationalist, militarist masculinist position against the existence of a ‘should-be’ un-
crossable border. The re-production of this post-war stance allows them to continue 
mobilising the ‘existential threat’ and need for a ‘nation-in-arms’ contingent on a potent 
army, as well as discourses of heroism and collective virility as a defensive and 
offensive stance against the ‘occupation’ forces.  
294 
 
 
Moreover, their understanding of the armed part of the struggle extends beyond the 
mostly shared understanding of the public, to fortifying the NG, which should perform 
not only a defensive but also an offensive role. In this understanding, the revival of the 
Single Area Defence Doctrine was expressed by them to be integral to the reiteration of 
the post-war position assertion. In this understanding of the national struggle, they 
support the reconstruction of the unified mono-ethnic community of a ‘Greece of Greek 
Christians’ that will ‘not forget’, predicated on the collective national ‘I struggle’. This 
understanding of the need for such community goes further than the public’s criticism of 
the adoption of an individualist self-interested attitude, because it directly links to their 
support of a society that produces the militarist and heroic types of masculinity, and, by 
extension, men that will sacrifice themselves for the community’s interest, namely, the 
national struggle.  
While they perceive the role of the state of the ROC in the national struggle as 
submissive, they directly oppose its existence and appear to have formed their own 
groups of militants. Their opposition to the state, their groups of militants, and the 
embodiment and performativity of certain discourses of neo-Nazi masculinity show that 
their reversion back to the post-war stance towards the ‘occupation’ has been fused 
with neo-Nazi and junta-phile ideological elements. These remarks appear to confirm 
Passmore’s (2003: 171) observation that men who subscribed to ultra-nationalist ideas 
in France embodied the notion of virile ‘true men’ who would restore the nation to glory 
and prominence through heroism and bravery, also applicable to the ultra-nationalist 
parties in Cyprus.  
 
8.6. Future Research 
The findings of this thesis provide a natural guide for further research. The masculinist 
discourses articulated by my participants in relation to the post-armed conflict situation 
did not relate exclusively to the actual role of men in the conflict and military 
conscription itself, but to a broader support of a masculinist, nationalist militarist posture 
of the community in the conflict situation. Nationalist military masculinity could also be 
applied to Northern Ireland, Israel, Palestine, South Korea or to post-armed conflict 
societies more generally. For example, Kwon (2010) provided an analysis of the 
persistence of a culture of militarism in South Korea through the gendering of 
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conscription. Extending that further, the role of masculinity here should be understood to 
go beyond the actual role of men as soldiers towards South Korean nationalist military 
masculinity co-constituting nationalism and militarism. This approach could lead to a 
finding that the mobilisation of South Korean masculinist nationalist militarism projected 
against North Korea is a discourse that fights feminisation from a South Korean position 
of power, in a post-armed conflict situation.  
Furthermore, this thesis provides a strong foundation on which the implications of the 
finding of natural gas resources for the politics of the conflict and reconciliation and the 
developments in the role of the military that took place after the fieldwork was 
conducted (e.g.) could be explored in future research. The recent events that followed 
the finding of gas in the Cypriot territorial waters call the significance of continuing to 
address the re-adaptive workings of this co-constitutive relationship in relation to the 
imagination (Anderson, 19 3) of the future of ‘occupation’. The territorial border in the 
sea between the ‘free’ and ‘occupied’ areas of Cyprus is another border created through 
the re-adaptation of this stance. Indeed, the role of political machismo in the dispute 
over the exercise of sovereignty of the gas findings has already began to be recognized 
as an issue that needs to be addressed (see Constantinou, 2011). The thesis, therefore, 
provides a robust ground for understanding how the re-adaptation of this co-constitutive 
stance under political and social developments creates new borders against which it 
becomes further mobilised.  
The discovery of gas in Cypriot territorial waters in a time of economic crisis is 
presented today as the primary avenue for the future economic resuscitation of Cyprus 
(see Xrisolora – Χρυσολωρά (2013). The drillings have already sparked military 
confrontations with Turkey around the gas extraction, which opposes any sole G.C. 
legitimacy over the gas. With Turkish military threats over Cyprus’ natural gas ventures, 
repeated announcements from Ankara that the search for gas in Cyprus EEZ will 
commence (see Antoniou, 2012), and some already taking place (see Proto Thema, 
2013), Cyprus entered a process of upgrading its geostrategic power by creating 
alliances with stronger military powers to provide an armed deterrent force against 
Turkey and, thus, to secure sovereignty over the gas (see Bimbitisihs, 2013). These 
geopolitical and military tensions have promptly become formative in the adapted 
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reiteration of nationalism, militarism and masculinity discussed in this thesis that now 
extends as it manifests in the Cyprus territorial waters.  
Crucially Cyprus is forming strategic military coalitions that currently show a strong 
military presence in the Cyprus EEZ (see Sigma Live, 2013b), and as projected by the 
Ministry of Defence, the NG begins again to acquire a central role in the politics of the 
conflict situation (see Phileleftheros, 2013b). Certain procurement programs have 
commenced that are aiming to provide a deterrent force against Turkish threats in the 
Cyprus EEZ (see H Kathmerini, 2013). What is important here is also that, through this 
re-adapted position, the ROC is again appealing to the international community for its 
support against Turkey, this time to report the invasion of the Cyprus EEZ.  
There are various questions that further research should address in relation to the 
defence position over the new gas drillings on the foundation provided by this thesis. In 
this thesis, I argued of a re-adapted iteration of the nationalist, masculinist military 
stance in the public position of defence. Meanwhile questions about the public position 
on trading-off reconciliation and economic prosperity should also be looked at through a 
gender lens. A key question for such research would be: how a new defence policy, 
including new defence coalition agreements, informs the re-adapted co-constitution of 
nationalism, militarism and masculinity and what are the implications of this for the 
relationship between Turkey and Cyprus, the relationship between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots and prospects for reconciliation?  
This thesis provides a solid basis for exploring the issues raised by the above question. 
It has illustrated that a re-adapted co-constitution of this relationship has led to the 
replacement of the previously un-crossable border with an ideological one that assists 
the sustenance of a G.C. position of power in the conflict situation. Following these 
developments, there seems to also be a new border that shifts the central border 
against which it predominantly manifests itself, from being staged on an open inland 
border to the sea territorial borders. These territorial borders in the sea did not 
previously acquire such national significance for G.Cs in the conflict situation.  
A hypothesis is that the newly created significance of these borders in the re-adapted 
G.C. co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity contributes to further 
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consolidating the G.C. position of power and rightfulness in the conflict situation and 
thus creates further obstacles for reconciliation: 
a) As they could lead to stronger assimilation policies from Turkey in the North of 
Cyprus 
b) They could create further distrust between the two main communities and thus 
further separation between them.  
 
This could be tested by doing further research. These findings motivate me, and 
hopefully others, to work within academic and policy institutions in Cyprus to raise 
awareness of what remains to be done.  
8.7. Concluding thoughts  
This thesis has provided an analysis of the ways in which G.C. nationalism, militarism 
and masculinity are co-constituted in the post-2003 armed conflict Cyprus situation, as 
well as of how this relationship can re-adapt under new social and political parameters 
in such ways that maintain the sense of the community’s masculinist, nationalist 
militarist position of power in the post-armed conflict situation. By deepening the 
understanding of the stakes of masculinity in, and implications for, nationalism and 
militarism in the post-opening of the borders Cypriot society we understand that what 
appears at first sight as a solidly nationalist or militarist expression, such as the 
resistance to cross the border and the continuous support for the existence of a potent 
army, does in fact specifically relate to the contingency of nationalist militarised 
masculinity in the co-constitution of this three-fold relationship that fights feminisation to 
withstand a perceived position of power in the conflict situation against ‘occupation’.  
Therefore, by understanding the role of masculinity in the post-2003 situation we 
understand also its implications for the political developments of the conflict. Hence, we 
come to understand that the newly designed governmental policy of gradually 
abolishing conscription and the continuing public support for a potent army that calls for 
the proffesionalisation of the force reveal the contingency of masculinity in the perceived 
‘position of power’ that conditions the political and public debates over the future of the 
NG.  
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Moreover, with the understanding that certain G.C. constructions of masculinity make-
up the resistance of perceptually feminising the collective ‘positions of power’, we learn 
that the obstacles preventing the conduct of meaningful negotiations for reconciliation 
specifically relate to masculinist, nationalist and militarist adapted reiterations of 
assertions of ‘power’ and jurisdiction over the whole of Cyprus. We may also learn to 
design a solution plan that will serve the interest of both communities, to overcome the 
conflict culture to construct a new one that will be based on a shared vision of the future.  
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Appendixes:  
Appendix 1: Access Letter to the National Guard  
The National Guard provided a letter confirming that I had been granted access into the force for 
fieldwork research. However, this letter has been now removed from here due to confidentiality reasons.  
 
Appendix 2: Consent Form for Soldiers or Officers 
This consent form has been translated from Greek so that readers know what the consent form said.  
Dear Officer/Soldier of the National Guard,  
 
This research that you are willing to take part in, is for my Dotorate.  
Any information and accounts you might offer will be used only for the purposes 
of the aforementioned purpose.  
 
Your participation to this research is voluntary and you are allowed to bring the 
interview to an end at any point, if you may wish.  
 
The interview is anonymous and any opinions offered will not be linked to your 
name.  
 
In signing this document, you accept that you have been informed and agree with 
all the above.  
 
Thank you for your participation to this research.  
 
 
Stratis Efthymiou 
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Appendix 3: The Economic Miracle of post-war Cyprus   
The consequences of the invasion were devastating for the economy of the Republic of 
Cyprus. The Turkish invasion in 1974 resulted in around 37% of Cypriot territory under 
occupation thereafter which had an immediate effect on the GDP. The GDP received a 
dramatic shock and, as Kollias, Naxakis & Zarangas (2004: 301) inform us, fell in real 
terms by 16.9% in 1974 and 19% in 1975. However, the Cypriot economy shortly after 
the war events recovered with growth rates of 18% and 15.8% in 1976 and 1977 
respectively and exhibited some comparatively high and steady growth rates that, in the 
1976 to 2000, period averaged around 5.5% (Gergakopoulos, 1999; Kammas, 1992). 
Since 2012 Cyprus has entered a financial crisis.  
 
 
Appendix 4: Photos of the Mothers of the Missing Persons  
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Appendix 5: Maternal post-war Cyprus expressed through literature and poetry 
For example, the popular post-war Cyprus song ‘waiting day and night’ - ‘Καρτερούμεν 
μέρα νύχτα’:  
 
“We are waiting days and nights  
for a wind to blow 
in this land that has been burnt 
and it's never cool (δροσιά) (we never get relief)  
 
We are waiting days and nights 
for the light of that day 
that will bring to everyone 
coolness (relief) and an end (an end to the pain of the occupation)”.  
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Appendix 6: Financial resources invested in ‘defence’  
The Republic Of Cyprus has, since the partition of the island, spent a considerable 
proportion of its GDP on military expenditure with 1991 being the peak at 9.1 %. Kollias, 
Naxakis & Zarangas (2004: 300) inform us in “the pre-1974 period, defense spending as 
a share of GDP averaged 1.7% during 1964–74, 1.8% during 1975–86 and 3.9% during 
1987–99”. The 1990s overall was a decade where Cyprus had consistently spent a 
noteworthy percentage of its GDP on defence, (see: also World Bank Military 
Expenditures). 
Appendix 7: Defence Tax 
G.C.s living in Cyprus pay ‘defence tax’ in most of their financial transactions. In Cyprus 
there is a special defence levy called the ‘Special Contribution for defence tax’, based 
on the Special Contribution for defence law (Number 117(Ι)/2002). This law provides 
that any income is subject to a special contribution for defence (including dividends, 
interest and rents, where the entire taxable income is subject to a special levy), (see: 
Cyprus Inland Revenue Department).  
 
Appendix 8: Single Area Defence Doctrine  
The Single Area Defence Doctrine was a pivotal turn in the direction of Cyprus post-war 
defence ideology but also policy that constituted the idea of the defence of Cyprus in 
many ways as synonymous to it. A military attack by Turkey in the area of the Cyprus 
and Greek states would have solicited a cooperative joint reaction from both armies. 
The NG under the discussed defence union, during this period, is modernised, equipped 
and creates infrastructures to accommodate specific military forces of the Greek Armed 
Forces, including naval bases and it’s first and only military airport. Defence spending 
between 1987-99 rises significantly to 3.9% of GDP when compared to the previous period: 1.8% 
during 1975-86, with noteworthy amounts spent on defence especially between 1990-2 with an 
average of about 8% (exactly 7.93%) of GDP. This change in defence policy is also reflected by 
the sharp rise of arms imports during the 1987- 1997 period (see: UN military expenditure data). 
In this period, the Global Militarisation Index (GMI) ranked Cyprus for most years as the 3rd 
most militarised country in the world. 
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Appendix 9: Picture of ‘Attila’s boot’ 
 
 
 
Appendix 10: 2011 Law on draft dodging and conscientious objectors  
On the 1st of November 2011 the Cypriot Parliament voted a new legislative plan aiming 
at dealing with the phenomenon of draft dodging in the force. The National Guard Law 
(2011) provides stricter measures for those who choose not to enlist: detainment of the 
right to vote between other citizenship restrictions.  The given law poses great 
difficulties if one is to attempt to evade his service, with strict laws on conscription and 
the introduction of community or civil service as an alternative to the military service. 
The introduction of alternative service was a key policy as in the past soldiers 
diagnosed as unable to perform their military duties due to health related issues were 
after a certain process usually exempt from their military service. Further, to those that 
due to health issues are granted temporary exception from service strict diagnostic 
processes and several restrictions are provided. Noteworthy is that the National Guard 
Law (2011) provides systematic and frequent check-ups of the given condition until the 
age of 30. Given that conscription is enforced between the ages of 18-20, the above-
mentioned period is for 12 years.  
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Under the discussed Law conscientious objectors and reserve conscientious objectors 
who refuse to serve their military obligations to the NG serve alternative military service 
or alternative civilian service. Conscientious objectors have historically been an issue in 
Cyprus due to most conscientious objectors coming from religious segments and 
communities of the island, such as Jehovah’s Witness. Conscientious objectors under 
the 2011 Law on the National Guard serve either thirty-three months’ unarmed service 
in the army or thirty-eight months’ community work (when military service today is 24 
months). In the same way, soldiers who have served alternative military or civil service 
have an obligation to serve alternative reserve service.  
 
Interestingly, another new policy was to expand the concept of who is to serve in the 
NG. Previously, all males who have a father of Cypriot origin were called to conscript, 
now, after the implementation of the 2011 law, also those whose mothers are Cypriot 
but not their fathers qualify for conscription.  From 2008 onwards, all men belonging to 
the religious groups of Armenians, Latins and Maronites, the main ethnic minorities of 
Cyprus who were in the past exempt and could serve voluntarily, have to serve. 
 
Appendix 11: Motorcyclists’ March  
The Motorcyclists’ March march was organized by the Motorcyclists’ Federation of 
Cyprus and was an effort to bring a cross party-line presence to the Green Line and to 
voice a patriotic statement from a group of men who are usually perceived as hooligans. 
The ultimate goal of the march that began on the 2nd of August in Berlin was to end in 
Kerynia (a city in northern Cyprus), and thus to cross the border using peaceful means. 
The motto of the march was "Liberation is the Only Solution".  
Tasos Isaak, the first G.C. to die, was caught in the barbed wire in the UN-controlled 
buffer zone and was beaten to death by a group of Grey Wolves (Grey Wolves is a 
Turkish ultra-nationalist organization). The second Greek Cypriot, Solomos Solomou, 
was a cousin of Isaak who took part in a demonstration after Isaak’s funeral and entered 
the buffer zone. He was shot dead whilst climbing a Turkish flag-pole to remove the 
Turkish flag.  
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Appendix 12: Songs dedicated to Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou  
Dionysis Savvopoulos dedicated Odi to Georgio  Karaiskaki, Dimitris  Mitropanos 
and Thanos Mikroutsikos  dedicated Panta gelastoi  and  Stelios Rokkos  dedicated Gia 
to Solomo Solomou. 
 
The 2009 Notis Sfakianakis (In Greek: Νότης Σφακιανάκης), who is a popular Greek 
artist,  song, Itan Trellos from the album Matomeno Dakry directly deals with Solomou's 
death and the on-going Turkish ‘occupation’ of Cyprus (see  Sfakianakis, 2009). This is a 
clear representation of the interrelationship of the discourse of ‘occupation’ with certain 
ideals of heroism: 
 
My brother, you became heartache, 
how much courage can I put in just a song? 
Be my flag and come with me, 
help me draw away the ones who are a bother to me. 
He danced as death’s bow strikes dressed in black, 
he’s so tough that he didn’t even care leaving. 
 
Appendix 13 Consent Form  
 
Consent Form  
 
The purpose of the study is to examine nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-
2003 Cyprus. I am interested in understanding how G.C.’s understand notions 
associated to these three following the opening of the borders and the accession of the 
country to the EU. While there are no direct benefits to the participants, it is intended 
that the findings will contribute to knowledge production and policy design. There are no 
risks involved in participating in this study.  
 
Participation consists of one interview, lasting approximately one-hour. This interview 
will be audio tabbed, unless otherwise requested by the participant. Privacy will be 
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ensured through confidentiality. Participation is voluntary and the interviewee has the 
right to terminate the interview at any time.  
 
 
Signature of the Interviewee  
 
 
 
Signature of the Interviewer 
 
 
Appendix 14 Sample of Interview Agenda  
Sample of Interview Agenda  
 How old are you?  
 Where are you from (city?)? 
 Tell me a bit about growing up in ...  
 Who was in your family (brothers, sisters, grandparents)?  
 What is your profession? / What is your parent’s profession?  
 Did you grow up with your grandparents? Are you close to them?  
 Refugees? (parents/ grandparents) 
 Have your parents had a personal experience of the war? Did your father fought in the war?  
 Are they missing persons in your family?  
 
Key words:  
 What do you think makes a Greek-Cypriot?  
-Greek-Cypriot VS Cypriot  VS Turks? Or Turkish Cypriot …. 
-So who are the Turks for you? Who are Turkish Cypriots? 
 Family, national identity--- ways celebrated (ways to open it importance of nationalistic history in 
the family, national celebrations) --- how were these things in the family? Discussed about heroes? 
The war? Liberation movement?  
 Can you tell me ….. Family, national identity--- ways celebrated (ways to open it importance of 
nationalistic history in the family, national celebrations) --- how were these things in the family? 
Discussed about heroes? The war? Liberation movement?  
 Were they any missing persons in your family? Who? How did they become missing? What were 
the situation/ story? How was growing up in a family with a missing person? Did you discuss it at 
home? 
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-      Where they any national holidays and national celebrations were this person was more 
remembered and grieved in the family?  
-    Do your family belong to an organisation related to missing persons 
o In what ways do you believe one should care and provide for his/ her nation? 
o Have you ever crossed the border? Do you cross often? 
o Have you/ do you cross with your family?  
o Have you visited your house on the North (if parents refugees)?  
o How did you feel? 
o How did your parents feel? 
o Have you met any Turkish Cypriots since the opening of the border? Were North/S 
   --- ‘I do not forget’ and border crossing  
 
Soldiers 
o How was the experience of serving your military service?  
o What role (job) did you have in the military? Did you serve (guarded) on the Green Line?  
o Was this an important experience for you? 
What made you serve your military service and not find a way to avoid it? 
o How would your parents have felt if you were to not complete your national service?  
o Important step in the life of a man- in your life? You know the common Cypriot saying ‘boys 
become men in the military’, how do you feel in relation to that now that you are serving/ have served 
the military? 
o Military friendships …. 
o Are soldiers treated well by the military?  
 
 
Not serve as soldiers IMPORTANT say that I did not do it either: 
 
 How did you feel about not completing your national service?  
 What made you decide not to do/ complete your military service? 
      Did your parents support your decision?  
 How were you treated through the process of getting out of the army?  
- Did military officers/ your captain tried to convince you to stay? In what ways?  
  How did you feel about saying to people that you did not complete it?  
Defence spending: Introduce by saying Economic crisis, influencing people, influencing Cyprus, 
especially in the last year.  
 Tell me what you thing about the size of the army?  
 Does the existence of the military make you feel safer as a Greek-Cypriot? 
 Clearly we are spending an important proportion of our Gross National Income (GNI) on the 
military as well as an important proportion of human capital. How do you feel about this? Do you 
consider this necessary?   
 Why would one spend so much money on an army that could not possibly defeat the enemy?  
 We are not suffering! We do not live under the threat of violence or war– should we be cutting 
down on defence? 
 On South site- great post-war economic propensity. Do you think that this economic privilege 
should be partially, yet at a very important proportion, spend on the military? Or use it to have 
better schools etc? 
 
 
Masculinity  
 How would you describe the successful Greek- Cypriot man? (money, nation- duty, family) 
 How do you understand you father as man?  
- Is he a man you look up to?  
 What would make your father feel proud about you (check for economic success)?  
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 What about the national issue? Are the best men the ones which are currently devoted in serving 
their country? 
 How are men who are active politically in relation to the Cyprus conflict perceived? 
 What about politicians? Do you value them as men, since they work and provide towards justice 
to Greek-Cypriots? -     None president or important political figure (which all have been men) 
has succeeded in solving the national problem. How are they to be perceived as men?  
 How do you feel about Greek-Cypriot heroes? For example the heroes of liberation, heroes of 
the war in 1974?- What type of men were they? Makarios? 
 Who is for you Issac and Solomou today? 
 IS there the possibility of modern heroes today? 
- What exactly does it mean for you? 
 Christofias also shed tears in his interview with Elita Michaelidou at SIGMAs television program: 
Με την Ελίτα. How do you understand that two Presidents of Cyprus cried on TV? 
 Do you feel like forgetting? Would you like your children as well to grow up with ‘I do not forget’?  
 How do understand that Papadopoulos cried in his speech on saying ‘No’ to the Annan Plan? 
 How do you feel in relation the mothers of the missing persons? 
 How felt in relation to ‘I do not forget’ past- military years- Now …. 
 What do you think ‘I do not forget’ really stand for?  
- How did you feel about them while serving the military?  
 What type of men are Turks? What type of soldiers are Turks? T.C.? different G.C? 
 
Future (last questions) 
 Where do you think we should heading towards as a nation?  
 Shall we learn from the past (i.e. past mistakes)?  
o What type of men do you think young Greek-Cypriots are today? How do you feel in relation to 
this?  
 Is this the type of men we need? (i.e. as a society are we producing the type of men we need)?  
 How do you feel about the future of Turkish Cypriots? Where are they located in your 
imagination of the future?  
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Appendix 15 Sample of Nvivo Code  
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